

Elements of
**POLITICAL
GEOGRAPHY**

SECOND EDITION

Samuel Van Valkenburg

CLARK UNIVERSITY

Carl L. Stotz

Francis **DARCY CARVALHO** *Stotz*

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Preface

THIS BOOK IS ADDRESSED TO PEOPLE interested in world affairs, a group that may well include all thoughtful Americans. Today it is more important than ever before for Americans to know about the world, its geographical and political structure, and its problems, for they are members of the nation that has been forced by history into the leadership of the world.

To a great extent this book is factual, but it also deals with principles, ideas, and interpretations. Its purpose is to lay a groundwork for a clear, broad understanding of world problems as a basis for further and more detailed reading in the field.

World affairs have moved so rapidly since 1939, when the first edition of *Elements of Political Geography* was published, that an almost completely new book has become necessary. The present volume, therefore, is not merely a second edition of the earlier one; it is a new work that takes into account the staggering changes of the Second World War and the first years of the post-war period.

Political geography is a dynamic subject. It changes constantly in detail. No book written on such a subject can be kept completely up to date, even through new editions every few years. It is up to the reader to remain alert to what is happening in the world, watching and evaluating the shifting weight of all the factors. He will profit much from reading the source material suggested in the bibliography. He will find frequent reference to an atlas, as he reads this book, an indispensable aid to full understanding.

It is the hope of the authors that this volume will stimulate

readers to the vital interest in world events so urgently needed in these times.

The authors wish to express their thanks to Marion Henderson, reference librarian of Clark University, for her invaluable assistance in finding source material; to Jameson D. MacFarland and John R. Dunkle, students of the senior author, for making the maps; to Mrs. Mary O'Malley for her typing; and especially to Stella Bloch Hanau for editorial work. They are also indebted to Dr. Stephen Jones for his critical reading of the manuscript and to Dr. David Winslow for his editorial corrections.

SAMUEL VAN VALKENBURG
CARL L. STOTZ

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
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
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
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
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Part One

THE POLITICAL WORLD

The Field of Political Geography

AS THE NAME IMPLIES, POLITICAL geography is concerned with the geography of political units. These units vary widely in size and type, ranging from cities, communities, counties, and similar national subdivisions to small nations and giant world powers. In this book the frame of reference is nations and not their subdivisions. Geographic and political units are in some instances identical. For example, the Commonwealth of Australia covers an entire continent (including Tasmania on the continental shelf), and in some island states—such as Great Britain, Japan, and Cuba—the geographic and political units coincide. In general, however, political units are partly or entirely bordered by man-made boundaries. These often had no geographic foundation, but they became significant, geographically, because their existence influenced the culture and activities of the people involved.

Political geography is also concerned with the interplay between nations, insofar as geography influences it, and with the evaluation of areas of dispute or so-called trouble zones. It must be stressed that not only the geographer, but also the historian, the economist, the specialist in international relations, and the specialists in many other disciplines are called upon to study such problems. Geography, because of its content, is an integral part of any such study.

Several different approaches may be used in presenting the subject matter of political geography. One is a factual study of the world, nation by nation, as has been done in the excellent but now outdated volume by Isaiah Bowman, *The New World*, and a number of other books organized along the same lines. Another

is the more philosophical approach exemplified by Derwent Whittlesey in *The Earth and the State* and by Richard Hartshorne in various articles. A third approach is the one used in this book: it breaks down the general field of political geography into its various elements—the physical, the economic, and the human. This approach, the authors hold, has a twofold advantage. It presents factual information which is essential for any understanding of world problems and it provides the foundation for more advanced studies.

A specific example will be helpful in clarifying this general statement on the approach to political geography used in this book.

AN EVALUATION OF SWITZERLAND

Switzerland, as far as its territorial extension is concerned, is entirely man-made, although most of its boundaries are based on physical features, such as mountains, rivers, and lakes. The boundaries are not lines of logical separation for beyond them occur the same terrain, the same languages, and the same religions. Within the nation there is no ethnographic unity. Four languages are officially recognized and the pattern of religion—Protestant and Catholic—is a most complex one. One might say that Switzerland is entirely artificial in its structure. No one called upon to draw geographical divisions upon an unmarked map of Europe would think of an area corresponding to what is now called Switzerland. Nevertheless, there is a Switzerland and Swiss citizens have a strong national feeling, independent of language or creed. In fact, it is one of the best examples of a small but strong political unit. What is the reason for this seeming paradox?

Switzerland is not all mountains. Between the high Alps to the south and the less high but rather definite ranges of the Jura to the north, stretches the Swiss Plateau with its rolling surfaces of rounded hills and broad valleys dotted by many lakes. Man lived here in the interglacial period and the remnants of pole dwellings along some of the lakes are evidence of a fairly advanced culture more than 50 centuries ago. When the Romans under Julius Caesar moved in, they found a mainly Celtic people related to the Galliers to the west, and in the eastern mountains Rhaetians,

who have survived up till now in their mountain isolation and speak Rhaeto-Roman, a language supposedly older than Latin itself. At that time the control of what is now called Switzerland meant the control of the passes through which Roman roads led from the Po River Basin to Central Europe. With the decline of the Roman Empire, Germanic tribes, such as the Alemans and Burgundians, occupied this territory, and the present population is the result of their mixing with the Celts. The present line between French and German language areas—a line that has shifted very little since it came into existence—marks the separation between the part where Germanic culture prevailed and the other part which, in spite of Germanic influence, remained essentially Latin.

In the earlier periods of the Middle Ages, cultural development was very much the same as in the surrounding countries, namely, the feudal system with its dominance of nobility and clergy. Politically, the territory gradually came under the Hapsburgs, who became identified with the Austrian state. Neither the individualistic mountain population, nor the cities that had grown up in the Swiss Plateau at the crossings of trade roads, were, in the long run, willing to accept foreign rule. It was around the shores of the Lake of Lucerne (the Swiss call it the lake of the four forest cantons) that the first step toward independence was taken in the last decade of the thirteenth century, and the small political units united in their desire for freedom. The lake served as a link between them and is still considered as the national core of the Swiss state. Soon afterwards the nearby cities, such as Lucerne, Zurich, and Bern, joined the federation and gave it the power it needed. The federation continued to grow and at the beginning of the sixteenth century it had acquired substantially the shape of the present Swiss state. Control of the passes, especially of the St. Gotthard Pass, gave it more than local significance. Military successes against the Hapsburgs and Burgundians, as well as against the rulers of northern Italy, made greater power seem possible. In 1515, however, the crushing defeat of Marignano ended the Swiss dream of further expansion. From then on the Swiss federation was limited to the rather small territory it now occupies.

The loose character of the federation made it possible for dif-

ferent languages—German, French (in the western part), Rhaeto-Roman (in the east) and Italian in the conquered territory south of the Alps—to be used without conflict. Even the complex religious structure after the reformation did not destroy the federation and Protestant and Catholic cantons continued to cooperate instead of fighting each other as was the case in other parts of Europe. The desire for freedom—only possible through cooperation—prevailed over any quarrels which might have arisen. The only real trouble occurred in the nineteenth century when the Swiss federation, reborn after a French intermission during the Napoleonic period, changed from a loose structure into a tighter one with more power given to the central government. This led to a civil war in which seven Catholic cantons tried to secede. The present state still gives a great deal of freedom to the individual cantons (there are 22 of them); Geneva, for instance, still calls itself proudly “La République de Genève.”

The question now occurs, how could this small nation, surrounded by great powers and with great physical handicaps, grow up into the most prosperous country of Europe and reach the highest level of western European culture? These handicaps were not only the result of topography—about two-thirds of the country is mountainous—but also of the Swiss climate with its rather severe winters and cool summers. Another disadvantage was the total absence of coal and mineral resources, regarded at the time of the industrial revolution as essential for progress. Here was a challenge which was met successfully because, again, it was a question of either succeeding or remaining a poor mountain state.

Approximately one quarter of the land is under crops, one quarter is forested, one quarter is grass and pasture land, and the remaining quarter is unproductive. Despite soils of low natural fertility, yields are high thanks to good husbandry and the plentiful use of fertilizers. Efforts to increase the inadequate production of cereals, especially under the impetus of the two World Wars which, to a large extent, cut down Swiss imports, have resulted in a 50 percent expansion of the acreage in grain during the last 25 years. Fruits and vegetables play an important part in Swiss economy and in canned form are well known in most

parts of the world. Condensed milk, cheese (the famous Gruyère), and such products as milk chocolate are exported.

Without coal or oil but with plenty of water power, the Swiss, through their ingenuity, have developed manufacturing that requires highly skilled workers. Switzerland is now one of the highly industrialized nations, with more than one-third of its working population employed in industry. Her specialized industrial exports emphasize quality, and range from watches to electric engines, from shoes to embroideries. Moreover, conscious of the fact that mountain scenery is liked by tourists, the Swiss are masters in the art of providing accommodations and advertising to attract tourists, both for summer and winter vacations. One might say that tourists are the chief Swiss crop, carefully planned and harvested. All these activities called for a well-developed transportation system, which the Swiss have provided; roads and railroads cross the high mountain passes, zigzagging over them or tunnelling through them.

Switzerland is a perfect example of a well-planned and well-executed economy, made possible by the characteristics of its people. A blend of many racial groups, strengthened later by numerous refugees, who sought asylum under the protection of the nation's tolerance and neutrality, the Swiss are highly efficient people, proud of their traditions and their democratic type of government which they protect by a well-equipped army and strong mountain fortifications. Handicaps of different languages and religions have gradually been turned into assets, a feat that is possible only when the cultural level is high. Swiss education, emblem of modern culture, has become an economic asset, attracting many foreign students and scientists.

The evaluation sketched above gives a general picture but not a complete one. For that, it is necessary to consider the country in relation to the outside world. Switzerland is a small country with a population of about 4,500,000, only one-half of that of metropolitan New York. The position of small nations such as Switzerland is rather precarious in a world of conflicting great powers.

Located in the heart of Europe, Switzerland's position as the keystone of part of the European transportation system is one of

the reasons why she remained unscathed in both World Wars (Figure 1). The preservation of this system was essential for the belligerents on *both* sides in these conflicts. Invasion would have resulted in the destruction by the Swiss of the major tunnels that connect central and southern Europe. Moreover, in case of war Switzerland faces the problem of obtaining the products she needs for her existence because, despite her care-




FIGURE 1. Switzerland as a European railroad center. (From Van Valkenburg and Held, *Europe*, 2nd ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1952.)

fully planned economy, she cannot be self-supporting. Her diplomatic policy must be adjusted to this situation, even if at times the result has been curtailment of freedom of action. The aspirations of her neighbors in periods of expansion also present problems. It was not always easy for Germany to understand that the German-speaking Swiss had no desire to espouse the cause of German "Lebensraum." Likewise, the Italians at times have regarded the Tessin, with its Italian-speaking population, as potentially part of Italy. The French during the Napoleonic period had similar ideas and occupied parts of what is called French

Switzerland (La Suisse Romande). Outsiders, without knowledge of the passionate love of the Swiss for their nation, have sometimes suggested that the complex political structure of Europe would be simplified by doing away with the state entirely and dividing it among her neighbors. All these matters the Swiss have in mind when they face the outside world and defend their right of a permanent neutrality without foreign entanglements.

This necessarily short evaluation of Switzerland as a state makes clear, nevertheless, how various elements can be integrated into a full picture. The elements are partly physical, partly economic, and partly human. All three are primarily geographic although at times they intrude into other fields, such as economics and history. By recognizing these elements and studying their interrelations, the political geographer performs an important task.

This book provides the tools with which that task can be done. The tools—geographic, economic, and human—are discussed in the following chapters on a world basis, as an introduction to the field of political geography. With this knowledge, and with the help of detailed source material such as maps, books, and statistical data pertinent to a specific area, the reader should be able to obtain a well-rounded political-geographical picture of any political unit. This is a challenge that can be met.

GEOPOLITICS

A word should be added in this chapter about "geopolitics," which came to the fore after World War I, and is generally associated with the Nazi period in Germany when it was popularized by Karl Haushofer and his followers. Even the founders of the concept had great difficulty in defining it. Essentially, geopolitics is political geography seen from a national point of view, with the result that it includes many elements that the scientifically objective geographer cannot accept as tenable. German geopolitics explained (or sought to justify) the German philosophy of national expansion and, as Isaiah Bowman once remarked, became in effect an apology for theft.¹ We have today so-called American geopolitics, which discusses world problems

¹ *Compass of the World*, eds., Hans W. Weigert and Vilhjalmur Stefansson (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944), p. 52.

from the straight American viewpoint of what is good or bad for the United States. It is not necessarily aggressive, but it carries within itself the danger inherent in seeing only one nation's point of view.

Geopolitics is not considered in this book because the authors are concerned only with elements which can be used constructively for all people. It is hoped that eventually all nations will realize that their own future depends on what happens in other parts of the world and that their own interests are best served in a world of peace and cooperation.

The Political Pattern of the World

TO KNOW THE WORLD POLITICAL map is the first task and essential duty of anyone interested in the field of political geography.¹ The intricate system of boundary lines often appears familiar to the student of world affairs who has studied political maps in geography and history classes, and makes frequent use of them in newspapers and magazines. A single political map shows only the situation of the moment. Numerous and frequent political boundary changes take place within the lifetime of any individual and the mental picture of the world's political pattern must be constantly revised, even though to do so requires time and effort. Beginners should guard against the tendency to underestimate the importance of a given boundary change merely because it involves a small area with a relatively strange or little known name.

In addition to knowing the political map of the world, it is also necessary to understand the origin of the political units and the changes that have taken place in them. For the most part, only the political changes of the first half of the present century are considered in this chapter. The reader should keep in mind that behind each political unit and its territorial and political changes lies a history which the peoples involved have not forgotten. Sometimes modern political claims are based on old and even ancient historical events. An example of the modern use of ancient events was Benito Mussolini's claim to the boundaries of ancient Rome

¹ In order to avoid making this chapter too long, the authors have included mainly factual information. For more details and for recent developments, the reader is referred to such publications as *The Statesman's Year-Book* (New York: The Macmillan Company) and *New International Year Book* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Company).

as his goal in the aggrandizement of Italian territory and his technique of reminding his people of former glory by placing political maps of ancient Rome in prominent places throughout Italy. A review of the political and territorial changes of the past fifty years will provide a basis for understanding the present political pattern of the world, and the changes leading up to its establishment.

A study of the changing political world points directly to the question of territorial stability and instability of nations. In the last half century the new or western world has been rather stable, with few and relatively unimportant changes. In contrast, the old or eastern world, which might have been expected long since to have settled down, has experienced so many changes that it is difficult to show them all on a map. The eastern world, where people struggle with varying degrees of success to attain their political aspirations, is the danger area. It is here that world peace constantly hangs in the balance and the bulk of today's world problems is concentrated. Upon the solution of these problems rests world peace and the future civilization for all men.

NORTH AMERICA

The political map of North America has undergone very few changes in the last fifty years. Only four nations—the United States, Canada, Denmark, and Mexico—occupy territory on the continent, and only the first three were involved in territorial changes. In 1927 a committee of the British Privy Council determined the boundary between Labrador, a dependency of Newfoundland, and Quebec, a province of Canada, and put that line on the watershed, much farther from the coast than had been generally shown before. In spite of the barren character of the land, this territory has great economic value because of the huge iron ore reserves, which through the decision, fell to Newfoundland. Quebec protested strongly but the problem lost its international character when in 1949 the Newfoundlanders voted to join the Dominion of Canada. France still owns the two small islands, St. Pierre and Miquelon off the southern coast of Newfoundland, occupied by a French fishing population. Remnants of a former French colonial empire in North America, they played their part

during the prohibition period as smuggling headquarters and were, during World War II, the source of considerable official diplomatic embarrassment to the United States when Free French forces took them away from Vichy France. Denmark gradually extended her control along the coasts of Greenland and in 1933 the International Court rendered a decision in favor of Denmark in a dispute with Norway over settlements along the eastern coast of Greenland. The United States has a 99-year lease on bases in Newfoundland and British Bermuda and, with the permission of the Danish government, has established air bases and weather stations in Greenland along the most direct air route between central United States to central and eastern Europe.

CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

In spite of the inner political instability of the Central American Republics, which formed themselves around core units of former Spanish control, few territorial changes have taken place in the last half century. The only major change came in 1903 when Panama seceded from the Great Columbian Federation and became an independent republic which in 1904 gave the United States the right to build the Panama Canal and to keep the so-called Canal Zone in perpetual lease. British Honduras is the only remnant of the former colonial period and here European control is strongly disputed by Guatemala, which claims the territory.

The political pattern of the Caribbean islands is very complex. Once completely Spanish, that country has been entirely pushed out, a process which started in the seventeenth century when England, France, Holland, and even Denmark were attracted by the economic value of the islands (at that time sugar was the major commercial crop) and was completed by the United States at the end of the nineteenth century when that nation took over Caribbean political leadership in her desire to protect the approaches to the Panama Canal. The present political map strongly reflects the historical background.

By 1900 Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic had attained the status of independent states. Puerto Rico, until 1952 under




FIGURE 2.

A—Independent

A-1 United States
A-2 Mexico
A-3 Guatemala
A-4 El Salvador
A-5 Honduras
A-6 Nicaragua
A-7 Costa Rica
A-8 Panama
A-9 Colombia
A-10 Venezuela
A-11 Brazil

A-12 Santo Domingo
A-13 Haiti
A-14 Cuba


B—British

B-1 Trinidad
B-2 Tobago
B-3 Grenada
B-4 St. Vincent
B-5 Barbados
B-6 St. Lucia
B-7 Dominica
B-8 Montserrat

B-9 Antigua
B-10 Barbuda
B-11 Nevis
B-12 St. Christopher
B-13 Anguilla
B-14 Sombrero
B-15 Virgin Islands
B-16 Turks Islands
B-17 Caicos Islands
B-18 Bahamas
B-19 Little Cayman
B-20 Grand Cayman

CARIBBEAN POLITICAL STATUS

0 100 200 300 MILES



B-21 Jamaica
B-22 British Honduras
B-23 British Guiana

C—Under Control of the U.S.
C-1 Swan Islands
C-2 Corn Islands
C-3 Canal Zone
C-4 Virgin Islands

C-5 Puerto Rico
C-6 Mona
C-7 Navassa
C-8 Guantánamo Bay

D—Netherlands
D-1 Aruba
D-2 Curaçao
D-3 Bonaire

D-4 St. Eustatius
D-5 Saba
D-6 St. Martin (half Netherlands,
half French)

E—French
E-1 Martinique
E-2 Guadeloupe

the direct control of the United States, during that year became a self-governing free commonwealth, associated with the United States.

The United States leased Guantanamo Bay from Cuba as a naval station in 1903 for an indefinite period. In 1917 the United States, afraid of German interference, purchased the western Virgin Islands—St. Thomas, St. John, and St. Croix—from Denmark and at the same time renounced to Denmark claims to the northwest coast of Greenland. United States' rights on Navassa Island, located between Haiti and Jamaica, and on the Swan Islands, north of the coast of Honduras, date from about the middle of the nineteenth century, at the time of the guano trade.

Great and Little Corn Islands, also called the Mangles Islands, were leased to the United States for 99 years by Nicaragua in 1914. Some of the islands to the east, such as the Serrano Bank, are used by the United States to aid navigation, although special fishing rights are held by the Republic of Colombia. As a result of an agreement with Great Britain during World War II, the so-called "destroyer deal," the United States has military bases on the Bahamas, Antigua, St. Lucia, Jamaica, and Trinidad, on a 99-year lease.

The British possessions in the Caribbean are divided into six groups: (1) Jamaica (including Turks Island south of the Bahamas); (2) Trinidad-Tobago; (3) the Bahamas; (4) Barbados; (5) the Leeward Islands of which Antigua, the eastern Virgin Island, and Barbuda are the most important; and (6) the Windward Islands, consisting of St. Vincent, St. Lucia, and Dominica.

In recent years efforts have been made to combine most of these possessions into a union which would also include British Honduras and British Guiana with dominion status as a final goal.

Three groups of islands make up the French possessions in the Caribbean: (1) Martinique, south of Dominica; (2) Guadeloupe and neighboring Marie Galante, north of Dominica; and (3) some small islands in the northern Antilles. Among these small islands are St. Barthélemy, purchased by France from Sweden, and the island of St. Martin which is owned half by France and half by the Netherlands. These islands are regarded by France

as Overseas Department and are represented in the French parliament.

Finally, the Dutch own the "A.B.C. Islands"—Aruba, Bonaire, and Curacao—off the coast of Venezuela, and Saba, St. Eustatius, and one half of St. Martin in the northern Antilles. Of these only Curacao and Aruba are important because of their refineries using Venezuelan crude oil. These islands at present belong to the Overseas Territories of the Netherlands and have self-government. Plans to give them, together with Surinam (Netherlands Guiana), a kind of dominion status were well under way in 1953.

SOUTH AMERICA

The political map of South America showing ten independent republics and the three colonies of the Guianas has been subjected to few changes since the overthrow of the Spanish and Portuguese colonial regime in the beginning of the nineteenth century. The new states were generally identical to the former colonial divisions which had expanded from their coastal or near-coastal core into the interior. A map of 1830 for instance represents, but for a few later changes, the present political picture. Efforts made by the famous liberator Simon Bolivar to establish political unity have proved unsuccessful. Boundaries, which in most cases go back to the colonial times, were rather ill defined, drawn in areas unoccupied by white settlers and much later caused problems when settlements advanced and economic interests of the individual nations clashed.

These problems were chiefly concentrated in four areas—at the junction of Chile, Bolivia and Peru, along the boundary between Paraguay and Bolivia, the zone of contact between Brazil, Paraguay and Peru, and finally at the junction of Peru, Colombia, Ecuador and Brazil. Valuable nitrate deposits were chiefly responsible for the first conflict when stronger Chile prevailed over its weaker neighbors, Bolivia and Peru. Bolivia, in the eighties, lost its outlet to the Pacific while the dispute between Chile and Peru continued to 1929 when Chile returned the Tacna area, formerly occupied by her, to Peru.

The bloody Gran Chaco war between Paraguay and Bolivia arose from conflicting interests in the use of the land for grazing

and the extraction of quebracho. The newly discovered oil fields along the foot of the Andes also played a part. After three years of fighting, a new boundary was agreed upon which gave gain to Paraguay but kept her away from the oil fields. Luckily, the overlapping claims of Paraguay, Peru and Brazil along the east foot of the Andes were solved without bloodshed by the 1909 Acre agreement.

More serious was the political strife around Ecuador in the headwaters of the Amazon and also along the Pacific coast with its oil fields. Ecuador was the loser and her eastern boundary now follows rather closely the east side of the Andes, while Peru now joins Colombia along the Putumayo River. Colombia received a corridor to Leticia, a port on the Amazon River. Along the Pacific coast, Peru pushed her boundary northwards almost to the Gulf of Guayaquil.

The islands off the coasts of South America, outside of the Caribbean, belong to their coastal neighbors. The only exception is the Falkland Islands controlled by Great Britain but strongly claimed by Argentina which calls them the Malvina Islands.

ANTARCTICA

Figure 3 is copied from a British map of Antarctica, published in 1947 by *International Affairs*, the well-known British magazine, and, of course, represents the British point of view. On it Antarctica is divided into segments of ownership assigned to units of the British Commonwealth—Great Britain, New Zealand, and Australia—and to Norway, and France. Territorial claims of Chile and Argentina are entirely ignored, in spite of the claims they have made, and even followed up by landings, on the territory to the south of South America. The name of the United States does not appear on the map, although one segment of the continent, that of recent American explorations, remains unassigned. The United States government has carefully avoided making any claims to Antarctic territory. It is possible that the United States will favor either putting the entire area under the United Nations or making it an area of international cooperation.

Islands off the Antarctic coasts are, for the most part, small and rocky and have little value except as stations for exploration

expeditions. Most of them, such as the South Georgia, Sandwich, South Orkney, and South Shetland Islands between South America and Antarctica, are claimed by the British Commonwealth.




FIGURE 3.

France claims Kerguelen and Crozet Islands and Norway claims Bouvet and Peter I Island.

EUROPE

The map of European territorial changes shows comparative stability in the western part of the continent but great instability in the eastern zone, bordering on Russia. Because of the great interest of the United States in a Europe at peace, a fairly extensive discussion of European territorial changes since 1900 is presented here.

The 1900 Political Map of Europe

The 1900 political map of Europe (Figure 4) was a fairly simple one. Relatively few changes were made on it during the 85-year period between the time it was drawn by the Great Powers at




FIGURE 4. (From Van Valkenburg and Held, *Europe*, 2nd ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1952.)

Vienna in 1815, following the Napoleonic conquests, and the turn of the twentieth century. However, there were two major alterations. The first was the creation of Germany under the leadership of Prussia in 1870 and the separation of Germany from Austria; the latter was limited mostly to its Danubian empire as the dual state, Austria-Hungary. The second major change was the consolidation of most of the territory of the Italian peninsula into the State of Italy, completed in 1870 when the Papal State became part of Italy. At that time Austria, now landlocked,

extended south of the Alps and, by controlling Istria, gained access to the Mediterranean.

Other changes, although minor, were nevertheless important as possible sources of future trouble. In the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire was showing signs of disintegration. It had been forced to recognize the independence of the new states of Rumania, Serbia, and Greece and its control over Bulgaria was merely nominal. Austria-Hungary had occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina. In central Europe Germany had gained Alsace-Lorraine from France following the Franco-Prussian War, and had taken Schleswig and Holstein from Denmark. The United Netherlands, as created by the Treaty of Vienna in 1815, had failed as a political entity and the separation of Belgium and the Netherlands had come about as early as 1830. Except for a few rather localized wars, however, Europe had been at peace.

The Political Map of Europe Following World War I

Great and numerous changes took place in Europe after 1900 as shown on the political map drawn at the end of World War I (Figure 5). During the first two decades of the twentieth century the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman Empires, combined with the temporary weakness of Russia, resulted in the creation of a number of new states and the territorial enlargement of some already in existence. The changes which resulted from the settlement of World War I were based largely on the Wilsonian principle of self-determination. Since the purpose of this chapter is to give a factual review of changes in the world's political pattern during the past fifty years, no discussion of the merits or demerits of boundaries drawn at the close of World War I is pertinent. The ethnographic principle underlying the drawing of the boundaries and how well it has worked are discussed in Chapter 20.

A zone of new or enlarged states extended from the Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea, comprising Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Albania, and Greece.

Like Austria and Hungary, which were left as greatly reduced remnants of former glory, Germany lost considerable territory. The new Poland, containing former parts of Germany, Austria,

and Russia, gained access to the Baltic by way of the so-called Polish Corridor, and the Free City of Danzig was established in an unsuccessful effort to solve the complex problems of Polish-German contact. France regained Alsace-Lorraine; Denmark, through a plebiscite, obtained a part of Schleswig; the small




FIGURE 5. (From Van Valkenburg and Held, *Europe*, 2nd ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1952.)

provinces of Eupen and Malmedy voted to join Belgium; and Memelland went to Lithuania.

Italy obtained Istria and extended its boundaries to the crest of the Alps. In 1918 Iceland declared itself a sovereign state but continued its allegiance to the Danish king. After a long and bloody struggle the Irish Free State was born in 1921 although it remained within the British Commonwealth. In 1905 Norway, which had been united with Sweden, declared its complete inde-

pendence and, in a remarkable demonstration of political maturity, Sweden agreed to Norway's decision. Later, through a treaty signed at Paris in 1921, Norway took possession of Jan Mayen Island and Svalbard (Spitsbergen).

The Present Map of Europe

In the period between the end of World War I and the end of World War II the political map of Europe was in a constant state




FIGURE 6. (From Van Valkenburg and Held, *Europe*, 2nd ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1952.)

of flux. Especially during World War II numerous political and territorial changes came about under Hitler's program of expansion implemented by military conquest. Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Albania, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia lost their sovereignty and ceased to exist as states. Other nations, including Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece,

and France, were occupied by German troops. Although these nations did not cease to exist as states, they had little if any sovereignty. At the same time two new states, Slovakia and Croatia, were created. All of these war-born changes, however, were temporary and are simply noted in passing.

The present world map is more than ever before a product of power politics, and is quite different from the map which resulted from World War I. In one respect, however, the two maps have deep marks of similarity; the western portion of Europe continues to be relatively stable and there is still an eastern zone of political instability.

Thus, in the west, only slight changes have occurred, with the 1953 map showing boundary shifts along western Germany and Italy. Present Germany faces the difficulty, temporarily at least, of division. East of the Iron Curtain is the Democratic Republic, and west of it is the Federal Republic.

In the eastern portion, Russia extends much farther west and includes Bessarabia and a section of Bukovina, both parts of prewar Romania. Russia now also includes eastern Poland, a part of former Czechoslovakia known as Ruthenia, a part of former German East Prussia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and the areas of Lake Ladoga, Porkkala, and the Arctic coast, formerly parts of Finland. Czechoslovakia has increased its bridgehead across the Danube at Bratislava and Poland extends generally westward to include large parts of Germany in East Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia. Italy has lost Istria, Zara, and her Dalmatian coast islands to Yugoslavia, and the present Free City of Trieste seems to be a temporary effort to solve the problems of Italian-Yugoslav contact—like the Free City of Danzig in the earlier postwar period. Italy has also lost the Dodecanese Islands, off the coast of Asia Minor, to Greece. The island of Crete, occupied by the Germans during World War II, has been returned to Greece. In 1929 the Vatican and Italy signed the Lateran agreement establishing the independent state of Vatican City. This agreement was made a part of the Italian Constitution in 1947.

The tides of war have washed around the tiny states of Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino, remnants of former feudal conditions, leaving them to carry on in the traditions they have built up for centuries. The sovereignty and the lim-

ited area of these diminutive states have not been affected by the political changes of the last fifty years, but their respective economies have been influenced by conditions in the states which are their immediate neighbors.

The 1953 map reflects the declarations of independence of two nations. Iceland became a republic in 1944 and Ireland became completely independent in 1949. Northern Ireland, although still a part of Great Britain, has its own parliament.

The strong nationalistic associations and tendencies that the peoples of Europe's eastern zone of political instability have always shown are not likely to disappear under either direct or indirect occupation by a great power.

AFRICA

By 1900 the period of colonial expansion of the European nations was at an end. Practically the whole of Africa had been divided among Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Portugal, and Belgium, leaving only Liberia, Ethiopia, and Morocco as independent nations. At that time the Ottoman Empire, which exerted a theoretical rule over Lybia and Egypt, was the only non-European colonial power in Africa.

At first glance, the present political map of Africa (Figure 7) may not appear to differ greatly from the map of fifty years ago. Liberia is still an independent state, as is Ethiopia despite its rule by Italy during the period 1936-1941. Morocco is now governed by France and Spain; its former place in the trilogy of independent states has been taken by Egypt, which received its complete independence from Great Britain in 1922. However, as in 1900, the continent still is basically colonial, although in the last fifty years there have been some territorial changes and many changes in types of governments and their affiliations.

Four political events account for some of the most important territorial changes in colonial Africa in the twentieth century. These are the disappearance of the Ottoman and German Empires from the African scene, the coming and going of the Italians in Africa, the recognized control of North Africa by France following the Algeciras Pact of 1907, and finally, the creation of the Union of South Africa.




FIGURE 7. Political status in Africa.

| | | |
|--|-------------------------------|---------------------------|
| <i>A—Independent</i> | B-14 Northern Rhodesia | <i>D—Italy</i> |
| A-1 Liberia | B-15 Tanganyika (Trusteeship) | D-1 Somalia (Trusteeship) |
| A-2 Ethiopia-Eritrea | B-16 Nyasaland | |
| A-3 Egypt | B-17 Kenya | <i>E—Spain</i> |
| A-4 Libya | B-18 Uganda | E-1 Spanish Morocco |
| | B-19 British Somaliland | E-2 Ifni |
| | B-20 Anglo-Egyptian Sudan | E-3 Rio de Oro |
| | (Condominium with Egypt) | E-4 Fernando Po |
| | | E-5 Rio Muni |
| <i>B—British Commonwealth of Nations</i> | <i>C—French Union</i> | <i>F—Portugal</i> |
| B-1 Gambia | C-1 Morocco | F-1 Portuguese Guinea |
| B-2 Sierra Leone | C-2 French West Africa | F-2 São Tomé |
| B-3 Gold Coast | C-3 Togo (Trusteeship) | F-3 Cabinda |
| B-4 Togo (Trusteeship) | C-4 Cameroons (Trusteeship) | F-4 Angola |
| B-5 Nigeria | C-5 French Equatorial Africa | F-5 Mozambique |
| B-6 Cameroons (Trusteeship) | C-6 Madagascar | |
| B-7 South-West Africa | C-7 Comoro Islands | <i>G—Belgium</i> |
| B-8 Walvis Bay | C-8 French Somaliland | G-1 Belgian Congo |
| B-9 Union of South Africa | C-9 Tunisia | |
| B-10 Basutoland | C-10 Algeria | <i>N—Neutralised Zone</i> |
| B-11 Swaziland | | N International Tangier |
| B-12 Bechuanaland | | |
| B-13 Southern Rhodesia | | |

The Union of South Africa came into existence in 1910, shortly after the conclusion of the Boer War. With the status of a dominion in the British Commonwealth, it includes the former colonies of Cape of Good Hope, Natal, the Transvaal, and the Orange Free State. For all practical purposes it also includes Southwest Africa which was mandated to the Union of South Africa by the League of Nations and is still officially considered a trusteeship by the United Nations (see Chapter 24). Southern Rhodesia was under the administration of the British South Africa Company until 1923 when it obtained its own governor and legislature and was accorded semi-dominion status. Northern Rhodesia was also administered by the British South Africa Company until 1924 when it secured a considerable degree of self-government. In 1953 the Rhodesias and their neighbor, Nyasaland, formed the Central African Federation. In the south of Africa only three colonies remain directly under the British Crown: Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland.

In addition to the political units of South Africa, Britain also possesses two large colonial areas, one in eastern Africa and the other in the west. With Egypt, Britain maintains a condominium over the Sudan, but in 1953 an agreement was reached between them to let the Sudan decide its own future. The eastern colonies include: Uganda and Kenya, a protectorate and a crown colony respectively; Tanganyika, which was German until taken over by the British in 1918; and Nyasaland, a protectorate which until 1907 was known as British Central Africa. British Somaliland is in northeastern Africa. The western colonies include: Nigeria, the British Cameroons (a trust territory administered by Nigeria since the withdrawal of Germany), Gambia, the Gold Coast, and Sierra Leone. Togoland, a former German colony, is entrusted partly to Britain and partly to France. The British colonial territory of Ashanti is directly north of the Gold Coast.

Minor insular possessions of Britain off the coasts of Africa are Zanzibar; Mauritius, including Rodrigues and Diego Garcia; the Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean; and Ascension Island, St. Helena, and Tristan da Cunha in the South Atlantic.

Northwest Africa with its three units, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, is French territory. It adjoins French West Africa, with its many subdivisions, and the French mandates of Togoland and

the Cameroons. It also connects with French Equatorial Africa. In the northeast of the continent France governs a part of Somaliland. French possessions in the Indian Ocean include the large island of Madagascar, Reunion Island, and the Comoro Islands between Madagascar and the African mainland.

Spain clings somewhat precariously to relatively small colonial areas along the northwest and west coasts of Africa and to some islands immediately off these coasts. In the northwest is Spanish Morocco, over which Spain gained complete control in 1927, following a war between the Spanish and the natives of the Riff. Along the west African coast is Ifni, a small Spanish enclave in French Morocco, which was ceded to Spain by Morocco in 1860 but not effectively occupied until 1934. To the south is Rio de Oro, Spain's largest and least productive colony in Africa, and still farther south in the Bight of Guinea is Rio Muni. Spain's insular possessions include the Canary Islands off the coast of Rio de Oro, and the islands of Fernando Po and Annobon in the Gulf of Guinea.

Angola is Portugal's largest African colony and has been owned by that country since the sixteenth century. Mozambique is Portugal's second largest colony in Africa. In 1919 some 400 square miles, the Kionga Triangle, were ceded to it from the former German colony, Tanganyika, then under British mandate. Along the west coast, in addition to Angola, Portugal also owns Cabinda and Portuguese Guinea. Insular possessions include the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe in the Gulf of Guinea; and the Cape Verde Islands, Madeira, and the Azores in the Atlantic Ocean.

The Belgian Congo, which was established as a free state in 1885, with the King of the Belgians as sovereign, was formally ceded to Belgium by King Leopold II through a treaty signed in 1907.

Africa's only international zone, Tangiers, was formerly under the supervision of the powers which signed the Algeciras Pact of 1907. Later Spain reopened the question by demanding that Tangiers be incorporated in Spanish Morocco. Through an agreement signed in 1928 Spain gained control of all policing in the zone and thus had a basis for controlling the area during World War II.

Spain withdrew its occupational forces after the war and the zone returned to international control in 1945.

The former Italian colonies, Libya, Eritrea, and Somalia, were liquidated after World War II. Libya became an independent state in 1951, and Somalia is under Italian trusteeship. Eritrea was united by federation with Ethiopia, which had regained its independence after a period of Italian occupation.

Although it is not to be expected that political boundaries in Africa will change greatly in the near future, the political status of the various units is due for a revision. The problem of colonies will be discussed later, but it seems proper to call attention to that problem here. Colonies as such are on the way out. Former Italian Libya is now an independent state. Eritrea, also Italian, is now part of Ethiopia. The trusteeship of Italy over Somalia is only for a ten-year period. In 1953, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan faced the problem of either joining Egypt through some form of federation, or preparing for independence with or without the help of the British. The Gold Coast, once a top British colony, is now governed by a native prime minister and a native legislature. The desire of the Negro to take active part in government and not to accept the control of a relatively small group of white men, brings unrest from the Cape of Good Hope to the Gulf of Guinea and Lake Victoria. Arab agitation in the north calls for the autonomy of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria and even, at times, advocates a break with France. More examples could be given from all over Africa. The continent is fermenting, partly openly, partly under cover; the days of white supremacy are numbered.

ASIA

Asia—the world's greatest land mass and the site of the world's greatest concentrations of population—has been in a state of political unrest and confusion for many years. As might be expected in so large an area, its millions of people have developed numerous political, national, economic, and cultural points of view which have been loudly and often forcibly expressed during the twentieth century. Since 1900 Asia has undergone vast political upheavals and territorial changes. Today's political map shows these changes

and focuses attention on the world's great crescent of political instability which extends southward from the northernmost tip of Japan, through the Indian subcontinent to the northernmost point of Turkey, in the west, where it joins the unstable eastern zone of Europe.

Until the end of World War I the decadent Ottoman Empire officially possessed most of the territory in Asia west of Iran, with British control only along the south and southeast coasts of the Arabian peninsula. The "Sublime Porte" exercised a loose and frequently ineffective control over most of the area, however, and the political structure of the Middle East changed completely after World War I. Arabia and Yemen gained their independence and most of the remaining territories were mandated by the League of Nations to Great Britain and France. Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and Iraq were controlled by Great Britain, and the Syrian States by France. Asia Minor was divided most unsatisfactorily into zones over which various powers were accorded controls which were, for the most part, ineffectively used. This was completely changed in 1922 when the Turkish Republic was founded, following the Greek-Turkish War, and Turkey regained control of Asia Minor and a portion of eastern Thrace in Europe. The mandated areas to the south gradually gained their independence and are now known as Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordania, and Iraq. The bulk of the Palestine Mandate became the Republic of Israel in 1948 after a long and bitter struggle. The eastern part of the Palestine Mandate is now included in the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan. The establishment of Israel created boundary difficulties. In 1953 the line was not yet permanent, being based only on an armistice agreement, and no peace was in sight. The island of Cyprus, administered by Great Britain since 1878, was annexed in 1914 and remained under British control. Since 1932 Arabia has been united in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, while Yemen continues as an independent state.

The British control the colony of Aden, which includes the Kuria Muria Islands off the south Arabian coast, the island of Kamara in the Red Sea, and the Aden Protectorate. Muscat-Oman, Trucial Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, and the Bahrein Islands also are under British protection but are virtually independent. In this area there are two so-called neutral zones, one between Arabia




FIGURE 8. Political status of the Middle East.

A—Independent

- A-1 U.S.S.R.
- A-2 Turkey
- A-3 Iran
- A-4 Afghanistan
- A-5 Syria
- A-6 Lebanon
- A-7 Iraq
- A-8 Israel
- A-9 Jordania
- A-10 Kuwait
- A-11 Bahrein Islands
- A-12 Qatar
- A-13 Trucial Oman
- A-14 Oman
- A-15 Yemen
- A-16 Ethiopia
- A-17 Egypt
- A-18 Saudi Arabia

B—British Commonwealth of Nations

- B-1 Cyprus
- B-2 Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (with Egypt)
- B-3 Kamaran
- B-4 Aden-Perim
- B-5 Aden Protectorate
- B-6 Kuria Muria Islands
- B-7 Pakistan

C—French Union

- C-1 French Somaliland

N—Neutralized Zones

- N-1 Between Israel and Egypt
- N-2 Between Saudi Arabia and Iraq
- N-3 Between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait

and Iraq, and one between Kuwait and Arabia. In reality each is a condominium. Oil suddenly changed the importance of the countries along the west shore of the Persian Gulf and brought unexpected riches to them and once more boundary lines in the desert assume great importance.

Changes have taken place along the line of junction between Turkey, the U.S.S.R., and Iran. The only actual territorial shift took place in the Kars-Ardahan district which the U.S.S.R. ceded to Turkey in 1917, and would now like to have returned. For short periods, different independent states existed in the junction area, such as Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan after World War I, and Iranian Azerbaijan and the Kurd Republic of Mahabad following World War II. Small boundary corrections took place in 1946 between the U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan.

After nearly two centuries of British rule the subcontinent of India was divided into two dominions in 1947: the Dominion of Pakistan, essentially Moslem, and the Dominion of India, essentially Hindu. The former consists of two rather widely separated parts. Both dominions have incorporated formerly princely states within their respective political frameworks. In 1953 the fate of the princely state of Kashmir, claimed by both India and Pakistan, was still undecided, but a plebiscite was being planned to determine its allegiance. The Dominion of India has authority over the Andaman Islands and the Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal. In 1948 Ceylon also became a dominion in the British Commonwealth and has authority over the Laccadive Islands off the west coast of India. The small group of the Maldive Islands declared its independence in 1952.

The small remnants of the Portuguese colonial empire along the west coast of India, Goa, Damao, and Diu, continue in their historic roles. Of the five similar relics of the French colonial empire along India's east coast—Pondicherry, Karikal, Chandernagor, Mahé, and Yanam—only Chandernagor had joined the Dominion of India by 1953.

In 1948 Burma obtained complete independence and after centuries of British control broke all relations with the British Commonwealth. Siam, an independent kingdom, at the turn of the century was squeezed in between the British and French possessions of Burma and Indochina, but gained its present area and

shape in 1905. During World II, with the help of Japan, it expanded by acquiring territory from Burma, Indochina, and Malaya only to return to its former position when Japan was defeated.


Indochina, after a long period of difficulties, became a federation of states in which Vietnam, recognized by France in 1949, had a considerable degree of independence. Civil war still raged throughout Indochina, however, and the final extent and political structure of the area was still undecided. Indonesia went through a similar struggle. A federation which brought together the pro-Dutch units and the Indonesia Republic was formed, but the Indonesia Republic proclaimed a centralized government in 1950 and abolished the federation. At that time the fate of Dutch Guinea was not decided upon; there is a possibility that it may be developed independently by the Netherlands. British Malaya is also a federation composed of the four former federated Malay States, the five former unfederated Malay States, and the two British settlements, Penang and Malacca. Singapore became a crown colony in 1946 and continues in that status with authority over the Cocos Colony and Christmas Island in the Indian Ocean.

The two British units of Borneo are now directly under the British Crown. North Borneo was transferred from the British North Borneo Company and Sarawak was acquired for the Crown through an arrangement with the Brooks family who owned it. Brunei remains a protectorate, and Labuan is united with North Borneo.

The Philippine Islands received full independence in 1946, ending a transitional period agreed upon between the United States and the peoples of the Islands.

Since 1895 eastern Asia has been almost constantly in a state of war, with the Sino-Japanese War heralding the period of conflicts. The Russo-Japanese War of 1905-06, the revolution in China ending in the founding of the Chinese Republic in 1912, World War I, the Japanese infiltration of the mainland during the interwar period, World War II, and the postwar Nationalist-Communist struggle in China gave the eastern portion of the world's largest continent fifty years of international and civil turmoil. Many sections changed political affiliations several times.

Present-day China, under a Communist government except for



B-14 Solomon Islands
B-15 Phoenix Islands
B-16 Ellice Islands
B-17 Fiji Islands
B-18 Tonga Islands
B-19 Pitcairn Island
B-20 Canada

C—United States
C-1 Nampo Islands
C-2 Ryukyu Islands
C-3 Bonin Islands
C-4 Marcus Island
C-5 Mariana Islands (Trusteeship)
C-6 Guam
C-7 Carolines (Trusteeship)
C-8 Marshall Islands (Trusteeship)
C-9 Wake Island
C-10 Eastern Samoa
C-10a Swain Island
C-11 Line Islands
C-12 Hawaiian Islands
C-12a Midway Islands
C-13 Alaska
C-13a Aleutian Islands

D—French Union
D-1 Indochina
D-2 New Hebrides (with Britain)
D-3 New Caledonia
D-4 Wallis Island
D-5 Society Islands
D-6 Tubuai Islands
D-7 Tuamotu Archipelago
D-8 Marquesas Islands
D-9 Clipperton

E—Portugal
E-1 Macao
E-2 Timor

F—Netherlands
F-1 Netherlands New Guinea

Formosa, last stronghold of the Nationalists, has been reunited with Manchuria and has also strengthened her hold on Tibet. She has, however, lost both Outer Mongolia, now a Russian satellite, and Tannu Tuva; the latter, after a short period of official independence, was incorporated into the U.S.S.R.

Some of the former territorial concessions to foreign powers have been terminated. France released its rights in Kwangchow, Britain in Weihawei, and Japan in Tsing-tao. Portugal, however, still controls Macao, and Great Britain controls Hong Kong-Kowloon, with a lease on the so-called new Kowloon area which expires in 1997. The U.S.S.R. has the use of the naval base of Port Arthur, as well as the adjacent Dalny Harbor, in what is officially a joint enterprise between the U.S.S.R. and China.

Japan has lost everything except her home islands. In addition to her former territories on the mainland, such as Manchuria and Korea, Japan lost to Russia southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles, and to the United States the former Pacific mandated islands, as well as some of the Ryukyu Islands between Japan and Formosa, and the Bonin Islands south of Honshu. All of these islands held by the United States are under a trusteeship from the United Nations. Japan itself regained its independence in 1952.

Korea was broken into two parts by the now well-known 38°N. parallel, selected originally as a boundary between the American and Russian zones of temporary occupation at the close of World War II. In 1950 Korea became the scene of a bloody war between the northern and southern sections which involved the United Nations, helping the southern sections, and China, the northern.


THE PACIFIC AREA

The Commonwealth of Australia was proclaimed in 1901 and New Zealand became a British Dominion in 1907. Both had been British colonies for many years. The federal government of Australia took over the administration of the Territory of Papua which has been a British protectorate. Following World War I it acquired as a mandate and now a trusteeship former German New Guinea and the adjacent Admiralty Islands, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the eastern Solomons. New Zealand has a trusteeship over the former German territory of Western Samoa, while the

phosphate island of Nauru has been jointly administered since World War I by Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand.


The political pattern of the Pacific islands is still complex although more simple than before the last war, because the United States now controls practically all of the islands north of the Equator where her interests have been widespread and of long standing (whale fishermen and others regularly visited the area early in American history). In 1895 the United States took official possession of Wake Island, and Guam became American following the Spanish-American War in 1898. The Territory of Hawaii was constituted in 1900; a proposal for its admission to the Union as a state was still pending in 1953. The former Japanese islands in the western Pacific are now under American trusteeship.

At the Equator and south of it, the situation is very confused because historic claims, economic interests, and strategic considerations enter into the picture. In addition to the above-mentioned possessions of Australia and New Zealand, certain island groups are owned by the United States, Great Britain, and France. In one case, that of the New Hebrides, Great Britain and France have a condominium. Among the British possessions are Fiji, the southern Solomons, the Tongo Islands, and the Gilbert, Phoenix, and Ellice groups. The chief French colonies are New Caledonia, noted for its minerals, and several island groups in the eastern part united under the name of French Settlements in Oceania. The United States obtained the eastern Samoa group in 1899 to which was added in 1925 neighboring Swain Island, originally privately owned. Disagreement between the United States and Great Britain about the many small islands along the Equator (the so-called Line Islands), important because of their strategic location, led in some cases to joint control; examples of this are Canton and Enderbury Islands. The American equatorial islands include Baker, Howland, Jarvis, Palmyra, and Kingman Reef, mere specks in the ocean but important as stepping stones across the Pacific.



Part Two

THE PHYSICAL ELEMENTS



Location, Size, and Shape

THREE PRIMARY GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS about a place must be known before any of its physical, human, or economic elements can be sorted and evaluated. These three primary factors are *location*, *size*, and *shape*. Information about where a place is, how large it is, and what shape it has is essential at the beginning of a study of political geography. Each of these factors is important for its own sake and each plays a significant role in association with various other factors in the political geographical drama of specific areas and of the world as a whole. Thus, each factor must be given careful consideration. Sometimes it is of paramount importance, sometimes of only minor concern, depending upon the region and its place in world history—both in the past and at the present time. But it never fails to enter into an evaluative study.

This chapter surveys the location, size, and shape of many of the countries of the world. It is designed to help the student form a mental picture of the world's political pattern. With such a picture clearly in mind he will have a better basis for understanding the world's political problems.

LOCATION

There are three main methods of expressing the geographical location of a specified place or area: (1) in terms of degrees of latitude and longitude (astronomical location); (2) in terms of its relation to water bodies and land masses; (3) in terms of its position with reference to its immediate neighbors (vicinal location). The first method is the one in most general use.

Astronomical Location

The world grid is the basis for expressing astronomical location. The grid is constructed around two major lines, the Equator and the Prime Meridian. The Equator is a line drawn on a map, equidistant from the North and South Poles. It has been assigned the mathematical value of zero, and distance between each pole and the Equator is 90 degrees. The lines drawn to express each degree, or part of it, are known as lines of latitude or parallels. They are used to express distance north and south of the equator. A line connecting the two poles and passing through the Equator is known as a line of longitude or a meridian. By the terms of an international agreement reached in 1884 the Prime Meridian is a line of longitude passing through the observatory at Greenwich, England. Like its latitudinal counterpart, the Equator, the Prime Meridian has a mathematical value of zero. Its longitudinal opposite is the line of 180 degrees east or west upon which the position of the International Date Line is based. Meridians are used to express distance east and west of the Prime Meridian. The lines of latitude and longitude collectively are known as the world grid.

A statement of an area's location with reference to the world grid is usually contained in the opening section of a geographical study. If the area is large, its position may be stated by giving the latitude and longitude of its geographical center. For example, Iran's geographical center is about 33° N. and 53° E. Another means of expressing the astronomical location of a large area is to give its extremes of latitude and longitude. Thus, Iran's location may also be expressed as between 40° N., 25° N. and 44° E., 63° E. Single figures are used if the area is very small; for example, Vatican City (41° 53' N., 12° 28' E.); the Free City of Trieste (45° 38' N., 13° 35' E.); Pitcairn Island (24° 4' S., 130° 6' W.); or Iwo Jima (30° 47' N., 130° 16' E.).

Distance from the Prime Meridian is usually of less importance to a state than distance from the Equator because the bulk of the controls which operate to produce the climate of an area depend upon the latter. Climatic conditions are of marked importance to the activities of states and therefore to the formation of their political structures and attitudes (see Chapter 4). Today,

all the great powers are located entirely or for the greatest part within the north temperate zone, where they enjoy the stimulation of pronounced seasonality of climate and marked cyclonic variety of weather. There is comparatively little land in the south temperate zone, as South America and Africa narrow down, south of the Equator. The leading states of the southern hemisphere are Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa.

Tropically located countries, such as those in South America and Africa, tend to compensate wherever possible for the disadvantages of persistent heat by using elevations that are available. The nuclei of these states are located at high altitudes in compensation for their low latitudes. The capital of Ecuador is in the high Quito basin ($0^{\circ} 10' \text{ S.}$, $78^{\circ} 30' \text{ W.}$) where the elevation is 9,340 feet above sea level. Bogota ($4^{\circ} 32' \text{ N.}$, $74^{\circ} 15' \text{ W.}$), the capital of Colombia, is located on the eastern Andean upland at an elevation of 8,500 feet. Similarly, Addis Ababa ($9^{\circ} 2' \text{ N.}$, $38^{\circ} 49' \text{ E.}$), the capital of Ethiopia, has an elevation of 10,000 feet above sea level. Brazil, the world's largest tropical country has vast areas in the equatorial zone. Its heart, however, is in the uplands of São Paulo which hug the Tropic of Capricorn and have elevations varying between 3,000 and 8,000 feet.

Location in Relation to Water Bodies and Land Masses

A second means of expressing the location of an area is to state its position with respect to land masses and water bodies. This method indicates the relationship between an area's continental and maritime activities, which is of considerable importance because it plays a large part in determining the character and interests of a state. The problems of purely continental countries are quite different from those with sea coasts of varying lengths and characteristics.

One way to determine the degree of a state's continentality is to compute the ratio between the length of its land boundaries and the length of its sea boundaries. This method is only a rough gauge, however, because it fails to take into consideration the nature of the boundaries involved. For example, the long Arctic Sea boundaries of the U.S.S.R. and Canada offer few maritime opportunities to these states, although they show up prominently

in the respective ratios. In contrast, many of the ancient Greek city-states, with land boundaries in rugged mountains, were forced to orient themselves toward the sea and hence were maritime to a greater degree than the ratios would indicate.

Even though the coastline of a state is favorable for maritime activities and is longer than the land boundaries, the interests of the state may be more continental than maritime if the land is sufficiently hospitable. In many cases, a state's major orientation will be toward the sea where nature is niggardly on the land. Norway faces a sea rich in marine life, and turns her back to the mountainous land that offers little sustenance. Some regions in Great Britain and in Brittany are similarly oriented. But in France the continental factor dominates life despite the long coastlines, because the land is attractive and hospitable. No state essentially continental in location (in the sense of having favorable land) has dominant maritime interests.

A less systematic but more effective way of evaluating the location of a state with reference to land and sea is to consider the influences each exerts on the people.

Maritime location. The influence of a state's coastlines on its culture and political structure varies according to the type of coast. Similarly a state's marine commerce is strongly affected by the open or closed nature of the sea upon which it is located. The states bordering on the Baltic Sea are, during periods of conflict, hampered in their commercial and military activities at sea by the fact that the exit from the Baltic can be controlled by Sweden, and Denmark from the land, or by a strong naval force in the North Sea. Even the North Sea ceases to provide an open passage when military force is used to control the Straits of Dover and its northern exit.

Control of the strategic locations—Gibraltar, Malta, Crete, Cyprus, and Port Said—can be used in wartime to eliminate the peacetime function of the Mediterranean Sea as a maritime highway. The Adriatic Sea and the Black Sea, normally functioning as commercial highways, can be virtually reduced to lakes through the control of the Straits of Otranto, and the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, respectively. Similarly, control of the Suez Canal at the north end of the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb at the south end can render it useless for maritime traffic. The naval




FIGURE 10.

value of the port of Vladivostok in the U.S.S.R. and of Pusan in Korea depend upon the power controlling the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea.

Generally, the more seas a nation fronts upon, the greater are its maritime opportunities and responsibilities. Figure 10 shows the nations of the world classified as states having one-sea, two-sea, three-sea, multi-sea, and insular locations. This system of classification gives a state's maritime position a numerical value, but it does not in any way indicate the character of the coasts involved and therefore is of only limited use.

One-sea location. South America and Africa are compact in shape with comparatively regular coastlines; in both, one-sea states dominate. In South America, even Brazil's very large size fails to give it access to more than one sea, and Paraguay and Bolivia have no coasts at all. In Africa a similar situation exists. Only the British territories of Bechuanaland, Southern and Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and Uganda have no sea coasts, although access to the sea is assured through other members of the British Commonwealth. Ethiopia, until it was joined by Eritrea, was the only independent state in Africa without a sea coast.

Europe with its many indenting seas is far from compact in shape. Hence, only its small political units—Belgium, the Netherlands, Albania, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria—have one-sea locations. Monaco is the only very small European state with a one-sea location; the others are entirely landlocked. Of the larger states, only Austria, Hungary, Switzerland, and Czechoslovakia have no coasts at all, and it seems most unlikely that any of them will acquire direct access to the sea in the near future. The urge of a state to reach the sea is best exemplified in Europe by Poland with its pre-World War II corridor to the Baltic through Posnan and Pomerze. Yugoslavia with its decidedly continental core reached the sea by acquiring Dalmatia after World War I.

Asia, because of its huge size, combines irregular coastlines with vast, compact, continental areas and thus has a number of states—western and eastern Pakistan, Iran, Burma, and Siam—with one-sea locations. It also has several states—Afghanistan, Sinkiang, Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, and Mongolia—with no sea coasts.

Two-sea location. Nations located on two seas are of several types. Some are isthmus states, such as Mexico and all the other republics of Central America except Salvador, which has only one coast. Some have a two-sea location by virtue of their peninsular character. All of these states are in Eurasia—the Scandinavian countries, Spain, Italy, and Greece in Europe; Arabia, India, the Malay States, and Korea in Asia. Sometimes it is difficult to decide the number of seas. In the case of Italy the Adriatic can be regarded as a separate sea and also as part of the Mediterranean. Others are located at the junction of two major water bodies. Chile, for example, with its long Pacific coast also fronts on the Straits of Magellan. The shores of the Union of South Africa are washed by the waters of the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean, and in the north of Africa Morocco has both Atlantic and Mediterranean sea coasts. Norway with its Atlantic and North Sea coasts may be said to have a two-sea location. Two states in this category should be mentioned especially. Panama, with its Pacific and Caribbean coasts, is at a man-made junction of two major water bodies. Egypt has a similar position because of the man-made Suez Canal.

Pakistan falls in a class by itself. Although each of its two parts has a one-sea location, as noted above, the state as a whole might well be said to have a two-sea location because it fronts on both the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. Following World War I, East Prussia was separated from the main body of Germany by the Polish Corridor, but since the main part of the country also fronted the Baltic, the main character of a two-sea location (North Sea and Baltic) was not altered. Thus the situation was not the same as in the case of Pakistan.

Three-sea location. Very few states have direct access to three seas, and those that do are generally large. In this large-size group are the United States, bordered by the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Gulf of Mexico; and Canada, bordered by the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Arctic Oceans. France, on the other hand, has a three-sea location not because of size but because Europe's irregular shape gives it direct access to the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the North Sea. Turkey too is generally considered a three-sea nation because its shores are washed by the

Black Sea, the Aegean Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea proper. Some add the Sea of Marmora to the above listed water bodies and consider Turkey as a multi-sea country.

Multi-sea and insular location. The U.S.S.R., because of its great latitudinal and longitudinal extent, has a multi-sea location. The limitations of the numerical system of classification are clearly brought out in the case of the U.S.S.R. Despite its multi-sea location it is essentially a continental state that never has ranked high as a maritime power. Australia, whether it is classified as a continent or as the world's largest island, has a multi-sea location. It may be noted that insular states have the most extreme type of maritime location although some of them, like Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Iceland, have direct access to only one sea.

Continental location. Nearly every state craves at least one seacoast and the majority of states without direct access to the sea have sought one in some way. Russia's historic and often devious efforts to secure warm water ports, the extension of Poland to the Baltic after World War I, and the extension of the Belgian Congo to the Atlantic are random examples of this process of seeking for the sea. There are, however, some purely continental states which often to their distress have no free access to the ocean. States of this type are Bolivia, Paraguay, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, some of the British colonies in Africa, and some of the landlocked states of Asia. They have little sea-borne commerce and have arranged for the shipment of their imports and exports through other friendly states.

On the other hand, many states with direct access to the sea are basically continental in their political structure. In all but insular states there is some continentality which is an important factor in shaping their characters. The degree of continentality and its effectiveness vary from state to state, depending upon such factors as the number and kind of neighbors, the type and character of the boundaries, and the attractiveness of the land as compared with that of the sea.

It is practically impossible to show all of these factors on a map. Maps showing some of them are often used in political geography studies; they have considerable graphic value provided the reader remembers that they do not portray the whole situa-




FIGURE 11.

tion but only part of it. Figure 11, for example, shows only the number of land neighbors of the European states after World War II. The figures range from zero for Great Britain to eleven for the U.S.S.R. They are important because they represent the

number of separate sets of international problems which each state had to face and they reflect something of the continentality of each state.

Vicinal Location

The vicinal location of a state is its position with respect to the number and kind of neighbors it has. The number of neighbors is a purely physical matter, but their various characters involve human elements. The boundary lines which separate each state from its neighbors are of immediate and vital concern whenever any aspect of the vicinal location of a state is considered.

The physical aspects of boundary lines and boundary problems are discussed in Chapter 5, "Relief," and the human aspects are surveyed in Chapter 20, "Boundaries." A few words about boundaries are pertinent here, to serve as a background for the fuller consideration of the subject in the later chapters, and to bring out clearly that vicinal location problems are based on boundaries and neighbors.

All boundaries are man-made, even those along the coasts, because the problem of high and low water, as well as distance from the coastline have to be taken into consideration. Land boundaries have two functions: a physical one, because they are superimposed on the physical landscape, and a human one, because they separate groups of people (except in cases where the land is unoccupied). Some systems of boundary classification are unsatisfactory because they fail to take this dual relationship into account.

Effect of vicinal location. The more neighbors a state has, the more complex is its vicinal location. A state with many neighbors has numerous boundary problems and is beset with a multitude of international situations. In time of war it can be far more vulnerable than a state with few neighbors.

Germany, on the eve of World War II, is an outstanding example of a state with an extremely poor vicinal location, from the point of view of defense. It had eleven neighbors separated from it in nearly every case by immature and unsatisfactory boundaries. In addition, a part of the state, East Prussia, was separated from the main body by the Polish Corridor. Disregarding the evil genius that shaped the destiny of Germany in the 1930's, the

state was so poorly located in a vicinal sense that it was certain to have many and very serious problems with its neighbors. Had its leadership been as good as it was bad these problems might have been settled peacefully and Germany might have profited from its central European location.

No better example of an excellent vicinal location can be cited than that of the United States. Its long boundaries with its two neighbors, Mexico and Canada, are superimposed upon the landscape but have matured with the passing of time through mutual cooperation and agreement. A long boundary is no source of difficulty when it separates states which are friendly to each other and are occupied by people with similar cultural backgrounds and outlooks. A boundary, long or short, when it separates states of markedly different backgrounds and ideologies constitutes a considerable danger to peace.

Political units since very early times have often tried to avoid boundaries with unfriendly or potentially hostile neighbors. Many of the earliest states achieved this objective by establishing border or frontier zones rather than boundary lines, a protective device that was possible chiefly in areas of sparse population. Another device was the establishment of buffer states.

Buffer states. Generally buffer states are zones of cultural transition and as such partake of the cultural and ideological patterns of the states on either side of them. They are thus buffers not only in a physical or spatial sense but also in a cultural sense. The theory is that two potentially hostile states are less likely to arrive at a state of war if they are separated by a neutralizing zone. When two hostile states go to war with each other, as they often do, the buffer state becomes the principal battleground.

European history provides two excellent examples of buffer states. In 843 the Treaty of Verdun divided the great empire of Charlemagne into three parts (Figure 12). The western portion of the empire, chiefly Latin in culture, fell to Charles the Bald, marking the beginning of the history of modern France. The eastern portion, chiefly Germanic in culture, fell to Louis the German. The middle portion, an area of transition between the two cultures, fell to Lothair I. After Lothair's death the middle portion was divided between Charles and Louis in 870 by the Treaty of Mersen. But it has stood out through history as a

physical and cultural buffer between the states of Latin culture in the west and the states of Germanic culture in the east. The modern political units in this buffer portion are the Netherlands,

TREATIES OF VERDUN, 843 AND MERSEN, 870




FIGURE 12.

Belgium, Luxembourg, Alsace-Lorraine, and western Switzerland; all of these states, with the exception of Switzerland, have been the scenes of many wars. Except for Alsace-Lorraine, which is part of France, all of them are still independent.

Eastern Europe also has its zone of buffer states, the so-called Cordon Sanitaire, including Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, eastern Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, and Yugo-

slavia. These states formed the physical and cultural buffer between the states of western European culture and the great area of Slavic cultural background which is the U.S.S.R. They are partly western European and partly Slavic in their culture and outlook, and this implies that they do not necessarily concur with the U.S.S.R. in its political philosophy and the means used to expedite it. In the wars between the western and eastern states, these buffer nations have also been the areas of intense fighting. At the mid-twentieth century, three (the Baltic states) have disappeared, and most of the others have become Russian satellites.

SIZE

Size is an important factor in the evaluation of a political unit, for without sufficient size no nation can ever rank as a leading world power.

Small countries may attain very high cultural levels, but they are always handicapped by their spatial limitations. Their small area, even when utilized under ideal physiographic and climatic conditions, fails to provide space for a large population. At various periods small states seem to have become temporarily important. Examples are Switzerland about 1500 and the Dutch Republic in the seventeenth century; in both cases their small size and consequent small populations prevented sustained greatness. Swiss dreams of greatness died in 1515 when a larger, more populous neighbor, France, administered a crushing defeat to the Swiss forces in the Battle of Marignano. The Netherlands, which was not only small but also poorly drained and relatively uninviting, lost its bid for supremacy of the sea in the seventeenth century to England for the simple reason that there were more English than Dutch.

On the other hand, large size is not always a sign of greatness and power. Many countries possess large areas which are not of great value because they cannot support large populations. Australia is a good example of this disadvantage of size. The state has an area of about three million square miles, 240 times that of the Netherlands, and a population of less than seven million, only 80 percent of that of the Netherlands. Australia also illustrates the fact that the element of size, if considered alone,

TABLE I
SIZE AND POPULATION OF NATIONS

| Size (In Thou- sands of Square Miles) | Population (In Millions of Inhabitants) | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|-------|------|-------------------------|------|------|--------------------------------|------|------|------------------------------|------|------|
| | Very Large More than 100 Million | | | Large 40-100 Million | | | Medium Large 10-40 Million | | | Medium Small 5-10 Million | | |
| | Country | Area | Pop. | Country | Area | Pop. | Country | Area | Pop. | Country | Area | Pop. |
| <i>Gigantic</i> More than 2 Million Square Miles | British Com- monwealth | 12997 | 610 | Brazil | 3285 | 53 | Canada | 3843 | 14 | Australia | 2975 | 8.4 |
| | U.S.S.R. | 8338 | 207 | | | | | | | | | |
| | French Union | 4838 | 120 | | | | | | | | | |
| | China (People's Republic) | 4278 | 463 | | | | | | | | | |
| | U. S. (and possessions) | 3624 | 167 | | | | | | | | | |
| <i>Very Large</i> 500,000 to 2 Million Square Miles | U. S. (48 states) | 3026 | 161 | | | | | | | | | |
| | India | 1222 | 357 | Indonesia | 735 | 78 | Argentina (and colonies) | 1079 | 18 | Saudi Arabia | 870 | 6.0 |
| | | | | | | | Belgium (and colonies) | 916 | 20 | Peru | 514 | 8.5 |
| | | | | | | | Portugal (and colonies) | 867 | 20 | | | |
| | | | | | | | U. of S. Africa | 790 | 13 | | | |
| <i>Large</i> 100,000 to 500,000 Square Miles | | | | Pakistan | 350 | 75 | Colombia | 440 | 11 | Venezuela | 352 | 5.0 |
| | | | | France | 212 | 42 | Egypt | 383 | 21 | Chile | 297 | 2.2 |
| | | | | Japan | 147 | 84 | Ethiopia | 398 | 16 | S. Rhodesia | 150 | 1.4 |
| | | | | Italy | 116 | 46 | Spain (and colonies) | 328 | 29 | Paraguay | 150 | 1.4 |
| | | | | | | | Burma | 261 | 18 | Finland | 130 | 4.0 |
| | | | | | | | Afghanistan | 250 | 12 | Norway | 124 | 3.3 |
| | | | | | | | Siam | 200 | 19 | New Zealand | 103 | 3.0 |
| | | | | | | | Spain | 193 | 28 | | | |
| | | | | | | | Vietnam | 124 | 24 | | | |
| | | | | | | | Poland | 121 | 25 | | | |
| | | | | | | | Philippines | 115 | 20 | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|--|---|----------|----------|--|----------|----------|---|--|---|---|--|---|-------------------------------|---|--|--|
| Medium 25,000 to 100,000 Square Miles | | | | | United Kingdom Western Germany | 94 98 | 50 48 | Yugoslavia Rumania Netherlands (and posses- sions) Czechoslovakia S. Korea E. Germany | 95 91 | 16 15 | Nepal Greece N. Korea Cuba Bulgaria Hungary Portugal Austria Ceylon | 54 51 49 44 42 35 32 25 | 7.0 7.6 8.2 5.4 7.0 9.0 8.0 6.6 7.7 | Laos Yemen Uruguay Cambodia Syria Nicaragua Guatemala Honduras Liberia Eire Jordanian | 89 75 72 67 66 57 45 44 43 27 27 | 1.1 4.5 2.3 3.4 4.7 1.0 2.8 1.5 2.5 2.9 1.5 | Iceland Panama | 39 28 | 0.1 0.8 | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Small 10,000 to 25,000 Square Miles | | | | | | | | Netherlands | 13 | 10.3 | Taiwan Belgium | 14 12 | 8.0 8.6 | Dominican Republic Switzerland Denmark Haiti Albania | 19 16 16 10 10 | 2.2 4.7 4.3 3.0 1.2 | Costa Rica Bhutan | 23 20 | 0.8 0.3 | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Very Small 1,000 to 10,000 Square Miles | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Israel Lebanon | 8 4 | 1.6 1.3 | Qatar Kuwait Luxembourg | 9 8 1 | 0.17 0.17 0.3 | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Miniature Less Than 1,000 Square Miles | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Saar Trieste Bahrein Maldives Liechtenstein San Marino Andorra Monaco Vatican | 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.0008 0.0002 | 0.8 0.32 0.1 0.09 0.013 0.012 0.005 0.02 0.001 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

may lead to a false conclusion. One half of the continent is desert, and only one eighth is suitable for occupancy by white men. This area, however, could support a much greater population than it does today. It is estimated that the potential population of Australia (at the white man's standard of living) is between twenty and thirty million.

Table I attempts to present in concise form a world survey of the two elements—size and population. In case of countries with colonies, the combined area and population, as well as that of the motherland alone, are given if important differences are involved. The dominions of the British Commonwealth of Nations are considered as separate units and also as part of the Commonwealth. The table ranks the nations of the world in groups according to size and population, with no attempt to show density of population. Seven size categories are used: *giant*, *very large*, *large*, *medium*, *small*, *very small*, and *miniature*. Six population categories are used: *very large*, *large*, *medium-large*, *medium-small*, *small* and *very small*. The reader is referred to the table for the arbitrarily assigned numerical delineations of these categories. The system provides for 42 combinations but only 25 occur.

Giant Size

Eight political units are in the *giant* size group. Five of these—the British Commonwealth of Nations, China, U.S.S.R., the United States, and the French Union—are in the *very large* population group and are the world's "Big Five," although from the point of view of political power they differ markedly. The area and population figures for the United States include noncontiguous territories; without them the 1952 figures would be 2,977,000 and 153,000,000 respectively. The remaining three countries in the *giant* size group—Brazil, Canada, and Australia—have comparatively smaller populations. Brazil is in the *large* population group; Canada, in the *medium-large*; and Australia, in the *medium-small*. In each of these three countries there are vast expanses of land unsuitable for human habitation; nevertheless, each could support a much larger population than it has at present.

Very Large Size

Nine political units are in the *very large* size group. One of these, India, is in the *very large* population group; in fact, two thirds of the population of the British Commonwealth of Nations live in India. The Republic of Indonesia is in the *large* population group, owing to the extraordinary density of population in Java which accounts for seven percent of the state's territory and two thirds of its population. In the *medium-large* population group are two colonial empires (Belgium and Portugal); two Latin American states (Mexico and Argentina); and Iran in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia has only a *medium-small* population. Denmark, if the very large and almost uninhabited island of Greenland is included, is in this size group and in the *small* population group; so also is Outer Mongolia, a Russian satellite.

Large Size

Logically, one might expect that most countries of *large* size would have *large* populations. However, only five nations combine these two elements, while twelve *large* size nations have *medium-large* populations, and eight are in the *small* population group. The five countries in the *large* population group are Japan, Germany, Italy, and France, all of which have played important parts in world politics, and the newcomer, Pakistan. In the *medium-large* population group are Spain and Poland in Europe; Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Union of South Africa in Africa; Colombia in South America; and Indochina, the Philippines, Turkey, Afghanistan, Siam, and Burma in Asia. In the *medium-small* population group are Sweden, Peru, and Chile. There are various reasons why the eight *large* countries with *small* populations are not thickly populated. These include climatic handicaps and mountain topography, and also lack of full use of the land. In this *large* size, *small* population category are Finland and Norway in Europe; Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia in South America; and Northern Rhodesia, Iraq, and New Zealand.

Taken as a whole, the *large* size group includes more countries than any other, although the next group comes close to it.

Medium Size

Great Britain is the outstanding example of a nation of *medium* size which rose to world power. It is the only state in this group with a *large* population. The three European satellites of the U.S.S.R.—Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia—have *medium-large* populations; so also has Korea, if it is considered as one nation, with the northern and southern portions combined. As may be expected, most of the countries in this *medium* size group are also in the *medium-small* population group. Europe is well represented by five nations: Hungary, Portugal, Greece, Bulgaria, and Austria; the other countries with the exception of Cuba are in Asia: Ceylon, Nepal, Yemen, and Malaya. In the *small* population group are Ireland, the only European country; Guatemala, Uruguay, Honduras, and Nicaragua in Latin America; Liberia in Africa, and Syria in the Near East.

For the first time in this tabulation the *very small* population group is represented. *Medium* size nations in this population group are arid Jordania and Oman, subpolar Iceland, and Panama with its tropical jungle. It may be noted that each of these units has an unfavorable environmental problem.

Small Size

The Netherlands is the only *small* country with a *medium-large* population. If the overseas territories are included, it is in the *large* size and *medium-large* population category (180,000 square miles and about 12,000,000 inhabitants). However, the possession of the western part of New Guinea, which is chiefly responsible for the large size, is still under dispute. Belgium by itself is in the *medium-small* population group; mention has already been made of its place in the *very large* size, *medium large* population category, if the Belgian Congo is included. The *small* population group is composed of Switzerland, Denmark, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador. In the *very small* population group are: Costa Rica, Bhutan (the Himalayan mountain state), and Kuwait, of oil fame.

Very Small Size

Two young countries born since World War II comprise this size category. These countries are neighbors and both have *small* populations. Israel was established by proclamation in 1948 and is recognized by the United Nations, although its boundaries with its Arab neighbors are not yet settled. Lebanon received its independence in 1944 when France dropped her mandated power.

Miniature Size

This is a very special group of *miniature* countries with *very small* populations. Two of them, the Saar and Luxembourg, almost belong in the *very small* size category and may be regarded as bona fide states, although the relation of the Saar to Germany is a perennial problem. The Free City of Trieste, an almost desperate effort to solve the boundary controversy between Yugoslavia and Italy, was at the time also under attack and seemed to be doomed to disappear. Monaco, Liechtenstein, Andorra, and San Marino are museum pieces representing a long-since closed period of history. The smallest of them all, Vatican City, has a great deal of world influence. It is the seat of the Pope, who, as religious leader of the Roman Catholic Church, has retained considerable influence on certain phases of world affairs.

SHAPE

Compact shape is an advantage to a state. The more compact it is, the shorter the length of its boundary in relation to its area. This relationship has a direct bearing on a state's vulnerability to attack. Compactness is also an asset from the point of view of economic, cultural, and political unity.

Theoretically, the ideal shape for a state is a perfect circle with the capital located at or near the center. It is possible to express the deviation from the ideal shape by using figures arrived at by calculating the ratio between the circumference of a circle containing the area of the country and the real boundary length; hence, a low figure would indicate an approach to the ideal shape. For example, France has a value of two, which indicates

that its shape is almost ideal. Switzerland, Hungary, and Rumania are also very compact countries. Norway has a value of eleven, indicating a great deviation from the ideal shape. Nevertheless, from the point of view of protection, other factors may offset the advantage of shape and Norway, almost isolated, has been subjected to invasions less often than France.

Separations from Main Unit

Although compactness and elongation represent the two extremes in shape, numerous other forms deserve mention. Chief among these in its effects is a shape which results in portions of the state being separated from the main unit. The shapes of countries that have more than one unit may be classified as follows: (1) a broken shape, indicating that one or more segments are disconnected from the main territorial mass; (2) a fragmented shape, implying that there are numerous disconnected units, such as islands, but that nevertheless the combined territory covers a definite area of the globe; and (3) a scattered shape, indicating that the various parts are found in different parts of the world. Pakistan is a good example of broken shape with the western and eastern parts separated by northern India. Inter-war Germany, with disconnected East Prussia, was another good example. Greece has a fragmented shape, with the numerous islands forming an important part of the nation. The British Empire, with its world-wide distribution of territory, was formerly an excellent example of scattered form, but the present Commonwealth of Nations has lost many of the qualities of a political entity.

Small disconnected sections of a state, surrounded by foreign territory are exclaves from the point of view of the country to which they belong politically and enclaves from the point of view of the nations which surround them. Figure 22 shows some German exclaves that are surrounded by Swiss territory, a remnant of the period of feudal rights that bound these small areas to the neighboring German state. Some countries have offshoots in certain directions for economic, strategic or political reasons. If small, they may be called salients, but if larger the expression "panhandle" is often used; in other instances they have the function of a corridor giving access to a coast or a river.

Efforts to avoid direct contact between unfriendly nations were responsible for the strange extension of territory of Afghanistan toward Chinese Turkestan. Originally it separated Russian and British territories; now it separates U.S.S.R. from Pakistan.

From a military point of view it was once essential to take into consideration how much of a nation was located near the boundaries and was vulnerable to immediate attack in time of war. This was especially important when the border areas had economic significance. For instance, in the case of France, the best industrial sections (the textile regions of Northern France and the iron ore region of the Lorraine) faced direct occupation by the German army in case of an attack. In World War I France was immediately deprived of these valuable areas and had to continue the war under great handicaps. The factor of the vulnerability of boundary areas has lost much of its significance because air attacks can be made with almost total disregard of distance and destruction can be carried out at long range.

Location of Capital

Shape also enters into the problem of where a capital should be located if protection from land attack is a leading consideration. As stated above, a circular shape with the capital in the center would be ideal, but few capitals have been selected with this in mind. The classical example of central location is Madrid, selected by Philip II as the mathematical center of the Iberian Peninsula. Generally, however, other factors, either historical or economic, prevail and it is only possible to accept the site and evaluate its advantages or disadvantages from the point of view of modern warfare.

A capital on or near a coast needs the protection of a strong navy. Washington was sacked by the British in 1814. London was almost abandoned when the Dutch fleet sailed up the Medway in 1667. Oslo fell at the start of the German invasion in 1940 when the German fleet steamed up to the Oslo fjord, losing only some ships by gunfire from one of the forts guarding the entrance. Before the creation of Yugoslavia the most vulnerable capital in the world was Belgrade. Austro-Hungary was just across the Danube River and in World War I Belgrade had to be evacuated immediately. Vienna is almost in sight of Hungary

and Czechoslovakia, and Sofia is only 40 miles from the Yugoslav frontier.

The shifting of capitals often reflects changes in the character of nations. When Turkey lost most of her European holdings the site of Istanbul became eccentric and vulnerable, and the shift to an inland location (Ankara) was logical. Moreover, the cosmopolitan character of Istanbul was not regarded as suitable for a strong national Turkish state. Moscow, the present Russian capital, has a much more central location in respect to the nation as a whole than Leningrad, the former St. Petersburg, which was under German gunfire during most of World War II. Geographically, Frankfurt would be a better location for the capital of the Republic of Western Germany, but Bonn was chosen by a small and much disputed majority.

Although most capitals develop historically, some are carefully selected when a new state is born. When the site for Washington, D. C., was chosen, it was a central location in the zone of contact between the North and the South. The capital of Canada has shifted position several times, keeping pace with the westward movement of population. Quebec was the first capital, Montreal the second, and Ottawa the third. Delhi, in its central location in the Ganges plain, became the new capital of India. In Australia the rivalry between Sydney and Melbourne led to the selection of a site midway between the two—the present capital, Canberra. The tension between the British and the Boer elements in South Africa is reflected in the fact that there are virtually three capitals; Pretoria is the official capital but the Union Parliament sits at Cape Town, and the Supreme Court is located in Bloemfontein.

Climate

MAN'S LIFE IS RELATED TO CLIMATE in many ways. It limits the kind of food he can raise and it strongly affects his mode of life. It also greatly affects his vitality and is one of the factors influencing his cultural attainments. Climate and the development of political power are closely related. Thus it is not a coincidence that the most progressive nations of the world are located in the temperate regions.

LIMITING CLIMATIC ELEMENTS

Cold, heat, and aridity are the three climatic elements that have a limiting effect on human occupancy and on the development of political power. Figure 13 is a graphic presentation of the world distribution of these three elements. The zones of cold, heat, and aridity have each been divided into two sections to show where the element exerts an extreme influence and where a moderate one. The areas not included in these zones are suitable for the growth of nations because they are neither too cold, too hot, nor too dry.

Cold

The zones of extreme cold are in the polar regions and on high mountains. Soils are generally frozen and most of the territory is covered with ice and snow. Only along the warmer margins does the climate permit a short growing season for grasses, mosses and lichens. These zones of tundra are practically devoid of human occupancy and are grazing lands for reindeer. Scattered mineral resources, such as coal in Svalbard, iron ore in




FIGURE 13.

northern Sweden, and gold in Alaska, have some economic value; so also have the animal resources of the sea—whales, seals, and fish. Strategic military considerations increase the political significance of these cold zones. For instance, the Russian ice-free ports on the Arctic Ocean, with their continuous flow of shipping have posed great military problems in the past and may do so again. Aviation experts are concerned with atmospheric and terrestrial conditions in these zones because the length of many air routes can be greatly reduced by flying over them.

The *taiga* is the portion of the cold zone where the temperature regime is less severe—the great forest of conifers encircling the north polar section of extreme cold. Its winters are long and its growing season is too short for large-scale food production. With only a sparse population and a few scattered areas of mineral deposits, timber is its principal economic resource. The strategic value of this section is similar to that of the colder section. It can never be the nucleus of an important state, although it is an asset to the nations which own or control parts of it. On the warmer side of these areas conditions become better. Grazing and crop agriculture make their appearance but forests still prevail.

Heat

Heat is the second climatic element limiting political development. The zones of high temperature are along the Equator and immediately poleward of it. In these zones the division into two sections is based not upon higher or lower temperatures, as in the case of the cold zones, but rather upon the existence or nonexistence of a dry season.

The equatorial lowlands of the world, which have no dry season, constitute the first section of the zone. These lands are always warm and always wet. The sheer monotony of this climate, with little or no seasonal change, as well as the heat and humidity make it unfavorable for human habitation. The daily rains leach the soils and make them ultimately infertile for crops. Small clearings here and there in the midst of the tropical rain forest, with its profusion of parasitic growth, are evidence of the futile efforts of man to combat the natural environment. The warm, moist air in the interior lowlands saps man's vitality and

makes any expenditure of effort extremely difficult. The uplands and coastal locations tempered by land and sea breezes enjoy cooler temperatures and are better places to live than the interior lowlands.

A dry season in the second section of the high temperature zone gives climatic conditions that are much more favorable to man. The dry season breaks the climatic monotony; moreover, man's wits are sharpened in providing sustenance for himself during this less productive period. The vegetation in this section is not as dense as in the wet, equatorial lowlands and, in response to the dry season, it exhibits some drought-resisting characteristics. The soils, too, respond to the dry season by being less leached and more suited to agricultural uses.

The optimum climatic conditions for man in the tropics are in this section in areas where the dry season is rather short, as in India, Ceylon, Java, and Cuba. These are among the most densely populated parts of the world. Food crops, such as rice and corn, are raised in large quantities and vast estates produce an important share of the world's sugar cane, coffee, tea, cotton, jute, mahogany, and teak. However, on the edges of these areas, bordering the steppes, the dry season is longer and the rainfall is less certain. Famine is not uncommon in years of unusually low rainfall. Millets and sorghums replace rice and corn, and peanuts are the chief source of fat. Grazing increases and population density decreases. The struggle to produce enough for bare human existence is a bitter one.

Very warm climates, even those with dry seasons, are a definite handicap to modern political development. The Maya Empire of Yucatan and the Mon Khmer of Cambodia are historic instances of the rise of great political powers in the tropics, but in both cases the energy and impulse for development came from other climatic zones. These once great states are now gone, never to return. The trend of world-power development has been away from the warm climate zones and there is no reason to suppose that this poleward tide will reverse itself.

Aridity

The third climatic element that handicaps political development is dryness. The desert sections of the world are inhabited

only where it is possible to overcome this handicap by providing water in sufficient quantities for agriculture or where valuable mineral resources are being worked.

The world has many irrigated regions that support dense populations, and the density is in direct proportion to the size of the available water supply. If an irrigated area is large, it may become the site of an important political unit. The oldest states of the world, in the valleys of the Nile, the Tigris and Euphrates, and the Indus, were products of a desert climate where water for irrigation agriculture was supplied by rivers. These regions, lacking the enervating climatic monotony of the equatorial zone and the severe cold of the polar zone, were in those times the most favorable portions of the world's lands for human progress and political development. Their climatic conditions enable man to develop to a point where he can conquer the vicissitudes of the less inviting climatic areas. The extent of irrigation was limited by the water supply, however, and consequently the political growth of the states was curtailed. At present those once great states have lost their position as world political leaders, although Egypt, Iraq, and Pakistan still rank high in the community of nations.

Desert areas that are inhabited because valuable mineral resources are being worked are comparatively small in extent, and the size of the population is limited by the manpower requirements of the extracting operation. The population, itself an import, is sustained by supplies brought in from the outside, often at great expense.

Such areas obviously lack the environment necessary for the development of a state. They do, of course, have one great asset: the mineral wealth which provides economic power for the political developments elsewhere. For example, although the central section of Chile is the political heart of the nation, it was for years the exploitation of the nitrate deposits in the desert of northern Chile that provided the state, through taxes, with sufficient income to operate practically on a single income basis. Later, the discovery of a process for the manufacture of synthetic nitrates resulted in such a decrease in the export of natural Chilean nitrates that the state was forced to reorient its whole economy. Similarly, the national core of Saudi Arabia lies in

its scattered oases, but currently the bulk of the state's income is derived from the exploitation of the vast petroleum resources located in the northeastern section, along the coast of the Persian Gulf.

The steppe, where semi-arid conditions prevail, is the second section of the arid zone. Populated by nomads, except where irrigation waters make sedentary life possible, the steppes have been the cradle of many dynamic events in world history. At times great movements of men, great invasions, have emanated from them to alter the world political structure. The steppes have also occasionally been temporary centers of great political power, as in Mongolia and Manchuria at the time of their supremacy. Today, the dynamic energy of semiarid lands is clearly visible throughout the Middle East, especially on the Anatolian Plateau in Turkey, and in Israel.

In general, however, semiarid climatic conditions, resulting in a sparse, nomadic population, prevent sustained political greatness. Thus in the past, the centers of power have shifted from the steppes to conquered regions of more favorable, less limiting climate.

THE SUITABLE CLIMATES

There remains for consideration the zone in which the climate is favorable for political development, in contrast with the climatically unfavorable parts of the world discussed above. The term, "favorable climatic zone," needs further amplification. For instance, western Europe and most of the United States fall in that zone. However, when the empires of Egypt and Babylon were at their peak, only savages roamed through the European forests and in America the Iroquois never reached the cultural level of the Aztecs on the subtropical Mexican Plateau.

The reason for this mystery is that climates can only be regarded as favorable for human progress if man has learned to live comfortably under such climatic conditions. In other words the cultural level enters into the picture. Of course it is possible that civilizations develop in situ, but generally ideas are brought in from the outside. Ellsworth Huntington, the man who put climate on the map as a factor in human life, wrote about the

"polar march of civilization." By that he meant that civilization started in the more clement climates where man did not need special protection against cold and gradually extended into the more severe climates, which up until then had blocked human progress. It was a slow process and the road from Heliopolis and Babylon to London and Paris was a long one. But gradually man became ready to profit culturally from the climates we have called favorable. Even at present one cannot say that man is able to live a fully productive life under all climatic conditions but he has come a long way and has overcome some of the disadvantages of the so-called unfavorable climatic conditions, such as extreme heat or cold.

The zone of favorable climate is humid with intermediate temperatures. Like the zones of unfavorable climate, it is divided into two sections: the middle latitudes section, and the lower latitudes section where high elevation offsets higher temperature.

In the first—the middle latitudes section—cool temperatures together with marked seasonal changes and cyclonic storms, which bring a constant variety of weather, combine to make a climate best suited to the development of political power. A comparison of Figure 13 with a world political map brings out the fact that all politically powerful nations, with the exception of Brazil, are located in this section of the humid intermediate climate zone. On the map, three major concentrations of political power stand out: one in central North America, one in Europe, and one in the Far East. These areas, which have nurtured the world's greatest political developments, are all in the first section of the favorable zone—that is, they all enjoy a humid intermediate climate with strong cyclonic influences. Also politically outstanding in this section are Argentina and Chile in South America, New Zealand and Australia, French North Africa, and the Union of South Africa.

The second section of this climate zone is characterized by low-latitude mountains and highlands. In some instances these areas become centers of political power. Many of the South and Central American republics and Ethiopia are examples of political development in areas where elevation offsets the effects of low latitude. The limited area of these elevations and the tend-

ency toward rough topography, caused by the rapid erosion of the uplands, generally prevent the development of politically great nations. Brazil is the exception, being the only country in the world with its core on a tropical plateau of large extent. Together with Argentina and Chile, both in higher latitudes, it seems destined to dominate the future course of history in South America.

HOMOGENEITY VERSUS COMPLEXITY

Up to this point only very broad climatic areas have been considered. Obviously, climatic details vary greatly within the sections of each zone. In a nation occupying a large area, the variety of climatic conditions will exert a strong influence upon the people and hence upon the structure of the state. Merely to say that a nation is located in one or another broadly defined climatic zone or section of a zone is not sufficient. The climatic details which operate in an area must be considered because each state, in its effort to establish a sound economy and make the best possible use of its natural resources, must cope with its varied climates.

As a general statement it may be said that climatic homogeneity is an asset to political unity of a nation, whereas complexity, the opposite extreme, may have a less favorable influence and in some cases may even lead to political disintegration. A state, unless it is very small, usually has more than one type of climate. However, as we shall see, a certain climatic trend often dominates and, accordingly, a certain degree of uniformity prevails. In climatic complexity, there may be abrupt changes in the type of climate or a gradual blending. The former condition may become detrimental to political unity. The latter condition gives climatic variety, which may be considered an asset.

Climatic Homogeneity

The ancient Roman Empire was climatically homogeneous because it was composed chiefly of areas having a Mediterranean type of climate, characterized by winter rains and marked summer droughts. In this sense, Rome was a Mediterranean Empire not only because it occupied the shores of that great sea, but

also because throughout most of its extent this type of climate gave rise to a similar type of economic and cultural problem. The climate varied slightly from place to place; it was colder to the north than to the south and more moist in the northwest than in the southeast. Nevertheless, uniformity of climate prevailed, and everywhere the people of the Empire spoke the same "geographical language." Because of the similarity of their environmental problems they understood one another's point of view and could more easily be governed from one central point—Rome. Homogeneity of climate strengthened the centralized Roman government and was responsible, in part, for its long and fruitful existence.

Abrupt Climatic Complexity

Spain is an equally good example of a state with climatic complexity (Figure 14). Although Spain was once a part of the Roman Empire it was too small to be a dominant force and its climatic disadvantages were not critically effective until it became a separate political unit. Within its relatively small area it combines three very different types of climate. Along the northern coast is an area of so-called Atlantic climate, very similar to the climate of western France. The southern and eastern coasts have a Mediterranean climate. Between these two very different climate areas is a third, an inland steppe. The contrasts between the climates of the three areas are great and transitions are abrupt.

The highly centralized government in Madrid has attempted for centuries to effect some semblance of unity among the people living under this complex structure. It is little wonder that various parts of the state have from time to time demanded greater political freedom on the grounds that the Madrid government did not understand their local problems. The demands for political autonomy made by Catalonia, the Basque Provinces, and Galicia led Spain far along the road to disintegration, until military power under a dictatorship established an uneasy unity.

Another example of climatic complexity, but one with far different effects, is the British Commonwealth. From a small, climatically uniform, insular base the British spread their empire throughout the world, embracing many different climates. The

empire thus had some degree of climatic variety, but its advantages were far outweighed by the disadvantages of complexity. This situation became apparent as soon as individual units of the empire became strong enough to protest vigorously against the




FIGURE 14.

British government's failure to understand local problems. The American War of Independence may be said to have had, to some extent, a climatic basis. The lack of appreciation of the difference between the problems of life under the climate of England and those under the climate of the eastern seaboard of the American continent was one of the factors that led to armed conflict. The outcome served to warn the British that similar events were certain to occur in other parts of the empire. The transmutation

of colonies into dominions and of the Empire into the British Commonwealth of Nations was also an adjustment to the problems arising from widely differing climatic conditions. Historic events, of course, cannot be explained by climate alone, but in the study of history the influence of climate on human life cannot be neglected, although it is often outweighed by other considerations.

Gradual Climatic Complexity

The United States is a good example of a country with climatic blending. The climates east of the Great Plains, having the same controls, are very similar. Marked temperature differences exist between the northern states, from Minnesota to New England, on the one hand, and the Gulf States on the other; the transition from north to south, however, is gradual and there are no abrupt climatic changes. Similarly, the transition from east to west between the humid climates of New England and the semiarid, steppe climates of the Great Plains and the western mountains is gradual, one blending almost imperceptibly into the other. The Pacific Coast states, however, have climates quite different from those of the rest of the country. Were it not for this difference, it might be said that climatic variety without complexity existed in the United States.

The reactions of the people in various sections of the country to national issues is often a reflection of the element of climatic complexity. People in the West Coast states are likely to feel that their problems are not understood on the eastern seaboard. Wool growers in the semiarid western areas feel differently from the people of humid New England about low import tariffs on wool. Agricultural problems and their proposed solutions are viewed differently by people in the Corn Belt than by people living in the timber country of the northwest or the irrigated lands of the southwest. The Civil War was, in a sense, a conflict based on climate, in that it was a clash between different ways of life, both economic and philosophical, each adapted to the climatic conditions under which it developed and thrived.

The U.S.S.R., occupying more land area than any other state in the world, has a great variety of climates, but the prevailing continental type gives it a certain amount of homogeneity. Its

expanses of tundra and taiga stretch from the Finnish boundary to the Pacific, and southward blend gradually into the vast interior steppes and deserts of Asia. The continental European climate—characterized by cold dry winters and warm, fairly wet summers—dominates the western, or European, part of the state and extends well into central Asia; there monsoons and extreme continentality take over as the dominant climatic factors.

Modes of economic and cultural life are inevitably widely diversified throughout such a varied climatic structure. The sedentary farmer in eastern Europe, the nomadic herder of the central steppe, the lumberman of the taiga, and the people of the high mountains in the south, have vastly different problems and points of view. Throughout this extremely varied climatic structure, however, there is an underlying uniformity through the predominance of a continentality in a considerable part of the state. Nevertheless, the climatic structure of the U.S.S.R., like that of the United States, contains an element of complexity which some day may create internal political problems.

CLIMATE AND WAR

Wars have always been a part of the life of states, and climate has always been an important factor in the conduct, duration, and final outcome of wars. In time of war, climate plays a dual role, on the home front and on the battle front.

On the home front, climate influences the nation's ability to wage war because it is directly connected with the economic structure of the nation. Modern warfare strains the economy of a state by demanding vastly increased production of foods, textiles, military equipment, arms, and innumerable other items. The efficiency of the manpower which makes increased production possible is to a great extent dependent upon the energy of the population and upon the domestic food supply; both these factors are largely dependent upon climatic conditions. Assuming that a state has adequate resources of raw materials or access to them, its capacity to produce to meet the demands of war is in a general sense dependent upon its having climates which make the use of such resources possible.

The advantages of climatic blending in the United States have

been proved in two World Wars. Its varied climatic regions are so large that an abundant and diversified domestic food supply is always available. Only tropical food products, such as bananas, pineapples, coffee, tea, and cacao, have to be imported, and from the standpoint of health and energy the population of the country could easily do without these imports if necessary. During the two World Wars the climates of the United States were important factors in making it possible for this country not only to be "the arsenal of democracy" but also, after the fighting ceased, to supply material help to the devastated nations in their rehabilitation efforts. An equally large area with equally large supplies of resources and manpower could not have achieved such results if it were burdened with climatic complexity or uniformity bordering on monotony.

On the battle front, climate is perhaps even more important. The health, comfort, and fighting efficiency of the troops are of prime importance and are dependent to a considerable degree on the climatic conditions in the battle areas. The welfare of the troops also depends on the size and quality of the food and material supplies reaching them from the home front.

Those responsible for the conduct of modern war give careful consideration to the climate of the areas in which their troops will be located. The speed with which modern warfare is conducted makes it necessary to lay careful plans to assure adequate supplies of the proper kinds of food, clothing, shelter, and equipment for troops fighting under any and all climatic conditions. This requires a full knowledge of the details of world climate, a wealth of skill in design of materials, and a huge productive capacity at home. The following examples, taken from World War II, indicate the vast and complicated problems posed by climatic conditions that must be solved to maintain the efficiency of the combatants.

The troops that fought their way across the hot, arid wastes of North Africa to capture Libya required far different food, clothing, and equipment than the men who brought the supply laden ships into Murmansk. Men and equipment suffered from the growth of fungi in the hot, rain-drenched islands of the South Pacific while their comrades in arms suffered from snow and cold in western Europe. Troops in the Persian Gulf command had to be equipped

to withstand heat and high humidity in parts of their area and arid cold in other parts. In Italy the troops fought both the enemy and the seemingly endless days of winter rain. In some combat areas the problem was to get enough of the right kind of clothing to keep warm, while in other areas it was impossible to take off enough clothing to keep comfortably cool. The men who fought by air had to be especially well equipped and adaptable for they frequently took off from a hot, wet base to land a few hours later on a snow-covered air strip where the temperature was below freezing.

Proper equipment often meant the difference between success and failure. While we at present say with pride that we have the best-equipped armed forces of the world, this was certainly not the case at the time of Pearl Harbor and many soldiers died because either the necessary information about the areas was not available or the correlation between climate and such things as clothing had not been perfected.

We are not the only ones who suffered. When the German armies advanced into Russia in June, 1941, the German staff, or perhaps Adolph Hitler himself, expected the war to be over before winter struck. In the beginning it appeared that this expectation was correct, but gradually with increasing distance from the home base, the advance slowed down. A final effort in late fall to reach Moscow failed and the German armies got the order to dig in and wait till spring. The winter was a severe one even for Russia, but with the proper equipment much could have been done. However, when the generals at the front asked for winter clothing, it was discovered that the German Quartermaster had not prepared for that emergency. In distress, the Army had to go to the civilian population for help and soldiers in women's fur coats manned the German trenches. The misery of that winter when the badly equipped German armies had to defend themselves against constant Russian attack, was one of the factors which broke the spirit of the German soldiers and provided the Russians with the inspiration to win.

Climatic Timing

When the timetable of war is set up, when the dates for the beginning of campaigns and battles are established, climatic fac-

tors are of great importance and are given great consideration. Throughout the ages invaders have timed their campaigns to take advantage of the most favorable climatic conditions. History offers examples of military disasters resulting from lack of climatic knowledge. Today, however, knowledge of the world's climates has increased to such an extent that it is possible to forecast climatic conditions on a long range basis with considerable accuracy.

Recent history offers many examples of climatic timing in warfare. In the spring of 1935 almost everyone expected Italy to attack Ethiopia. From May to September heavy rains drenched the Ethiopian plateaus and transportation was at a standstill. In September, when the rains ceased, the attack began, as expected; and the war dragged on through the dry winter. In the spring of 1936 the threat of approaching rains caused a speed-up in the Italian operations and Addis Ababa fell at the beginning of May, well before the rain started.

It was almost inevitable for World War II to start in September. In the spring of 1939 it appeared certain that Germany was going to make war, but it seemed most likely that she would take advantage of Europe's summer climate to produce and harvest a good crop because a manpower shortage might result in a food shortage later on. Moreover, heavy rains fall on Poland in August; in October the cooler temperatures there result in less evaporation so that roads are in poor condition. September, a relatively dry month, was thus the most suitable time for a German attack because the German crops were harvested, German mechanized equipment functioned best on firm ground, and the weather was ideal for fighting on the plains of Poland.

Another classic example of climatic timing was provided during World War II. The invasion of Norway was launched at the beginning of April, 1940. On this occasion the timing was not for good weather but for bad. In April, winter still holds sway in Norway, and coastal storms, cloudiness, and mists cause very poor visibility. The invasion of Norway was a surprise attack materially assisted by bad weather. "Empty" German ore boats on their return to Norway carried soldiers, and bad weather provided protection for this Trojan horse operation. Once the invasion had been accomplished continued bad weather meant continued protection from British interference.

Relief

PLAINS, HILLS AND VALLEYS, PLATEAUS and mountains are the major physiographic forms which separately or in varying combinations make up the relief of states. As an element of the political geography of a state, relief always functions internally and also at times in connection with a boundary line. Internally, it exerts a strong influence upon the cultural and economic patterns of the state and, together with climate, provides a permanent backdrop against which a state's history is enacted. On the periphery of a state, relief occasionally provides an excellent physical basis for a boundary line. More frequently it offers no basis at all for a boundary and sometimes it even hampers the functioning of a boundary superimposed upon it.

INTERNAL INFLUENCE OF RELIEF

Plains, under the proper climatic conditions, provide the most favorable sites for economic and social progress, and hence for political development. No other land forms, despite their respective advantages, are as well suited to human habitation and cultural growth. Thus it is not surprising that the bulk of the world's population lives on plains and that the major part of the world's economic, social, and political activities are carried out on level land.

Gentle Relief

Gentle relief of plains offers practically no obstacle to transportation except where a dense forest cover interferes, as it does in the equatorial lowlands of South America and Africa. Here and there

a cuesta or moraine may break the even skyline, or a swamp, lake, or river may provide wet footing, but these barriers have a very minor effect.

Horsemen have ridden unhampered over the great interior plains of Asia for centuries. Covered wagons from the settlements of the Appalachians rolled with comparatively little difficulty across the Great Plains of the United States to reach the West. Later, the same plains offered few obstacles to the building of transcontinental railroads and motor highways. More recently, they have provided fine terrain for the construction of airports to facilitate transportation by air. Water transportation is also more effective in plains since canals are readily built and usually require few if any locks. The gentle relief of the Mohawk Gap in New York State made possible the construction of the Erie Canal which connected the Great Lakes with the Hudson River and played a large part in the development of New York State and of the entire Middle West. The Erie Canal is no longer in use, since the expansion of rail and motor transportation, but the New York State Barge Canal, which follows essentially the same route, is used to transport slow moving, bulk freight. The lowlands of France have made it possible for that country to construct one of the most intricate and unified canal systems in the world to transport men and goods from one end of the country to the other over rivers and connecting canals. The importance of the canals of the Netherlands is legendary and needs no comment.

Communications are also facilitated by plains. Telephone and telegraph wires and radio and television cables easily traverse plains; postal service is more easily maintained in level areas than in more rugged ones.

To summarize, plains make possible unimpeded transportation and communication. The resultant free flow of men, goods, and ideas is the life blood of a state's social, economic, and political structure. Plains also provide the world with its best large agricultural areas and with the sites for its greatest cities. Level land is easily tilled and yields abundant crops if the climate and soils are favorable for agriculture. The construction of villages, towns, and cities has always been less difficult on plains than in areas of sharper relief.

These great advantages are lost if the relief is so gentle that it

hampers the runoff of rain water. The land then at times becomes soaked and neither farming nor transportation is easy. Heavy summer rains falling on the gumbo of Nebraska turn it into a sticky mass. Roads become lanes of mire in Poland in October, and in Argentina the Gaucho fights against mud during the rainy season. The plains of the U.S.S.R. in northern Asia drain gently northward so that the headwaters and upper reaches of the rivers thaw sooner than the mouths, and great annual floods occur along the lower sections of the streams. Often more rain water runs off the land than the old rivers of many large plains can handle so that flooding is not uncommon in many parts of the world.

Gentle relief and climate. Climate and gentle relief sometimes together provide nearly ideal environmental conditions for man. The three factors—levelness of the land, a long, warm growing season, and an ample supply of rain in the late spring and early summer—make Iowa and its neighboring states the greatest corn-producing region in the world. On the Pampas of Argentina, where the land is level farther than the eye can see, the climate supports a lush growth of grasses and permits cattle to graze in the open throughout the year. This combination of gentle relief and favorable climate makes the Pampas one of the world's best meat-producing areas. On the eastern Great Plains of the United States, west of the Corn Belt, and also in the southwestern part of the U.S.S.R., the climate is ideal for the growth of wheat. In both regions the flatness of the land makes possible the use of great combines in the production of enormous quantities of grain.

Sometimes climate cancels the advantages of gentle relief. On the plains of western Egypt and eastern Libya so little rain falls that only a very sparse population can be sustained. The vast northern plains of Canada and the U.S.S.R. have so short a growing season that little agriculture can be carried on and only conifers can survive.

Disadvantages of Gentle Relief

The advantages which plains offer to man far outweigh the inconveniences which they sometimes impose upon him. As noted above, the ease with which men, goods, and ideas move on the plains is an important element in the political growth of states. Plains, however, have one serious drawback—they are vulnerable.

The very lack of barriers that facilitates transportation in peacetime also makes the movement of troops a fairly simple matter in time of war. Plains provide excellent sites for man to live and work, but they offer no protection against his enemies except where some other environmental factor makes up for the deficiency of low relief. Swamps with their tangled vegetation, dense forests, and climate sometimes offer protection. We have already noted how the early civilizations in the Nile, Indus, and Tigris-Euphrates valleys were protected by a surrounding belt of aridity which was difficult for invaders to cross.

Uplands

Uplands, where the relief offers protection, are often the natural birthplace of political units. As states mature politically they often outgrow their physiographic protection and spread beyond their mountain cradles to more attractive and more vulnerable adjoining lowlands. In South America, the centers of Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador are in high mountains and each of these states extends down the mountain slopes to the bordering sea-coasts. In Asia, Iran extends beyond its mountain-framed plateau to the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. Turkey, whose center lies on the mountain-rimmed Anatolian plateau of Asia Minor, extends to the coasts of the Black, Aegean, and Mediterranean seas. In Africa, Ethiopia made an effort to reach the sea beyond its mountain fastnesses, but was blocked by Italian, French, and British colonies. Today, as we have noted, it has reached that goal because of its union with Eritrea.

In times of great distress nations may retreat from their vulnerable lowlands to refuges in the uplands. In 53 B.C., during the Gallic Wars, Vercingetorix counted on the protective topography of the Auvergne Plateau when he led the great revolt against Rome. Caesar, despite his brilliant strategy, had difficulty in fighting the topography and the climate before he emerged victorious. The Moors, who overran Spain in the eighth century, easily conquered the southern cities, but they met constant and bitter resistance well into the tenth century from the Spanish Christians who fled the lowlands to take refuge in the forested northern mountains. In World War I the Serbs left the plains of the Danube River and tried to defend themselves in the mountains where their

nation was born. Again in World War II the same mountains were the scene of extensive guerilla fighting as the Yugoslavs defended themselves.

Uplands, with their elevations and sharp relief, hamper man in his trade and travel. Moreover, upland topography is usually unfavorable for agriculture, and its steep slopes provide few sites on which large cities can be built. The chief economic assets of uplands are timber and minerals, the production of which requires comparatively few people. Thus highlands are generally sparsely populated and they stand out on population distribution maps as border or frontier belts next to the more densely populated adjoining lowlands.

Mountain states. Nevertheless, a few purely mountain states exist today. Tibet and Switzerland are outstanding examples. Others are Andorra, nestled in an isolated section of the Pyrenees between Spain and France; and Nepal and Bhutan, occupying valleys between the high ranges of the Himalayas and the Siwalik Hills, which separate the mountains from the northern plains of India.

Tibet is the world's most noted mountain state. For centuries the Himalaya and Kunlun ranges not only protected its valleys and lakes from invasion but also isolated the state from the rest of the world. The passes leading to Tibet are high and so difficult to negotiate that, even in the twentieth century, they serve as passageways for a bare minimum of trade and communication. Only a few of the more adventurous travellers have made the great effort necessary to visit Tibet and its people, who are not especially hospitable to strangers. Politically, Tibet has generally accepted Chinese suzerainty, but the ties between the two states have been very weak. In 1951, however, Chinese armies invaded Tibet and brought it under direct Communist control. There are now Russian-controlled airfields on the high plateau, and Tibet has become a part of the area beyond the Iron Curtain.

Switzerland, born in the mountains around Lake Lucerne, is also a good example of a mountain state. Although the nation spread over the Swiss Plateau and its armies once swept the plains of the Po River, in the course of time it retreated from the plains to its present mountain-plateau location. Here relief provides natural protection and control over strategic passes which, unlike

those of Tibet, serve as excellent routes of trade and communication when the Swiss want them to be open. Relief was certainly one of the major factors which enabled the Swiss to maintain neutrality in World Wars I and II.

Complex upland topography favors the formation of small political units. Ancient Greece is the best example of this type of development. The many mountain-rimmed basins formed cradles for numerous small political units which, because they had better access to the sea than to the adjoining inland areas, expanded by colonizing the nearby islands. The numerous Italian states, once welded into the Roman Empire and re-established as separate entities upon its fall, had a physiographic base in most cases. San Marino stands alone today as a survival of the process. Its thirty-eight square miles of rugged topography on the slope of Mt. Titano have enabled it to avoid the ravages of the many wars that have swept around it. It has maintained its independence continuously since the fourth century and lays claim to being the oldest state in Europe. In the Caucasus Mountains there were, at times, as many small political units with distinctive ethnographic structures as there were valleys in the mountain range.

Upland handicaps to national unity. Uplands which once aided national growth are sometimes serious handicaps to national unity when a state has reached a later stage of political development. Switzerland experienced several civil wars based upon regional differences closely related to its mountain topography. Romania has found the Transylvanian Alps, once regarded as a safe refuge for people fleeing from invaders of the Danubian plains, a handicap to national unity. They separate the southern and eastern parts of the country from the northern and western sections, and considerable energy and thought has been needed to reduce the barrier effect. The Balkan Mountains are a similar handicap to Bulgarian unity, for with only the Isker Valley as a narrow though easy pass, they divide the country into northern and southern units. In this instance a marked difference in climate between the two parts serves to accentuate the barrier effect of the relief; there are really two geographic regions, politically united.

A country divided by mountains, like Romania or Bulgaria, is known as *un pays à cheval*, a country on horseback (Figure 15). The people of the western coastal plains of Peru, for example, are

separated by the peaks of the high Andes from their fellow countrymen on the eastern Amazonian lowlands. Until recently, when a newly-established airline to some extent reduced the barrier effect of the mountains, intercourse between the western and eastern parts of the country had to be carried on chiefly by sea, via

Cape Horn or the Panama Canal, and by a long trip on the Amazon River.




FIGURE 15.

States have often surmounted physiographic handicaps of upland relief. The Appalachian Mountains and the Allegheny Plateau once retarded the westward movement of peoples in the United States with the result that the nation at first occupied only a long narrow strip along the Atlantic seaboard. Eventually the barrier was conquered and today the Appalachian Mountains and the Allegheny Plateau are only a small

handicap to communications. They are not only traversed by numerous roads and railroads but are also fairly well populated. In the same way, the dissected eastern rim of the Australian Plateau exerted a mountain barrier effect until it was conquered; the rolling uplands are now used for sheep ranches and wheat farms.

Mountain passes. Mountain passes often have marked political significance. The Dariel Pass in the Caucasus Mountains controls all north-south movement in that area. Serious disorders were frequent and a great number of lives were lost before the British secured some degree of political control over the important Khyber Pass, between India and Afghanistan. The pass today is controlled by Pakistan and disorders are again frequent. The St. Gotthard Pass, within the territory of the original Swiss federation, gave Switzerland control over the road to Italy and thus permitted national expansion to the south. Control over the St. Gotthard, the Simplon, and other passes through the Alps has

been an important factor in the maintenance of Swiss independence and neutrality.

INFLUENCE OF RELIEF ON BOUNDARY LOCATIONS

The concept that most boundary lines are based upon relief or other natural features is quite common, but a study of the world's boundary lines will reveal that this condition is relatively rare. In a few cases relief features, sometimes aided by vegetation, have exerted a barrier effect of sufficient magnitude to bring about a natural separation of peoples, thus providing a good natural basis for a boundary line.

Lowland Boundaries

Boundaries are better able to perform their separating function if they are based upon a physical barrier or upon a topographic feature which exerts a barrier effect. When boundaries are established in areas of low relief the gentle topographic features are usually of very minor importance. On plains, natural features—such as swamps, lakes, rivers, and forests—have in some instances been used as the base for boundaries, but lowland boundaries are generally based on some human element. Because low relief lacks marked physical barriers and provides no protection, man erects fortifications along such boundaries. These fortifications provide a measure of protection and clearly identify the boundary as a distinct line of separation.

In early times, walls occasionally served as definite boundary markers and as protection against invaders. Trajan's Wall, extending from the Transylvanian Alps across the plains of the lower Danube to the Black Sea is one of the most famous ancient boundary walls. Little of it remains today, but for centuries it marked the northern limit of the Roman world in the Balkans. Another such protective device that indicated the position of a boundary was the Picten Wall in northern England. The ancient and renowned Great Wall of China, although it did not traverse only lowland plains, was a man-made protective barrier and a distinct boundary marker. Today it has lost both its protective value and its function as a boundary marker, and serves only as a tourist attraction when tourists are free to travel there.

The modern counterpart of these ancient walls is a fortification, largely underground, built along frontiers which lack natural protection as a result of low relief. Examples are the Maginot Line in the northern lowlands of France, the Mannerheim Line on the poorly drained lowlands of the Karelian Isthmus in Finland, and the Siegfried Line along the western boundary of Germany. It is clear that while none of these fortifications and walls, ancient or modern, proved to be very effective, man has continually tried to protect his property from invasion if nature failed to do so for him.

Vulnerability of lowland states. Lowland states are much more vulnerable in case of war than countries whose boundaries are strengthened by physical barriers. Poland, for example, has very little protective topography near its boundaries except for the rather ineffective Carpathian Mountains and the Pripet Marsh. It has therefore always been under pressure to maintain as large an army as possible to repel invaders. Despite all Poland's efforts there have been long periods in its history when it was without sovereignty. Hungary's low-lying plain boundaries are open to attack from all sides, and Rumania has only rivers to protect it on its Bulgarian and U.S.S.R. frontiers. In World War I Germany's lowland topography made it vulnerable on both its eastern and western fronts. It temporarily overcame the disadvantage by staging a series of bold attacks which took the fighting into neighboring countries. Again in the later stages of World War II Germany faced attack from both east and west. This time she lost; the two fronts met around Berlin. The boundaries of the Netherlands cross low-lying plains which give no natural protection. Formerly, in times of attack the Dutch forces could retire to the even lower interior of the country where some measure of protection was gained by flooding the land. Modern amphibious warfare tactics, however, leave the Netherlands wide open to attack.

Upland Boundaries

Because the barrier effect of uplands on man's movements can be eliminated for the most part by the expenditure of materials and energy, it is the scarcity of people in the uplands rather than the physiographic features that encourages man to use them as a base for his boundary lines.

Despite sparse population, upland boundaries are not easy to construct. When a boundary line is drawn in mountain country the question usually arises whether it should be drawn along the crest of the main range, along the hydrographic divide, at or near the foot of the slope, or on the basis of the ethnographic structure and distribution of the sparse population. Sometimes human elements in a boundary problem make it necessary to draw the line in the lowlands to include the entire range within a single political unit.

The Vosges as a boundary base. During the twentieth century one of the world's most important boundary lines has been the one separating France and Germany. Its shifting location is based on numerous factors, one of which is the position and relief of the Vosges Mountains.

The Vosges, west of the Rhine River which they parallel, are a pronounced though low-lying range with the highest point, Ballon de Guebwiller, at 4,680 feet above sea level. The range forms the hydrographic divide between the Rhine and the Moselle drainage systems and its slopes are heavily forested. On their eastern side, the Vosges slope steeply toward the Rhine plain and erosion has cut many sharp, narrow valleys into the eastern mountain face. On the western side, the slope toward central France is long and gentle. Because of its orientation and relief, the Vosges would seem to be a natural barrier that could serve admirably as a base for a boundary line. Moreover, their physical attributes as a boundary base are augmented by certain human factors. They form something of a language boundary, with French the predominant language to the west and German to the east. Economically, the western slope of the Vosges and the lands to the west are definitely oriented to the French economy, but the eastern slope and the adjoining Rhine plain fit best into the economic region of the Rhine Valley.

Despite all their advantages as a physical base for the Franco-German boundary line, the Vosges have served in that capacity for only a relatively short period of time. In 1871, following the Franco-Prussian War, the boundary between France and Germany was moved westward from the Rhine River, where it had been for more than a century, to the crest of the Vosges. This move had

economic and cultural advantages for the people in the transferred territory and for the German state. But it also proved a very serious military disadvantage for both the French and the Germans.

In World War I the Germans experienced the military disadvantage of having to negotiate the steep eastern slope of the Vosges and to traverse the numerous narrow valleys cut into the mountain side. The French moved over the long, gentle western slope with ease and found the sharp eastern valleys a military advantage. On the other hand, the French faced a constant danger that the Germans would succeed in reaching the crest of the Vosges from which access down the long, gentle western slope to the heart of France would be very easy. With the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 the Franco-German boundary was moved back to the Rhine River where it remains today.

A boundary on a slope. Before World War I the boundary line between Austria and Italy extended along the northern rim of the eastern plains of northern Italy. Since it was on the lower slope of the Alps, the line left the bulk of the range in Austria. In the early years of the war the Italian forces tried repeatedly to gain the crest of the range, but each effort was repulsed, and the limestone slopes of the Carzo between Trieste and Gorizia were the scene of many Italian defeats. Early in 1917 the forces of the Central Powers came down the slope and broke through the Italian lines. They won the Battle of Caporetto not only through military might and superior planning, but also through a physiographic advantage. It is no wonder that Italy insisted at the peace conference following the war that the boundary be moved well to the north to include the crest of the main range, even though such a shift raised serious ethnographic problems.

The Pyrenees as a boundary base. The Pyrenees have often been cited as an example of a mountain boundary base. On wall maps and in atlases they appear as a great wall separating Spain and France. Undoubtedly they have served admirably as a frontier zone, but because of local details in their relief they are not a complete barrier. Hannibal crossed the Pyrenees during the Second Punic War and so did the Moors when they swept across Spain into France in the eighth century. The Basques today live on both the northern and southern side of the mountains. Roussillon, in southern France, was originally Catalanian and became a part

of France through the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659; and the population of the Val d'Aran in Spain, is French-speaking.

Oriented in a general east-west direction, the Pyrenees extend from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, a distance of about 280 miles. The highest part is the Maladetta range which reaches 11,169 feet above sea level in the Pic d'Annetto. Elevations are lower on both the eastern and western ends of the range where narrow coastal plains separate the mountains from the sea. Numerous cirques are evidence of former glaciation and the upper mountain topography has broad expanses of fairly level land. These features make communication with corresponding sections across the boundary much easier than with the lowlands on either side, since the latter are separated by rough slopes. The existence of the independent state of Andorra is based upon these broad upland areas which make transportation and communication within the country easy, and upon the rough topography of the slopes which have given protection to the state throughout its history.

The frontier between Spain and France, although it is superimposed upon the varied mountain topography of the Pyrenees, has, nevertheless, not been altered for a considerable period of time. Today it is one of the world's mature boundaries with local cultural, economic, and political affairs adjusted to it.

Glacis-territorial Extension

Sometimes nations extend their territory beyond their mountain frontiers in an effort to obtain double protection, a type of territorial extension known as a "glacis." There are numerous historical examples of glacis. The former Austro-Hungarian Empire had a glacis in Galicia (Figure 16) in order to provide itself with an arena in which to fight the Russians before the latter reached the Carpathian Mountains, the natural but ineffective frontier of the Empire. Now the Russians have a glacis south of the Carpathians that extends to the Danube plain. France once extended beyond the Pyrenees in a glacis known as the Spanish March. Today, the Ticino (Tessin) area is a glacis of Switzerland into Italy, and the plains of Alsace, east of the Vosges and west of the Rhine, are glacis of France, although gradually France came to regard the Rhine and not the Vosges as its natural frontier. Fig-

ure 17 shows two good examples of less known glacis in the south-eastern part of Switzerland, extending from the Maloja and Bernina passes into the valleys leading to Lake Como.

Plateau Boundaries

Plateau country, as a physical base for boundary lines, combines some of the attributes of both highlands and lowlands. Generally, it has more level land than mountains but far less than




FIGURE 16.

plains because erosion cuts sharply into its exposed, uplifted surfaces, especially along the forward edges. The dissection of the forward rims of plateaus results in topography which is often referred to as mountains because it appears as such to travellers and surveyors. These dissected portions sometimes offer physical bases for boundaries not unlike those of mountains, although the gently rolling, upland surfaces present the same sort of problems to boundary makers as do lowland plains.

The Czechoslovakian boundaries with Germany and Poland, following World War I, were drawn in recognition of the barrier effect produced by the dissected rim of the Bohemian Plateau. These bordering rims, called "mountains," are known as the Bohemian Forest in the west, the Ore Mountains in the northwest, and the Sudeten Mountains in the northeast. Their rough topography, dense forest cover, and the resultant zone of sparse popula-

tion combine to make the area one of Europe's historic, physical boundary bases.

An unusual and historically interesting physical boundary base in plateau country is the rift valley of the Jordan River, which was significant for centuries as the basis for the eastern boundary of




FIGURE 17.

the Holy Land. Recently, with the formation of the state of Israel, it ceased to perform its historic function.

The northern extension of the Arabian Plateau in this area has an average elevation of 3,000 to 4,000 feet. A great block of it faulted downward making a large rift valley or *graben*, through which the Jordan River flows. Where the river enters the Lake of Tiberias (Sea of Galilee) the elevation of the valley floor is about 600 feet below sea level and at the river terminus, the Dead Sea, it is 1,300 feet below sea level. The sides of the rift valley, often referred to as "mountains," are steep and sharply dissected. These sides, rather than the Jordan itself, offered the barrier effect to man's movements; but the river, being sharply defined on the

landscape, provided the basis for the boundary line. With the formation of Israel, human factors loomed far larger than any physical barrier and the historic boundary line was replaced by one superimposed on the physical landscape.

WORLD BOUNDARIES BASED ON RELIEF

Africa, the plateau continent, offers few examples of boundaries based on relief features. The land rises abruptly from narrow coastal plains where most of the colonies had their origin. Territory was claimed from the coast inland, and this practice accounts for the continent's large number of astronomical boundaries. As the colonies prospered and their populations grew they generally conquered the escarpment and occupied the gently rolling plateau surfaces which, except for their elevation, resemble plain lands. Some political units, notably Liberia and Sierra Leone, have never conquered the escarpment and remain today as coastal plain states.

Asia, abounding in nearly every type of relief feature from vast lowland plains through high plateaus to the world's loftiest mountains, fittingly has more miles of boundary lines based on relief features than any other continent. The Kurdistan-Zagros Mountains, for example, are used as the basis of the boundary between Iraq and Iran. The Taurus Mountains constitute a real barrier between Turkey and its two southern neighbors, Syria and Iraq, although the present boundary is to the south of these mountains. Mountains frame the subcontinent of India and the countries of southeastern Asia. The boundary between British and former Dutch possessions in Borneo, now a part of Indonesia, is also based on mountains. In the past the old Chinese Empire was once framed by mountain walls over which the Russian forces have now infiltrated, and in 1950 many Americans became acutely aware of the mountainous northern frontier of Korea.

North America has few international boundaries and only two examples of boundaries based on upland topography. One is a portion of the Maine-Canadian boundary between the headwaters of the St. Francis River and those of the Connecticut River. The uplands through which the boundary is drawn separate the St. Lawrence drainage system from that of New England. The other

North American upland boundary is between the southern panhandle of Alaska and Canada. In Central America only the boundaries of Honduras are based upon the mountainous character of the land.

In South America the boundary between Argentina and Chile, based on Andean topography, is the longest mountain-based boundary in the world. But the making of this boundary, like that between France and Spain in the Pyrenees, presented numerous difficulties. The boundary, seemingly a "natural" one, was supposed to run along the lofty peaks and passes that were believed to form the water shed. However, unknown to the original boundary makers, the mountains were not made that way. Glaciation has left a drainage pattern often unrelated to the crests, and there are many instances of bifurcation.

In 1900, Argentina and Chile, rather than go to war with each other to settle boundary disputes, agreed to use field studies as a basis for correcting the boundary line originally agreed upon in the treaty of 1881 when the lands involved were little known to either party. Accordingly, field parties of surveyors were sent out under the direction of Colonel Sir Thomas Holdich and on the basis of their findings, with King Edward VII of England as the final arbitrator, a completely satisfactory settlement of the problem was reached within a year or so. This case is a good example of problems which may arise if boundaries are based on relief features. There were two translations of the 1881 agreement. The Argentine translation said that the boundary "shall run along the most elevated crests of the Cordillera de los Andes that may divide the waters and shall pass between the slopes that shall descend on one side and the other." The Chilean version was that the boundary line "shall run over the higher summit of the Cordillera which divides the waters and shall pass between the source of the streams flowing down to either side." It was further stated that "all the land and all waters, to wit: lakes, lagoons, rivers and parts of rivers, streams, slopes situated to the east of the line of the most elevated crests of the Cordillera de los Andes that may divide the waters, shall be held in perpetuity to be property and under the absolute dominion of the Argentine Republic."¹ The Chileans

¹ Arthur R. Hinks, "Notes on the Technique of Boundary Delimitation," *The Geographical Journal*, December 1921, p. 417.

maintained that the boundary should be the continental divide and nothing else. The Argentines maintained that the phrase "part of the river" recognized the possibility of rivers crossing the




FIGURE 18.

boundary and that at any rate the boundary must lie in the Cordillera. The Chileans replied that in their opinion the low divide on the Argentine pampas was in the Cordillera. One member of the Argentine delegation demonstrated the indefinite character

of the divide by diverting one of the rivers from the Pacific to the Atlantic through digging a ditch, with the aid of a few men, in one week's work. This controversy did not lead to war and probably gave a lot of fun to the members of the tribunal of arbitration, but it showed the difficulty of agreeing upon relief features to be used as bases of boundaries. The only other South American boundaries based on uplands are those between Brazil and Venezuela and between Brazil and the Guianas.

Most international boundaries based on upland topography are in Europe (Figure 18). The boundary line between Norway and Sweden is notable not only because it is based to a large extent on mountainous topography but also because it is a very mature boundary that was in its present position even before the two states became fully independent of each other in 1905. The boundary between Spain and Portugal is also mature and is based largely on what seems to be mountains, but is in reality the dissected forward edge of the Iberian Plateau. The Spanish-French boundary in the Pyrenees has been discussed above. The boundary between France and Italy follows essentially the crest of the main Alpine range except in one small portion where it jogs noticeably to the west. This portion of the boundary was constructed originally to permit the ancestral hunting grounds of the House of Savoy to remain in Italy.

Inland Water Bodies

RIVERS AND LAKES ARE THE MOST important inland bodies of water from the point of view of function and use. To these must be added canals and swamps for a complete survey of this geographical element.

RIVERS

Throughout history rivers have played a dual and contradictory role; they both unite and separate the areas through which they flow. This dual function appears clearly in political geography. The uniting character of rivers has made them highways within states, and their separating character has tended to make them boundaries between states.

Rivers Within States

The oldest states in the world were river states. They were located on the northern limit of the tropical deserts where climate at that time, taking into consideration the cultural level, offered the best conditions for the advancement of human culture. These areas had enough seasonal climatic variety to stimulate energy, but did not have the cold temperatures which man in the early stages of cultural development was not yet able to endure. In these desert environments water was essential for life, and hence rivers were of the utmost importance. Natural floods and in later times irrigation made possible the raising of food. Cooperation was necessary to control the water supply, and protection had to be provided against the raids of neighboring tribes. States survived that could embody the necessary cooperation in laws and provide

the necessary protection by armies. These were essentially river states, extending along the shores of the life artery—the river. Egypt, the Nile state, is the classical example; others existed along the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and the Indus River. At present, Egypt and Iraq are still river states, not differing essentially from their forerunners in the rise of civilization.

When the use of ships was developed, rivers became important as highways, especially in low countries, for they gave access from the coast to the hinterland or connected various parts of a state in the days when roads were poorly developed and far from safe. The political expansion of the Hanseatic League inland from the Baltic and the North Sea followed the main river courses, and the League's control was limited to the water highways. The rivers of Russia, from their focal point in the Valdai Hills, became the lines along which the young Russian state grew into its present shape in Europe. Similarly, the St. Lawrence and Mississippi rivers were the backbones of the French colonial possessions in North America. By way of these rivers the French explorers penetrated far into the interior of the continent.

River crossings, especially before engineers were able to construct bridges almost wherever needed, grew up as points of importance within a state, and many a city was founded on a river island that had the factor of protection and was also important as a traffic junction. Paris is an outstanding example. All of these functions are still significant in varying degrees. The present world political pattern offers numerous examples of the important role of rivers in the structure of states.

River States

In Europe, the Danube was the backbone of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The disintegration of the empire at the end of World War I resulted in the creation of several states and the enlargement of others, each of which received a share of the river. Lack of cooperation between these states, however, led to a decline in traffic, despite the efforts of an international Danube committee. Since World War II, when the U.S.S.R. was added to the nations having a front on the Danube (the north branch of the delta), the Soviets have exercised major control. Strained relations between Russia and Yugoslavia, however, may bring a note of discord into

communist Danubian harmony. Poland between the two World Wars was primarily a Vistula state although that river had little economic value; now Poland also controls the Oder, the outlet for Upper Silesia. The Rhine was regarded by the Germans as their special river (*Der Deutsche Rhein*), but its function is now partly that of a separating boundary, rather than a uniting element.

Asia offers three examples of single-river states; one, Iraq, has already been mentioned. The two others are Burma and Siam along the Irrawaddy and Menam rivers, respectively. Although China is too extensive to be considered a river state, the three great rivers—Hwang Ho, Yangtze Kiang, and Si-kiang—form the framework along which the country has developed.

The African rivers in general lack the character of highways, especially because of the frequency of rapids and falls near their outlets where they break through the African mountain frame from the plateau to the coast. There are, however, some exceptions. The Nile is navigable up to the first cataract at Aswan. Egypt, on the Nile, has already been noted, and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, upstream, above the cataracts, is also a Nile River state. Nigeria controls the lower part of the river after which it is named; the Belgian Congo covers most of the basin of the Congo River; and British Gambia is the river state *par excellence*, with boundaries following the Gambia River at a distance of six miles for their entire length.

In South America, rivers, which played an important role in the Spanish period, retain their national significance. Northern Brazil is the state of the Amazon; Venezuela, except for the northern uplands, is the state of the Orinoco. In each case, however, the uplands are the real heart of the state and the river lands are still only of potential value, awaiting development. Paraguay is definitely an inter-river state between the Parana, Paraguay, and Pilcomayo rivers. In North America the Mississippi River unites all the land between the Appalachians and the Rockies into a huge river basin which is the heart of the United States, but the economic outlet of the country is captured by the eastern seaboard with its more favorable location. With the development of rail, motor, and air transportation, the Mississippi River has lost most of its former glory.

Delta States

Besides river states which control river drainage systems, there are also delta states. Their existence seems geographically illogical, because they control the outlet of a river belonging to another state and are destined to run into trouble. The best example is the Netherlands, primarily a delta state of the Rhine, Scheldt, and the Meuse rivers. Here on the contact between sea and land traffic (the Rhine is navigable up to the Swiss town of Basel) an independent state developed with its own national character based on that contact. The importance of its location protected its existence, since no large European nation would permit other nations to control it. In the balance of European power, the Netherlands was safe. Only in times of German supremacy, as in World War II, was its independence at stake, for a German victory would have meant the end of its existence as a free state. Another example of a delta state was the interwar Free City of Danzig, a compromise between Polish export needs and a predominantly German population.

River Frontage

Access to rivers is so desirable that to achieve this end states often occupy land that otherwise would not interest them. Two examples of this process are the extension of former German Southwest Africa, later a South African mandate, to the Zambesi (the so-called "Caprivi" extension), and the two extensions of German Cameroon before World War I to the Congo River system (the so-called "Duck's Bill"). More recent examples are the Leticia Corridor extending Colombia to the Amazon River, and the eastern extension of Syria to the Tigris.

The importance of river frontage is also shown by the fact that some of them are internationally controlled. Especially after World War I the idea of international control of the most important European rivers prevailed. Incidentally, they were all located in the territory of the defeated nations. The Rhine, Elbe, Oder, and Danube were put under international commissions, the membership of which was not always restricted to the countries through which the rivers flowed. The German government, under Hitler, resented the international interference in what it termed

purely German affairs, and in April, 1936, it denounced all international control over the German river systems, but promised to keep the streams open to international traffic. The Oder and the Danube are now beyond the Iron Curtain and the future control of the Elbe and Rhine has not yet been decided.

Military Value

Rivers within states have military value and serve as protection against invading armies in spite of modern methods of surmounting river obstacles. Some river crossings are famous in history, notably Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon and Washington's crossing of the Delaware. Battles have been named after rivers; for instance, the two battles of the Marne in World War I. Size does not necessarily determine the military significance of rivers. American soldiers in World War II will always remember the Rapido which impeded the march toward Rome in the Cassino region, as well as the difficulty in crossing the Roer (between Aachen and Cologne) whose shores could be flooded by the destruction of dams upstream. The battle of Arnhem (September, 1944), in which parachute troops were landed to secure a Rhine crossing, was fought in vain and the real Rhine crossing was made months later, by the American 1st Army over the Remagen bridge and by Patton's and Montgomery's armies to the south and north respectively. Russian rivers played an important part in World War II as they had done in former times, for example, when the retreating Napoleonic army crossed the Beressina. A striking case of the military importance of rivers was the German effort to reach the Volga in World War II, which led to the German tragedy at Stalingrad, the beginning of German defeat. There are many other instances of importance, such as the struggles to cross the many little creeks on New Guinea and the Solomon Islands during the second World War.

Separating Effect

Even within states, some rivers separate, rather than unite. They then become disturbing elements in national unity, comparable to a mountain barrier within a country, as discussed in Chapter 5. This separating effect of rivers may arise from various factors. It may be the width of the stream, which makes

bridge building difficult. It may be the character of the flow, which is too rapid or too irregular to permit navigation. Sometimes the river valley and not the river itself exerts a separating influence and acts as a landscape barrier. The canyons of Spain have always been separating elements within the Iberian Plateau. Another good example is the Zambesi Gorge, below the Victoria Falls, which breaks the connection between the lands to the north and south. In the United States the Grand Canyon of the Colorado might cause difficulties if there were a necessity for intercourse between the two upland rims of the canyon. In a minor way it already has, because the canyon separates the northwestern corner of Arizona from the rest of the state. As a result, Arizona authority over this isolated section had to be exerted through California, Nevada, and Utah until the Navajo Bridge was built.

Rivers as Boundaries

Rivers as international boundaries have two advantages, or it may be said, functions. They separate and consequently protect, and at the same time they offer a definite base for a boundary demarcation. In the latter case, the rivers—like mountains when they are used in this way—constitute a zone and not a line, and the real boundary is only man's interpretation of the use of that zone. A boundary line can be drawn along either bank, in the center of the stream, or in the mid-channel. Islands within the stream complicate the process of drawing a river boundary, especially as they can be used for crossing in case of war. An example of this situation was the constant quarrel between Russia and Japan (through Manchukuo) over the control of the islands in the Amur River. The fact that rivers sometimes change their courses offsets their advantages as definite bases; however, most of the important rivers used as boundaries are well under control. The Mississippi, which for most of its length is an interstate boundary, has varied its course frequently, leaving parts of the left bank on the right side and vice versa.

The Rio Grande. Internationally famous is the case of the Rio Grande, which has a bad reputation for wandering around in its valley. This case is ably discussed by Stephen B. Jones of Yale University:

The Rio Grande, as a boundary between Mexico and the United States, has had a history as tortuous as its course. It was adopted in 1848 and surveyed in 1852-53. In thirty years, so many changes of course occurred that further action was necessary. The convention of November 12, 1884 . . . criticized:

"The dividing line shall forever be that described in the aforesaid Treaty and follow the center of the normal channel of the rivers named, notwithstanding any alterations in the banks or in the course of those rivers, provided that such alterations be effected by natural causes through the slow and gradual erosion and deposit of alluvium and not by the abandonment of an existing river bed and the opening of a new one."

"Any other change, wrought by the force of the current, whether by the cutting of a new bed, or when there is more than one channel by the deepening of another channel than that which marked the boundary at the time of the survey made under the aforesaid Treaty, shall produce no change in the dividing line as fixed by the surveys of the International Boundary Commissions in 1852, but the line then fixed shall continue to follow the middle of the original channel bed, even though this should become wholly dry or be obstructed by deposits."

The first clause contains the unfortunate use of "slow" and "gradual." Application of the second clause eventually resulted in the existence of fifty-eight pieces of land, locally called "bancos," due to the cutting of meanders by avulsion. The existence of many bancos created confusion in administration and led, in 1905, to an additional convention, which returned the boundary to the actual river. The bancos fell to Mexico or the United States, as they lay to the right or the left of the river. For the future:

"The International Commission shall, in the future, be guided by the principle of elimination of the bancos established in the foregoing article. . . . There are hereby excepted from this provision the portions of land segregated by the change in the bed of the said rivers having an area of over two hundred and fifty (250) hectares, or a population of over two hundred (200) souls, and which shall not be considered as bancos for the purposes of this treaty and shall not be eliminated, the old bed of the river remaining, therefore, the boundary in such cases."

In some portions of the Rio Grande Valley, the meandering river course has not been straightened and stabilized by dredging and diking. The boundary now lies in the rectified channel instead of the natural bed:

"The parcels of land that, as a result of these cuts or of merely taking the new axis of the channel as the boundary line, shall remain on the American side of the axis of the rectified channel shall be the territory and property of the United States of America, and the territory

and property of the United Mexican States those on the opposite side, each Government mutually surrendering in favor of the other the acquired rights over such parcels.”¹

Other river boundaries of the United States. The United States has a number of river boundaries. The one between the United States and Canada, starting at the eastern boundary of Maine, follows the St. Croix River to its source, and then, after it reaches the St. John, follows that river and its branch, the St. Francis, to the outlet of Lake Pohenagamook. Farther west the boundary follows Hall's Stream from its head to the 45° parallel. This looks rather simple but at the time the boundaries were drawn there were numerous complications. Which one of the several rivers having their outlet in the Bay of Fundy was the St. Croix? The St. Croix River, once decided upon, was to be followed to its source, but there proved to be two branches; which one was to be used? The “Halls Creek” that is the western source of the Connecticut River does not cross the 45° parallel, which the boundary was to follow according to the treaty, but joins the Connecticut above that line. All these details may look rather insignificant, but at the time they caused a lot of trouble. In one case, the King of the Netherlands was called upon to arbitrate, but his decision was not accepted by the United States, and more discussion was necessary.

South of the 45° parallel the St. Lawrence is used as a boundary and so are the connections between the Great Lakes—the Niagara River, Detroit River, St. Clair River, and St. Marys River. River boundaries also exist between Lake Superior and the Lake of the Woods, such as Pigeon River and Rainy River. The Rio Grande boundary between the United States and Mexico has already been discussed. One more river boundary should be noted—the 20 miles of the Colorado River south of the junction between that river and the Gila River.

Problems of river boundaries. In unexplored territory, rivers, like mountain ranges, have been agreed upon as convenient boundary lines. Thus many colonial boundary lines were drawn through the midcourses of rivers whose outlets were known but

¹ *Boundary-making*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Monograph Series No. 8 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945).

whose upper courses were unexplored. Examples can be found in the Guianas in South America and in various colonial units on the African Guinea coast. Complications in the use of rivers as boundaries sometimes arise over the question of which of the two branches is the main stream and hence the boundary. Michigan and Wisconsin engaged in a long and expensive boundary dispute which arose chiefly over the question of which fork of the Menominee River was the main stream. It is difficult in the case of many rivers to decide whether their real character is a separating or a uniting one. In such instances a political separation may be a temporary economic disadvantage. The Rhine boundary between France and Germany, which separates Alsace from the German province of Baden, is a case in point. From 1871 to 1918 Alsace and Baden were part of the German economic system and were united by numerous economic ties. The new boundary established after World War I broke these connections entirely and forced Alsace to an economic reorientation toward the French markets. Thus it may be seen that the function of a river depends a great deal upon political circumstances.

Boundaries Based on, but not at, Rivers

Although it seems logical to draw river boundaries in the river itself, in certain cases the dominant power at the time the boundary is agreed upon forces the boundary from the river to the shore or even the river bank, thus preventing access to the water itself. When oil was found in Iran, and Abadan became the outlet for it, the problem of the use of the Shatt el Arab (common outlet of the Euphrates and Tigris) arose. Up to that time Iraq had controlled the waterway and Iran had no rights beyond the river bank. This situation was corrected in 1939 when Iran received a share of the river in front of Abadan. Similarly, Afghanistan could not use the Oxus River, because the boundary was along the southern bank. In 1946 an agreement was reached whereby Afghanistan received a better river boundary, while conceding the town Kushka, in the river of that name, to Russia. Another case was the former Polish-East Prussia boundary, which was located on the German side of the high-water bank of the Vistula; only at one spot did a narrow

corridor reach the river itself, in accordance with the rules of the Treaty of Versailles.

A good example of a country being kept away from a river front is the eastern boundary of Dutch Limburg. When the boundaries of the Netherlands were agreed upon in 1815, efforts were made to deny Prussia an outlet on the Meuse River. The distance between the boundary line and the river, however, is so small that it served no purpose when the German armies invaded in May, 1940. They lost practically no time in crossing the Meuse on a bridge prepared on German territory and brought with ease to the river front.

Another interesting case is the boundary between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. In order to protect the Nicaraguan rights on a potential interocean canal, the boundary follows the south bank of the San Juan River up to a point near the settlement El Castillo, and then continues three miles south, parallel to the river and to Nicaragua Lake. However, Costa Rica has the perpetual right of free navigation both on the river and the lake.

Bridgeheads

Efforts to control river crossings have led to the concept of a bridgehead which defends the approach to a river from the opposite side; bridgeheads may be regarded as river glacis. An example is the river glacis temporarily constructed on the east side of the Rhine after World War I in order to control any German uprising and facilitate any movement of the Allies' army of occupation into Germany.

There are many examples of bridgeheads, some of long standing, others of very recent origin. Often their existence is due not to military considerations but to historical events or economic factors. For instance, the bridgehead of Edirne (the former Adrianople) across the Maritsa River gives Turkey a station on the main railroad from Central Europe to Istanbul before it enters Turkey proper. The Maastricht bridgehead across the Meuse in Dutch Limburg is based on the fact that Maastricht had been part of the Dutch Republic and remained in Holland when the separation between northern and southern Netherlands took place (Figure 20). The accompanying map also shows a boundary correction made after World War II shortening the



FIGURE 19.

length of the Netherlands-Germany boundary.

After World War II a new bridgehead was created and an existing one was enlarged. The new one, on the west bank of the Oder River, is Stettin, the port of that river, and also includes one of the two delta islands as well as the outerport of Swinemunde; the enlarged bridgehead is across the Danube from the Czechoslovakian town of Bratislava.




FIGURE 20.

LAKES

Lakes, like rivers, have a double function in political geography, they both unite and separate. As unifying forces they become centers of states, and as separating elements they provide excellent international boundaries. A good example of a lake that is the nucleus of a state is Lake Lucerne (Vierwaldstättersee) in Switzerland (Figure 21). Similarly, Lake Mälär in Sweden




FIGURE 21.

may be considered as the center of Swedish political power. In South America, Lake Titicaca once had a central location in the Inca Empire.

As boundaries, lakes have the advantage of being definite landmarks, even in otherwise unexplored territory. The second point favoring lakes as boundaries is economic, namely, the advantage to both countries of having a share in the trade across the lake. However, on lakes, as on rivers, the question arises as to the exact location of the boundary line. It may be the median line between the two shores or a mathematical line uniting two lake points. Islands in the lake complicate the process of making

boundaries because they offer points of advantage for controlling lake trade. Excellent examples of lake boundaries are those on Lake Geneva, Lago Maggiore, Lago di Lugano, and Lake Constance in Switzerland. The last two are discussed below; they indicate the complexities of boundary problems when natural factors, such as rivers and lakes, are used in combination with historic factors.

Lake Constance and Lago di Lugano

The Rhine starts its function as an international boundary at Sargans, where it separates Switzerland first from Liechtenstein




FIGURE 22. The Lake of Constance. (This map also shows examples of exclaves and enclaves, which are discussed on p. 60.)

and then from Austria. According to an Austria-Switzerland treaty in 1929, the frontiers between the two states were to remain unchanged even after the completion of two changes in the bed which the Rhine follows. Consequently, Switzerland now has a central section across the Rhine while Austria has the present outlet in Lake Constance. Lake Constance (Figure 22) is now a three-nation lake, bordered by Switzerland, Austria, and Germany. Before the unification of Germany in 1870 five states had

access to the lake—the three semi-independent German states (Bavaria, by way of a narrow corridor, Württemberg, and Baden), Switzerland, and Austria. Across the narrows between upper and lower Lake Constance is a German bridgehead, Constance, its position based on its role as an ancient imperial city. Lake Constance, as well as some other lakes with international boundaries, was a favorable place for escaping from Germany or for entering it secretly, because boats could cross unnoticed under the protection of darkness. The boundary west of Lake Constance is very complex. Switzerland has three extensions north of the Rhine, of which the middle one—Schaffhausen—is fairly large. Germany still retains two enclaves in the Schaffhausen area, one of which is very tiny. All these complications have historical backgrounds. Switzerland has another bridgehead across the Rhine at Basel, where she controls both shores of the river at the junction of Switzerland, France, and Germany.

The case of Lago di Lugano, though relatively simple, is still complex largely because of the bizarre shape of the lake. Italy possesses the northeastern branch and shares the western branch, she also has an enclave (Campione) on the east side of the lake opposite the Swiss city of Lugano, separated from the homeland by part of a slope.

African and North American Examples

The boundaries of Africa were drawn before exploration was complete and thus offer good examples of the advantages of lakes as convenient border areas between countries. One of these areas is Lake Chad, which once served as the focus of British, French, and German interests, while Italy also looked in that direction from Libya. Of course the most famous lake boundaries are found in North America. The United States-Canada boundary through the Great Lakes is an uninterrupted line of 1,000 miles, if the short intermediate river sections of the St. Marys, St. Clair, Detroit, and Niagara are included. This boundary area is one of the world's greatest inland waterways, but it also serves excellently in separating the two national territories.

SWAMPS

Unlike rivers and lakes, which have both uniting and separating functions, swamps only separate territory or serve as a refuge. Out of the swampy delta of the Rhine River arose the political unit now called the Netherlands; here the protective value of the swampy terrain was a great factor in the success of the war of independence against Spain. The Pripet Marshes, out of which the western source of the Dnieper River flows, were used principally as a base for the interwar boundary between Poland and Russia; the area was essentially a no-man's land separating these two states. From the strategic point of view, swamps are still important in modern warfare. In 1914 the Russian armies were halted in the intricate complex of swamps and lakes of East Prussia, and were routed completely by a relatively small opposing force which used these physical elements to its advantage.

INUNDATION

Water may be used as a barrier through planned inundation, but this can be done only in lowland plains that lie below or near sea level. During World War I the march of the German troops toward Calais was stopped in Flanders by opening the gates of the locks of the Yser River and inundating the land. Similarly, the defense of the Netherlands is based on a system of inundation. Here the presence of numerous small drainage ditches increases the hazards of this defensive measure. However, there is a risk that in cold winters the water may freeze and thereby make invasion easy. History affords instances of this catastrophe, but they are rare exceptions rather than the rule. There are very few freezing periods in the mild winters of northwestern Europe. The invasion of the Netherlands by Germany in 1940 was made possible, not by a weakness in the strategy of inundation, but because the Germans also attacked from the rear with parachute troops and so broke the resistance.

CANALS

Another type of inland water body that at times has political functions is the inland canal. (Interoceanic canals are not considered here, but are discussed in Chapter 9.) Inland canals are so essential in the economic structure of some nations that their destruction in times of war is strategically as important as the demolition of industrial developments. In the later stage of World War II the German Mittel Canal, connecting the Rhine, Weser, and Elbe, was rendered partially useless through the bombing and destruction of some of its locks and viaducts. The Kiel Canal, connecting the Baltic with the North Sea, combines great shipping value and strategic importance. During World War II the canal made it possible for the Germans to avoid the trip around Jutland and to shift their fleet at will.

The building of the Dortmund-Ems Canal is an example of economic considerations affecting another nation. It was hoped that Rhine shipping would use the canal instead of going through the Netherlands, but this hope was not fulfilled because the latter route had the transportation advantages of an open river outlet.

No definite example can be found of a canal used as a boundary. None of the famous Sault Ste. Marie Canals, it should be noted, is a boundary between the United States and Canada. Two are on the American side and one on the Canadian side of the boundary, which follows the rapids in the riverbed.

Coasts and Maritime Development

COASTS ARE THE ZONE OF CONTACT between land and sea; they vary in actual location because of tidal differences. Along that zone—which for practical purposes is called “the coast”—two economies meet, that of the land and that of the sea. The coast has all the advantages of this double economic structure. It is also the connecting link between two types of transportation—the one traversing the land, the other, the sea. Finally, along its coast a nation faces all other nations of the world that have coastal locations.

COASTAL BOUNDARIES

Traditionally, the coastal boundaries of a nation lie three miles offshore (figured on low tide), a distance originally based on the range of coastal gunfire. This distance was formerly regarded as a minimum and exceptions increasing the distance have been made in several instances.

The United States promulgated a new concept in September, 1945, by announcing that it was the national policy to regard the national resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf as “appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control.” The proclamation did not define the term “continental shelf,” but a Department of State Bulletin (September 30, 1945) described it as the area adjacent to the continent and covered by not more than 100 fathoms (180 meters) of water. The right of free navigation upon the high seas above the shelf was unconditionally recognized. The reason for this new policy was the desire to safeguard American rights in mining as well as

in coastal fishing; it referred especially to oil production along the coasts of the Gulf of Mexico. The proclamation also recognized the necessity of negotiating treaties with other countries where offshore fisheries had been developed jointly by the United States and other nationals.

It is noteworthy that the word "sovereignty" was not used, only the expression "jurisdiction and control." The area between the coast and the 100 fathom line contains 759,600 square miles and varies greatly in width. It is narrow along the Pacific coast but wide along the Mexican Gulf and parts of the Atlantic, and especially wide along the Bering Sea.

The Latin American republics eagerly espoused the concept, generally changing the idea of control to that of sovereignty, and adding the area of the epicontinental sea to that of the continental shelf. Chile, for instance, proclaimed a line 200 marine miles distant and parallel to the coast as the limit of her sovereignty.

The coastal American nations face wide oceans and the new boundaries generally will not cause much friction except when they interfere with existing fishing habits of other nations. The only difficulty will be the location of the 100-fathom line in areas where the topography of coastal waters is complex, for example on the coast of New England with its submarine ridges and canyons. In western Europe, however, such a policy could not be easily adopted. Great Britain and Ireland, for instance, are both located on the continental shelf and the application of the 100 fathom line would lead to unsolvable complications.

The American boundary expert, S. Whittemore Boggs, made a careful study of this subject.¹ He differentiated between territorial waters and the contiguous zone claimed by a nation. The width of territorial waters ranges from three miles—the usual width—to twelve miles, with many variations between these limits. The U.S.S.R. is the chief country with a twelve-mile zone of territorial waters. This claim causes trouble, especially in the Baltic, as a result of the Russian practice of confiscating any foreign (chiefly Swedish) fishing boats within that zone, and of shooting down foreign planes above it. The width of the contiguous zone, if it exists, also varies from six miles (France) to

¹ "National Claims in Adjacent Seas," *Geographical Review*, XLI, No. 2 (1951), 185-210.




FIGURE 23.

200 miles (Chile, Peru, and San Salvador); some other nations consider the continental shelf as their contiguous zone.

THE "DRANG" TO THE COAST

It is understandable that nations should desire a seafront, giving them access to ocean traffic, especially one not controlled by other powers. Efforts to obtain one often dominate the foreign policy of a nation. The wish for a seafront may be called, to paraphrase the *Drang nach Osten* policy of the German expansionists, a *Drang* to the coast.

Such a *Drang* may lead to the creation of corridors connecting a state with the coast. A well-known example is the former Polish Corridor, which gave the "new" Poland, created after World War I, a share of the Baltic coast but separated East Prussia from the rest of Germany. Hitler used the latter situation as one of the reasons for going to war with Poland in 1939. After World War II the corridor disappeared, because Poland now has a longer stretch of the Baltic coast between Russian East Prussia and Germany beyond the Oder River. Another example of a corridor to the coast is the outlet of the Belgian Congo, connecting it with the Atlantic Ocean. Ethiopia, after having been cut off from the coast, gained a coastal zone on the Red Sea north of French Somaliland after World War II, but later, through her union with Eritrea, her coastline was greatly increased in length.

The converse situation occurs when the connection of a state to the sea is broken off and the country becomes landlocked. A good example is Bolivia, after Chile deprived her of her coastal front on the Pacific. Likewise Italy, by occupying Trieste and Fiume after World War I, took away from Austria and Hungary the only harbors they possessed.

Free Zones

In order to give inland states an opportunity to use the seas for trade, free zones often have been created in the ports of other nations. A nation that has a free zone in another nation has the right of free transport from that zone to its own territory without political or other control by the nation in which the free zone is

located. Czechoslovakia between the World Wars had such a zone in Hamburg, with the use of the Elbe River for transportation. In the same period Yugoslavia had one in Saloniki. Switzerland made special arrangements during World War I to use the French port of Sète on the Mediterranean coast, and ships were sailed from there under the Swiss flag.

FACTORS IN MARITIME DEVELOPMENT

The Character of the Coastline

A coastline is favorable for shipping when it offers harbors well protected against ocean storms, a most important factor in the maritime development of nations. Bays and gulfs—often island-protected—wide river estuaries, and large lagoons with sufficient entrance are among the best types of coasts for navigation if other factors are also favorable. Conversely, a straight coastline that is either rocky or sandy makes large-scale navigation to and from it comparatively difficult. Open roadsteads where only tenders or small boats can reach the coasts are handicaps to navigation even under present conditions of technical skill, especially when there is a heavy surf. The senior author remembers many such difficult landings in the Indonesian islands, when sharks stood eagerly by waiting for a mishap.

Of course, artificial harbors can be made almost anywhere today, and the only deciding factor is whether the costs can be offset by the commercial advantages of such a port. Many natural harbors, even the best ones, need some improvement, either by the building of piers or jetties, or by dredging or deepening the approach.

Another point to be considered is that factors that may not be favorable today were favorable for maritime development in ancient times. Coastlines once noted for shipping are often worthless for modern navigation because their shallow waters do not permit the approach of large steamers; in other cases a once-good coastline has lost its favorable qualities through silting, and once-famous ports are now wholly land cities, showing only a few signs of their period of maritime glory.

The Character of the Ocean

The favorable character of a coast can be handicapped by the character of the ocean along it, either because of the prevalence of storms and fog, or because severe winters close the coast during a part of the year. In former times storms kept small boats near the coasts, and ship mortality was high. Large modern steamers are able to weather all storms except hurricanes, which generally can be avoided. The large fishing fleets off Newfoundland and Iceland, and even around the British Isles, still suffer losses from heavy storms which are less frequent than in former days when vessels were less sturdy. The problem of fog still has not been solved, and collisions occur despite foghorns and controlled pace. This is so even near the entrance of New York harbor, where traffic is sometimes halted for days because of poor visibility.

The Character of the Hinterland

Even an ideal coastline has no practical value if the hinterland is entirely unproductive. Whatever the reason for lack of productiveness, whether deserts, mountains, cold climates, or other factors, the results are the same. The beautiful fjord coastline of southern Chile remains undeveloped because the hinterland up till now has been worthless. In the same way, navigation on the Greenland coast, difficult in some places as a result of ice conditions, is limited to a few steamers a year (government vessels or scientific expeditions) because the land itself is inhospitable.

There are, of course, numerous variations between a good and a bad hinterland from the viewpoint of its effect upon maritime development. Each must be appraised according to a number of factors. Chief among these are the economic value of the potential products and the size of the market. Sometimes a single valuable export product is sufficient for maritime development.

The Availability of Building Material

In the days when ships were made of wood, availability of timber was a prominent factor in maritime development. This was especially so in the infancy of maritime activity; later, wood

could be obtained from other sources if a nation had no forests or if they had been depleted. So also, when iron began to be used for ships, a nation that had iron ore and coal could more readily make the change from sailing ships to iron vessels than a nation which lacked these resources. The growth of the British merchant marine in modern times is based in part on the fact that iron ore and coal were available in the British Isles and that therefore British shipyards took the lead in ship construction.

The Character of the Population

Most people are well adjusted to their environment and have developed whatever maritime possibilities their country possesses. In some cases, however, inland people with no coastal background, who gain a coastline through political events, make little or no use of it. A good example is the case of Turkey. After the disastrous Greek-Turkish War of 1921, the Greek population that had lived on the coast of Asia Minor since the days of ancient Greek civilization was expelled, and the Turks who came from the semiarid grasslands were settled there. The Turks were unable to continue the coastal shipping for which the area had long been noted at anywhere near the former level of activity.

CLASSIFICATION OF STATES AS MARITIME OR INLAND

It is not always easy to determine whether a state should be characterized as a maritime or an inland power. The two extremes are clear, but the gradations between them present difficulties. Many efforts have been made to make an evaluation by some "common denominator" which makes possible comparison of nations on the basis of maritime and inland activities. One method is to compute the ratio between the length of the coastline and the land area of a state. This ratio does not, however, take into account the character of the coast or the economic value of the land.

The authors have experimented with another method—the ratio between the tonnage of a nation's merchant marine and the number of its inhabitants. The results are presented in Table II. These ratios, however, fail to give a complete and

accurate picture. The tonnage figures used ignore ships below 100 tons; this means that thousands of small ships, so typical of the coasts of eastern Asia, Chinese junks and Malayan prahoes for example, are not taken into consideration. Moreover, some countries have a high ratio, not because of high national maritime activity, but because it is profitable for the ships of other nations to sail under their flags. According to the ratio, Panama is a first-class maritime state, but in reality the figure is high because United States ships sail under its flag in order to be free from United States regulations. The same is true for Honduras, but the very high ratio for Iceland is the result of a very small population and a large number of coastal fishing boats.

TABLE II

RATIO BETWEEN MERCHANT MARINE TONNAGE AND POPULATION, 1951

| Country | Tons per 100 Inhabitants | Country | Tons per 100 Inhabitants |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Iceland | 624 | Canada | 7 |
| Panama | 442 | Australia | 6.5 |
| Norway | 176 | Italy | 6 |
| United Kingdom | 37 | Portugal | 6 |
| Honduras | 37 | Belgium | 5.5 |
| Netherlands | 32 | Germany | 5.5 |
| Denmark | 31 | Spain | 4 |
| Sweden | 30 | Union of South Africa | 2 |
| United States | 17 | Poland | 1 |
| Greece | 17 | Argentina | .5 |
| Finland | 14 | | |
| New Zealand | 12 | All others are smaller | |

Despite these limitations, the method has practical value. It should be noted that wars, with all their destruction, do not greatly alter the picture. Although Germany and Japan temporarily lost their status as important maritime states after World War II, most of the other nations soon regained their prewar tonnage levels. The United States is the only nation that had a much higher ratio in 1951 than it had before the war, but it seems probable that this figure may drop. Norway is without question the maritime state *par excellence*. The ratios for the countries around the North Sea and the Baltic are, in general, high. The

ratio for Great Britain is also high, considering its population of 50,000,000. This brief consideration of the various aspects of coasts and their effect on nations is illustrated below by a few examples.

The United States

When this nation was born it had all the requisites for maritime development. The strongly indented coastline of New England, with its numerous well-protected bays, and the wide estuaries along the coast south of what is now New York were favorable for harbors. It had lumber resources for shipbuilding; export products such as fur, fish, tobacco, and cotton, desired by other parts of the world; a coastal location with a limited hinterland bordered by the Appalachians; and a population brought up in the maritime traditions of northwestern Europe. All these elements pointed to the development of a maritime state.

The results were those that could have been expected. The United States became a maritime state and its ships sailed the seven seas. Many were the ports, especially in New England, whose names were known all over the world. In 1800 more than 90 percent of American trade was carried in American vessels. American whalers ventured along Antarctic shores; the American clipper, the most beautiful sailing vessel the world has ever known, connected the east with the west coast. Only wars and the lack of a protecting navy, caused setbacks because of heavy ship losses.

The United States is no longer a maritime power. The great change came after the Civil War. A number of factors were responsible for this change; among these were the wartime depletion of the merchant marine, and the difficulty, because of the scarcity of well-located iron production, of building steel ships that could compete with those of the British. However, the main reason for the change was the inland expansion of the United States and the development of an inland empire. Americans ceased to be ocean conscious; they were interested in the rich soil of the grasslands with their abundant crops, and they left the shipping to others.

In 1900 less than ten per cent of American trade was carried by American ships. Although coastal shipping, restricted to Amer-

ican vessels, continued to prosper, competition with other nations became almost impossible because of increased rates resulting from a higher standard of living. World War I, which demanded the construction of ships to offset losses, caused a resumption of interest in maritime activities, but it was brief. Now suddenly, after World War II, the United States finds herself with the greatest merchant marine in the world, even topping Great Britain's. United States tonnage declined somewhat as a result of selling ships to the countries which had suffered the greatest war losses, but in 1953 she still ranked first. Will this position be sustained or will tonnage again decline? Does our merchant marine have to be subsidized or can it exist unaided? These are questions that only the future can answer.

Great Britain

Although second in actual merchant marine tonnage as well as in naval strength, Great Britain is still the greatest maritime power as far as the impact of the sea on the history and life of a nation is concerned. When the art of navigation was ready to face the vicissitudes of the open ocean and new worlds were discovered, Great Britain had the great advantages of a good location and a favorable coastline. Situated in front of the most developed part of Europe and facing toward the Americas, the British became, with the Scandinavians and the Dutch, the chief traders of the world. Well-protected harbors on coastal bays and estuaries, the result of a drowned coastline, increased the value of location and even today, in spite of all competition, the British ports have kept their high standard among competitors. Britannia ruled the waves for many centuries and did a good job. She is still prominent and undoubtedly will always be so, even if a nation such as the United States, with more population and more resources, may surpass her in actual volume of trade.

The Mediterranean

Many factors were responsible for the fact that the Mediterranean Sea was a cradle of navigation. The coastlines were in general rather favorable, especially in the period of small ships. Near-shore mountains were covered with forests which provided the material needed for the construction of ships. The sea itself

does not have many severe storms, and fogs are rare. By day, land is visible from practically any point, and at night, the stars are clearly seen. Moreover, mountains and deserts limited the occupied area in most instances to a coastal zone which looked upon the sea as the main thoroughfare for contact with other areas. Here was the center of world civilization.

Many were the maritime states which arose on the shores of the Mediterranean. There were Phoenicia and Crete, the earliest; there were the Greek city-states, with their colonies; there were Carthage, and the Roman Empire, and in later years the coastal city-states of Venice, Genoa, and Ragusa. Trade with the Levant remained important even after the shift of major maritime activity, first to the Baltic and then to the North Sea, and the corsairs of the Barbary Coast thrived in captured merchant ships. With the expansion of oceanic trade a decline set in, perhaps more in terms of the percentage of total activity than in actual figures. Even the Suez Canal could not arrest the trend. Italy, despite its peninsular location and some favorable coastal sections, is not a great maritime power. The Dalmatian coast, once the playground of Venice, is now in the hands of the Slavic inland people. Only Greece has kept her interest in maritime activities; the ratio between Greek tonnage and population was high until World War II when many of her ships were destroyed.

The actual amount of trade is still considerable, but it has lost its ranking position because of the increased importance of other areas. This does not mean that the Mediterranean is now empty. It is still traversed by numerous ships, but many come from the outside and use the Mediterranean only as a passageway to the East. However, with the exception of the surrounding forests which have been depleted, the chief factors responsible for the development of this region still prevail, and if the trend of history is more favorable to the area, new maritime life may develop there.

China

South of the Yangtze River, conditions for maritime development are excellent. A deeply indented coastline, protected by islands and backed by forested mountains, and a dense coastal population, limited in arable space, provide all the conditions

favorable for shipping. The Chinese came there relatively late and found a population accustomed to navigation. Nevertheless, only at certain times in her history has China used her coast as a base for extensive shipping. China is essentially an inland power. Only when her inland expansion has been blocked has she turned her interest to the ocean—for example, when Chinese ships traded with the Malay world, India, and even the Arab states. But this was long ago. Today, although the southern coast is still active in local shipping (at times including piracy), Chinese ships no longer sail the oceans and only foreign vessels connect China with the outside world.

The Arabs

It is difficult to connect the Arab of the desert with ocean activity; nevertheless, Arabs were, for a time, famous navigators. Most of their activity was limited to two localities, the coast of Oman and, in a lesser way, that of Yemen. In both areas forested mountains face a fairly favorable coastline. From Oman, especially, Arab vessels explored the Indian Ocean all the way to the Malay Islands, while Arab colonies extended along the African coast. When the European nations—Portugal, the Netherlands, and Great Britain—sailed around the Cape of Good Hope, they came into conflict with these Arab colonies and destroyed most of them.

The Netherlands

The great sandbar which formerly closed the coast from the Strait of Dover to the Danish peninsula of Jutland was not favorable to navigation. Only after the sea broke through and created inland seas and islands did maritime development begin. The inland waters were rich in fish, especially herring, and the new fishing ports also became centers of general shipping activity on the protected coast. Shipping, at first coastal, gradually extended throughout the worldwide colonial empire. The Netherlands became one of the great mercantile powers, hampered only by the limited size of the homeland.

Wars with Britain on the issue of sea supremacy caused a decline; there were too many British and not enough Dutch.

Moreover, modern shipping found the Netherlands' inland waters too shallow. The Dutch, however, were not defeated. Shipping canals now connect Amsterdam and Rotterdam with the ocean, and the extensive Rhine hinterland provides, under normal conditions, an enormous market. The Netherlands, as may be seen in Table II, still ranks high among the maritime nations even though conditions have changed considerably since the time when the Dutch fleet used a broom on the masts of its ships as a sign that it had swept the sea free of its enemies.

Norway

As Table II indicates, for no country is shipping of more importance than it is for Norway. A most favorable coastline, with deep fjords extending far inland and thousands of small islands protecting the coast against storms, as well as a rather inhospitable land, turned Norwegians toward the ocean, not only for fishing, but also for ocean traffic. From the times of the Norsemen and the Vikings, Norwegian ships have sailed the oceans, plying between ports as carriers of trade. Twice war caused great destruction and a decline in the number of Norway's ships; twice the fleet was built up again. The Norwegians are, indeed, the greatest sailors of the world.

Other Maritime States

Space permits only a brief mention of other maritime states. Sweden and Denmark show in a minor way the maritime development of Norway. France, besides her Mediterranean coast line, possesses excellent Atlantic ports as well as the indented coastline of Brittany with its numerous small fishing ports. Japan, in its modern development, took to the ocean as a fish takes to water, and although it lost most of its merchant fleet because of the war, it is rapidly regaining her former position. Even the U.S.S.R., locked in either by arctic conditions or by closed inland seas (Baltic, Black Sea, Sea of Japan), has become ocean-conscious and is increasing the tonnage of her merchant marine. In spite of the emphasis on the air, the ocean has lost only a little of its prominence, and the total number of ships using it is greater than ever before.

CONTINENTAL VERSUS MARITIME POWER

In the foregoing pages we have frequently touched upon the problem of how to differentiate between maritime and continental nations, using the criteria of location, coastal characteristics, and the ratio between marine tonnage and population. What conclusions can be reached through a comparison of maritime and continental power?

History affords frequent examples of the clash between maritime and continental nations, between forces that were primarily naval and those that consisted mainly of land-based armies. This has been so despite the fact that maritime states have had armies and land powers have sometimes had navies, often recruited from conquered coastal states. The story of ancient Greece is essentially that of the struggle for supremacy between naval and land forces, between the power of the Athenian fleet and the armies of Asiatic continental invaders.

Heartland and World Island Concept

A modern interpretation of this concept was presented by Halford J. Mackinder, a citizen of Great Britain (a naval power) early in the twentieth century. In an address before the Royal Geographical Society in 1904 Mackinder set forth the idea of a continental core (the pivotal area, as he called it) versus an inner marginal crescent and an outer insular crescent. In his later publications, he developed the idea into the noted concept of the Heartland and the World Island. It was expressed as follows: "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland. Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island. Who rules the World Island commands the World." It should be noted that Mackinder meant the old world by the term "World Island" and that the meaning of the actual extent of the Heartland has changed considerably since it was introduced. Heartland originally meant the large Eurasian area with inland or arctic drainage. From out the great grasslands of Eurasia invaders on horseback had come periodically, disturbing the peace of the surrounding areas. It could not be reached by naval power because of its inland location, nor even by rivers reaching inland from the coast; the arctic approach was protected by ice.

Although the Heartland idea was a useful one and its application furthered an understanding of historical events, it has limited value because the heartland as Mackinder originally envisaged it was primarily a sparsely populated area with little or no military power.

The events of World War I forced Mackinder to change his concept of the original Heartland, extending it much farther toward the west. As was shown in that war, the areas of the Baltic and the Black Sea were no longer under the control of maritime nations. Thus the western boundary of the Heartland was now drawn along the crest of the Scandinavian peninsula, through Jutland and central Europe, along the Dalmatian mountains and across to the Dardanelles, including, also, most of Asia Minor. This extension not only made the Heartland larger but included in it the whole of Eastern Europe with all its population and resources. This enlarged Heartland represents the area where, under modern conditions, sea power cannot gain access.

It is interesting to note that Germany was located half in the Heartland and half in the European coastal zone. It was, according to Mackinder, a fatal blunder for Germany to attack the Heartland core (Russia) while still at war with the naval power, England. The attack failed because one of the chief advantages of an inland area is its almost unlimited space into which to retreat. It is also interesting to compare Mackinder's "new" western line with the political situation after World War II. There is an uncanny resemblance between that line and the Iron Curtain. The only deviations are the inclusion of Sweden, which, incidentally, did not enter the Atlantic Pact, and of parts of Turkey, protected by the Truman Doctrine.

Meanwhile, with the increasing use of the air as a war theater, a continental location has great advantages. Planes taking off from continental bases can control areas formerly under naval protection. On the other hand, the maritime nations must use airfields that are far more vulnerable because of their close proximity to the Heartland boundary line, or carriers, whose effectiveness is still being disputed by experts.

In view of this situation it is understandable that another Englishman, C. B. Fawcett, suggested a change in the Heartland area to include the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Persian

Gulf, and to exclude the Near East and most of Africa from the control of western maritime powers (Figure 24).²




FIGURE 24. Fawcett's concept of the Heartland.

Evaluation of the Heartland Concept

Mackinder's three rules can be evaluated as follows:

The first—who rules East Europe commands the Heartland—is

² *New Compass of the World*, eds., H. W. Weigert, V. Stefansson, and R. E. Harrison (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), pp. 91-103. Fawcett's article should be required reading for anyone interested in political geography.

certainly correct in so far as the strategic conception of the Heartland is concerned, although the control of Fawcett's extended area may not be tenable.

The second rule—who rules the Heartland commands the World Island—is not borne out by the present situation. The marginal coastal states, if we include the part of North America that faces the U.S.S.R. across the icy waste of the Arctic, still have great advantages, not only in number of people and resources, but especially in the philosophy of liberty as contrasted with the philosophy of dictatorship. One wonders whether there is something inherent in a continental location that favors the dictatorial doctrine even if repudiated by the majority of the people. In Eastern Asia, the Heartland—thanks to the success of Communism in China—controls most of that country and threatens southern Korea and even southeast Asia. However, India is still free from Heartland influence, while the Mohammedan world of the Near East is certainly not inclined to accept Russian control.

The third rule—who rules the World Island commands the World—can readily be accepted. A complete political union of Europe, Asia, and Africa would probably control the air and so control the New World.

Thus, the future of the world and, incidentally, the future of the United States, depends on the fallacy of the second rule.

It is very disturbing that the world situation forces upon us such military considerations and evaluations of the powers to be used by nation against nation. It is possible to visualize that battle between the Heartland and the peripheral zone: the warships, the armies, the gigantic planes with their atom bombs. Why is it not possible to visualize another picture: that of harbors busily loading and unloading products from far and near, of world trade in a world at peace, of cooperation among all nations? The Heartland concept is suitable for a world potentially at war; that is why it appealed to the geopoliticians. It is doubtless necessary in our present world situation. Is it not a great pity that we have not been able to advance world civilization to a level where such a concept could be discarded because it is no longer of any practical use?

Islands and Peninsulas

ISLANDS ARE PIECES OF LAND THAT are surrounded by water but are not large enough to be called continents; peninsulas differ from islands in that they are still attached on one side to the mainland.

ISLANDS

Islands vary in size from gigantic Greenland (840,000 square miles) to small rocks barely showing above the surface of the water. Much of what has been said about coasts in regard to political geographical development applies to islands, but many islands have special functions based on location, size, and other factors and can even develop into political units. These functions can be brought out best by dividing islands into four main groups with subdivisions. This grouping is based on location and size, and, although somewhat arbitrary, serves its purpose very well.

Coastal Islands

In this group are the many thousands of small islands immediately off the coast. These islands are actually parts of the mainland, but are disconnected either by a rise in the sea level or by a sinking of the land. Most coasts have coastal islands; some coasts are fringed by them, thus providing an island zone between ocean and mainland. Examples of such fringes are found in the Alaska panhandle, northern New England, southern Chile, Norway, western Scotland, Dalmatia, Greece, the Burma panhandle, southern China, and western Korea. The value of

coastal islands is that they protect the main coast against the fury of the ocean; in some cases they offer protection against the fury of an invader. For example, Helgoland, in front of the outlet of the Elbe River was, prior to World War II, a rock honeycombed with galleries and was a German fortress against attack. After the war its fortifications were destroyed. In the same way, the function of Corregidor was to protect the entrance to Manila Bay; it became in 1942 the last stronghold against the Japanese invaders.

In some instances the element of protection has also led to the establishment of cities on coastal islands, and under favorable conditions these have developed into political cores. Thus ancient Tyre, one of the centers of Phoenician power, had a coastal island location, Venice grew into a city-state, for long the leading naval power of the Mediterranean.



FIGURE 25.




FIGURE 26.

If coastal islands are possessed by a nation other than the one owning the coast, the former nation may exert political pressure or even control. An example of this situation is the British island of Hong Kong (Figure 25), in front of the outlet of the Si-kiang, southern China's most important river. Other examples in recent history are: Singapore (Figure 26) and Penang, off the coast of the Malay Peninsula (later the adjacent mainland also became British); British Zanzibar across from former German East Africa; the Dodecanese off the coast of Asia Minor (they belonged to Italy from 1922 to 1947); and the Italian islands on the eastern side of the Adriatic (Lagosta, Saseno) which were taken away from her after World War II. Sometimes foreign control has lost its former political importance.

Macao, a Portuguese island near Hong Kong, and the French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon are remnants of former colonial periods; similarly, British ownership of the Channel Islands near the coast of Brittany has no political value today.




FIGURE 27.
(After Stamp.)

In general, however, coastal islands are politically part of the mainland, with the advantages of island location. Some are sites of cities which have spread from the mainland (Manhattan and Bombay), and some are used for prisons (Alcatraz and Devil's Island off the coast of French Guiana); most of them are just little islands, often picturesque and used as tourist resorts—outposts of land extending into the ocean.

Islands in Inland Seas

Although many islands in inland seas may be regarded as coastal, islands of this type have played such important roles politically that it is advisable to consider them as a separate group.

Islands in the Baltic. The islands in the Baltic are generally part of the nation on the nearest shore. For instance, Öland and Gotland belong to Sweden; Saare and Hiiumaa, formerly Estonian, now belong to Russia; Finland controlled some small islands in the Finnish Gulf but lost them to the U.S.S.R. in the Russian-Finnish war of 1939-40. A special case is the Åland Islands at the entrance of the Gulf of Bothnia, long a source of controversy between Sweden and Finland, with the U.S.S.R. an interested outsider. After World War I the Åland Islands by a decision of a committee of the League of Nations remained under Finland but with special autonomy, including the use of the Swedish language; they were also demilitarized.

Very important are the Danish islands between Jutland and South Sweden; the nucleus of the Danish state once extended along both shores but Denmark now controls only Jutland. Good size, fertility, location, and water protection gave them the necessary foundation for political power. Danish Bornholm controls the approach to the Sound, chief outlet of the Baltic. During World War II the Germans occupied it, and a period of Rus-

sian occupancy followed but, surprisingly, was terminated after a year. One of the reasons for the Russian withdrawal may have been that Bornholm's prosperity nullified Russian propaganda about capitalistic slavery and was detrimental to the morale of Russian soldiers.

Islands in the Mediterranean. Except for the small islands off the shores of Greece, the islands of the Mediterranean are of good size and were at times large enough to become political units, sometimes alone, sometimes in combination with the adjacent shore. Sicily and Naples once formed the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies; Corsica and Genoa were united, and in ancient times Crete was a major political power. Sicily once might have been called the world's most coveted island; many nations desired it and many for a time controlled it.

Great Britain is the only non-Mediterranean power possessing islands in that sea, and these islands, Malta and Cyprus, are in very strategic locations. Since Italy lost the Dodecanese and Saseo the political picture is fairly stable. The Balearic Islands belong to Spain; Italy has Sicily and Sardinia; France has Corsica despite the sometimes violent Italian protests; and Greece has all the islands surrounding the mainland and extending to the shore of Asia Minor.

Islands in other inland seas. Most other inland seas are remarkably poor in islands except small or coastal ones which give rise to few political problems. However, if they are under foreign rule, this can mean the political control of the inland sea. The Bahrein Islands in the Persian Gulf, famous for American oil production, are under British protection. Likewise Perim on the southern outlet (Bab el Mandeb) of the Red Sea and Kamaran, 200 miles farther north, both British-occupied, are strategically important; Kamaran's chief function, however, is that of a Mecca pilgrimage quarantine station.

Islands on the Continental Shelf

These islands differ from coastal islands because of size or because of greater distance from the coast, although geographically they are still part of the continent. Figure 23 shows the extension of the continental shelf, varying in width from very narrow shelves to wide platforms, such as the Newfoundland

Bank off Cape Race. From a political geographical point of view, these islands vary greatly in importance. Some of them, under favorable conditions of location, size, and natural resources, have developed into states of major rank, whereas others are of little significance.

North America. The large number of islands in the Arctic are parts of the North American shelf, although at spots deep breaks occur between them. Aside from some fishing activity, their value at present is based on location which permits their use as weather stations, as sites for potential military bases, and as radar stations for protection against possible attack. In the same way, the islands in the Bering Sea and those of the Aleutian chain have little economic value except for sealing and fishing; strategically, however, they are important, as was shown in World War II when the Japanese occupied some of the western Aleutians.

A second group of shelf islands is located in front of the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Capé Breton, Prince Edward Island, and Anticosti belong to this coastal group, except for their relatively large size; Newfoundland, however, is a typical shelf island in size. Once a bone of contention between Great Britain and France, it developed its own political life as part of the British Commonwealth. In 1949, after a period of British control, it joined the Dominion of Canada. Greenland is attached to the North American continental shelf. Danish controlled, its resources are very limited, but its location between the U.S.S.R. and the United States is a very strategic one.

South America. South America has few shelf islands. On the Caribbean side is British Trinidad off the coast of Venezuela. Economically it is one of the chief British islands here; strategically its importance was demonstrated by the establishment of a United States base there. The Falkland Islands, on the east side of the wide continental shelf, extend from Patagonia far out into the Atlantic. British controlled, their main value is that of location in front of Magellan Strait, but British possession is hotly disputed by Argentina, which calls them the Malvinas.

Europe. The British Isles, located on the European shelf, have two political units: the United Kingdom, the cradle and center of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the Irish Republic.

The United Kingdom, or Great Britain, has used the advantage of her island location to the highest degree. Comparatively good size, rich natural resources, and a protected island location in front of the most productive part of Europe were factors favorable for the development of a world power. Excellent coastal conditions also helped to make Great Britain a maritime power *par excellence*. The narrow Strait of Dover was wide enough to protect it against continental political turmoils. No armies have invaded Britain since William the Conqueror crossed from the French coast in 1066. At the same time, Great Britain could, to a large extent, influence political conditions on the continent through her fleet, and her armies fought frequently on European soil.

A detailed discussion of the rise of Britain to a Great Power and the factors which made that rise possible cannot be given here. It is sufficient to point out that she developed far beyond her own resources. She has, however, the limitations, inherent in all islands, imposed by size and the amount of arable land. Today, deprived of many of her former markets, she faces the competition of other nations with much larger resources.

Ireland never rose to political prominence. More isolated because of the fact that Britain was between her and the continent, smaller in size, and with far fewer natural resources, Ireland was dominated by Great Britain for centuries until it received its independence after World War I. Complete independence was not achieved until 1949. Ireland, although still unable to rule the entire island owing to political differences with Northern Ireland, is nevertheless a healthy, young national unit. A major asset is her isolated location which made it possible for her to remain neutral during World War II.

Africa. The African continent has, generally, a very narrow shelf and accordingly few shelf islands. On the shelf is located one of the islands in the Guinea Bight, Fernando Po. Once important in their near-coastal location, especially in the period of slavery, the islands in the bight are now of minor significance.

Asia. Except for Ceylon, now a dominion of the British Commonwealth, all the shelf islands of Asia are located on the east coast from the Indonesian shelf to Sakhalin. Formosa is on the shelf, but the Philippine Islands have only a partial shelf location because of deeper water between some of the islands and the break

between them and Formosa. The distinction between the Indonesian shelf islands (Sumatra, Borneo, Java, Bali) and the other islands (such as Celebes, the Moluccas, the Lesser Sundas, and Timor) is not significant politically because the deeper waters do not mean political breaks, and all these islands are included in the Indonesian Federation. Strategical location, favorable resources, and in parts a very dense population, e.g. Java, make these islands increasingly important in our present world; their political development will be followed with a great deal of interest. The Republic of the Philippines comprises all of the islands of that group. Founded officially in 1946 after a period of transition, it is an example of an island state.

Hainan off the southern China coast has had no independent political development, and Formosa, after a stormy period of Japanese control, is once more part of China although politically separated from the communist mainland.

The case of the Japanese Empire is in many ways similar to that of Great Britain, but there are also differences. Like Great Britain, Japan developed into a great empire, and also like Great Britain, she has favorable but limited resources and a dense population. However, Japan's relations with the mainland are less intimate owing to distance and also because part of the adjacent continent is of much less economic and political value than that facing Britain. Japan had a choice between isolation and empire expansion, and only in the last hundred years did she choose the role of an empire. Like Britain, she faces the problem of a limited economy amid growing continental competition. Russian Sakhalin was once one of the many isolated Russian areas used for the exile of prisoners. Its increasing economic values will gradually make it an important and integral part of the U.S.S.R.

Australia. The two shelf islands of importance in Australia are Tasmania, a member of the Australian Commonwealth, and New Guinea, of which the eastern half is under Australian control.

Oceanic Islands

Large size. It is difficult to set up a definite criterion for what size island may be considered large; nevertheless, the subdivision "large size" has practical advantages. Under favorable conditions ocean islands can develop into political units. Iceland, for instance,

has been an independent republic since 1944. Its history is very interesting and is discussed in Chapter 17. Cuba and Hispaniola (with its two republics) are so near the North American continent that they miss the qualities of ocean protection and are to some extent influenced by their powerful neighbors; nevertheless their independence is carefully guarded. A good case of island independence is New Zealand, a dominion of the British Commonwealth of Nations, which through its location has developed a definite national sentiment, loyal to the British crown but otherwise a separate entity.

Groups and individual islands. Although the Atlantic, Indian and Antarctic oceans have only a few ocean islands, the tropical Pacific is virtually dotted with them. Their importance varies a great deal. Some of them have mineral resources which appear on the world market, for instance, Nauru and Ocean Island with their phosphates. Others have enough space to raise export crops, such as sugar cane for which Mauritius, Reunion in the Indian Ocean, and Fiji, are well known. Hawaii is an excellent example of economically valuable islands; so also are the island groups in the east Atlantic (the Azores, Madeira, and the Canaries). The tourist business is an important asset, especially for islands with mild or warm winter climates, located not too far from Europe or North America.

The chief function of these relatively small islands is their value as stepping stones for ships and planes, communication stations, and weather stations. Bermuda, the Azores, Ascension Island, the Galapagos, and many of the Pacific equatorial islands served as air bases during World War II and continue to some degree to serve that purpose.

Finally, because of their isolation, some oceanic islands formerly functioned as places of exile. St. Helena is the noted example from the Napoleonic period, but other islands, such as the Seychelles, also have been used for this purpose.

PENINSULAS

Peninsulas differ from islands because they are attached to the continental mainland. The character of that attachment varies a great deal; sometimes it is wide, sometimes quite narrow; some-

times it is closed by a mountain barrier which gives protection, sometimes it is open and has no natural protection. If the protective element prevails and other factors are favorable, peninsulas are suitable places for the development of political units. Small peninsulas often are important from a military point of view. It seems best to inquire into the significant attributes of peninsulas through actual examples.

India

Triangular in shape, India is one of the world's largest peninsulas. Large size and a generally unfavorable coast line have given it a continental character with maritime activity limited to a few sections, such as the lagoon-bordered Malabar coast. High mountain ranges separate India from the rest of Asia, but have not prevented invasions by way of the passes. This natural unit, because of population complexities, has only known political unity under foreign control, which at times came overland and at times from across the ocean. The present separation of India and Pakistan is so illogical from a geographical point of view, especially because of the two widely separated parts of Pakistan, that one wonders how long these conditions will continue.

Arabia

Arabia is also a large peninsula, and again the approaches are protected, this time by deserts. Its inhospitable climate greatly hampered its economic development. As in the case of India, maritime activity is limited to a few localities of which the Oman Coast is the most important. Political unity, which existed at times, was often made impossible by foreign influence, but there has also been much conflict between the nomadic interior, with its sprinkling of oases, and the coastal areas.

Italy

Italy is an excellent example of a rather narrow, long peninsula protected by a continuous mountain frame; this protective barrier, however, has been frequently crossed by invaders. The backbone of the Italian peninsula is mountainous and, except for the Po plain in the north, the level land is limited to narrow coastal plains and river valleys. The coasts are not too favorable for shipping; there

are, however, notable exceptions such as the Ligurian coast on both sides of Genoa, the Naples area, the north coast of Sicily, and lagoon-located Venice. Relief complexity and foreign influence prohibited political unity during all the centuries between the breakdown of the Roman Empire and the creation of modern Italy in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Italy's peninsular location makes her vulnerable if her navy is not strong enough to protect her shores.

Scandinavia

The large peninsula of Scandinavia is attached in the north to the mainland between the Bothnian Gulf and Arctic Ocean. No invasions have come along that approach, which is protected by a severe climate and inhospitable land. The U.S.S.R. borders Norway in the far north, the only contact between the NATO countries and communist Russia, until Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1951. Mountains divide the peninsula into a narrow western coastal zone and a wide slope toward the Baltic. The double political division, accordingly, was a logical response: Norway, a mountain and supermaritime state, faces the Atlantic; Sweden, less mountainous, faces the Baltic. Norway, a victim of World War II, is now a member of the Atlantic Pact; Sweden retained her neutrality during both World Wars and continues to pursue that policy.

Denmark

The Jutland Peninsula is not the political core of Denmark. It is open to invasion, with a boundary fluctuating throughout history according to the strength of the southern neighbor, and is economically less productive than the islands between Jutland and the Swedish coast. The center of political power is on the islands. Jutland, together with Schleswig-Holstein, illustrates well the disadvantages of the lack of a natural protection.

Iberia

Despite its mountain-lined attachment which provides an excellent boundary, Iberia does not have the characteristics of a peninsula. Spain is rather continental, with the center of power in the basins that are separated by mountains from the coast. Only

when the center is weak does the maritime character of some of the coastal regions, such as Galicia, Cantabria, and Catalonia cause political difficulties which lead to separation. The only exception is Portugal, with its coastal location but with the handicap that only the outlet of the Tagus River offers a first-class location for maritime activity. The great colonial expansion of Spain was more a response to temporary power, after the defeat of the Moors, than to actual maritime aspirations.

Greece

Greece is the peninsula of the Balkan Peninsula. Like Norway, she depends on the seas. In ancient times the mountain relief and the generally favorable coastline resulted in growth of maritime states, although the interior location of certain mountain basins also favored development of land states such as Sparta. Access to the peninsula was difficult because of narrow defiles. Nevertheless foreign armies have succeeded in invading this area. The history of Greece after her pre-Christian period of glory is one of foreign domination until she was gradually resurrected at the end of the last century. But the Greeks never lost their interest in the sea and Greek ships were always the traders of the eastern Mediterranean.

Malay Peninsula

Long and narrow, the Malay Peninsula extends almost to the Equator. It has, like most peninsulas, a mountain core and a coastline which varies between very favorable (the Burma panhandle) and quite unfavorable (the southern part of the east coast). Nonetheless, the inhabitants of the Malay Peninsula have always been seafaring people cruising with their small junks between the peninsula and the neighboring islands. From the north, Burma and Siam extended their influence over the local Malay states, while foreign powers came by sea. During this period their maritime character never changed and the great ports of Penang and Singapore, both located on islands, reflect the importance of this peninsula in world trade. The autonomy of the Malay States, with independence planned for the future, may result in strong political unity, although the problem of ethnic complexity may create some difficulty. The ease of approach by sea

has resulted in many immigrants, especially Chinese, who actually outnumber the Malay population.

Korea

The Korean Peninsula has never been the seat of an important political power. It has many good qualities, such as mountain protection to the north, natural resources, and a favorable south and west coast. However, stronger powers were too near her—on one side China, a land power, and on the other side maritime Japan—and in late years Russia, too, entered into the picture. Korea never had a real chance. After World War II it faced the problem of division into a communist half and a democratic half. Someday, perhaps, Korea may get its chance to become a unified nation.

The Peninsula of Florida

The peninsula of Florida is physiographically an extension of the coastal plain which borders the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico. Except for extensive swamps it is open to the north. Nevertheless, it showed its separate character by remaining under Spanish control from the time of its discovery in 1513 until it was bought in 1819 by the United States, except for a short period of British occupation between 1763-83. Plans have been made to cut the long detour between the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico by a canal. This project was never built, although a start was made in the nineteen thirties by the Works Progress Administration. For a long time Florida remained a rather undeveloped region until modern use of some features of climate caused the rapid growth of subtropical agriculture and made it an attractive winter resort for tourists.

Other American Peninsulas

Another American peninsula is that of Lower California. It has had little value economically because of arid climatic conditions, but nevertheless, it is important because of its location on the Gulf of California, a Mexican-controlled sea. During the period preceding the Gadsden Purchase in 1853 many efforts were made to draw the American-Mexican boundary through the Gulf, which would have made this peninsula the territory of the

United States, but the final decision left the boundary to the north.

The Yucatan Peninsula with its broad attachment to the mainland, once the seat of the Mayan civilization, is now the junction of three political units: Mexico, Guatemala, and British Honduras, disputed by Guatemala as part of her territory.

Small Peninsulas

Peninsulas throughout history have been ideal places of settlement because they have the element of security; only one side needs to be defended against land invasion. Especially in the Mediterranean, where there are classical examples of rocky peninsulas, that function was highly important, and many were the cities which owed their prominence to such a location. Both the Phoenicians and the Greeks used the protective element of location. Sidon and Carthage, as well as Cadiz in Spain, had peninsular locations. Syracuse, on a peninsula on the east coast of Sicily, was originally a Greek settlement; it resisted the attack of Rome for three years before it finally succumbed. In modern times a peninsular location may become a handicap because of lack of space. This point is illustrated by San Francisco which has partly overcome the handicap by building bridges to the mainland.

If a peninsula is not suitable for a settlement because of topography it may serve as an excellent refuge. This element of protection resulted in the so-called Republic of Athos, on the eastern one of the three fingerlike peninsulas which extend from the larger peninsula of Chalcidice, east of Saloniki. Even during the Turkish period Athos enjoyed a large degree of independence for its monasteries; at present as part of Greece it continues to be an autonomous unit.

Peninsulas in War and Peace

Peninsulas have always been important as places that can be defended, as well as attacked, by land. The Peninsular War between France and the combined forces of Spain, Portugal, and Britain owes its name to the shape of the area in which the war was fought. The Crimean War between France, Britain, and her allies against Russia was also a peninsular war. In the Civil War the name "Peninsula" was given to a strip of land between

the York and James rivers in Virginia, a Union objective in an unsuccessful campaign in 1862. In World War I the Gallipoli Peninsula guarding the approach from the Aegean Sea to the Bosphorus by way of the Dardanelles made the front page as British soldiers tried in vain to cross the narrow stretch of mountains which forms its backbone. World War II offers numerous examples of the role of peninsulas in warfare. These include the famous retreat on Bataan from the Japanese and the retreat of the German African armies to the Cape Bon Peninsula. From the point of view of attack, the Cotentin Peninsula was one of the chief objects of the Normandy landing in 1944.

With their half island, half mainland location, peninsulas in peacetime offer advantageous locations for harbors and have many other assets. There are thousands of peninsulas. Some are very small, providing space for only one house, and some are large enough to become national units. All are interesting in a study of location and of the connection between land and water.

Seas and Oceans

THE ATLANTIC CHARTER, DRAWN UP as a joint declaration of peace by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain (August 1941) and adopted in principle by the then allied nations including the U.S.S.R., concludes its statement of purpose with the words, "... such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance..."; indeed a beautiful idea but difficult to attain.

Freedom of the seas, as envisaged in the Atlantic Charter, will become a reality only when a permanent peace is established throughout the world. History has given ample proof that it is one of the first principles that is sacrificed in time of war, and that, paradoxically, it is a major issue in the initiation of hostilities.

FREEDOM VERSUS CONTROL

The principle of "freedom of the seas" is very dear to Americans. In the nineteenth century interference with this principle led to the blockade and bombardment of Tripoli, our action against Tunis, and the protection of our shipping in the Mediterranean against corsair trespassing. It also led to the War of 1812. In 1917, we sided with Great Britain partly because German submarine warfare restricted our freedom. In World War II, sinking of American ships outside the actual war theater combined with the absence of any efforts to safeguard the crews (in violation of international law) did much to mobilize sentiment in support of the Allies long before the Pearl Harbor tragedy. As James W. Ryan expressed it:

A nation like the United States, not economically self-sufficient, and relying on ocean trade for essentials to its defense, can be weakened by being denied access to the seas. It cannot maintain, let alone increase, its existing state of defensive power while its strength is being sapped by gradual contraction of the ocean areas its vessels can safely navigate. Essential cargoes would pile up for lack of shipping space, because importers and shipowners would be reluctant to send their goods and ships to almost certain destruction in the unprotected trade lanes.*

From the British point of view (and the British for centuries were the leading maritime power), "freedom of the seas" means command of the seas. Once that command could be exercised by a strong navy. The problem today, however, is considerably more complicated because movement upon the seas can be blocked not only by ships but also by mine fields, by submarines, and by planes. In each of the World Wars the submarine menace was finally conquered just in time, but not before the nations involved and neutrals as well had suffered tremendous losses in ships and human lives.

In theory, joint American-British cooperation in maintaining control of the seas through the establishment of strategically placed naval and air bases appears to be a step in the right direction. The very fact, however, that so many bases are needed indicates the weakness of this method of control. We must conclude that for the time being *freedom* of the seas, in distinction to *control* of the seas, is an ideal; its realization must await the day when the nations of the world learn to live in peace.

INLAND SEAS

Although the oceans comprise most of the water surface of the earth, inland seas—in effect, parts of the ocean connected with it by relatively narrow entrances—are also involved in the question of freedom of the seas. Indeed, in time of war, the principle is even more flagrantly violated on inland seas than upon the high seas. The reason is obvious. An inland sea is controlled by the power that controls the entrance to it; thus the struggle for command is sharply focused.

* *Freedom of the Seas and International Law* (New York: Court Press, 1941).




FIGURE 28.

Strait Location

A strategic strait location with access to an inland sea can give rise to a political unit, which, once established, continues to exist because of the rivalries between stronger nations.

The Baltic. Denmark, for example, controls the three outlets of the Baltic Sea: the Sound, the Little Belt, and the Great Belt. She shares only one of these (the Sound) with Sweden and for a long time until Scania became part of Sweden she controlled it alone. Germany, greatly affected by the Danish control, constructed the Kiel Canal to connect the Baltic and North seas. Nevertheless, in World War II Germany occupied Denmark not only as a stepping stone to Norway but also to control the Baltic. For the U.S.S.R., foreign control of the Baltic, where she is now the leading power, is a great handicap, especially since Denmark signed the Atlantic Pact. Occupation of Danish Bornholm by the U.S.S.R. after World War II gave rise to fears that Russia was taking steps to free herself from that handicap, but they were allayed when Bornholm was returned to Denmark (see Chapter 8).

The Bosphorus. Another example of the international problems arising from a strait location is that of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, between the Mediterranean-Aegean and Black seas. Here also, a minor state, Turkey, controls the connection. For a short time after World War I it seemed that Turkish control was a thing of the past. After a brief period of Allied control and demilitarization, Turkey is again in control and the centuries-long efforts of Russia to free herself from that handicap have up to now been unsuccessful. The U.S.S.R.'s request after World War II to establish bases on the Straits was refused by Turkey.

The Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf. A third case, one of long standing, is the control of the Mediterranean Sea. Great Britain is the dominant power. She controls the western outlet with Gibraltar, the narrows between Italy and Tunisia with Malta, and the eastern part with Cyprus. World War II proved that control was insufficient, since enemy air action rendered the Mediterranean unusable for a long period, and it would be even less effective in a future war.

Great Britain also controls the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf; the former through its protectorate of Aden, and the latter through treaties and agreements with the Bahrein Islands, Oman, and Trucial Oman. The Persian Gulf, however, may be within the range of enemy bombing should there ever be another armed conflict.

Wider Outlets

The examples given above are inland seas with narrow outside connections. Those with wider entrances have different problems.

The most important of these is the North Sea with a narrow southern entrance, the Strait of Dover, but a wide opening to the north. Considerable naval action took place here during both World Wars. In World War I traffic was greatly restricted, and it was partly blocked in World War II. The northern entrance, however, is so wide that when the Germans occupied Norway in World War II Great Britain could not close it completely, and Germany naval units and raiders were able, at times, to escape through it.

In North America, the bodies of water north and east of Canada can be considered inland seas, although their names—Gulf of St. Lawrence, Baffin Bay, and Hudson Bay—indicate their gulf character. Only the St. Lawrence River portion has been of any significance in wartime.

In the Far East, the U.S.S.R. through the occupation of Port Arthur has a military base on the shore of the Yellow Sea but lacks the naval power necessary for the control of that sea. Japan, until the end of World War II, controlled the approach to the Sea of Japan, but now shares that control with the U.S.S.R. and Korea. The United States, together with the U.S.S.R., dominates the Bering Sea, and her newly acquired bases in the East Pacific give her command over the China Sea. The Sea of Okhotsk is now entirely within U.S.S.R. territory.

With the exception of the important British base of Singapore at the junction of the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea, the lands that surround the various Indonesian inland seas belong to the Indonesian Federation.

The Carribean Sea, with the adjacent Mexican Gulf, may be con-

sidered as being under the supervision of the United States despite its many outlets and the many other nations involved.

Finally, the Arctic Ocean is theoretically an inland sea, where Anglo-American and Russian interests meet. Here planes replace ships as the chief military units of control.

Occupation of Coasts

Although the control of outlets is important, many nations have tried to dominate inland seas by occupying their entire coasts. Sweden once had political control of most of the Baltic shores until Peter the Great forced the recognition of Russian interest at the Battle of Poltava. Greece, for a short time after World War I, had control of the shores of the Aegean and its islands, except for the Italian Dodecanese; this control ended when Greece was defeated by Turkey under Kemal Attaturk in 1923. Italy's dreams of an Italian Adriatic, "Mare Nostrum," were also shattered. The British Commonwealth of Nations still almost encircles the Indian Ocean and controls its use.

Occupation of Bridgeheads

Nations have often occupied the shores of inland seas or straits opposite their home coasts as a matter of protection or aggression—in other words, as a defensive or offensive measure. Thus, Great Britain for a long time occupied sections of France, part of her Normandean inheritance; the last remnant, Calais, was given up in 1558. In the same way Spain occupied the Moroccan presidios, extending later into Spanish Morocco.

The French conquest of Northwest Africa and the Italian conquest of Libya were considered to be bridgeheads for later conquests, although in the case of France the overbridged distance was rather large. Japan tried to control the opposite Asiatic shore through Korea and for a time succeeded in doing so; and Russia "bridged" the Bering Strait to occupy Alaska.

CANALS CONNECTING OCEANS

The two canals that connect oceans are the Panama and the Suez. The Panama Canal connects the Atlantic and the Pacific; the Suez connects the Mediterranean and the Red Sea and

through them the Atlantic and Indian oceans. In some respects the canals are similar. In the case of the Panama Canal, the United States has a permanent lease on the Canal Zone. This action, to a great extent, has been responsible for the creation of the Republic of Panama. The latter country, although recognized as an independent nation, certainly has no independent military power. In the case of the Suez Canal, Great Britain was the controlling power, while Egypt was for a long time a British-controlled state. Egypt, however, is now seeking more independence, and in 1956 the control of the canal will be returned to her; indeed, she may perhaps gain control before that date under the impact of the Egyptian nationalist movement. Egypt will then be both a river state because of the Nile and an ocean canal state because of the Suez.

A canal through the Kra Isthmus of the Malay Peninsula, which would shorten the trip from China to India by some 1,500 miles, has been discussed several times. At present, however, Siam has promised Great Britain not to take any steps in such an enterprise without British sanction. This certainly will not be given because Great Britain does not want to weaken the commercial and strategic value of Singapore.

Canals competing with the Panama Canal, either through Nicaragua by way of the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua, across the Mexican Isthmus of Tehuantepec, or even through a tunnel across Honduras, have also been discussed from time to time. The projects, however, have gone no further than the planning stage.

Geometrical Boundaries

IN THE FOREGOING CHAPTERS ONLY boundaries based on physical features of the landscape have been discussed. There are, however, many boundary lines which totally disregard the physical landscape. Many of them can be understood only from a human-historical point of view and therefore are discussed as ethnographic boundaries in Chapter 20. There is, however, one large group of boundaries that has neither a direct physical nor human base, but is strictly mathematical. This group is considered in the present chapter, which has been placed in Part Two, "The Physical Elements," only for the sake of convenience.

There are four chief types of geometrical boundaries: (1) longitudinal, that is, lines due north or south along meridians; (2) latitudinal, that is, lines due east or west along parallels; (3) the shortest connection between two points not on the same meridian or parallel; and (4) boundaries equidistant from a river or coast.

Except for the fourth type which is directly connected with a physical factor (a coast or a river), geometrical boundaries totally ignore the forms of the landscape and are drawn either because the area involved is practically unknown or is not yet occupied by the nations agreeing upon the boundary. Geometrical boundaries are decided upon in conferences. The surveyor then marks the line in the landscape regardless of whether it crosses mountains, plains, forests, deserts, or arctic wasteland. In some cases little or no consideration is given to how the line will affect the native population.

Often a newly agreed upon line has disrupted economic and social ties and changes have to be made later to make the bound-




FIGURE 29.

ary effective. A good example of a later correction of a geometrical boundary is the line separating Syria from Iraq. The original geometric boundary drawn between points on the Euphrates and the Tigris crossed a mountain system called Jebel Sinjar. The resulting separation of the area caused great difficulties because of the tribal unity of the inhabitants of these mountains. A committee of the League of Nations consequently studied the case and gave the entire mountain section to Iraq, eliminating part of the geometrical character of the boundary. In a similar way changes were made in the geometrical boundaries of Libya, adjusting the line to the pattern of the oases which had been ignored when the original boundaries were drawn.

An interesting solution of the problem of how to draw boundaries in an area with a nomadic population, where both countries involved used certain areas for grazing or for waterholes, was found in setting up the boundaries between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In each case so-called neutral zones were created which could be used by the inhabitants of both nations. In reality they were not neutral zones but condominiums. Witness the fact that when the so-called neutral zone between Arabia and Kuwait was later discovered to be in the oil zone along the Persian Gulf both governments had to agree upon contracts for exploitation.

The world map shows a number of examples of geometrical boundaries. These are discussed below according to their type.

LONGITUDINAL BOUNDARIES

The best known longitudinal boundary in North America is the line 141° west of Greenwich between Alaska and the Canadian Yukon territory. This line was the eastern limit of the Russian territory in Alaska, which became part of the United States by purchase in 1867.

There are several other longitudinal boundaries in North America. The eastern boundary of Maine follows the St. Croix River to its source and from there continues due north until it reaches the St. Johns River. The United States-Canadian boundary from the northwest corner of the Lake of the Woods runs north-south to the 49° parallel. It is interesting to note that

dary between Netherlands and Australian territory follows the 141° meridian (east of Greenwich) except for a short section along the Fly River.

The classic case of longitudinal boundaries is the action taken by Portugal and Spain to divide the newly discovered world into zones of interest. In 1493 Pope Alexander VI by decree established a Line of Demarcation, located 100 leagues (1 league equals 2.4 miles) west of the Azores. That line was modified by the Treaty of Tordesillas between Spain and Portugal in 1494 to run through a point 370 leagues to the west of the Cape Verde Islands. The latter line, it is interesting to note, is responsible for the Portuguese colonization of Brazil. In 1529 another dividing line, 297.5 leagues east of the Moluccas, was agreed upon by the Treaty of Saragossa, and this gave the Spice Islands to Portugal.

LATITUDINAL BOUNDARIES

The most noted example of latitudinal boundaries is the 49° parallel between Canada and the United States between a point south of the Lake of the Woods to the Pacific Coast. Superimposed over mountains and valleys, the boundary has not caused any friction since the movement for " $54^{\circ}40'$ or fight" in 1844. Peaceful relations have existed between the United States and Canada, and both countries have adjusted their economy to the boundary line. Not as long but almost as important is the United States-Canadian boundary along the 45° parallel between the Connecticut and the St. Lawrence Rivers. This line, after having been agreed upon in 1785, was not accurately surveyed. Through an agreement reached by the two countries with the King of the Netherlands serving as arbiter, Rouses Point actually located north of the parallel was permitted to stay within the United States although it was north of the true 45° parallel.

The boundary of the United States with Mexico also shows two latitudinal sections interrupted by the longitudinal part mentioned above. The northeastern boundary of Guatemala and Mexico is the only important example of this type in Latin America.

In the Old World the best example is the greater part of the

boundary between Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan; other examples are found around Rio de Oro, Angola, Rio Muni, Libya, Southwest Africa, and the boundary between Uganda and Tanganyika crossing Victoria Lake.

SHORTEST CONNECTION BETWEEN TWO POINTS

Most non-geometrical boundaries have short straight-line segments, but here we are concerned with longer distances. On a sphere such a line is a great circle. The northern boundary of Maine shows two of such sections between the St. Francis and branches of the St. Johns River. Two much longer sections are found on the United States-Mexico boundary; one from the crossing of the $31^{\circ}20'$ N. parallel and the 111° meridian west of Greenwich to a point on the Colorado River 20 miles below the junction of the Gila and Colorado rivers; the other from the junction to a point on the Pacific Coast one marine league (1.15 miles) due south of the southernmost point of the port of San Diego.

Examples of this type of geometric boundary can be found in South America (such as the Leticia Corridor of Colombia to the Amazon) and in Africa. They are most numerous, however, in the Near East where a great many boundaries of the Arab states are of this type.

BOUNDARIES EQUIDISTANT FROM A RIVER OR A COAST

Boundaries of this type are quite rare and two examples, one for a river and one for a coast, will suffice.

Gambia is the classic example of boundaries equidistant from a river; its borderlines (except on the west) are located ten kilometers (6 miles) from the Gambia River.

The coastal example is more complicated. According to the convention of 1867 ceding Alaska to the United States, the boundary of the Alaska panhandle north of 56° North Latitude was supposed to follow the summit of the mountains parallel to the coast until it crossed the 141° West Longitude. The absence of a summit line near the coast and the intricate character of the coast with its many indentations and bays, caused a dispute be-

tween Canada and the United States which continued for many years. A translation from the French of the treaties between Great Britain and Russia in 1825 and of the nearly identical definition in the Treaty of 1867 on the sale of Alaska by Russia to the United States said, in part, that the demarcation line should follow the crest of the mountains parallel to the coast and that if the crest of the mountains that extended in a direction parallel to the coast were found at a distance of more than ten marine miles from the ocean the line would be drawn parallel to the sinuities of the coast. The controversy was chiefly about the significance of certain words. What, for instance, was "the crest"? It certainly was not the watershed. What was "the coast"? Was it the shore? Was it the limits of the open sea or of all territorial waters? Did the word "ocean" include the landlocked waters between the islands and the mainland? And finally, did "sinuosities of the coast" mean anything more than "the coast" alone?

Both countries involved, the United States and Canada, had views which favored their territorial situation and a compromise was necessary. In 1905, a tribunal of six members (three American, two Canadian, and one British) decided, with the British member voting with the Americans against the two unconvinced Canadians, upon a zigzag line joining the peaks and lying between the claims of the countries involved. The line follows the summit of the mountains parallel to the coast when the summit is more than ten marine miles inland from the coast, making the actual boundary line quite jagged.


All the coastal boundaries, that is, the limit of territorial waters, are geometrical lines of this type, equidistant from the coast, although they are, of course, never marked. The distance from the coast is discussed in Chapter 8. This rather theoretical boundary becomes important in times of smuggling, as was the case during prohibition when the liquor fleet could operate outside the line, or in case of military action between other nations, as happened in World War II when the battle between the "Graf Spee," a German cruiser, and British war vessels took place directly off the coast of Uruguay in territorial waters of that Republic. The "Graf Spee" temporarily sought refuge in Montevideo and was later sunk by the Germans themselves.

CONCLUSION

Geometrical boundaries are typical for countries that are "new" from the white man's point of view, because lack of knowledge of the areas favors the creation of such lines. Many of them have been successful because the new economy of the countries has been adjusted to the boundaries. In Europe, they are totally absent, because most boundaries have historical foundations, or are based on physical features. The one geometrical boundary of Europe, the western border of the Petsamo corridor of Finland, artificially created after World War I, was eliminated after World War II when the U.S.S.R. occupied that section.

Part Three

THE ECONOMIC ELEMENTS



Basic Natural Resources I— Food and Power

ECONOMIC FACTORS HAVE GREAT weight in an evaluation of the strength of political units and of the relations between them. The major factors within this frame of reference are: (1) food, (2) power and other resources basic for the development of industries, (3) manufacturing, (4) foreign trade and investment, and (5) transportation. These five factors are discussed briefly in this chapter and the three that follow, which, taken together, comprise a survey of the economic elements in political geography.

Food is probably the most important of the economic elements and has become a powerful political weapon in a world torn by conflicting philosophies and doctrines. Lack of an adequate supply, resulting in undernourishment and finally in starvation, has been one of the chief causes of unrest throughout history. The fact that this problem still exists is a disgrace to modern civilization. It must be solved if we are to have a well-organized world. In addition to an adequate amount of food, there is need for a well-balanced diet to maintain health and energy. In this respect there is still much to be done.

A second factor, important especially for nations that are industrialized or have plans for industrialization, is the availability of power and other natural resources essential for industry. This factor is significant in times of peace and to a large extent controls a nation's standard of living. Such wealth is essential in times of world crisis when a decision between war and peace depends upon an evaluation of the industrial capacity needed to

carry out war plans successfully; it must be compared with the capacity of potential enemies.

Related to the factor of power and resources is manufacturing, which utilizes these elements in making a wide variety of tangible things needed in both peace and war. Foreign trade and investment also enter into the political-geographical picture. They control many foreign relations and have a bearing on the question whether a nation can be self-sufficient or must depend upon other nations. Finally, if manufactured products are to be used, they must be distributed either by land, water, or air. Thus the strength of a nation is greatly influenced by the adequacy and efficiency of its transportation system.

THE WORLD FOOD SITUATION

World Diet

The calorie content of the average diet of a country frequently has been used as an indication of its standard of living and national energy. One must, however, take into consideration the influence of climate (loss of heat because of low temperatures and air cooling), the weight of the average person, and the amount of activity called for by his occupation. For instance, the energy output per kilogram (2.2 pounds) of body weight per hour varies between .4 calories for sedentary work and 7.9 calories for physical work. Nevertheless, a survey of prewar world diet, by nations, indicated that ten per cent of them were well below a daily amount of 2,000 calories, while five per cent were above 3,000 calories. Increase of per capita consumption in the low-calorie countries, such as Korea, Iran, Iraq, Jordania, El Salvador, and Mexico, is therefore essential for a well-nourished world. Of course, during the recent war the figures were much lower, and starvation conditions prevailed in some countries of Nazi-occupied Europe.

The structure of the diet. Figure 31 is taken from a publication of the United Nations (*World Food Survey*, 1946) and shows the prewar diet structure of four countries, two in a middle latitude, and two in a tropical location. The *Survey* includes the following statements:

COMPARISON OF PREWAR FOOD CONSUMPTION IN FOUR COUNTRIES
(QUANTITIES PER HEAD PER WEEK)




FIGURE 31. (From *World Food Survey*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1946.)

In New Zealand, with a high average food consumption, the diet was well balanced. Calories from cereals amounted to a little less than 1,000 and consumption of meat, milk, and fat was high. The supply of protein averaged 96 grams, of which 65 percent was of animal origin. Denmark was the highest food consumer among the Scandinavian countries. It is of interest to note that Denmark and New Zealand, though situated on opposite sides of the earth and differing in many characteristics of national life, consumed approximately similar kinds of diets. Cereal consumption was equally low and milk consumption equally high in the two countries. The main differences were that while consumption of meat, fish, and eggs in Denmark was comparatively high, the consumption of these foods in New Zealand was twice as great; on the other hand Denmark consumed half again as much fat as New Zealand. When there is abundance and variety of food and purchasing power is high countries tend to choose a diet fully adequate for health.

Java and the Dominican Republic, by contrast, are examples of countries with low average levels of consumption. In Java, with a total calorie supply of about 2,000, the calories furnished by cereals were more than 1,000 per caput daily. Carbohydrate intake was further increased by the consumption of large quantities of cassava, so that not only was the average supply of animal protein almost negligible (4 grams), but the total protein (43 grams) was the lowest

recorded in all the 70 countries surveyed. The Dominican Republic was little better off; the main difference lay in the larger intake of animal protein, accounted for by the considerably greater consumption of milk, meat, fish, and eggs. Bananas have been included in the roots and tubers group in the case of this and other tropical countries in which they were a staple of diet. In nutritive value they are akin to this group.¹




FIGURE 32. (Adapted from *World Food Survey*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1946.)

Figure 32 gives the diet structure for the various regions of the world. The calories bars are divided into two parts which in a good diet should balance each other in calorie content. However, the chart clearly shows that except for North America, southern

¹ Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, *World Food Survey* (Washington, D. C.: FAO, 1946), p. 10.

South America, western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand there is a heavy emphasis on cereals, roots, and tubers. Compare, for instance, the diet structure of North America with that of the U.S.S.R. and note the differences. The Russian diet is often mentioned as very poorly balanced. However, one wonders a little bit about the conclusions which can be drawn from this fact, because the average Russian soldiers certainly did not give the impression in World War II of being poorly nourished persons with little energy.

Nutritional targets. The Hot Springs Food Conference in 1943 (called a United Nations Conference) recommended that governments should: "... adopt as the ultimate goal of their food and nutrition policy, dietary standards or allowances based upon scientific assessment of the amount and quality of food, in terms of nutrients which promote health, and distinguish clearly between these standards and the more immediate consumption goals which necessarily must be based upon the practical possibilities of improving the food supply of their populations."

In order to improve the food situation nutritional targets were set up for each area; these took existing conditions into consideration but established goals to attain. The following principles were used, according to the *World Food Survey*, to determine what those targets should be.

- (a) A per caput calorie intake of 2550-2650 should be taken as the minimum level to which intake should be raised in the low-calorie countries, and the quantities of additional foods required should be estimated on this basis.
- (b) *Cereals.* If calories from cereals fall between 1200 and 1800, no change should generally be recommended. If they fall below 1200, and if total calorie intake is below 2600, some increase in cereal intake may be recommended unless the total calories from cereals, starchy roots and tubers and starchy fruits, sugar, fats and pulses exceed 2000-2100.
If cereal calories exceed 1800 and total calories are high, the question of decreasing the former should be considered.
- (c) *Starchy roots and tubers and starchy fruits* (for example, bananas, which in composition resemble roots and tubers).

An intake of 100 to 200 calories from these foods per day may be taken as a desirable objective. A larger consumption may, however, be advocated if intake of cereals is low and adequate amounts of protein can be obtained from such foods as pulses, milk, meat, and fish. But where these cannot easily be made available, as for example in certain manioc-eating countries, too high a consumption of starchy roots may seriously lower protein intake.

- (d) *Sugars.* In general, no increase in the intake of sugars should be recommended. If calories from sugar exceed 10 to 15 percent of total calories, some reduction may be considered, with due regard to the dietary pattern as a whole.
- (e) *Fats.* Total daily calories from fats (as a separate food group) should be at least 100 and preferably 150-200. Intake of fat through the medium of other food groups must be taken into consideration.
- (f) *Pulses.* In countries in which pulses are already an important feature of the dietary pattern, calories from this source may well reach 250-300 daily. In general, this means countries in which meat supplies are necessarily low (say below 150 calories from meat daily) and sources of animal protein limited. But even when meat calories are as high as 200-250 calories from pulses may be pushed to 200-250 if this is in general conformity with dietary habits. Pulse intake must be considered in relation to intake of cereals, starchy roots and tubers and starchy fruits, milk, and meat.
- (g) *Fruits and vegetables.* Total calories from these foods (excluding starchy vegetables and fruits) should be at least 100 per caput daily. Preference must be given to leafy green and yellow vegetables and fruits and to fruits and vegetables which are good sources of vitamin C. The quantities of fruits and vegetables recommended should be considered in relation to their nutritive value. If the kinds grown are of low vitamin content, daily calories from this source should be raised. If the reverse, they can perhaps be slightly reduced.

- (h) *Meat (including poultry), fish and eggs.* Not less than 100 calories per caput daily, and preferably 150-200 should be derived from these sources. If intake of milk and pulses is high, that of this group can be correspondingly reduced. Fish can replace meat in countries in which the latter cannot easily be produced in quantity and where fish supplies can be readily increased.
- (i) *Milk and milk products.* An intake of 300-400 calories per caput daily represents a desirable minimum level of consumption. In recommending milk supply targets, weight must, however, be given (1) to existing dietary habits in respect of milk consumption, (2) to the present level of milk intake, and (3) to the possibility of providing certain important nutrients of milk through a combination of pulses and leafy green and yellow vegetables. Small fish eaten whole can supply calcium to replace milk calcium, but this is not the case when only fish muscle is eaten. In countries in which milk supplies are at present negligible or nonexistent, the milk calorie target may temporarily be set at 50-100 calories, which will represent a very large percentage increase over existing supplies.²

The Present Food Situation

A good, well-balanced food supply is certainly an asset for the welfare of nations and there is a close relationship between standards of living and diet. Ellsworth Huntington, for instance, in *America at War* (1942) stressed the fact that a country like New Zealand which has an excellent diet, stands number one among all the nations of the world with regard to per capita agricultural output, health and vigor and medical care, and only second (after the United States) in industrial productivity per worker and income per capita.

Before World War II, the world had tried to solve its food problem in the best way possible. Many countries were too poor to supplement their own resources, others were able to buy what was sorely needed. In the more advanced countries the food economy was quite complicated and well-planned. But World War II disrupted the world food economy and in many European

² *World Food Survey*, pp. 11-14.

countries the food situation was extremely critical, both as to amount and composition. In the Netherlands, for instance, inhabitants of German-held area in the last winter of the war suffered from extreme hunger, and long lines of people on bicycles or walking barefoot left the cities to find something to eat in the outlying farming districts. Even before the armistice had been signed food was dropped by parachute in order to save lives.

Four years after the war European countries had recovered as far as food was concerned, thanks in part to American aid through the Marshall plan, although in some cases the supply was still limited. In the fall of 1951, for example, the British weekly ration was 10 ounces of sugar, 1½ ounces of cheese, 3 ounces of butter, 4 ounces of margarine, 3 ounces of bacon, 3 ounces of cooking fat, and meat equivalent to two small chops. This is below the American consumption but nevertheless did not prove to be deleterious, because health conditions at that time were better than ever before. However, there are large parts of the world where lack of food is a chronic condition; as a result many people are undernourished. The problem of how to feed the world is the greatest one we face at present because of its political complications. Hungry people will willingly forego their freedom and accept communist totalitarian control if they have the hope of thus getting more to eat.

The case of Britain. Great Britain offers an interesting case of a changing food economy due to political events, first the influence of World War II, and then the so-called austerity program. Even before the war Britain had started an inventory of land use, that is, a careful mapping of the use of the land. During the war that survey became extremely useful as a basis for planning. As the importation of food became more and more difficult, it was essential for her to raise as much food as possible at home. The results are shown by the fact that in the period 1936-1938, 1.6 million hectares were used for cereals while in the period 1945-1947 more than double that amount was used—3.4 million hectares. However, this expansion did not mean that Great Britain became self-sufficient, only that the deficit was less. A comparison between prewar and 1948 food consumption shows a slight reduction in the number of calories in the diet but a considerable change in the composition: increases in dairy products, fish,

cereals, and especially potatoes; decreases in meat, oils, and fats.

The relation between home production and imports is shown by the following figures. Eighteen per cent of the wheat was home-grown (a low figure in spite of the increase). For fats and butter home production was only 10 per cent; for meat, 45 per cent; for bacon, 33 per cent; for eggs, 65 per cent; and for cheese, only 14 per cent. Great Britain made frantic efforts to buy as little as possible from the United States in order to protect her dollar credits and collateral treaties. Instead she exchanged imports for exports with Argentina and with the U.S.S.R. This caused bad feelings in the United States because it interfered with the principle of multilateral trade, as sponsored by this country.

Eight years after the war was over, the supply of meat and eggs was still very low. The average adult was allowed one egg a week, and that one was used in the general cooking. It was considered a great improvement when the weekly meat allowance was raised a penny (about one cent). Still the British take it and grin, for they are a remarkable people.

World Food Trade

Basic commodities are not the only foods in world trade. In this country we import a lot of food that we do not need but nevertheless like to have. European cheeses, out-of-season fruit from the southern hemisphere, and dates from the Middle East are luxuries we can afford. Generally, however, when we talk about food trade, about surpluses and deficits, we mean the basic foods that are needed for a balanced diet.

It is difficult to divide the world in two parts on the basis of food surplus and food deficit. Not only do the amounts of production vary from year to year with the result that certain countries will import one year and export another, but some countries are both importers and exporters of foodstuffs. The latter situation is the case in northwestern Europe where the countries around the North Sea export dairy products—the Netherlands also exports fruits and vegetables—and at the same time import grains and fodder. Most countries involved in world food trade export as well as import foodstuffs. Certain nations, however, ordinarily have large food surpluses, whereas others must import a great part of their food to keep alive.

The surplus countries are usually young countries, historically speaking, with low population densities; examples are the United States, Canada, Argentina, Australia, and New Zealand. Originally they sold food and bought manufactured products. Gradually they have increased their industrial development, even to the point, as in the case of the United States, of making large exports of manufactured goods. The deficit nations are found principally in Europe. Formerly they paid for that deficit by their exports of manufactured products, but now they face a difficulty in finding markets, or else they have the problem of not being able to pay for the food they need. This problem was, indeed, one of the major ones of the world economy directly after the last war, but fortunately the situation has improved since then.

In Europe, food production is slowly returning to prewar levels and some countries produce more than before the war (Switzerland, Great Britain). France is even planning to become a food-exporting country and sees in that plan hopes for a better future. The U.S.S.R. is again exporting cereals. As a result of her newly gained territory, Russia's food production shows an increase of approximately ten per cent over prewar figures. However, many of these areas are densely populated and need all the food produced. Poland, in its territorial shift, lost more than it gained; so did Rumania. Greece needed large food imports because of civil war conditions, and Italy also is importing food but hopes to attain self-sufficiency.

In Asia the major food trade comes from Burma, Siam, and Indochina in the form of rice produced on the river deltas of the Irrawaddy, Menam, and Mekong. After the recent war only Siam remained a rice exporter because trade in the other two was stopped by civil wars.

Many efforts have been made to stabilize the food trade by international agreements. This was done for sugar during the period between the World Wars. An example is the International Wheat Agreement, which has as its objective assurance of wheat supplies to importing countries and markets for wheat to exporting countries at equitable and stable prices. The 1949 agreements were arranged by 42 governments of which five were exporting countries (Australia, Canada, France, the United States,

and Uruguay), and the others importers. Neither Argentina nor the U.S.S.R., although both attended the preliminary meeting, were willing to participate in the agreements. In addition to stabilization of prices, the agreements allot guaranteed export quantities. In 1949 these totaled 460 million bushels (Canada, 203 million; United States, 168 million; Australia, from 80 to 85 million; France, 33 million; and Uruguay, 1.8 million). A new allotment is made every year. On the other side, the deficit countries were guaranteed the purchase of the cereal; actual amounts were also agreed upon for this.

Conclusion

In a book on political geography the problems of the world food situation can only be touched upon. However, they are serious and on their solution depends the peace of the world. The United States has helped tremendously in restoring the world after World War II. Without that help thousands, perhaps millions, would have died. On the other hand, there is danger that such help may be interpreted as interference with the complete economic and political freedom of the nations involved. This potential danger is indicated by the accusations of American economic imperialism that come from beyond the Iron Curtain. Although almost none of the accusations are based on truth, they have emphasized the importance of the food problem as an element in international relations. The offer to extend the help of Economic Cooperation Administration funds to the countries of eastern Europe was declined because of orders from Moscow, but it has made a great impression upon the people of those countries. Even the wildest charges that America was trying to dominate the world have not killed the feeling that the United States tried to help.

WORLD DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

Besides atomic energy, which is still in the exploratory stage, there are three chief sources of energy: coal, oil, and hydroelectric power. Although coal, from a world point of view, is still the chief agent of energy, recently oil and natural gas together have displaced coal from its first place position in the United States.

Atomic Energy

It is difficult to judge what the value of atomic energy will be in the near future and what it will mean as a weapon of war. Some believe its potentials are unlimited, others that its use will be restricted. Meanwhile, geologists hunt all over the earth's surface for uranium deposits, and the former uranium centers, such as Great Bear Lake in Canada and the Belgian Congo (Shinkolobwe), may give way to undiscovered supplies in the years to come. There are many rumors of newly discovered deposits; moreover, little is known of the situation behind the Iron Curtain except for already well-known deposits of pitchblende in Czechoslovakia. In 1953 the most promising new centers were in the western United States (the Colorado Plateau and the Blackhills), in South Africa (a by-product of the gold-mining operations there), and in Australia.

There are too many "ifs" at present in the picture of atomic power to venture any opinion about the future. Will atom bombs be used in warfare? How large is the stockpile of the United States? Does the U.S.S.R. have an ample supply of atom bombs? How many are there, and how destructive? Will the atom bomb be outlawed? Will atomic power be controlled internationally? How can such control be established so that the nations will accept it? And, finally, what will be the value of atomic power in a world at peace? Will it revolutionize the entire power situation or will it be restricted? These and many other questions cannot yet be answered, but the answers will have to come soon. Atomic power is the most destructive power the world has ever known. At the same time it can be the most constructive power, capable of bringing progress to the most isolated parts of the world, because the problem of transmitting this power is a minor one in contrast to that arising in transmitting other power resources. The world is waiting for the answers; may they come soon and may they be beneficial ones.

Oil

No modern economic development can exist, no modern war can be fought, without the use of large quantities of oil in its various forms. For instance, preparatory to the invasion of




FIGURE 33. The discrepancies between percentages shown on the maps in Figures 33-38 and those given in the text are due to constant changes in production throughout the world and to the unreliability of reported figures from many countries.

France through Normandy, 23 million tons of petroleum were transported across the Atlantic and stockpiled in England. Home production of oil and access to other productive areas is a very important factor in the evaluation of the power of nations. In time of peace petroleum products are available everywhere, but in wartime the problem of where to get them may be a deciding factor in the outcome. Failure of the German armies in their surge through Russia to occupy the Caucasus oil fields (only the Maikop field was occupied) and the later destruction of the German synthetic oil plants were two great victories for the Allies. Their significance is evident by the fact that at the end of the war thousands of German planes were captured on the airfields, unable to get away because they had no oil. Conversely, the German submarine attack on Caribbean and coastal tankers was for a time a serious threat to the United States; Japan in the winter of 1942 occupied the oil fields of Indonesia and Burma because she needed that oil production for her war economy.

Major producing areas. At present there are five major oil-producing areas: the United States, the Caribbean (including the coastal sections), the Persian Gulf region, the U.S.S.R., and southeastern Asia. Production figures as of 1953 in percentages of total production were: United States, 50 per cent; the Caribbean, 16 per cent; the Persian Gulf, 18 per cent; the U.S.S.R., 8 per cent; and southeastern Asia, 2½ per cent.

Production figures, however, change fast, especially in two sections, the Persian Gulf area and Venezuela, the chief producer of the Caribbean. In 1951, when the Abadan plant of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was closed and the Iranian flow of oil was stopped, Kuwait alone by doubling her production was able to fill the gap and prevent a shortage. The case of Kuwait is almost unbelievable. In 1946, the first year of production, the monthly output was only 67,000 metric tons. By October 1953 it had increased to four million tons, an amount equal to the production of the much older oil fields of Saudi Arabia and about twice that of Iraq, once regarded as the most promising oil region. Venezuela also has increased her production, thanks to new oil fields in the Orinoco district. Russia in 1950 passed her prewar production figure. It is interesting to note a shift from the ancient Baku fields to the new so-called Second Baku area north of the Caspian and




FIGURE 34. Oil reserves in 1951.

west of the Urals, stretching from the Pechora to the Ural River, with main concentration around Molotov (formerly known as Perm) and Ishimbai south of Ufa. The shift means greater distance from the air bases in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East from which, in case of war, an attack could come.

Potential production. The heavy flow of oil which is pumped daily from the earth raises the question—what about the future? Will the supply soon be exhausted? Despite some pessimistic views in the nineteen twenties and thirties, oil production has increased rapidly and new fields have replaced those which were exhausted. Of course a limit must exist, but there is no reason to believe that it will be reached in the near future.

Although estimates are accepted with some reservations, it is held that the Persian Gulf district contains the largest reserves, with Kuwait alone having 15 per cent of the total (one per cent being about 800 million barrels). However, there are large potential oil zones still unexplored. Geologically, for instance, it is quite possible that a more or less continuous oil zone follows the eastern side of the Andes in South America connecting the Maracaibo area in Venezuela with the oil fields of Bolivia. Oil has been found in spots where no one dreamed of expecting it only ten years ago. For instance, oil derricks now rise out of the flat plains of the eastern Netherlands. The Russians are rather optimistic about their oil reserves, and the recent development there shows great possibilities along the western slopes of the Urals. There seems to be no danger that the world is exhausting its oil, but local changes will take place and it is an open question whether the United States will keep its dominant position in the future.

Despite our inability to make definite predictions, some deductions can be drawn. First of all, the United States today is in an excellent position with one half of the world's oil reserves available to her, if we include the Caribbean. The British Commonwealth is in a bad position so far as her home territory is concerned. Canada, Trinidad, India, and Pakistan are only minor producers. It is accordingly very essential to the Commonwealth that the production of the Persian Gulf area remain available to her. The U.S.S.R. probably looks with envy at the Persian Gulf oil fields and in case of a conflict probably will try to occupy

them. The battle for oil is a very real one in our present world.

In addition to the major producers, there are a number of minor ones and for their economy such relatively small production can be very important. Argentina and Peru, for instance, are doing well; oil in Bolivia may prove quite an asset to that country as a source of income, as has happened in the Near East where the oil-producing countries are really floating on their oil income and getting rich overnight. In Europe, where oil is very scarce, Austria, Rumania, Hungary, and Poland are the major producers, but that production is controlled by Russia. However, even in Europe, where we might think all possibilities have been exploited, the Netherlands increased her production from a trickle in 1942 to 600,000 barrels in 1948—an achievement for the small-scale Dutch economy.

Pipelines. Before oil can be transported by tankers in world trade it must first be brought to the coastal harbors in pipelines. In large countries the centers of oil production also have to be connected with the areas of consumption. The United States has an intricate system of pipelines for this purpose. The building of the Big Inch and Little Inch pipelines from the Middle West to the East Coast are examples of how necessary such lines are in a time of an emergency. Russia, which formerly had only one major pipeline, from Baku on the Caspian to Batum on the Black Sea, now has pipelines from her oil fields that extend into the centers of consumption.

Except for the Iraqi oil field of Kirkuk, the Persian Gulf oil fields are near the shore. A three-forked pipeline takes Kirkuk oil to the Mediterranean; one fork goes to Haifa in Israel, one to Tripoli in Lebanon, and the third to Baniyas on the Syrian coast. The long haul around the Arabian Peninsula can be cut off by direct pipelines to the Mediterranean, and a pipeline from the Persian Gulf now runs directly to Sidon on the Mediterranean coast. Long pipelines, however, are quite vulnerable in times of war or political unrest. The line from northern Iraq to Haifa suffered much damage during the Jewish-Arab struggle and did not function after 1948.

Oil derricks have shown themselves to be remarkably invulnerable to air attack; their spread is sufficient that even atom bombs would not be a paying proposition except in infrequent cases of

high density of derricks. Oil refineries, however, are, of course, vulnerable and in time of war have been especially selected for air attack. The major destruction is, however, done by troops on the ground. The oil centers of Indonesia, such as Tarakan and Balikpapan in Borneo were twice destroyed in World War II, first by the Dutch when the Japanese came and then by the Japanese when Australian troops occupied them at the end of the war.

Coal

World distribution of coal production is an interesting one when seen from the political point of view. There are three great producers: the United States (34 per cent of world production), the United Kingdom (15 per cent), and the U.S.S.R. (18 per cent), totaling two-thirds of the world's output. Europe (not including Russia) and the United States produce equal quantities. Besides the United Kingdom, the major producers are Germany, Poland, France, and the Saar. In terms of political alignment, the Atlantic Pact nations, including Western Germany, produce 73 per cent as compared with 21 per cent for the U.S.S.R. and her satellites. There is very little coal in South America, except for some in Chile and in Brazil, and very little in Africa except in the Union of South Africa. In the Far East, figures on Chinese production are not available, India has an appreciable amount, and the relatively large Japanese production is approaching the prewar level. Australia is a fairly good producer, important especially because coal production in that part of the world is small.

Available coal reserves. Coal reserves are still so adequate, especially if lignite is taken into consideration, that it will be a long time before they are exhausted. For the United States alone, this is estimated to be more than 250 years from now. Nevertheless, for many countries which have been using their limited coal reserves rather rapidly, depletion will come much sooner. Already, some of the European nations have used the best layers, and the production per worker is declining. Great Britain, for instance, is encountering this difficulty because the layers near the surface have been exhausted and the use of the lower ones is more expensive; for a country that was once the world's greatest exporter, such a situation is a tremendous handicap.




FIGURE 35.

Coal from the strategic point of view. Despite the stress on oil, in most countries coal is still the principal source of power, either in its original form or transformed into electricity and gas. Although the coal mines are not vulnerable to bomb attack, many workers are required, and this means large settlements which are, of course, vulnerable. Bombing also can hinder distribution of coal by destroying railroad lines.

In modern countries that depend on manufacturing or are faced with low temperatures in wintertime, it is not possible to live without coal. Even patriotism is not always enough to offset the lack of heat in homes. The necessity of having coal also can greatly influence the foreign policy of nations. In World War II, Italy for a time was allowed to use British waters for her coal ships coming from Germany; her entrance into the War was based upon Germany's promise to send long trains from the mines of the Reich and the Saar to Italy by way of Switzerland. Communist control of coal workers and the resulting political strikes, as happened in France in the fall of 1948, are great handicaps, especially in periods of reconstruction. At any time, however, coal strikes severely affect a nation's economy, and governments tend to intervene in order to prevent a complete breakdown.

Although Europe is almost back to prewar production of coal, the amounts mined in 1951 were not sufficient to cover the needs of increased industrial production. The coal problem of Europe is one of the great difficulties which still has to be overcome. Plans were made to increase British production by importing Italian labor, but this idea was not well received by the British coal miners. The Scandinavian countries have to get their coal from Poland, which means that, in return, other products of strategic value have to be exported to the countries behind the Iron Curtain.

Hydroelectric Power

Water power differs from power derived from oil and coal in that it is continuous and cannot be exhausted. Whereas both coal and oil are products of the earth's crust and depend on the geological structure, water power depends on only two factors: the relief and the amount of water available. The rain, however, does not have to fall on the spot where the power is produced; it can fall elsewhere and be transported by rivers. One of the necessary

bases for water power is an amount of available water that does not vary much during the year. Hence, there must be either storage reservoirs or a river not affected by seasonal changes, or a fairly uniform rainfall of sufficient quantity. Figure 36, showing potential water power, combines the two factors—relief and precipitation. The heaviest concentration is in central Africa with its high year-round rainfall, its large rivers, and its mountain rim which is crossed by rapids and waterfalls.

Figure 37, showing present distribution, presents a very different picture. Africa is still virgin as far as actual hydroelectric power is concerned. Elsewhere in the world there are only three areas of concentration: North America, western and southwestern Europe, and Japan. The highest per capita use is in Norway, Switzerland, and northern Italy, where conditions are favorable, and neither coal nor oil is available. The figures for the U.S.S.R. are still low in spite of the publicity given to some large developments, but potentially it is better off, especially in the Siberian section, than the United States and Canada combined. It is necessary, however, to realize that most electricity is not produced by water power but by coal; in the United States, for instance, the share of hydroelectric power in the total production of electricity is only 29 per cent.

Water power and warfare. Hydroelectric-power dams and stations are vulnerable to air attack and in some countries destruction of one station means almost total elimination of the use of power. In countries like Norway and Switzerland that would mean an almost total stoppage of manufacturing. In World War II, the famous Dnepropetrovsk Dam was destroyed twice, once by the retreating Russians and once by the retreating Germans. The spectacular destruction of the Ruhr dams by torpedo air bombing not only caused a power shortage but resulted in heavy floods down the river bed.

Hydroelectric power does not have to be used at the power plant but can be conveyed to other areas; the distance, however, is not unlimited—the maximum being about 300 miles. Thus, hydroelectric power can become an export product, as is the case in northern Switzerland where power is exported to southern Germany. Plans are now being made to correlate power developments in parts of western Europe and to provide a system which




FIGURE 36.




FIGURE 37.

would make it possible to provide power wherever and whenever it is needed.

Conclusion

This short survey of oil, coal, and water power has brought out some interesting facts. The position of the United States in respect to power is almost impregnable; at present and in the future. The U.S.S.R. is well situated, although less so than the United States. Development of water-power potentials in the tropics may make a great change in the world's economic structure. However, if and when atomic power becomes available for civilian use, all such considerations may become meaningless, because it may be possible to bring atomic power wherever there is a need for it. Since that is still in the future, nations can still be evaluated, as far as power is concerned, on the basis of the availability of oil, coal, and hydroelectric power.

Basic Natural Resources II— Minerals and Other Resources

MINERALS, FIBERS, RUBBER, AND wood are the chief natural resources in addition to food and power that are essential to a nation's industrial development and have a profound effect on international relations.

MINERALS

Any discussion of the world distribution of minerals and the resulting political complications must be based on statistics. However, a difficulty arises because changes in production can occur rather abruptly in response to the demands of the market. Production can rise rapidly in wartime, when the demand for certain minerals is at a peak, and it can drop quickly when peace is restored. Moreover, in case of need, production takes place without regard for the costs, whereas, normally, cost is an important competitive factor.

In addition to these peculiarities of mineral production, no statistics are available for some parts of the world. This is true of the U.S.S.R., for which only estimates of production are available; the Russian-controlled states, also, are gradually following the practice of not issuing production data. Finally, some minerals are so important strategically that nations generally keep the amounts produced secret.

Minerals in Warfare

In time of peace minerals can be bought on the open market, but in wartime a most pressing problem for a belligerent country is

how to obtain essential and critical minerals, not mined in large enough quantities domestically. For example, in World War II, Germany had access only to Europe for her mineral needs, whereas the Allies could buy from the rest of the world. Germany tried to solve the difficulty; first by prewar stockpiling, then by the occupation of countries which produced needed minerals, and finally by trying to buy from those neighboring states that were not involved in the war. However, here she met the competition of the Allies, and the struggle to determine what country was going to get a share, and how much, of such minerals was a very desperate one. Turkey, for instance, produced in 1943 about 200,000 tons of chromite, most valuable for the production of high-grade steel. German efforts to get that supply were to a large degree unsuccessful because the Allied countries had made a contract with Turkey to buy the total production for a period of three years.

Less successful, as far as the Allies were concerned, was the situation in Spain and Portugal which sold tungsten, not otherwise available in large quantities in Europe, to Germany; in 1943 their joint production reached 11,400 tons, about 20 per cent of world production. Only after the Allied liberation of France could Germany be entirely cut off from that supply. It is interesting to note that since then production has dropped to ten per cent of the war level. Spain in any case presented a difficult problem. In order to strengthen Spain's desire to stay out of the war, although that country was giving all aid possible to Germany, the Allies had to help her economically with food and oil while her mineral wealth of iron ore, lead, zinc, manganese, tin, copper, wolfram, and tungsten, was being sold to Germany. Only when the war turned in favor of the Allies was it possible to bring about curtailment of such sales.

The United States' need for South American minerals increased greatly during the war, and this led to a mineral boom in some of the Latin American countries. Stockpiles available in the United States at the end of the war, as well as competition from other producers who temporarily had been unable to sell, caused great concern in South America. For example, the decline in demand for Bolivian tin led to a crisis which threatened to become a calamity for the entire Bolivian economy. As a general rule, marginal pro-

ducers do well in time of great demand but are the first to suffer when the competition is severe.

Iron Ore

In global value, iron ranks first among the metallic minerals and in peace as well as in war iron-ore production is essential to the industrial development of nations. In using the amounts of iron ore as a basis for this discussion, one should keep in mind that the actual iron content varies between 30 and 65 per cent. For the United States the average content is 50 per cent, for Sweden 60 per cent; at the other extreme, the average for Germany is only 25 per cent. For a long time, also, phosphorus content of the ore was a great handicap, until it was solved by the Bessemer process in the middle of the nineteenth century.

World distribution of iron ore. In 1950 the United States was the world leader in the production of iron ore with about half of the total output. Of that production, about two-thirds came from the Lake Superior region with the Birmingham area ranking second in importance. Canadian production is rather insignificant. It is quite possible that eventually Canada will outrank the United States because of the iron ore resources of the so-called Canadian Shield, a great mass of ancient rock. That part of the area near the boundary between Quebec and Labrador is especially promising.

In Europe, France is slowly coming back to her prewar level of 10 per cent of the world production; the chief mining area is in the Lorraine region and extends into Luxembourg, the so-called Minette. Great Britain produces 4 per cent and Sweden, with her high-grade ores in the north, 8 per cent of world output. U.S.S.R. figures are not available but can be estimated as about 14 per cent of the world total. Outside of the United States and Europe, only India, Australia, and Chile are major producers. Some other countries—Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Spain—although minor producers, have significance as exporters. Brazil probably will become more and more important as a producer when her large, rich resources are developed, and lately Venezuela has entered into the picture.

Movements of iron ore. In each of the big iron- and steel-producing countries there is an interplay between coal and iron

ore; limestone is also needed but it is a minor factor because it is generally locally available. In the United States the movement of ore along the Great Lakes to their southern shores and then to the Appalachian coal fields is a good example. In like manner, Russian iron ore from the Krivoi Rog district in the bend of the Dnieper River moves to the Don coal region. Until coal fields were discovered near the Ural ore center, there was an exchange of coal and ore between the Kuznetsk area in Siberia and the Ural fields.

Of far greater importance than these internal movements, from the point of view of political geography, is the transport of ore from one country to the deficit areas in another that have developed beyond their original resources. Germany, for instance, needed Swedish iron ore, and the conquest of Norway and especially the capture of Narvik, the winter port for ore from northern Sweden, was to a large extent based on that need. Great Britain must also supplement her home production by imports from other countries; not only Scandinavia, but also Spain and North Africa are important to her in this regard, and the necessity of obtaining ore influenced to a great degree her war policy toward the latter two countries.

Steel Production

The United States is far ahead of the rest of the world in the production of steel. The output in 1950 was, according to estimates, more than three times greater than that of the U.S.S.R., almost five times more than that of Great Britain, and seven times more than the combined output of France and Luxembourg. Germany in 1950 showed signs of recovery, and for the first time since the war surpassed France-Saar in steel production.

Copper

Copper merits special discussion because of its great use in our present world. Copper resources in the United States are still excellent. The United States produces 35 per cent of the world's copper; Chile produces 18 per cent and Canada, 9 per cent. Since Mexico, Cuba, and Peru also produce some copper, the Western Hemisphere supplies approximately two-thirds of the world's total. A second center of copper production is located in Northern




FIGURE 38.

Rhodesia (Broken Hill) and the southern Belgian Congo (Katanga), which together have 16 per cent of world production. A third center is the U.S.S.R., with an estimated production of about 8 per cent. This leaves comparatively little (10 per cent) to the rest of the world. However, in countries like Japan or those in western Europe, every little bit helps. This was especially true in World War II when the minor production of Sweden, Germany, Spain, and Yugoslavia was a great asset to the Germans. Worthy of note is the vulnerable position of the United Kingdom which has to import all its copper from abroad.

The necessity of bringing inland copper to the coast led to the development of a railroad system in central Africa. It connects Katanga in the Belgian Congo and the Broken Hill districts of Northern Rhodesia with the coast, on the Atlantic side to the Portuguese harbor of Lobito in Angola and on the Indian Ocean, to the Portuguese town of Beira in Mozambique.

Lead and Zinc

North America produces about 60 per cent of world lead, of which 30 per cent comes from the United States and an equal amount from Canada and Mexico. This amount is sufficient for North American needs. The rest of world lead production is distributed among many countries, the most important of which is Australia with 13 per cent. The zinc situation is similar; the United States, together with Canada, produces 60 per cent, and Belgium is next in importance with 9 per cent. The present position of the U.S.S.R. with regard to these two minerals cannot be established, but in 1939 Russia and Poland together produced 12 per cent of the world's zinc. Russia's share of the lead output was estimated at 5 per cent.

Bauxite and Aluminum

Despite the large production of bauxite in Arkansas, 58 per cent of the amount consumed by the United States has to be imported, chiefly from Dutch and British Guiana, but Jamaica's output is increasing in importance. Bauxite production in the world is widely scattered; chief producers aside from those mentioned above are Italy, France, Yugoslavia, and Indonesia.

As for aluminum, the United States and Canada together pro-

duce 75 per cent of the world output, with the U.S.S.R. (11 per cent) the next ranking country.

Tin

Tin is the first of the minerals thus far listed that, practically speaking, is not found in United States territory. Before World War I most of the tin came from the Malay area but after the Japanese conquest United States interest turned toward Bolivia, Nigeria, and the Belgian Congo. In 1950 the Malay area again produced more than half of the world production, with Bolivia accounting for 20 per cent and the African territory 15 per cent. Major uses of tin in the American economy are in bronze and in the production of tinplate.

Nickel

Canada produces roughly three-fourths of the world nickel output and supplies the needs of the United States. The estimate for the U.S.S.R., including Finnish production, is 17 per cent. New Caledonia in the South Pacific was a major producer during World War II, but by 1950 its output had declined to about 5 per cent.

Magnesium

Shortage of aluminum during World War II, because of increased demand, greatly increased the use of magnesium as a light metal. After the war, production decreased to only 5 per cent of wartime production. The leading countries during the peak were the United States with 70 per cent, Germany, and Great Britain.

Precious Metals

The Union of South Africa has remained the chief producer of gold with 45 per cent; the U.S.S.R. second with 20 per cent, and the United States together with Canada ranking third with 18 per cent. North America which includes United States, Canada, and Mexico, produces 82 per cent of the world's silver. In the production of platinum, Canada ranks first with 40 per cent, the U.S.S.R. second with 30 per cent, and the Union of South Africa third with 16 per cent; production in the United States increased during the war to 5 per cent, but dropped afterwards.

Mercury

In 1950 world production of mercury dropped to one-half the war level. Despite Italy's loss to Yugoslavia of Istria with the Idria mercury mines, Italy and Spain continued as leaders, together accounting for roughly two thirds of world production. The United States ranks third with three per cent. Canada and Mexico, in time of need, can increase their production considerably, as they did during World War II.

Minerals Used Chiefly in Alloys

A number of minerals produced in rather small quantities are extremely important because of their use in alloys, especially in the production of various types of steel. Because of the relatively small quantities needed they can be stockpiled, but if they are absent in wartime, production is considerably handicapped. We have already mentioned the battle for chromite in Turkey and for tungsten in Spain and Portugal during World War II.

In the war period the United States was able to increase her production of many of these materials but for some time she had to depend on imports. Antimony, for instance, which is used for antimonial lead, had to be imported from Bolivia, Mexico, and the Union of South Africa; cobalt, used for magnet steel, from the Belgian Congo; titanium, a hardening factor in alloys, from India, although United States production is now more than half of total world output. Vanadium came from Peru and Southwest Africa (here also the United States production has increased to 40 per cent of world output); and chromite from Turkey, Southern Rhodesia, Union of South Africa, and Cuba.

Since the war, Philippine production of chromite has again become important. The United States is well provided with molybdenum, used in steel, and accounts for 90 per cent of world production. A special case is manganese, of which large quantities are needed for steel production. The U.S.S.R. is the major producer with 50 per cent. Difficulties in obtaining manganese from that country have increased American interest in other producing areas, such as the Gold Coast, India, the Union of South Africa, and Cuba.

Conclusion

The minerals discussed above comprise a listing that is far from complete. To cite only a few of the many omissions, no mention has been made of diamonds for industrial purposes from the Belgian Congo and Brazil; mica from India and Brazil; cryolite from Greenland. The survey, however, suffices to show the complexity of the problem facing a Great Power in securing all the minerals needed in peacetime; this problem is even more complicated in war when access to the usual sources may be cut off.

From the information presented it is possible to draw certain conclusions as to the relative position of the various nations with regard to minerals.

It is pertinent to call attention to the fact that in some cases small producing areas in seemingly remote corners of the world can be of critical value in case of need. The Belgian Congo, once a forgotten section of darkest Africa, is now the center of interest not only because of the production of copper, tin, cobalt, and diamonds, but especially because of production of uranium as a source of atomic power. The Pacific island of New Caledonia is one of the few producers of nickel, and Madagascar, off the east coast of Africa, is prominent for its graphite and mica. During World War II the mineral production of the Latin American countries came strongly to the fore; examples are tin and wolfram in Bolivia, and vanadium and antimony in Peru. More or less forgotten in a free world market, these countries suddenly had their day, perhaps to be forgotten again now that the War is over. Cuba has become increasingly important with its iron ore reserves and its production of manganese and chromite.

Mineral resources may mean wealth, especially to a small nation; however, this situation may be temporary and may involve the danger of foreign control or interference. The Boer War in South Africa at the turn of the century, which ended with the disappearance of the two Boer republics, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, was certainly influenced by the discovery of gold deposits of the Witwatersrand near Johannesburg. Foreign capital, necessary for the exploitation of minerals, can mean foreign economic pressure and, in wartime, foreign occupation; witness the Nazi occupation in parts of Europe. Some countries, now

in the center of attention because of their minerals, may at times wish that their underground wealth was not yet discovered and they were poor but undisturbed.

FIBERS

Besides food, power, and minerals, textile fibers play an important part in the economy of nations and in many instances can be called strategic materials. The absence of wool, for instance, was a serious handicap in Germany's war equipment and made the Germans' winter uniforms inferior to those eventually used by the Allies. Likewise, without cotton Germany had to turn to artificial fibers, which were not always equivalent to the natural ones for making protective clothing.

In cotton production, the United States still ranks first, but it no longer holds the absolute leadership it once had. In 1950, not counting the U.S.S.R. for which no comparable data were available, the United States produced about two fifths of the world's output. Other major producers are India, China, Egypt, Brazil, Pakistan, Mexico, and Argentina. Europe depends entirely on imports—a great handicap in time of war when transportation facilities are limited or even entirely lacking.

With regard to wool, Australia and New Zealand, which together account for almost two-fifths of the world's production, rank first, followed in order of importance by Argentina, the U.S.S.R., the United States, the Union of South Africa, and Uruguay. Note the dominance of the young countries of the Southern Hemisphere where the semiarid grasslands offer ideal conditions for wool production.

Flax fiber, the basis of linen, was the specialty of the U.S.S.R., and became even more so when she took over the Baltic states. All other producers are insignificant compared with Russia. The same is true for hemp, although Italy and Yugoslavia produce appreciable amounts.

For hard fibers, the Philippines with its abaca or Manila hemp, Tanganyika with its sisal, and Mexico with its henequen are the chief producers; Pakistan and India raise all of the world's jute in the Ganges delta.

Rayon, a synthetic fiber, has taken over to a large extent the former role of silk; it is produced chiefly in Europe, with Germany and the United Kingdom as leaders. Outside of Europe, Japan is slowly recovering from the war slump to regain her prewar position, and production in the United States after a postwar decline amounted in 1951 to 33 per cent of world production, exclusive of the U.S.S.R.

RUBBER

Natural rubber is still an essential product for our modern economy even though synthetic rubber can be produced. Natural rubber, once a product of the tropical jungle, reached its peak production through the development of rubber estates in southeastern Asia. The name Malaya, for instance, calls up a picture of millions of trees, planted in rows, which daily produce their quota of rubber latex as regularly as cows produce milk. Southeastern Asia is still the chief source of production, with Malaya and Indonesia the leaders. The rapid rise of production is illustrated by the fact that world production increased from 247,000 tons in 1920 to 1,623,000 in 1941. During World War II when the Japanese occupied southeastern Asia rubber production flared up in other parts of the world, and for a short time the tropical jungle was searched for rubber-producing trees. After the war, conditions returned to those of the prewar period. Outside of southeast Asia, only Liberia deserves mention for rubber production; estate output has been increasing but it is only a small amount when compared with world output.

Synthetic rubber production on a large scale was developed by Germany during the Hitler period but abandoned after World War II. The United States, under war pressure, made a remarkable effort to produce synthetic rubber and actually surpassed the highest production figures Malaya had ever reached for natural rubber (833,000 tons in 1945). The production has continued, although at only about one-half the war peak. Likewise, the U.S.S.R. has been successful, after many efforts, to abstract from plants substances used in making synthetic rubber; the yield was estimated to be about 300,000 tons in 1951.

WOOD

The great supply of wood, nature's gift to mankind through the enormous world forests that grew wherever climate permitted, has been sadly depleted. In many cases this was necessary because man needed the forested area for food production, but in many instances where the land was not needed no efforts were made to restore the forest.

It is only in recent times that the nations of the world have become conscious of dangers inherent in a scarcity of wood. In the United States, steps have been taken belatedly to protect and increase our forest reserves. The amount of wood which is used yearly is indicated by the fact that the estimated annual production in the United States of so-called "round wood" was about 8.5 billion cubic feet in 1949. But even with such large production we do not have enough and must import pulpwood and lumber from Canada and hardwood from the tropical Americas. The timber reserves in the tropics are still very large, but are difficult to exploit efficiently partly because of the complexity of the tropical forests where pure stands which can be used economically are rare.

The chief commercial wood area is found in a circle around the Arctic, a belt of conifers which covers large parts of Canada, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union uses its own resources, but wood and products derived from it are the major exports of the other countries mentioned.

Industry, Trade, and Investment

FREQUENTLY, WHEN WE THINK ABOUT the power of nations, we think especially in terms of industrial development. We unconsciously visualize big buildings, smoking chimneys, blast furnaces, freight cars bringing raw materials or leaving with the finished products. We see in our minds masses of workers moving toward the factory or returning, after work, to street after street of identical houses. The picture is somewhat appalling, but nevertheless means strength and through strength security.

In many parts of the world this picture is still true, but gradually it has changed. The modern, smokeless factory, the huge parking place with thousands of cars, the individual homes with their flower gardens along tree-lined lanes. But it is still industrial power and it still means strength. Its importance or the lack of it is a great factor in the relations between nations and can be used as a kind of barometer to rank countries.

INDUSTRY

Industrial capacity is one measure for the evaluation of the power of a nation. It is difficult, however, to express the total industrial production of a nation in common denominator terms so that it can be compared with production of other countries. It is possible to compare individual industries, but that would be a tedious and lengthy process, and would be incomplete because the countries beyond the Iron Curtain publish very few data. Another method is to show the percentage of people actively engaged in industry country by country, but here again a difficulty arises

because statistical methods are not uniform. Sometimes, for example, the number of people engaged in construction work are included, sometimes not.

The difficulties involved in using this method are illustrated by the 1950 figures. The percentage of people in the United States engaged in manufacturing was about 23 and probably no great change has taken place since. Compared to the industrial countries in Europe that figure is low. For the United Kingdom and Western Germany, the comparable figure is about 40, for Belgium 36, and for the Netherlands the same as the United States. This similarity is rather strange because the Netherlands is certainly not an example of intensive manufacturing. Of course, in assessing industrial production other factors have to be taken into consideration, such as the output per worker. This is quite high for the United States, but no figures are available for comparison.

Despite these discrepancies, and excluding the United States, which has a special position due to the intensity of production, the nations of the world can be divided into four categories according to the percentage of people engaged in manufacturing.

Categories of Industrialization

Group one, made up of nations with more than 30 per cent of the population engaged in manufacturing, may be called the highly industrial group. In addition to the three leaders—Great Britain, Belgium, and West Germany—it includes Switzerland, Luxembourg, and Czechoslovakia. Group two, with percentages between 20 and 30, includes those nations with a high-grade economy in which manufacturing plays an important part. In this category fall most of the other countries in western Europe, as well as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Group three, with percentages between 10 and 20, is comprised of nations in which manufacturing has started, but has not yet developed into a major enterprise. This is a large group including Spain, Portugal, Ireland, some countries of eastern Europe, India, and some of the Latin American countries. Finally, there is group four, with a very low level of manufacturing, typical for the underdeveloped parts of the world; in this group are Africa and large parts of Asia and South America.

Three nations—China, Russia, and Japan—should be mentioned separately. China is an unknown factor, but probably belongs in group four. For Russia no comparable data are available, but the percentage of workers in manufacturing industries has been increasing rapidly and thus it probably fits into group two. In Japan, the percentage in 1947 was only 17. This low figure was due partly to the industrial postwar slump and partly to the fact that in spite of high-grade manufacturing the bulk of the population is engaged in farming.

Industrial Regions

Figure 39 shows the industrial regions of the world. Two large ones stand out, namely, eastern United States and a large zone in Europe; the latter starts on the Atlantic coast, runs through central Europe, and breaks up into separate units in Russia. A third one, minor in size, is found in central Japan, especially along the north shore of the Japanese Inland Sea.

However, such a map may give a wrong impression, because factories take up little space, and one can travel through these regions without noticing them. Rarely are plants sufficiently concentrated to be called areal in extent. Moreover, there has been a tendency to decentralize manufacturing, partly to make plants less vulnerable to air attack, partly, too, because decentralization makes possible better living conditions for the laborer.

Another factor that has influenced industrial location in many countries is the distance from the frontier and the danger of being occupied by foreign armies in case of war. France, for instance, has faced the disadvantage that her chief area of manufacturing is located along the boundary with Belgium and Germany. During World War I the German armies occupied only a small part of France after their advance had been stopped at the Marne River, but that section included most of the industrial areas, and France had to continue the war under a great handicap. Likewise, in World War II, German advance into Russia included the Donets Basin. Russia, however, was able to continue her industrial production in the Urals and in Siberia, out of reach of German aggression.




FIGURE 39.

Vulnerability to Air Attack

Military activities in World War II included air attacks on important industrial developments. The German "Luftwaffe" started this concentrated bombing with a heavy attack on Britain; its destruction of Coventry was so devastating that the name "Coventry" still stands for this type of warfare. The Allies later retaliated by "around-the-clock" bombing of industrial plants in Germany. In the last days of the war Japan, also, suffered from such attacks on her industrial cities. Still, it was difficult to destroy individual plants, and production often continued till the transportation system collapsed or raw materials were no longer available. This does not mean that no damage was done, but that the bombs often missed their targets, and economic activity, surprisingly, was able to continue among the ruins. Perhaps the element of terror was more important than the actual damage, except of course in densely populated cities that were reduced to heaps of stones and rubble. Another factor, in the case of Germany, was that the well-organized, defensive air force was destroyed or grounded because of lack of gasoline, and thus allied bombing took place almost at will.

The atom bomb has changed the situation to a certain degree because the area of destruction is much larger and the destruction itself far more complete. But even so, it is questionable whether a limited number of such bombs can destroy the industrial power of a nation, especially when the plants are not concentrated but spread over large areas. Again, the element of terror and loss of human life may be more telling than the actual damage done to manufacturing. Of course, it would be possible to destroy specific plants which produce certain items indispensable in warfare—such as the ball-bearing plants in Germany in World War II. Special steps may be taken to avoid such a catastrophe by putting production, insofar as possible, out of reach of bomb attacks, either underground, or in remote areas. However, planes at present can carry enough fuel to reach almost any point and return to their bases. Adequate protective measures may be possible in Russia and in the United States where space is available, but it is far more difficult in the densely populated areas of western Europe. No wonder that the European countries are very much concerned over the

danger of war and are extremely anxious not to provoke conditions which may cause another war.

TRADE

Wars play havoc with regular world trade conditions. Former connections are interrupted, new ones have to be made, and prices are often unimportant if the nation at war needs specific products for its war economy. No country at war is self-supporting; differences are only relative and the ability to obtain critical materials may mean the difference between defeat or victory. For example, in World War II, Turkey and Portugal got ridiculously high prices for their chromium and tungsten, which were needed by both sides.

Trade conditions did not become normal after the War. The need for reconstruction as well as for replenishment of exhausted resources of food and raw materials resulted in lopsided trade balances, with import values way ahead of exports. The United States was the major country supplying those needs and as a result American export trade rose sharply, and was, in 1947, almost three times that of imports. Since then, exports have declined and imports have risen, but the difference between the two is still great.

Even before the War trade was restricted by tariffs, and in some countries, notably Germany and the U.S.S.R., further government controls were imposed. After the War, most European countries tried to decrease their imports through government trade control, while seeking markets for their exports. Artificial rates of exchange and changes in those rates further hampered the free flow of products. The dollar gap, caused chiefly by the fact that only American industries could replenish the depleted European household and that trade for a time was very one-sided, became a threatening danger. Even the large credits given by the United States, through the European Recovery Plan and other loans, could not solve the difficulties. Although by 1950 most countries were well on the way to recovery, the trade situation in early 1953 was still grave and carried with it political complications. Meanwhile, the income from foreign investments had decreased greatly, be-

cause those investments had to be sold during the War in order to get credits. Only the increasing number of tourists helped to offset the disadvantages of unfavorable trade balances.

The importance of foreign trade for the individual countries, with special reference to the United States, is shown in a series of maps and tables (Figures 40 through 43 and Tables III and IV). It should be noted that most states behind the Iron Curtain do not publish trade data; accordingly, information about them has perforce been omitted. In general they are unimportant as far as world trade is concerned, but this is, to a large extent, the result of artificial restrictions.

Value of Total Foreign Trade

It is understandable that in Europe, with its many rather small-sized political divisions, international trade is more important than in North America. Trade, for instance, between the Netherlands and Belgium is comparable to trade between two adjacent American states. Accordingly, the total percentage figure for Europe west of the Iron Curtain is higher than that for the United States, Canada, and Mexico combined, 37 as against 23 per cent. It is rather surprising that the amounts for the United States and Canada are so high. This shows the dominant position of North America in world trade. The figures for the other continents are relatively small. Latin America, excluding Mexico, has 8 dots on the map; Africa, 3; Australia-New Zealand, $3\frac{1}{2}$; and India and Pacific Asia, 9.

It would be interesting to know what part of the total production of a country is exported, but it is difficult to find such statistics. For the United States, that percentage figure would be relatively low, but even that export, which in dollars comes to 12.5 billion, may mean the difference between prosperity or depression; for certain industries export means a great deal. For Britain the figure before the War was 20 per cent, showing the significance of exports for that country.

Likewise, it would be useful to know what part imports play in a nation's consumption, but here again it is difficult to find pertinent data; only for food consumption are such data generally available. The share of individual countries in world trade expressed in percentages cannot be given, because the U.S.S.R. and




FIGURE 40. This map shows the relative distribution of approximately 85 per cent of world trade in 1950.

its satellites do not publish such information, and as a result the total amount of world trade is not known.

TABLE III
TRADE VALUE PER CAPITA IN U. S. DOLLARS, 1951

| <i>Country</i> | <i>Dollars</i> | <i>Country</i> | <i>Dollars</i> |
|------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Iceland | 710 | Brazil | 70 |
| Malaya | 656 | Portugal | 68 |
| New Zealand | 655 | El Salvador | 68 |
| Belgium and Luxembourg | 575 | Nicaragua | 67 |
| Canada | 546 | Greece | 65 |
| Switzerland | 514 | Egypt | 60 |
| Sweden | 507 | Peru | 60 |
| Australia | 459 | Guatemala | 54 |
| Denmark | 453 | Mexico | 50 |
| Norway | 453 | Paraguay | 45 |
| Netherlands | 440 | Honduras | 44 |
| Venezuela | 418 | Poland | 44* |
| Finland | 372 | Philippines | 44 |
| United Kingdom | 367 | Iraq | 43 |
| Ireland | 267 | Japan | 40 |
| Israel | 260 | Ecuador | 39 |
| Cuba | 255 | Hungary | 36* |
| Uruguay | 229 | Turkey | 34 |
| France | 206 | Bolivia | 33* |
| Union of South Africa | 188 | Haiti | 32 |
| Argentina | 186* | Jordania | 32 |
| United States | 168 | Iran | 30 |
| Chile | 119 | Spain | 30 |
| Costa Rica | 117 | Indonesia | 26 |
| Germany | 116 | Yugoslavia | 25 |
| Austria | 115 | Bulgaria | 22* |
| Jamaica | 95 | Burma | 18 |
| Panama | 95 | Pakistan | 16 |
| Ceylon | 94 | Indochina | 14 |
| Syria and Lebanon | 94 | Thailand | 12* |
| Italy | 80 | Afghanistan | 10* |
| Czechoslovakia | 77 | India | 10 |
| Tunesia | 77 | Ethiopia | 5 |
| Colombia | 77 | Liberia | 2* |
| Dominican Republic | 76 | China | 1.4* |

* Figures for an earlier year

Trade Value per Capita

The table of trade value per capita (Table III) presents a different picture. Three countries rank above 600 dollars, namely: Iceland, New Zealand, and Malaya. The total value of Icelandic trade is only around 100 million dollars, not large enough to be shown on the preceding map. However, the population is very small, only 145,000, and most of what the country produces (fish and animal products) is exported, whereas most of what is consumed has to be imported. New Zealand is in a somewhat similar position with large exports of wool, meat, butter and cheese, and imports of manufactured products. Malaya ranks high because of the export value of rubber and tin.

In the group between 500 and 600 dollars are Belgium and Luxembourg, Canada, Switzerland, and Sweden; three of those are highly industrialized whereas Canada resembles New Zealand with a large trade and comparatively few people.

Between 400 and 500 dollars are Australia (comparable to the position of New Zealand and Canada), three highly developed European countries—Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands—and Venezuela with its huge oil exports.

Only two countries have a per capita trade value between 300 and 400 dollars, namely Finland, which resembles Sweden although the trade is much smaller, and the United Kingdom, where a large trade is offset by a population of over 50 million.

Five countries represent the group between 200 and 300 dollars, a group of great variety. Israel belongs to it because of the large imports needed for her economic development; Ireland, Cuba, and Uruguay are exporters of food (dairy products, sugar, meat), and France is a well-balanced industrial nation.

The United States, in the group between 100 and 200 dollars, seems to be placed surprisingly low, but one has to take into consideration that the foreign trade is only a small percentage of the total production and consumption, and that the United States is self-sufficient to a large extent. To this group, also, belong the Union of South Africa, Chile, Argentina, Austria, and Germany. This last country will probably rank much higher in the near future in spite of its large population once German industry has fully recovered from the war. All other countries have a per capita

trade value below 100 dollars. Some of those will gradually reach a higher level, for instance, Italy and Japan, still under the shadow of a disastrous war, but for most of them there is little to sell and no money to buy. India with her huge population just reaches ten dollars while the Chinese estimates show a trade value between one and two dollars per capita.

The table deserves careful study and yearly revision, because each country is a special case, and for each there are particular reasons for the trade situation, which from year to year reflects the home economic development.

United States Share of Foreign Trade of Other Countries

If the foreign trade of a country is chiefly controlled by one nation, this situation may influence political relations. Ireland, for instance, has to take into consideration that 90 per cent of her exports go to Britain and that in spite of complete political freedom she still has preferential treatment in the British market, which she does not want to lose.

Figure 41 shows the American share of trade of various countries for the year 1950. It shows clearly the remarkable hold the United States has on trade in the Americas. Except in some European colonies and in Venezuela, which sends part of her oil to the Dutch Island of Curacao for refining, the United States has more than one-half of the trade in the Western Hemisphere countries north of the Equator. South of the Equator the percentage drops as low as 19 only in Argentina. The United States is also the chief trader in the Far East. The exceptionally high figure for the Philippines is based, of course, on special preferential rights which were continued after independence was achieved. Important, too, is the role the United States plays in the trade of the Near East—in Turkey, Syria, and Iran. The large share in the trade of Greece, Austria, and Germany is a reflection of postwar conditions of occupation and economic help. The rate of American trade in Europe, important as it is, does not rank high in percentage, because inter-European trade is the prevailing factor in this area. There is little trade with the countries behind the Iron Curtain. The United States share is also relatively small in Africa and Australia, except for the Union of South Africa, where 17 per cent of the trade is with the United States.




FIGURE 41.

Figures 42 and 43 permit a differentiation to be shown between the United States share of imports and exports. For instance, the United States takes 61 per cent of the exports of the Belgian Congo, but provides only 20 per cent of that country's imports. Likewise, Brazil sells more than one-half of her production available for export to us, but buys less than one-third of her imports in return. The maps clearly indicate the European trade problems; in most countries the American share of the imports is much larger than the share of the exports, which means a dollar deficit on the trade balance.

TABLE IV

WORLD DISTRIBUTION OF UNITED STATES EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, 1951
(APPROXIMATE PERCENTAGES)

| <i>Country</i> | <i>Exports</i> | <i>Imports</i> |
|--------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| Canada | 19 | 20.5 |
| Mexico | 5 | 3 |
| Central America | 1.5 | 2 |
| Caribbean | 5.5 | 7.5 |
| South America | 14.5 | 21 |
| Europe | 29.5 | 18.5 |
| Britain | 7 | 4 |
| Germany | 4 | 2 |
| Near East | 3 | 2 |
| South and Southeast Asia | 5 | 10 |
| Far East | 7 | 5 |
| Australia, New Zealand | 2 | 4 |
| Africa | 4.5 | 4 |

World Distribution of United States Exports and Imports

Canada ranks highest from the point of view of American trade both in imports and exports. One-fifth of American foreign trade is with her northern neighbor. Imports from Canada are even higher in value than those from the whole European continent. Latin America, except for Mexico, is more important for American import than for export, and, as a customer, Latin America ranks above Asia and, of course, well above Africa and Australia.

The case of European trade needs special attention. The difference between our sales and our purchases, which directly after World War II amounted to more than four billion dollars, had




FIGURE 42.




FIGURE 43.

dropped in 1951 to about two billion. Herein lies one of the great problems in economic and also in political affairs which affect our relations with the European continent. How can imports from Europe be increased and the dollar gap lessened? Most European exports compete with home production and many of them could be sold cheaper if not subjected to tariff regulations. It would seem to be imperative to take more action, because economic tension often has political consequences, and even now many Europeans accuse the United States of commercial imperialism. It is not easy to convince the American public and especially the American businessman directly concerned that it may be necessary to lower protective tariffs and, to some extent, to favor export products from Europe.

INVESTMENTS

In the first edition of this book it was possible to write a chapter on "Foreign Investments." Amounts were fairly well known. A map of distribution showed that there were two credit centers, namely the United States and western Europe, and that the rest of the world was in debt to them. The United States and Britain accounted for 70 per cent of the total world foreign investments, although Switzerland ranked first on a per capita basis.

World War II has changed that picture completely, because part of the investments of most European countries were liquidated during the war, while the rest has in many cases only doubtful value, especially as far as former colonial territory is concerned. Only the United States is left as a main credit nation, and Switzerland, neutral during the war, has strengthened its position from a per capita point of view. Private foreign investments were estimated in 1948 to total 18.1 billion dollars, of which one-third was invested in Canada, one-fourth in Latin America, and one-fourth in Europe. American government grants and loans to foreign nations have temporarily stopped most of the flow of private capital, although it is hoped that private capital can take over the moment government help is discontinued. Such hope is based, however, on economic recovery. Private capital is only willing to take a certain amount of risk.

Despite the changed situation sketched above, the general remarks made in the earlier book are still valid and can be sum-

marized here. It is a popular belief that financial interests are often the cause of international complications that lead to war. Although it cannot be denied that financial factors may sometimes influence the relations between states, their importance has been greatly exaggerated. Few countries at present are willing to sacrifice the lives of their soldiers for the sake of financial investments. International disagreements involving finances are generally limited to the diplomatic game played at round-table conferences. On the other hand, investments often have led to peaceful penetration which terminated in colonization or annexation of foreign territory. Nevertheless, it may be said that nations only occasionally have clashed because of competing financial interests.

Effects of Financial Involvement

A small country loses a great deal of its political freedom when it becomes dependent on the funds invested in it by larger countries or private interests. When France took over the protectorate of Tunis in 1880, this act was the culmination of a long period of financial penetration that had brought Tunis under French control. The official political change required little adjustment. The French protection of Tunis, however, almost caused a war between France and Italy, for the latter considered that Tunis was in its zone of influence. Since it was the loser in this financial game, Italy turned away from France in the diplomatic circles of prewar Europe. Similarly, the famous Morocco affair, when a German gunboat arrived at the port of Agades to protect German interests in 1911, climaxed a long struggle between the financial interests of France and Germany in Morocco. The compromise that gave Morocco to France was regarded by Germany as a diplomatic defeat, even though it also provided German Cameroon with an outlet to the Congo River. A later example was the financial dependence of Albania, which in the thirties had virtually become a vassal state of Italy, although in many Albanian circles the Italians were far from popular.

In the Far East, the clash between Russia and Japan in 1904 was hastened by the dispute between these countries over the Yalu timber concession on the Korean-Manchurian border. The British South Africa Company under the skilled direction of Cecil

Rhodes aroused definite anti-Boer sentiment in England by its propaganda. These feelings were partly responsible for the disastrous Boer War which followed the Jameson Raid of 1896.

Most colonial possessions are the result of financial enterprises that led to political domination. The Netherlands Indies were taken over by the government of the Netherlands after the East India Trading Company had ruled them for nearly two hundred years. Similarly, England took over the Indian possessions of the British India Company in 1774. A nineteenth-century example is the British North Borneo Charter Company, which, only ten years after its inception, was followed in 1888 by the British flag. The British South Africa Company was relieved of the administration of Northern Rhodesia in 1924 when that territory became a crown colony, and Southern Rhodesia, the other portion of the Company's domain, now enjoys status almost equal to that of a dominion. The United States was involved in Samoa in 1895 when its shipping interests conflicted there with those of a German firm; at the same time Great Britain wanted the islands for a coal-
ing station. A compromise divided the islands between the United States and Germany. The former German portions of these islands are now mandated to New Zealand.

CONCLUSION

In our present unstable world, discussion of world trade and investments has only momentary value and needs constant revision.

As far as trade is concerned, data are readily available and the reader can easily make up-to-date maps himself, compare them with the ones given in this chapter, and seek explanations for the changes. A world in which trade would flow freely from producer to consumer is still far off, and as long as political instability continues not much can be done to reach this goal. However, efforts in Europe toward "economic union" are indications that the trend may be away from a narrow national point of view and towards a larger economic one. As the economy of nations recovers from the wounds of war, private capital will also regain its importance, not as a form of imperialism and economic slavery, but as a business enterprise favorable to both creditor and debtor.

Transportation

TRANSPORTATION IS A MAJOR FACTOR in the evaluation of nations in peace as well as in war. To a citizen of the United States or western Europe it appears that the transportation problem has been solved. An intricate system of roads, railroads, and inland waterways serves the land, while large vessels loading and unloading cargoes on modern piers indicate that the sea is another of man's highways. A dense network of airlines, based at a rapidly increasing number of airfields, permits swift transportation not only for long distances but for shorter trips; the latter service makes it possible to commute to a city from a distance of several hundred miles and not take much more time than nearby travel by train, automobile, or bus.

There are still handicaps in air traffic, such as the interference of bad weather and the distance between the city proper and the airfield. However, air transportation has developed within the lifetime of the present older generation and it is still in its infancy. It does not seem fantastic to forecast that once atomic power is used, most of the freight of the future will be carried by air, even such bulky material as oil (when not brought by pipeline), grain, and ores, and that transoceanic liners and transcontinental trains will be regarded as historic vestiges of the growth of transportation. But we have not yet progressed so far, and transportation by present methods, used in peace as well as in war, still needs study as a factor in political geography.

RAILROADS

In spite of the competition of the modern roads, on which cars, busses, and trucks transport an increasing number of passengers

and freight, and of the airlines, which are still comparatively in their infancy, railroads are still the most important factor in world transportation. Hence the density of a nation's railway system reflects its economic development. It is doubtful whether the world's railroads will show a heavy mileage increase in the future. In underdeveloped parts of the world new lines are still being constructed or planned, but the increase in mileage is slow; in other areas a decrease has even set in, owing to the abandonment of short lines which can no longer compete with road service.

TABLE V
LENGTH OF RAILROADS, 1950

| <i>Country</i> | <i>Miles per million population</i> | <i>Miles per thousand square miles of territory</i> |
|----------------|---|---|
| Great Britain | 465 | 272 |
| United States | 1515 | 2 |
| U.S.S.R. | 272 | 200 |
| Canada | 3257 | 77 |
| Australia | 3690 | 7 |
| Belgium | 382 | 12.2 |
| Belgian Congo | 170 | 9 |

Disregarding the efficiency of rail transportation, its importance for political units can be shown by comparing the length of the railroad system with the area covered, and with the number of people served. Table V gives such figures for a few countries and discloses three types, namely, those that have fairly high values for both elements (Belgium, Great Britain); those that have very high values per capita but low values per areal unit (Canada, Australia), and finally those that show low figures in both cases (Belgian Congo, U.S.S.R.). The United States falls between the first two types; in comparison with Great Britain she has three times as many miles per capita but only about one-third of the British mileage per 1000 square miles. Russia, despite her claims of modern progress, is still in the third category with inadequate railroad coverage, only partly offset by the use of waterways.

Figure 44 gives a general picture of railroad density. Large areas with well-developed railroad systems are found in eastern and central North America, and in western and central Europe.




FIGURE 44.

The small units comprise sections along the west coast of the United States, western Cuba, the region around Buenos Aires, the area around Melbourne, Java, Japan, and the Egyptian Delta.

Areas of dense railroad networks are usually surrounded by zones of moderate density. Such is the case in North America and Europe. The European zone extends far into Russia and also into the Middle East and North Africa. Areas with moderately dense railroad systems are India, North China, eastern and southern Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and in South America, the Chilean west coast and most of the east coast.

Nevertheless, low railroad density prevails in many parts of the world. Northern North America, and most of South America, Africa, and Asia, will probably bypass the railroad state of development entirely and pass directly into the modern air age, insofar as economic development necessitates transportation.

Strategic Railroads

Most railroads have strategic importance in times of war or danger of war. In World War II the United States railroad system was able to more than double the amount of freight and passengers carried in normal times, an enormous service to the nation's economy. In Germany, the railroad system was the link between the eastern and western fronts; its partial collapse, due to constant bombing and strafing of trains, and the destruction of railroad junctions and bridges, was an important factor in Germany's defeat.

Some railroads were built chiefly for political or military reasons, with their economic value of only secondary importance; in many such cases the economic factor finally overshadowed the political or military. The transcontinental line of Australia, running from Perth on the west coast to Adelaide in southern Australia is still a politically strategic line, but it has very little traffic; only once a week does a passenger train run along its tracks. In Africa the projected Cairo-Capetown line will probably never reach completion. The reason for its existence as a connecting link for British territories ceased to exist when Egypt became independent and the future of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan became politically uncertain. Various parts of this line are now connected by steamer and bus, but the airlines carry most of the

through passenger traffic. The transcontinental railroads in North America, linking East and West, are still strategically important, but during and after their completion they aided in the economic development of the West and now we think of them mainly as arteries of trade and passenger travel.

The Trans-Siberian Railroad, with its branches and connection with the Trans-Caspian lines, is still the artery of Russian Asiatic power, economic as well as political. Once a one-track line unable to supply the Russian armies adequately during the Russian-Japanese war, it has become a lifeline of the U.S.S.R., connecting the Baltic region and the Pacific.

Military Factors

Some railroads have only military significance. For instance, before World War I the Germans built a dense railroad system along the Belgian border, which greatly facilitated the German invasion of that country in the summer of 1914. The annexation of Eupen-Malmedy after World War I brought this system into Belgian territory, and some stations and many track lines stood deserted without any economic significance.

The desire to make a railroad line less vulnerable to invasions may have been one of the reasons why the northern Swedish route runs about 50 miles inland from the coast of the Bothnian Gulf with feeders to the coastal towns. Even a second railroad was constructed still farther inland to be used in case of disruption of the coastal line. Similarly, the Trans-Siberian Railroad was established some distance north of the Amur River when the U.S.S.R., before World War II, faced the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo; here, also, there were short lines connecting the main line with the river settlement. A second main line was planned far to the north. A very good example of a military railroad was the one which the Japanese constructed across the mountains of Tenasserim, connecting Siam and Burma. It was called the "bloody railroad" because of the many prisoners who lost their lives working on it. After the Japanese defeat the railroad was left unused and the tropical jungle took it over.

ROADS

Most of us are so accustomed to good roads that it is difficult to realize that only limited parts of the world have firstclass highway systems. However, in most cases modern roads are totally lacking. In their original form of trails and paths, roads are as old as mankind and were, except for waterways, the only connection between distant areas. Even before man, some animals used trails, which they kept open by frequent use. It is not by chance that the early development of civilization took place where transportation was relatively easy, namely in deserts, steppes, and did not extend beyond the forested parts of the world. Of course, there are many other reasons, but open country and the possibility of easy movement certainly was a major factor. When civilization moved into areas with more vegetation, definite roads became a necessity.

The Roman Empire was famous for its *Vias* which connected its capital, Rome, with all parts of the state. Even now certain sections of that extraordinarily well-built road system are in use, although they have, of course, been modernized. After the collapse of Rome, the road system also broke down, and transportation in medieval Europe (and even later) was based on very few roads, generally in poor condition. Military leaders have always recognized the need of good roads. Napoleon sponsored the French *Routes Nationales*, still the pride of France, and in recent times, Adolf Hitler was responsible for the German *Autobahnen* on which American jeeps later raced, only interrupted in their progress by destroyed viaducts and bridges.

In many areas of the world roads are still very scarce and often can be used only during certain parts of the year, since they become quagmires in the rainy season or during the spring thaw. However, it is surprising what automobiles can do and how makeshift busses, constructed of old Fords or modern jeeps, can overcome difficulties and often serve as the only means of transportation over long distances. But very often the only means of transportation is on foot or on horseback along narrow trails and precipitous mountain slopes.

Military Value

Roads are an essential part of our modern civilization and their number and quality reflects a nation's standard of living. They attain their greatest importance in time of war, chiefly because along them must move the supplies which keep armies going. Obstruction of such traffic, for instance by the destruction of an important bridge, may mean defeat if the movement cannot be restored; conversely, the capture of a vital river bridge, for example, may mean rapid victory.

In World War II the most famous example of this situation was the Remagen Bridge. The Germans' neglect to destroy that bridge and its subsequent capture and use by the American forces in crossing the Rhine, greatly facilitated an Allied victory. The battles of Nymegen and Arnhem in September, 1944, were struggles for bridges on the Rhine, in which one was won and the other lost despite the heroic attempt of parachute troops. The Germans in their victorious march into France and the Low Countries in May, 1940, also knew the importance of bridges and used the technique of having parachute troops take a strategic bridge well in advance of the arrival of ground units. Throughout the war bombers concentrated their attack on strategic bridges, in order to hinder the road transportation which was essential in keeping the armies supplied.

Famous International Roads

The Pan American Highway. The Pan American Highway, 3,267 miles long, when completed will run from Laredo, Texas, to Rio de Janeiro, by way of Buenos Aires. (See Fig. 45). From Peru to Argentina the highway has two branches, one by way of La Paz, Bolivia, and the other by way of Chile crossing the Andes through the old railroad tunnel through the Christ of the Andes Pass or over the pass itself. Side branches run from Bogotá to Caracas and from Buenos Aires to Asunción and to Montevideo by way of a ferry. In 1952 there were still 400 miles incompletd, of which the longest stretch was between Panama and Colombia. Connecting all the capitals of the Americas, the road has more a cultural and tourist value than a military one, but it does give the impression of inter-American solidarity.

The Alcan Highway. The Alcan Highway which is 1,522 miles long connects Dawson Creek on the boundary between Alberta and British Columbia with Fairbanks, Alaska. It was constructed after an agreement between the United States and Can-




FIGURE 45.

ada was reached in March, 1942, when a military road to Alaska became an urgent necessity. It was completed in November of the next year, a stupendous performance considering the inhospitable character of the terrain and its distance from civilization. The Alcan Highway connects at Big Delta with the Richardson Highway which starts at Valde on the Alaska coast. A steady

flow of tourists use the Highway in summer, but its value is still essentially a military one.

The Burma Road. The 720-mile Burma Road leading from Lashio, terminal of the Burmese railroad system, to Kunming in Yünnan, China, was begun in 1937 when China could no longer use her coast because of Japanese occupation. Made almost entirely with hand tools by 200,000 workers, it was completed in 1938. It crosses the gorges of the Mekong and Salween rivers and rises at times to elevations of 8,500 feet. The Burma road was one of the few arteries for the flow of war material into China. Closed during part of 1941 by the British because of Japanese pressure, it was opened again and functioned until the Japanese occupied Burma. However, the road itself remained in Chinese hands and after the liberation of Burma functioned until China became communist.

The Ledo Road. The equally famous Ledo Road, which crosses from Assam into northern Burma, was constructed for the reconquest of Burma in World War II. After the war it lost its reason for existence and has been grown over by jungle through which it was built.

PASSES

The discussion of roads brings up the importance of passes as connecting links between the two sides of mountain ranges. Passes, once crossed by rough trails, are now provided with modern roads. Railroads also go through them, often using tunnels to lower the highest points on the line. In time of peace they serve as trade arteries; in time of war they control movements of armies and strategic defense. Examples are many and can be taken from almost any mountain range of the world, from the passes of the Rockies and the Andes to the Himalayas and the Karakorum. Great migrations used them; conquerors crossed them with their armies. Such names as the Khyber Pass in Northwest India, the Dariel Pass of the Caucasus, the Pass of Roncevalles in the Pyrenees, the Uspellata Pass of the Chilean Andes, and the Grand Saint Bernard in the Alps were milestones in the history of the countries which they connected. In modern times the Brenner Pass was the place of meeting between Hitler and Mussolini as

well as the artery through which German war material passed to Italy.

Pass States

The importance of passes, especially the St. Gotthard and Simplon passes, to mountain-rimmed Switzerland has already been mentioned. Another good example of a pass state is the former County of Tyrol, later on part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It extended on either side of the central chain of the eastern Alps and controlled several passes of which the Brenner is the best known and also the most important. After the first World War, Italy extended its territory up to the mountain crest and the function of Tyrol as a pass-state disappeared.

CANALS

The importance of rivers and lakes in both national and international transportation has already been discussed in Chapter 6, and canals from the point of view of political significance are discussed in that chapter and in Chapter 9. The transportation aspects of canals are considered here.

Most canals have only local significance, connecting river systems and permitting small ships to reach far inland. However, in a few countries canals are important enough to become salient features in the economic functioning of the state. Naturally canals are chiefly restricted to lowlands, although in some instances terrain obstructions have been met by tunneling or by viaducts. The oldest of all canals is the Grand Canal in China. Built in the fifth century B.C., this canal, connecting the Yangtze with the Hoangho, is 1,000 miles long.

In North America, the Chicago Canal connecting the Great Lakes with the Mississippi-Missouri River system, the Sault Ste. Marie Canal between Lake Superior and Lake Huron, and the Welland Canal between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario are the most important for transportation.

European Canals

It is, however, in the European lowlands, extending from France through Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Poland into

Russia that canals have reached their greatest development; sections of England can also be regarded as part of this system. Before the era of railroads and trucks these canals, connecting river systems, were excellent means of transportation. Some of them have lost their importance and are now quiet inland waterways with little shipping, but others have gained in significance because of the increase in inland shipping. On the other hand some new canals are planned for the near future. In the Netherlands, for instance, navigable inland waterways are almost twice the total length of the railroad system, and the inland fleet has more than 16,000 ships, totaling almost four million tons. Similarly in Russia, where a great deal of the traffic utilizes the river system, the connecting canals mean much to the economy. During World War II the German Mittelland Canal connecting the Rhine, Weser, and Elbe rivers was considered important enough to be bombed frequently, and the resultant destruction of locks and viaducts caused complete collapse of traffic.

Canals for Inland Ports

In some cases canals have been constructed to permit ocean ships to reach inland ports. The Manchester Shipping Canal is a good example, and both Amsterdam on the North Sea Canal and Rotterdam on the New Waterway are now accessible from the ocean. In the United States, the best example is the Houston Shipping Canal, which connects Houston with Galveston and the Gulf of Mexico.

Internationally Important Canals

A few canals have international significance not only because of their value to world transportation but also because of their strategic locations. These are the Suez, the Panama, and the Kiel canals.

The Suez Canal, which connects the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea, was opened to navigation in 1869. It was not, however, the first canal to join these bodies of water. The early Egyptians used a canal which they had constructed between the Red Sea and the Nile River. The decline of their civilization and the instability of trade conditions which accompanied it caused this canal to be neglected, until today only vague traces of it are

visible in the desert. The Suez Canal, built by the French under the direction of Ferdinand de Lesseps, attained political significance early in its history when Great Britain, in 1875, became the chief stockholder in the enterprise through the purchase of the shares held by the Khedive of Egypt.

As soon as it was opened to navigation, the Suez Canal became the most important transportation link in the British Empire. Through it runs the all-important lifeline between the homeland and the dominions and colonies of the Indian Ocean area. The necessity of protecting this lifeline resulted in an increase in British influence in the Egyptian portion of the Ottoman Empire, until in 1914 a British protectorate over Egypt was declared. The efforts of Egypt to gain independence after World War I met with success in 1922, but in the agreements between Egypt and Great Britain, the special interest of the latter in the defense of the Suez Canal was recognized. This control will terminate in 1968 when the canal will revert to the Egyptian government. Although the Suez Canal still ranks first in ocean traffic with a ship tonnage that, in 1950, amounted to 82 million in contrast to 29 million for the Panama Canal, it lost most of its military value during World War II because of the vulnerability of its approaches to air attack.

The Panama Canal is the only interoceanic waterway connecting the Atlantic and the Pacific between the Arctic and the Straits of Magellan. From the commercial point of view the canal is of the utmost importance in shipping, and yearly serves more than 5,000 vessels. Although it has been in operation only since 1914, the world has become so accustomed to its existence that it is difficult to recall the time when the Isthmus was without a water crossing. The value of the Canal, however, is not merely commercial. The lifeline of the United States from the East to the West Coast runs through the Canal, thus permitting the use of the fleet in either the Atlantic or the Pacific, according to the nation's needs.

Politically, the United States has permanent use of the Panama Canal Zone, an area five miles in width on each side of the Canal. Actually, both the Canal and the Canal Zone are a part of the Republic of Panama. The breaking away of Panama from Colombia and its immediate recognition by the Government of the

United States (1903) showed this country's great interest in the Isthmus.

During World War II the Panama Canal was not attacked, although German submarines were marauding in the Caribbean. With its Gatun locks vulnerable to air attack, it is understandable that plans are being discussed for an alternate route between the Atlantic and Pacific. Among the various plans suggested, the building of a canal through Nicaragua, using the San Juan River and the Nicaragua-Managua Lake system, seems to be the most logical, especially since political rights have been obtained by the United States (see Chapter 9).

A third important canal, internationally speaking, is the Kiel Canal which connects the North Sea and the Baltic Sea and thus enables shipping to avoid detour around Jutland. Completed in 1895, it had especial strategic value for Germany, permitting her to shift her fleet between those two seas. In peacetime its traffic was tremendous—in 1938, 53,530 vessels with tonnage totaling 22,500,000 tons. In postwar years, having lost its military value, it is rapidly regaining its economic significance—in 1950, 49,270 vessels with 17,800,000 tonnage.

AIR ROUTES

In the first edition of this book it was still possible to present a map of world air routes. At present, however, such a map, even if it disregarded local concentrations, would give a confusing picture of lines crossing continents in all directions. The vast network of airfields permits planes to go almost everywhere. New names appear on the maps published by the airlines in areas once remote from world traffic; new settlements arise in deserts and in jungles to serve as wayside stations or as junctions. Besides the planes which follow regular lines according to a published schedule, there are thousands of others which are chartered for special trips. Feeder lines connect with the main routes just as short railroad lines join the main lines.

Barriers to transportation, such as mountains, have lost a great deal of their significance. The Andes, until recently crossed only by a few roads or railroads, are now crossed daily by air in many places. Planes, more than other means of transportation, have a

tendency to unite the world. This expansion of air transport is still in rapid progress; speeds are increasing and the factor of danger is gradually being reduced to minor proportions. Everything indicates that long distance transportation in the future will be based on air traffic.

At present, national considerations still hamper free movements of planes. Nations restrict the use of what can be called their share of the air. Theoretical boundaries, rising vertically from those marked over land or ocean encircle those parts of the atmosphere that countries want to control. The purpose of restriction may be commercial, to confine air transportation within the country, or military, to prevent foreign planes from crossing the national boundary; the latter may lead to the shooting-down of planes even in time of so-called peace. The Iron Curtain extends upwards and few planes cross it in either direction, except along a few scheduled lines. A no man's land, such as we once had on land, is developing in the air, and will separate nations by zones of emptiness.

Great changes are taking place in the routes connecting nations and their cities. Planes are gradually freeing themselves from dependence on relatively closely spaced bases. Because of greater speed and longer distances between refillings, they will more and more follow global routes, the shortest distances between points. Increasingly the Arctic will come to the fore and will be the focus of air navigation between central North America and central Eurasia. The only problems to be solved are technical difficulties that surely will be overcome, and political difficulties that must be overcome if we want to live in a peaceful world.

Air Transport in War

Planes threaten to make obsolete the long-established principles of warfare, even those of World War II. Protection through distance, which was so important in Russia's defense against German invasion, has lost most of its value. It will be possible to reach any point at any time if air progress continues. The danger of submarines will disappear if there are few ships to attack. Theoretically, Great Britain can be served by planes instead of by ships. Armies and equipment for land warfare are now trans-

ported by plane, and the question of battleship versus plane is hotly debated.

Because of the rapid development of flying, war in the near future may indeed attain global proportions of destruction. There may be no winners, only losers, and world civilization may be at stake.

THE ARCTIC MEDITERRANEAN

Air traffic, having solved most of the physical difficulties, of the earth's surface, is gradually adjusting itself to the proper use of the earth's shape, and the opened vistas give new value to some of the up-till-now neglected parts of the world. This is especially true for the Arctic Mediterranean, intermediate between the great land masses of North America and Eurasia. It is astonishing to see how many potential air routes between populated areas in those continents cross the Arctic and only wait for political obstacles to be overcome before they can be put into operation. Already weather stations dot the Arctic region, and the number of air bases has been increasing constantly. The American air base at Thule in Greenland, now almost exclusively of strategic value, may well be destined to become one of the world's busiest airports.

The major difficulty is political, and the reason for that is shown in Figure 46. Across the North Pole, stretching from northeastern Norway to the Bering Strait is the boundary between the U.S.S.R. and the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in this case, Norway, Denmark, Canada, and the United States. Of the full circle around the Arctic the U.S.S.R. controls almost one-half, from 30° east of Greenwich to 170° west of Greenwich. This control blocks most of the use of the Arctic for regular airlines except for such special cases as the airway between northwest Europe and Japan.

It is easy to see why the Arctic is the potential battlefield between the two worlds. In case of war aerial attacks from either side will use this approach. Bombers will cross it, flying high above the lower atmosphere and finding the air warmer than at the same altitude over the Equator. Perhaps guided missiles will be able to use this route if their range can be extended to cover

such long distances. Here is the battlefield, not a line of ground fortifications, but the air itself. Here radar, for detecting invaders and backed up by fighter planes from Arctic bases, will be the first line of defense. The Pole, once an unknown place till




FIGURE 46.

Perry reached it in 1903, is now an international junction and the scene of future activity. The question is whether that activity will be one of commercial planes with passengers looking out of the window to see the Pole, or of military bombers and missiles bringing destruction to cities and installations thousands of miles away.

OCEAN TRANSPORTATION

The subject of maritime as opposed to continental location was discussed in Chapter 7, and the character of coasts, the location of harbors, and the protection of ocean routes were considered in Chapter 9. The economic aspects of shipping are discussed here. These are concerned with the distribution of shipping among nations and comprise, first, the dependence of a state upon shipping, and second, the percentage of that shipping which is under the national flag.

The dependence of a state upon shipping for its economic existence is related to the amount of its international trade and also to

TABLE VI
MERCHANT MARINE TONNAGE *

| <i>Country</i> | 1939 | 1951 | <i>Tonnage per 100 inh. (1951)</i> |
|----------------|-------|---------|--|
| United Kingdom | 17891 | 18550 | 37 |
| United States | 11362 | 27331** | 17 |
| Japan | 5630 | 2181 | 2.2 |
| Norway | 4834 | 5816 | 176 |
| Germany | 4483 | 1031 | 1.5 |
| Italy | 3425 | 2917 | 6 |
| Netherlands | 2970 | 3235 | 32 |
| France | 2934 | 3367 | 8 |
| Greece | 1781 | 1277 | 17 |
| Sweden | 1577 | 2113 | 30 |
| Denmark | 1175 | 1344 | 31 |
| Panama | 718 | 3609 | 442 |
| World | 68509 | 87245 | 3.6 |

* The figures represent thousands of gross registered tons. Only those countries with a tonnage above 1,000,000 tons are shown.

** Without the Great Lakes fleet.

the percentage of that trade carried by its ships. This percentage varies, of course, from almost 100 per cent for an island state, to nothing for a landlocked country. For these two types of states the percentage is obvious at once, but for others that are neither islands nor entirely landlocked territories, the percentage is difficult to obtain. Even a detailed study of the value of imports and

exports by land and sea would not give completely accurate results because some products might be vitally essential to the life of a state even though their financial value might be small.

The principle that ocean transportation is generally more vulnerable to attack in case of war than is land traffic should be kept in mind. States which depend largely upon maritime trade are confronted with a more dangerous situation than those obtaining supplies by land routes. It should be remembered that both World Wars were almost lost because German submarines made it almost impossible to supply Great Britain with food and raw materials. In both cases relief came at the last moment through new devices against submarines and through the speeding up of shipbuilding.

The subject might be approached through a study of the tonnage of ocean shipping in each country. This would prove unsatisfactory because tonnage figures do not always mean trade. For example, the figures of ship tonnage for 1949 are greater for Uruguay than for Argentina for the simple reason that practically all steamers to and from Argentina stop at Montevideo, where their amount of trade is smaller than at Argentine ports.

Better results can be obtained through a study of the tonnage of the various merchant marines of the world from two points of view, the share in world shipping and the tonnage per capita. Table VI, which presents prewar as well as postwar figures, shows that the total tonnage has increased from 68.5 million in 1939 to 87.2 million in 1951, indicating that a drop in percentage does not always mean a drop in tonnage. The increased importance of the United States, which went into first position during World War II, is interesting. Most of the other ranking nations have returned to or have even exceeded their prewar figures; only Italy and Greece have not yet recovered, and of course in 1951 Germany had no merchant marine worth mentioning.

Table VI also shows the ratio between tonnage and population. Intentionally, prewar conditions are used, because this period clearly indicates the maritime character of nations and present changes may be only temporary. The ratio for the United States was 17 in 1951, but that relatively high figure is more the result of special war conditions than of a sudden upsurge of interest in seafaring. The figure for Panama appears strange, but it is ac-

counted for by the fact that ships of many nations, especially of the United States, use the Panamanian flag in order to avoid control and taxes imposed by their respective governments.

CONCLUSION

Gradually, transportation is conquering distance and uniting the world. Airplane lines extend into the Arctic and across oceans, modern roads have been built through equatorial forests and over high mountain ranges, long freight trains rapidly transport raw materials to industrial centers, and gigantic ships reduce the time required to connect continents. The development of transportation facilities probably has been the most important forward step of our modern civilization. It has not yet reached its climax. Distances will become relatively shorter as the various modern modes of transportation increase in speed. States will become more closely connected and the world's economic structure will tend to become more uniform in all of its parts.

The development of transportation on a world-wide basis calls for increased cooperation among the nations and for more friendly international relations. If the world powers can in some way be persuaded that friendship and cooperation are necessary for the expansion of transportation, they may then be convinced of the absurdity of war.

The U.S.S.R.—A Brief Economic Evaluation and a Comparison

EXPERIENCE IN THE LAST TWO GREAT wars has taught that wars are not won by brute force alone, they have to be derived from and supported by an adequate economic structure. Of course, the outcome of wars cannot be calculated solely on the basis of economic data, but economic resources are of paramount importance, especially if a conflict is not decided in a short time. This fact, of course, is well known to a nation that plans war and is at war. If her economic potential is low in certain basic materials which cannot be stockpiled in sufficient quantities, she may try to increase that potential through the occupation of areas within reach where those materials are available. For instance, the German invasion of Russia in 1941 was to a large extent dictated by the need to reach the Caucasian oil fields, because neither the synthetic oil plants at home nor the Rumanian and Polish fields were sufficient to meet the demands of the German war machine. Likewise, Japan needed oil for her plans of conquest and the control of the fields of Borneo and Sumatra was essential to her scheme.

The lessons of history demonstrate that in order to understand the present international situation and to arrive at some concept of what the future may hold it is necessary to make an economic study of specific key nations. If such a study is made for Russia and her satellites, what major conclusions can be reached? Such a study is greatly hampered by the fact that the countries beyond the Iron Curtain have not supplied the world with much economic data and that even when statistics are available they often have

been regarded with a great deal of suspicion as to their accuracy. The authors make no claim that the data they use are accurate but under existing conditions they feel that they have the best information available. Most of the statistics come from publication by the United Nations. China, although communist, is left out of consideration for practical purposes, because there is an almost total lack of statistical data.

FOOD

The Russian food supply is home-grown and home-consumed. Some imports may come from the eastern European satellites but those are minor factors. Also at times some exports of cereals take place, generally for propaganda purposes, and are highly advertised. Generally, it can be said that the average Russian has enough to eat, although the diet is rather monotonous and not too well-balanced (see Chapter 11). The total production of cereals expressed in weight is less than that of the United States, namely 125 as against 140 million tons which means even a greater difference per capita as the ratio of the population between the two is three to four. However, the actual cereal consumption in Russia is much higher than the American because more than half of the American production, especially the large corn crop, is used for the stock while also some of the production is exported. This difference is well shown by the production figures for bread grain (wheat and rye); the figures for the U.S.S.R., based principally on a rye production almost equal to that of wheat, are twice as high as those for the United States where rye production is very small.

The number of cattle is higher in the United States (80 as against 60 million), but again, that does not tell the story because the available figures do not differentiate between dairy and meat cattle. In pigs, the United States has twice the number of Russia (60 as against 30 million) and only in sheep does Russia far outrank the United States (100 as against 30 million), but their main purpose is to produce wool. Russia's meat consumption is only one-eighth that of the United States (1.3 million metric tons for the U.S.S.R. as contrasted to 10 million for the United States), which means that the average American eats about 10 times as

much meat as the average Russian. The production of fish in the two countries is about equal, but consumption in the United States is very low when compared with that of some western European countries. Because statistics are lacking, few of the other items that constitute the food supply of the two countries under consideration can be compared, but data are available for sugar, vegetable oil, and butter. For sugar, Russian and American production is roughly the same (two and one-half million tons), but twice that amount is available to the United States in Cuba. The Russian production of vegetable oils is about one billion tons as compared with two and one-half billion in the United States. Comparative figures for butter are 350,000 tons for Russia and 660,000 tons for the United States. These figures speak for themselves, and no startling changes, such as those that occur in some industries, can be expected in agricultural production. Increasing a nation's food supply is a slow process. However, completion of the projects in the Volga-Don Basin and in Turkestan promises the irrigation of some 15.5 million acres of land, but even that would mean an increase in acreage of barely three per cent and of only six to seven per cent in production. Meanwhile, the increase in population goes on, and the per capita amount of food will remain about the same in spite of all the improvements made.

POWER

In 1952, oil production in Soviet Russia and her satellite countries was about one-sixth that of the United States (342 million barrels as opposed to 2250 million). There has been a rapid increase in recent years, due in part to the new oil fields in the western Urals, which surpass in production those of the Caucasus. Russian reserves, however, are fairly low, only seven per cent of the world's reserve, so it is understandable that Russia views with interest political developments in the Middle East where more than half of the reserves are located.

With regard to coal, the situation of the U.S.S.R. is much better. Coal production, which was still about equal to that of the United Kingdom in 1949, surpassed the latter in 1950, and Russia has now taken second place, ranking directly after the United States. A change has also taken place in the pattern of distribution. The

Donets coal field, although still the largest producer, has lost its prominent position and yields only 35 per cent of the total. The rest comes from the Kuznetsk Basin in Siberia, the Karaganda coal fields on the Kirghiz steppe, the Ural coal fields, and those of the Moscow area. To the total production of about 260 million tons should be added the 94 million of the European satellites; of the latter figure Poland alone produces 75 million, well above the total production of France and the Saar. The grand total is in excess of 350 million tons as compared to 519 million for the United States and an almost equal amount in western Europe. This does not take into consideration lignite production, which amounts to 48 million tons for the satellites alone; the figures for the U.S.S.R. are not known. If the Russian plans to increase coal production become reality, in 1955 the production of the U.S.S.R. and her satellites will pass the American production. Coal, indeed, is a strong factor in Russia's economic power. However, it should be taken into consideration that a considerable percentage of the coal production is used to transport the coal to the place of consumption.

Electric Power

Figures for electric power in Russia vary a great deal. *The Economic Survey of Europe*, published by the United Nations, gives a total of 104 billion KWH (kilowatt hours) for 1951 to which can be added roughly 30 billion for the satellites. Plans are to increase that production to 242 billion in 1955. This compares with an American production of 461 billion, four times the present Russian output. How much of the Russian production is based on steam power and how much is hydroelectric could not be discovered but steam as a source of power is much more widely used. Increase of electric power can be expected in the near future if the many projected dams and hydroelectric stations have been built. For uranium (source of atomic power) no figures are available.

MINERALS

In 1951, the estimated metal content of iron ore produced in Russia was 22 million metric tons, less than one-half that of the United States. As in the case of coal, a change in the production




FIGURE 47. Principal mineral deposits and chief industrial regions of the European Soviet Union. (From Van Valkenburg and Held, *Europe*, 2nd ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1952.)

pattern has occurred. The predominance of the well-known iron-ore regions of Krivoi Rog, west of the bend of the Dnieper River, has been broken because new fields have been opened in the Urals and near the Kuznetsk Basin. This shift has stopped the coal traffic of the Kuznetsk to the Urals and the ore shipments of the Urals to the Kuznetsk Basin. The European satellites have some iron ore but not sufficient for the demands of heavy industries. They import ore either from Russia or Sweden in exchange for coal.

Copper remains somewhat of a weakness. Estimated production in Russia is about 250,000 metric tons, less than one-third that of the United States, and the satellites have not added much to the total. In lead and zinc, the totals are only a fraction of United States output.

Tin production is small in spite of the acquisition of the former Finnish tin deposits in the Arctic area. Among the alloys, manganese is outstanding. Russia has top-ranking position in the output of manganese; the major fields are near Nikopol on the lower Dnieper and in the Caucasus. Manganese is Russia's major alloy in the production of steel. Bauxite production of about 500,000 tons yearly is augmented by the Hungarian production of 350,000 tons, but the total is still well below the American production. Accordingly, aluminum production is considerably smaller.

STEEL

Steel is often used as a criterion of industrial strength, because it is the base for both heavy and light mechanical production. Here are the facts. In 1951 Russian production was 30 million tons of crude steel and that of her satellites was 6 million tons, of which one-half came from Czechoslovakia—a total of roughly 36 million tons. In 1952, United States production was 105 million tons. Figures for Great Britain and Western Germany, respectively, were 17 and 15 million. Russian centers of steel production are the Donetsk area, Stalinsk in the Kuznetsk Basin, and Magnitogorsk in the Urals.

TEXTILES

Cotton production, principally in Turkestan, but also successfully introduced in the Caucasus area, has increased considerably, but the reported total of 3.75 million tons, roughly equaling that of the United States, seems rather high. The prewar ratio was four to one in favor of the United States, and in 1948 the ratio was six to one. Accepting an official Soviet statement that cotton production had increased one million tons since the prewar period, the total would be 1.6 million, which seems nearer to reality. Consumption figures, as published by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations for 1950, showed that only 560,000 tons were available for home use. Corresponding wool figures were 86,000 metric tons, much lower than that of the United States, in spite of the large number of sheep. In flax and hemp, Russia ranks first among the nations. Her 1951 rayon production, however, was very small, only 40,000 metric tons compared to 587,000 tons for the United States. Another approach to the evaluation of the manufacture of textiles can be obtained from the figures on the 1951 per capita consumption of cotton, wool, and rayon as published by the FAO. According to those statistics expressed in kilograms (2.2 pounds) the figures for Russia are 2.7 (cotton), .04 (wool), and 0.21 (rayon). For the United States, corresponding figures are 14.3, 1.6, and 3.3, a total of 19.2 compared with 3.3 with the U.S.S.R. To give another comparison, the per capita consumption figures for Great Britain are respectively 7.4, 2.3, and 2.7—total, 12.4. The Russian figures are comparable with some of the Balkan States and of Spain. These figures may not include supplies for the Army, which is well cared for, but even then the amounts are appallingly low.

INDUSTRIES

In 1950 the Russian government announced that the industrial output had been doubled since 1940. Since Russian statistics generally announce percentage increase and not actual figures, evaluation is difficult. Moreover, a great deal of that increase probably has been in the military field—airplanes, tanks, mechanized transportation, submarines, and warships concerning

which, of course, there is no information. Accordingly it is necessary to limit this study to certain items for which statistics are available and give the corresponding figures for the United States. One has to keep in mind, however, that the American production is to a large extent one of replacement and that the Russians face what we would call an enormous consumer deficit and in some instances had to start virtually from scratch. Nevertheless, some of the Russian production figures are quite interesting and give a good insight into the Russian home economy.

The American production of cement in 1951 was roughly 40 million tons; that of the U.S.S.R. was 12 million tons. America produced 6.7 million cars and 1.3 million trucks. Corresponding figures for the U.S.S.R. were 66,000 and 428,000; for tractors, those figures were 700,000 as against 300,000. Here are two comparisons in other fields. Russian paper production was only 1.2 million tons in contrast to 24 million tons for the United States, and only one pair of shoes per capita was produced in Russia compared with three pairs in the United States.

TRANSPORTATION

Transportation has been Russia's constant problem. She suffers from lack of sufficient all-weather roads and lack of a dense railroad system, while her important water traffic is handicapped by a long, severe winter. Airplane service partly offsets these handicaps for passengers and valuable light freight. Motor-car production with emphasis on trucks is still in its infancy, and automobile transportation in any case cannot be developed until suitable roads are provided. But even on the few good roads few private cars are seen.

REGIONAL SHIFTS

Although the various Russian Five Year Plans have sponsored decentralization, and the German invasion in 1941 forced the evacuation of 1360 large plants to the Urals, Turkestan, and western Siberia, the chief industrial core is still concentrated in the Ukraine and central Russia, with the Urals in a strong third position. In the consumption of electricity, always a good criterion, those three

areas together use more than 60 per cent of the total output. Only in minerals do such regions as Trans-Caucasia, Turkestan, and western Siberia come to the foreground. New plans, nevertheless, still favor the industrial growth of the Dnieper and Volga-Don basins.

ECONOMIC GROWTH

Comparisons between 1926 and the mid-century show some interesting facts. During those twenty-five years the population increase was 27 per cent and that of the sown area 28 per cent, which shows only a slight increase of per capita food production even if somewhat higher yields are taken into consideration. The share of the urban population (cities above 50,000) increased from 9 to 20 per cent. But in other fields the increase was much higher. The value of the mineral output increased eightfold, that of the electrical output thirtyfold, while the traffic of rail freight was in 1950 four times that of 1929. In the last 15 years coal production doubled, and oil production increased 50 per cent. Other statistics show similar facts.

IS THE U.S.S.R. CATCHING UP WITH THE UNITED STATES?

Headlines in American periodicals often stress the gigantic stride of Russian industrial production. Indeed, the increase has been remarkable, but what has the American increase been? For example, the 1951 production of crude steel in the U.S.S.R. was about 31 million tons (not counting that of the satellites), which was an increase of 60 per cent since the years before the war. Even if Russia doubled her prewar production, the American figures show a triple increase since 1938. For electric power, the ratio increase in the two countries is about the same but the absolute increase in the United States is much higher. In oil, the Russian production increase from 1939 to 1952 was only 50 per cent; for the United States, the increase for the same period was 80 per cent. Only in coal is the U.S.S.R. closing the production gap. The increase since prewar time is about 100 per cent, whereas for the United States it is only 40 per cent, and in this case also the absolute increase is larger. It is true that the Russian increase is larger. It is true that the Russian increase is much higher than

the one of western Europe, but there is still an enormous difference in industrial power between Russia and the United States, and the gap between the two has become wider instead of narrower.

WILL RUSSIA START A THIRD WORLD WAR?

This brief economic survey of the U.S.S.R. is too general to allow a definite answer to the question whether Russia will start a third world war. Among Russia's assets are good power resources, a rapidly growing steel production, and a sufficient food supply. Among her liabilities are a scarcity of some minerals and alloys, poor lines of transportation, and a low standard of living that, because of the stress on war production, has improved but little. Moreover, the destruction of the last war has not yet entirely been repaired. After the initial success that dictatorial powers almost always obtain against democratic opponents, the statistics will be against her, not only if compared with the United States, but also for many items if compared with western Europe. If production figures are studied in the Kremlin, and if no other factors are taken into consideration, a decision would have to be made against the feasibility of waging war.

However, there are three other points which need to be mentioned. One is the fact that Russia at war can call on a much higher percentage of her economic production than, for instance, would be possible in the United States where there are limits to the restriction in consumption. The other one is that the U.S.S.R. may plan to overrun western Europe and add the production of that area to her resources. But the economic help of conquered territory generally has been most disappointing to the conqueror. The third one is the fact that public sentiment, so powerful a factor in the United States in the determination of the trend of foreign relations and its effect on domestic conditions, exists in the Soviet Union to a much lesser degree (see Chapter on Freedom of Information).

In speculating upon Russia's future actions, it may be noted that many of the classic motives of war, such as population pressure, the need for more territory, paucity of natural resources, are not pertinent. This is not to say, of course, that other motives are not present, especially the fear that communism and a free world cannot live side by side.

If peace can be kept and the fears from war can be lessened, Russia, as well as other nations, can use her resources to meet the challenge of raising her standard of life and developing to a greater degree her potentialities. As President Eisenhower stated in an address given April 16, 1953,—one heavy bomber equals more than thirty schools, two industrial plants, two hospitals or fifty miles of concrete pavement. It is up to the Kremlin to decide which Russia needs more.

Part Four

THE HUMAN-CULTURAL ELEMENTS

Race

THE WORD "RACE" IS USED HERE IN the biological sense. It refers to similarity of physical characteristics, such as the shape of the skull, the size of the skeleton, and other internal features of the body, as well as external features such as color and texture of hair, shape of the nose, color and form of the eyes, and complexion.

It is possible to differentiate between racial groups and to set up a list of racial characteristics for each one, but this does not mean that most people can be classified as belonging to only one such group. Racial purity possibly does not exist any more because of a long process of intermingling and resultant blending of types. Accordingly, there are only a few maps showing racial distribution. The physical anthropologist limits his mapping generally to the distribution of various racial criteria, such as the cephalic index, which means the relation between length and width of the skull. Figure 48, "Racial Centers," does not draw any actual borderlines between groups and only indicates the centers of dominance of the races involved. Note the center of the Nordics, a racial group which was glorified in the Hitler period.

It is difficult to be logical in the discussion of race as a factor in political geography. Even the name "Indian" for the American aborigine is racially not correct because of great differences between the various groups, but for the purposes of this chapter the term "Indian" will be used, nevertheless, in the interests of simplicity. Similarly, the Jewish problem is treated in this chapter for practical reasons despite the fact that Jews are not primarily a racial group.



FIGURE 48.

RACE CONSCIOUSNESS

When major racial differences appear, people sometimes have a feeling of race consciousness that is definitely important in political geography. Minor racial differences often pass unnoticed, and the people of most countries do not realize that they are a racial blend. The French, for example, show definite variations between the Nordic in the northern part, the Alpine in the center, and the Mediterranean in the south; but all of them are French, and no social differences exist. In the same way, Germany is far from pure racially; the glorified Nordics actually comprise only a

small part of the racial complexity. Generally speaking, Latin people are remarkably free of race consciousness. So also, are most of the Slavic people, who usually do not object to marriage between members of different racial groups; this is well demonstrated by the many instances of racial intermarriage in Russia.

In marked contrast is the very keen race consciousness of the European Nordic who inhabits the northwestern portion of the continent. To his way of thinking, the white race, to which he belongs, is definitely superior to all other races. In addition he feels that all other European racial subdivisions of the white race are inferior to his, the Nordic. This marked feeling of racial superiority possessed by the average Nordic is softened somewhat, in most cases, by a mature sense of fair play and tolerance, as is indicated by the position of the Jew in Great Britain. The Nazis in their approach to races, however, intensified the Nordic feeling of superiority and used it as a basis for racial discrimination.

North America

The attitude of the North American, whether a citizen of the United States or of Canada, is a curious mixture of the two points of view noted above. The North American population includes members of a variety of racial groups which came from Europe and the Near East and have blended together to produce the North American. The racial elements that have intermixed vary from section to section throughout the continent, but intermixing has always been present. Even the Puritans, who are generally thought of as "pure racial stock" were a mixed race before they came to New England. Their British racial inheritance was far from pure. It is interesting to note that racial groups of the Near East such as those from Syria and Lebanon, which were so carefully avoided in Germany, are accepted into the North American blend.

The attitude of the North American toward what remains of the native Indian stock is one of toleration and in some areas one of racial equality. Indeed, some well-known North American families today boast of their Indian ancestry. The elimination of most of the Indians was not the result of racial antagonism, but rather of conflict between two different social and economic systems. The weaker one here, as in the case of the Bushmen and

Hottentots of Africa and the natives of Australia, was doomed from the beginning.

On the other hand, the North American is extremely race conscious in regard to the Negro. The attitude of the white toward the Negro in the South with its patriarchal remnants may differ in detail from that in the North with its industrial pattern, but the color line is always drawn and little intermixing is to be expected. The large Negro element in the population, which totals 12 million in the United States, remains a strange feature in the North American racial pattern. The Negro is tolerated because he is present, but he is seldom regarded as an equal. Only if the Negro accepts this unequal status can he attain some degree of happiness. However, the present tendency is to give the Negro greater equality while still adhering to the principle of racial separation.

Latin America

Racial differences are of less importance in the political units of Latin America, where the blending of European, Indian, and, in many sections, Negro stock has resulted in a racial structure of great complexity. Although some Latin-American families of European stock try to avoid intermarriage, the color line is seldom sharply drawn. Even the British have submitted to that point of view, and it is a revelation to one used to British aloofness in the Orient to see the free mixing of races in the British West Indies. Here the immigration of Asiatic Indians, chiefly to Trinidad and British Guiana, further complicates the racial structure. Puerto Rico, with the largest percentage of so-called white population in Central America, may soon have skin colors that range from pure white to pitch black. The complete lack of race consciousness on the island is indicated by the absence of social differences based on race. In Mexico, there is a tendency to regard the Indians, who are the majority race, as the real Mexicans—a reversal of the usual procedure where white man is concerned.

The racial composition of Latin American countries as presented in Table VII offers many interesting details. Among these are the very high percentages of Negroes in Haiti, Jamaica, Guadeloupe, and other islands of the Caribbean; the domination of the Indian group in Mexico, which is also typical of all the Central American countries not included in the table except Costa Rica; and the very

TABLE VII
RACIAL STRUCTURE IN LATIN AMERICA ¹

| Countries | Percentage White | Percentage Indian | Percentage Negro |
|---------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| Central America: | | | |
| Costa Rica | 85 | 10 | 5 |
| Guadeloupe (Fr.) | 8 | — | 92 |
| Haiti | .5 | — | 99.5 |
| Jamaica (Br.) | 2 | — | 95 |
| Mexico | 9.5 | 90 | .1 |
| Puerto Rico (U.S.) | 74 | .1 | 25.7 |
| Trinidad and Tobago (Br.) | 9.9 | — | 55 |
| South America: | | | |
| Argentina | 98 | .9 | .5 |
| Bolivia | 15 | 83 | 1.9 |
| Brazil | 41 | 23 | 35 |
| Chile | 70 | 26 | .4 |
| Colombia | 34 | 61 | 3 |
| Ecuador | 8 | 78 | 14 |
| Paraguay | 10 | 89 | 1 |
| Peru | 10 | 82 | 3 |
| Uruguay | 99 | .05 | .05 |
| Venezuela | 3 | 62 | 35 |

small percentage of Negroes in South American countries, with two major exceptions, Brazil and Venezuela. Equally outstanding is the dominant position of the white groups in Argentina and Uruguay. Of great interest is the fact that even in the countries of greatest racial complexity national unity is not weakened because of it. That racial consciousness is not entirely absent is indicated by the fact that the Chilean government protested against this table, claiming that the Indian element was of less importance than was shown by the figure, 26 per cent. However, data in the table are taken from a book by the well-known population expert, Robert R. Kuczynski, and those for Chile are based on the official *Estadística Chilena* of 1935. Accordingly no changes

¹ R. R. Kuczynski, *Population Movement* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), pp. 109-110.

have been made, but it should be mentioned that the actual number of full-blooded Indians is rather small.

Africa

The problem of the colonial population in Africa is discussed in Chapter 25. However, the situation in the Union of South Africa is pertinent here since one of the most interesting racial problems is found in that country.

When the Dutch came to South Africa as settlers in 1652, they found a native population of Hottentots and Bushmen living on a low cultural level. Contact with the white settlers proved disastrous for the natives, and only a few half-caste representatives of these tribes remain. The Dutch imported Malay peoples from the East Indies to serve as farm hands; they stayed in South Africa and further complicated the racial structure. England took over the Dutch colonies in the early part of the nineteenth century, providing a regime that so displeased the Dutch that they began the great movement inland known as "The Great Trek." This movement encountered the southward migration of the Bantu Negroes. Politically the Negro was conquered, but he was far from eliminated for today he constitutes the largest unit of the population. Later Chinese and Asiatic Indian laborers were brought in to help work the mines, and they added yet another complicating element to an already complex situation. The results are extremely disturbing from the political-geographical point of view.

At present the population, numbering slightly less than nine million, is composed of two million whites of British and Boer Dutch descent, six million Bantu Negroes, 165,000 Asiatics, and approximately 800,000 persons of mixed racial stocks, which include the Hottentot and Bushmen strains. The percentage of blacks in South Africa stands at an even higher figure when the protectorates of Swaziland and Bechuanaland, which are still under British control, are considered. In these two areas combined live 850,000 blacks and only 6,500 whites.

The Union of South Africa's policy is to have a white man's country where the blacks are tolerated but enjoy no political or social equality. As a matter of fact, the two million whites own most of the property and run the state, while the six million

Negroes have about 11 per cent of the occupied land, which is very little property in proportion to their number. They exert no influence whatever on the affairs of the state. Although this policy may be understood from the white man's point of view, it is a dangerous situation and a basis for political weakness.

Asia

In Asia, the continent of greatest racial complexity, race is a very minor factor in political structures. Only the Japanese had a feeling of racial superiority and avoided racial mixtures in the countries under their control. In India, where pre-Dravidians, Dravidians, Mongolians, Aryans, and various other groups of Near Eastern origin make a complicated racial pattern, race does not count very much. Language is more frequently used to differentiate various groups, but language and racial boundaries do not coincide. Religion, Islamic, Hindu and others, is of much greater importance here than either language or race. The influence of language and religion on boundaries is discussed in Chapters 18 and 19, respectively.

A race frontier exists in the Near East between the semitic Arabs and the nonsemitic Turks, and the boundary line of Turkey with Syria and Iraq more or less follows the racial division. This is one of the very few examples of an approach to a racial-political boundary line. Here racial contrasts came to the fore in the Sanjak of Alexandretta located on the coast east of Cyprus, where the Turks, who form a portion of the population, feared Syrian domination when Syria secured its independence from France. Moved by the petitions and threats of war made by Turkey, France agreed to Sanjak's incorporation into the Turkish state, but the Syrians are still not reconciled to its loss.

Australia

In Australia the racial problem virtually disappeared with the almost complete elimination of the natives. Only about 80,000 are left in the interior of the continent. The Australian government is for and by the white population, and all others are excluded. In New Zealand the Maoris form only a small percentage of the total population.

THE JEWISH PROBLEM

The world was profoundly shocked when the German persecutions of the Jews suddenly destroyed what had been regarded as racial toleration in Europe. That event had so many consequences that it seems worthwhile to look more deeply into the situation.

TABLE VIII
JEWISH POPULATION IN 1933 AND IN 1950

| <i>Country</i> | <i>1933</i> | <i>1950</i> |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| F. North Africa | 310,000 | 400,000 |
| Argentina | 215,000 | 360,000 |
| Austria | 250,000 | 21,000 |
| Britain | 300,000 | 450,000 |
| Canada | 155,000 | 198,000 |
| Czechoslovakia | 356,000 | 17,000 |
| France | 220,000 | 235,000 |
| Germany | 510,000 | 40,000 |
| Greece | 72,000 | 7,000 |
| Hungary | 440,000 | 160,000 |
| Iraq | 87,000 | 110,000* |
| Italy | 48,000 | 35,000 |
| Netherlands | 156,000 | 27,000 |
| Rumania | 984,000 | 335,000 |
| U.S.S.R. and the Baltic States | 3,000,000 | 2,000,000 |
| United States | 4,000,000 | 5,000,000 |
| Israel | 175,000 | 1,150,000 |
| World | 16,240,000 | 11,490,000 |

* Many of these left between 1950 and 1952.

From Table VIII it is clear that before World War II eastern Europe from Latvia to Rumania and including the U.S.S.R. was a zone of Jewish concentration. It was in that zone that the Jew regarded himself and was regarded by others, as a Jew and not as a Pole, a Rumanian, or a Latvian. This attitude was in marked contrast to the situation in western Europe, where the Jew had been assimilated into the cultural and political pattern. It should be noted that Germany and Austria had relatively few Jews in their population; nevertheless it was in those countries that the

anti-Semitic sentiment flared up with such tragic results for the Jewish people concerned.

Perhaps a better understanding of the reasons for the anti-Jewish outbreak can be gained from a consideration of the proportion of Jewish people in the urban population, together with their share of economic activities. The Jews are above all else city dwellers. Originally, in ancient Palestine, they were farmers, but in their wanderings during the centuries, since they were tolerated only in cities and were prevented in many cases from owning landed property, a transformation to city occupations took place. In most cases the proportion of Jews in cities was four or five times greater than their proportion in the national population. Before the outbreak of persecution, 3.8 per cent of the population in Berlin was Jewish, and in Vienna, 9.4 per cent was Jewish, as compared with one per cent in all of Greater Germany. Bucharest's Jews represented 20 per cent of the total city population, but only 4.5 per cent of the national population was Jewish.

However, concentration of Jews in the cities is only one explanation of the problem of anti-Semitism. A clue to other causes, not only in Germany but also in other countries of central and eastern Europe, may be found in considering the value of their economic holdings in certain leading cities and hence the proportion of Jewish wealth in these states.

Before Austria became a part of Germany (1934), there were 192,000 Jews in the country, 176,000 of whom lived in Vienna, where they represented slightly less than 10 per cent of the total urban population. Table IX indicates the Jewish share in a number of selected occupations in Vienna in 1935. It is obvious at once that they strongly dominated many of the important economic activities. A neutral observer estimates that the Jewish share in the economic life of the city was not less than 60 per cent. Such a study in Berlin, prior to the Nazi purge, would doubtless have revealed similar figures. Warsaw, Budapest, and Bucharest were likewise to a large degree under the economic domination of Jews.

Here lie some of the reasons for the trouble that arose. One may call it racial antagonism, although the Jews are a social and not a racial group, but anti-Jewish propaganda continuously hammered on the principle of racial differences. One may call it

TABLE IX

PERCENTAGE OF JEWS IN THE ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF VIENNA, 1935

| <i>Occupation</i> | <i>Percentage of Jews</i> |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| Lawyers | 85.5 |
| Shoe stores | 80 |
| Newspapers | 80 |
| Banking | 75 |
| Wine trade | 74 |
| Textiles | 73 |
| Dentists | 70 |
| Movie theatres | 70 |
| Bakeries | 60 |
| Laundries | 60 |
| Doctors | 52 |
| Men's hats | 45 |
| Medical professors | 45 |
| Coffee houses | 40 |
| Jewelry | 40 |
| Dressmakers | 34 |
| Photographers | 34 |
| Watch stores | 32 |
| Pharmacies | 31 |
| Druggists | 31 |
| Book stores | 24 |
| Opticians | 21 |
| Meat stores | 11 |
| Barbers | 9 |
| Painters | 7 |

economic jealousy based on the fact that Jews had the ability to dominate certain fields. The Nazi found in jealousy fertile ground for fostering hatred of the Jews and used the Jews, much as the Romans used the Christians, to make a public spectacle. But no matter what the situation is called, it produced an ideology which had tragic results. Even now, after the War, when the Atlantic Charter promulgates the principle of freedom and tolerance, Jews are not welcome in many countries, especially in Eastern Europe.

The tragic fate of the Jews in all areas which were or came under German control during the war is well known, although too few realize the proportions of the shocking crime. Table VIII

gives the Jewish world population in 1933 (before Hitler) and in 1950. It shows a terrible reduction of almost 5 million. By 1945 almost one half of the surviving Jews lived in the United States. The end of the war did not mean the end of the tragedy. Jewish displaced persons in Europe, concentrated in camps, still did not know where to go; at that time immigration to Palestine was still much restricted because of Arab opposition, and the United States was not an adequate outlet because of her limited immigration quotas.

The creation of the State of Israel changed the picture substantially because movement of Jews to that country was unrestricted, except for certain limiting action by countries behind the Iron Curtain. Although the Government of Israel and its citizens have made remarkable progress in increasing the productivity of their small country, the influx of immigrants has been faster than the absorptive capacity. As a result Israel faces the problem of overpopulation, at least temporarily. The conflict between Arabs and Jews, which was reflected throughout the Near East, is definitely not a racial problem, but a clash between two groups with very different technical and cultural standards. The Arab point of view is that they were pushed out of the Israel territory, where they had been living for almost two thousand years and that this was accomplished through the policies of the United Nations, especially through the attitudes of Great Britain and the United States. The emotional feeling is still so strong that any effort to come to a compromise is still doomed to fail. It is a great pity that the success of Israel meant unavoidably extreme bitterness in the Arab world.

CONCLUSION

Race only occasionally enters into the field of political geography, and the world is increasingly willing to accept the concept of the equality of man independent of racial background. When race does enter into the situation it affects chiefly the internal structure of nations, as for example the Negro problem in the United States and the color problem in the Union of South Africa. In both cases, however, the problem has repercussions outside of the borders of the nation. The Union of South Africa is often

criticized severely, and her policy of segregation, called "apartheid," is regarded as antiquated. Every case of lynching in the United States is broadcast all over the communist world as an example of American "culture." Many times the senior writer, when he accused a German of Jewish persecution before World War II, met with the retort: "What about the Negroes you people murder?"

As has been said above, gradually racial discrimination is diminishing and it is hoped that eventually it will die out.

Ethnographic Structure of Nations

IN CONTRAST TO RACE, ETHNOGRAPHIC¹ structure is of prime importance for an understanding of the nations of the world and an evaluation of their strength. An ethnographic unit is understood to mean a group of people who feel that they belong together because they are unified by social and cultural factors. In the perfect case, they speak the same language, have the same religion, and cherish the same traditions and customs. Such ethnographic groups, if not too small, generally will ask for political freedom; if this is obtained the ethnographic group will become a national group. The elements of language and religion are so important that a separate chapter is given to each of them, but in this chapter we look at nations from a more general ethnographic point of view.

Let us take a simple case. Iceland was colonized by Norway and for a long time the Icelanders continued to be identified with Norway. When Norway came under Danish control, Iceland followed suit, and Danish rule persisted even after Norway was separated from Denmark. But the Icelanders in their harsh environment gradually developed into a separate ethnographic group. The people spoke the same old Germanic language they used when they came to Iceland, belonged to one church (Lutheran), and had the same customs and traditions; thus it was natural for them to want complete political freedom. In 1918 Iceland became a sovereign state, at first still accepting the King of Denmark as her head, but later (1944) severing its ties with Denmark to form the Icelandic Republic.

¹ Ethnographic in this book is not used as a term related to racial characteristics.

In most countries the story is not so simple; Belgium is an example. Located on both sides of the dividing line between Latin and Germanic languages, it suffered in its historical development from the evils of not being a unit, but only a zone of transition. In fact Belgium (the name comes from the Celtic people who lived there when the Romans came) was never as such an independent state until 1830 when it separated itself from its northern neighbor. All through history, since the time of Charlemagne, it was under the influence of outsiders who competed for control of this economically and strategically important section of Europe. There were France and Burgundy representing the Latin element, and the Holy Roman Empire and the Hapsburg (the Spanish as well as the Austrian branch), and since the second part of the sixteenth century there was the Dutch Republic, which fought against the Spanish Hapsburg and later against France using the so-called Southern Netherlands as a field of battle.

The creation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands at the Congress of Vienna may have looked at that time like a brilliant solution, a buffer state between France and Germany, but it was a shotgun marriage between two partners who had little in common and the marriage ended in divorce only fifteen years later. A royal house was imported, and the newly created nation got the blessings of the great powers. But that did not mean that the new country had a good ethnographic foundation. It was still separated by the language line and it took a long time for the inhabitants to regard themselves as Belgians and not as Flemish (to the north of the line) and Walloons (to the south). It would have been worse if religion had entered into the picture, which was not the case because both sides were Catholic, but difference of language and of culture was a difficult handicap to overcome. Even at the time of the first World War the Germans thought it favorable to sponsor an autonomous Flemish unit which would lean towards Germany and bring German influence to the coast opposite the British Isles, but already at that time national feelings were strong enough to defeat the German plans after a slight initial success. Gradually, Belgium grew into a national unit of a dual structure. However, even now the differences of sentiment between north and south crop up, as happened when the problem of the return of Leopold as King after the last war in-

flamed emotions and the threat of separation again was heard. In the first Chapter of this book, the case of Switzerland was discussed; there one finds, in spite of language and religious complexity, a strong national unity. But that has come along through centuries of originally loose federation. Belgium, as a state, has come a long way and has as an intermediate zone between cultures, a definite place among the nations of Europe. The dual nature, which it has in common with many other countries, for instance our neighbor Canada, can be entirely overcome, but it takes time. Much more difficult is the situation when definite minorities, often anti-national, are located within the confines of a state and weaken its unity.

THE ETHNOGRAPHIC WORLD PATTERN

An ethnographic map of the world, a map of peoples as it may be called, looks like a patchwork quilt. It forms an intricate pattern of smaller and larger units, each with its own cultural and social life, and many of them also political units. Differences between them and lack of understanding of each other's customs and traditions often have been sources of international strife and wars. It is a human quality to distrust those who are different in language or religion, in customs, in traditions, even in dress. However, that very complexity is also of great value because it results in interplay of ideas, which is one of the most fruitful factors in man's cultural progress. To the authors, the idea of a future "one world," with one religion, one language, one type of education, and—to go even farther—one book-of-the-month club and one number on the hit parade is most repulsive. Many cultural approaches, the outcome of the philosophies of various ethnographic groups, are needed to make a world in which man can reach his highest level. Monotony eventually kills, whereas variety is the spice of life.

THE IDEAL POLITICAL UNIT

Ideally, the political pattern of the world should correspond with the ethnographic pattern. This is a beautiful concept, and one of the great world tragedies is that it is not borne out in prac-

tice. In an effort to remedy this situation the late President Woodrow Wilson promulgated the principle of national self-determination of peoples. Even on the basis of that principle, regardless of all economic and strategic considerations, it would still be impossible to achieve identity between the political and ethnographic patterns, for the simple reason that ethnographic groups do not have boundaries but blend gradually into one another. The existence of ethnographic enclaves, entirely dissociated from the main group to which they belong, further complicates the problem.

In studying any state, a political geographer must consider all the details of the ethnographic structure and evaluate them as sources of potential trouble of an internal nature, or as elements likely to produce strained international relations. Such a study should first consider the principal or national ethnographic group, and determine its strength; it should also determine the strength of the other ethnographic groups (the so-called national minorities) which fit well into the national structure. The second feature of the study should concern the antinational minorities, those ethnographic groups that willingly or against their will are parts of the nation, but do not consider themselves as of the people. These can be divided into two types, those that have no chance of securing freedom or do not wish it, and those who struggle for separation with some chance for success.

ETHNOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE OF THE AMERICAS

North America

The United States provides a good example of how a national unit develops, because the process is still going on. Millions of immigrants who have poured into this country, although this stream recently has been reduced to a trickle, have become patriotic Americans, proud of their new fatherland. Of course, the more recent comers have kept some of the Old World customs and characteristics. At certain moments they show their old ties by not being able to understand international problems solely from the American point of view. The Irish, Greeks, Armenians, and many others will take sides on issues affecting their former homelands,

criticizing a purely American point of view. In general, however, it is amazing how far the process of assimilation has gone.

A major group, the 12,000,000 Negroes, has been mentioned in the preceding chapter. The Indians, roughly one-third of a million, have been settled in reservations or have blended with the white group. Asiatic groups, such as Chinese and Japanese, have not been incorporated as well and are not always regarded as Americans even after they have obtained their citizenship and have become Americanized. The many Puerto Ricans, especially numerous in New York City, still form a special unit, and the French Canadians of New England try to keep their special French character, although in the second and third generations that becomes increasingly difficult. Along the Mexican border, Mexicans, chiefly employed as unskilled labor, are an ethnographic minority not wholly accepted as part of the American stock. Some of them who have infiltrated farther north, however, are fully accepted along with others of their kind.

The situation in Canada is similar to that in the United States with one major exception. The national group has a dual structure, namely the Catholic French Canadians of Quebec and the largely Protestant people elsewhere in Canada. There is a sharp line of separation between the two groups, which shows no sign of weakening through a blending of the two elements. The dual structure at times has created problems, especially when Canada becomes involved in a conflict focussing on the British homeland for which the French Canadians have only limited ties of affection.

Latin America

In the Latin American countries the national unit is well developed, generally through the fusing of various racial and ethnographic groups, and minorities are rather unimportant. Blending of the various racial strains (discussed in Chapter 15) has been quite pronounced. Minorities are few in number and generally reflect recent immigration. For instance, the Japanese in Brazil (140,000) and Peru (40,000) have not merged well with the rest of the population. Similarly, some of the Germans, especially in Brazil, and Italians, particularly in Argentina, have retained their own ethnographic characteristics, such as language and cus-

toms, but it is only a question of time before they are absorbed.

Ethnographically it seems unnecessary to have so many political units in Latin America. Although great differences exist, for instance between subtropical Mexico with its primarily Indian culture and Argentina with its white population derived from Europe and living in temperate zones, the many political divisions are chiefly historical. They are based on the Spanish colonial provinces, which were separate economic units that had little intercourse with one another. Efforts for greater political unity have been made at various times, first by Bolivar, the great liberator, at the time of the separation from Spain in the 1820's and again in recent times by the Quito Charter which stresses greater cooperation between Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama. However, the Latin American Republics have developed their own national lives and aspirations, and the chances for unity are certainly less favorable than they were in Bolivar's time.

ETHNOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE OF EUROPE

Europe is the classical example of ethnographic confusion. Complex topography and frequent influx of tribes from Asia—the most recent ones were the Turks in the fifteenth century—has resulted in a complicated picture (see Figure 49). The chief element of this confusion has been the interplay between three main groups: The Germanic, the Latin, and the Slavic, each of which has a number of subdivisions.

The line of separation between the Germanic and the Latin goes back to the time when German tribes invaded the weakened Roman Empire. In most of the area conquered by these Germanic tribes, the Latin element prevailed, but the area adjacent to the Germanic homeland became Germanized. Since then the dividing line, although it has fluctuated at certain points, has been remarkably stable. It starts in northwestern France, runs through Belgium and west to Luxembourg through Lorraine and Alsace into Switzerland, and then follows the main crest of the Alps eastward, except for the area south of the Brenner and Carinthia where Germanic influences extend southward.

The boundary between the Slavic and Germanic zone is more




FIGURE 49.

Germanic

- 1 Germans
- 2 Dutch, Flemings, Frisians
- 3 English
- 4 Danes
- 5 Swedes
- 6 Norwegians
- 7 Icelanders

Romanic

- 8 French
- 9 Spaniards, Portuguese
- 10 Italians
- 11 Rhaeto-Romans
- 12 Rumanians

Greek

- 13 Greeks

Slavic

- 14 Great Russians
- 15 Byelorussians
- 16 Ukrainians, Ruthenes

Slavic (cont'd)

- 17 Poles
- 18 Czechs, Slovaks
- 19 Bulgarians
- 20 Serbs, Croats, Slovenes

Baltic

- 21 Finns
- 22 Estonians
- 23 Latvians
- 24 Lithuanians

Turkish

- 25 Turks, Azerbaidzhani
- 26 Kirghiz

Miscellaneous

- 27 Bretons, Welsh, Scots, Irish
- 28 Basques
- 29 Albanians
- 30 Magyars
- 31 Georgians
- 32 Lapps and others

complex, in fact it has been an area of transition because the Germans have infiltrated into originally Slavic territory in an eastern direction ever since the twelfth century. Along the Baltic, the Finns, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians prevent direct contact between Slavic and Germanic groups and act as a kind of buffer zone. South of the Baltic, as a result of World War II, the Germans were expelled from the territory beyond the Oder and from the Bohemian Plateau. As a result, a former zone of transition is now replaced by a more westerly sharp line of demarcation. Magyars of Asiatic origin and Rumanians claiming Roman heritage separate the northern Slavs (Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks) from the southern group (Bulgars, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes), who occupy most of the Balkan Peninsula and the borders of the Adriatic.

Besides these three chief groups—the Latin, the Germanic, and the Slavic—there are some minor groups which are either remnants of the past or newcomers. In the southern Balkans are the Greeks and the Albanians, both of ancient fame. To the east in the bridgehead across the Bosphorus are the last of the European Turks who came in the fifteenth century. Gaelic remnants in Scotland, Ireland, Wales, and French Brittany reflect the pre-Roman Celtic period of occupation of western Europe. The Basques, also descendants of an ancient ethnic group, are located on both sides of the northern Pyrenees.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognizes ethnographic differences in principle through the creation of 16 constituent Republics and of autonomous regions as well as autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics within the constituent Republics. The Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic is by far the most important of the constituent Republics. The other 15 are: The Ukrainian S.S.R.; Ukraina and Byelo-Russia (both separate members of the United Nations); the Karelo-Finnish S.S.R.; Moldavia (the former Bessarabia); Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (the former Baltic States); Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia in Trans-Caucasia; and Turkmenia, Tadzik, Kazakh, and Kirghiz in Central Asia.

Within these Republics and also in the ethnographic subdivisions special care is taken to protect ethnographic characteristics, although the unity of the entire U.S.S.R. as well as knowledge of

Russian is stressed. However, the units can be eliminated at will, as happened to the inhabitants of the Volga Republic and the Tartars of the Crimea who showed pro-German tendencies during World War II. Along the western border of Russia a process of Russification is well under way. Thousands of former inhabitants of the former Baltic states have been transferred to the interior, or are now working in labor camps which contain millions of so-called "doubtful persons."

AFRICA AND ITS ETHNOGRAPHIC PROBLEM

The political problem of Africa is chiefly one of conflict between the colonizing minority and the mass of the native population. This situation is discussed later in Chapter 22. In the Negro section of Africa, colonial boundaries often have been drawn in total disregard of tribal areas and have given rise to many complications. As in the case of the American Indians, the fact often has been forgotten that there is no Negro unity, and that the various groups and tribes differ from one another as much as do the people of Europe.

The independent Republic of Liberia is comprised of former American slaves and the local Negro population. Ethiopia also is far from an ethnographic entity and includes many different racial, religious, and linguistic units which are kept together more by force than by desire. In the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, now about to gain its independence, the northern Arab-Egyptian tribes contrast strongly with a southern Negro population. In Northern Africa, Egypt, independent for many years, regards itself as champion of the Arab cause and reacts strongly against any foreign interference. Libya received its independence in 1951, but for the time being this unity is based more on a decision of the United Nations than on the desire of the local tribes to join together as a state. Finally, French and Spanish North Africa present another case of political unrest owing to the efforts of the Arab-Berber native population to obtain autonomy, and if possible, political freedom.

THE ETHNOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE OF THE
MIDDLE EAST²

In spite of local complexity—probably no part of the world shows such a confusion of languages and religions as Syria—the general ethnographic structure of the Middle East is fairly simple. West of Iran and south of Turkey is the Arab world. It extends even beyond what we call here the Middle East and includes all of northern Africa and most of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Its origin, which brought this unity, is the Arab conquest after the death of Mohammed. The so-called Caliphate at its peak (around 750 A.D.) extended into Spain and eastward through Persia into what is now called Pakistan as well as Russian Turkestan, but in those areas the Arabs were either evicted (Spain) or the Arab influence submerged in the local culture. But from Morocco east to the Zagros mountains and south to the Indian Ocean is the home of the Arab. The uniting element is religion (generally the Sunni branch of the Moslem faith) and, above all, language. Most of this territory was part of the Turkish Empire which had conquered the Middle East in the sixteenth century and kept it nominally up till the end of the first World War. At that moment the time seemed ripe for the reconstruction of Arab unity (except for N. W. Africa, which had come under French control), but the interplay between European powers as well as disagreements between Arab leaders caused the creation of many states, first partly as mandates or under European supervision, then as independent countries. However, those countries had no real ethnographic base. Egypt was an exception because it had a solid historical foundation and had been an entity throughout its history. There was also the concept of Syria, but that should have included all areas between the eastern shore of the Mediterranean and the interior desert. Of course, the creation of Israel, a thorn in the Arab flesh as far as the Arabs are concerned, complicated the situation. Boundaries drawn for the Middle East were mainly artificial. Even now a

² Great confusion reigns as to how to define the area called Middle East, especially in its relation to the Near East. Without much logic the name Near East is often disregarded and the Middle East, used in a military way (Middle East Command), combines Egypt with the countries of southwestern Asia to the south of the U.S.S.R. with the possible exception of Turkey, which looks toward the Balkans for its political ties.

citizen of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordania will not answer the question what he is by saying that he is a Jordanian, but regards himself as an Arab. Nevertheless, gradually national tendencies have come to the foreground here, and if time permits, political units will also become national units. Already the inhabitants of Iraq consider themselves Iraqi, as well as Arabs, and even the Kurds in that country gradually accepted the national concept in spite of ties with the Kurds in neighboring countries.

The dream of a united Arab state from the Atlantic shore to the Zagros has not much hope of becoming a reality because of local desires and differences. Quite possible would be a rather loose Arab federation which would indicate substantial unity while permitting the various parts to govern themselves. The Arab League, which could have been a forerunner of such a federation, has not worked out very well because of the many differences of opinion between the Arab governments and especially between the ruling houses in so far as they are not republics. Efforts to bring closer relations between Jordania, Syria and Iraq have not been fruitful up till now. However, in many respects, the present arrangement is far from permanent, and greater unity eventually can be achieved.

INDIA AND THE FAR EAST

In the rest of Asia, east of the Middle East and south of the U.S.S.R., old countries have been rejuvenated and new ones, generally with old roots, have been created. In the beginning of this century, this was the stamping ground of European Powers—Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal. Their influence was either based on direct colonial control or indirectly by agreements and spheres of influence. Siam, still shown as independent on the map was squeezed between the British and the French. China was the focal point of foreign occupation, and special rights in the major towns limited Chinese sovereignty. Only Japan, through their process of westernization, brought about by American pressure, had escaped foreign influence and was well underway to "Great Power" status.

How different the picture is at present, when only small remnants of that colonial period can be found! A new era has started

and if it is possible to limit the expansion of communist influence that would result in the creation of Russian satellites, a free Asia will be an established fact. Independence, however, does not mean that the new or rejuvenated nations are already well-established. The problems they face are legion and many of them are ethnographic. The ethnographic pattern based on centuries of migrations is a very complex one. Within the borders of the nations are many groups with different customs and different languages which have not yet been consolidated. At the national core of Burma, for example, are the Burmese who occupy most of the lowlands of the Irrawaddy River system. But on the hills, the many tribes such as the Karens, the Chins, and the Shans do not yet recognize Burmese control and the influx of Indians and Chinese still increases the complexity. Eventually, if Burma is left in peace, a national state will develop, but it is not there yet.

The problem of Indochina, after the communists are defeated, is to make a workable federation between its major ethnographic components, the Annamites, the Cambodians, the Laotians. In Malaya the Chinese who emigrated and the local Malays are almost of equal strength, and the two very different groups have to be blended before a real national core will exist. There is still fighting in the Philippines and in Indonesia, which are suffering the growing pains of new states; they are geographically strong but lack ethnographic uniformity.

India faces so many problems of which ethnographic complexity is a major one that one sometimes wonders about its future when the present leaders, who owe their prestige and popularity to their successful struggle for independence are gone. Even Ceylon has a dual structure—the Singhalese majority, but a strong Tamil minority. Only in China is the ethnographic problem a minor one in comparison to the struggle to build a new state. The Chinese have shown a remarkable ability to absorb other groups. In Korea the new boundary between north and south has no ethnographic foundation at all, in fact, it has no geographic foundation whatever, but at the same time, artificial as it is, it is reality, and it will block Korea's prospects of becoming a prosperous state. Only Japan, even after defeat, is still a most important nation based on a solid ethnographic foundation. The few Ainus in the north are more an interesting remnant than a dangerous minority.

Asia needs time and peace to give the nations a chance to consolidate and put their houses in order. The road to successful freedom, even after it has been obtained officially, is a long and tortuous one.

AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE PACIFIC

The Australian Commonwealth is solidly of British stock and so likewise is New Zealand. The aborigines of Australia are on the way out as a result in the clash between modern and primitive life. On the other hand, the Maori of New Zealand have been better able to adjust themselves to new conditions. On the many South Sea islands natives of different races and numerous ethnographic groups are recovering from the excitement of modern warfare. They live again in virtual isolation, looking after copra and their subsistence crops.

Language

LANGUAGE IS ONLY ONE OF THE VARIOUS elements that enter into the complex known as an ethnographic group. It is, however, such an important element that it deserves special attention. In a state or a section within it, a single language serves as a common bond and brings peoples together in a community of ideas, whereas different languages act as a barrier and prevent peoples from attaining a real understanding of one another.

THE AMERICAS

Simplicity of the linguistic pattern has been an important factor in the international contact between the American countries. From Hudson Bay to Cape Horn, three chief languages are spoken nationally. English is spoken in the north, Spanish and Portuguese in the south, the United States-Mexico boundary line marks the sharp lingual divide. These three are the languages of the original invaders. They were adopted by the native Americans who survived the colonial struggles. In addition each of the three languages, within its own sphere, was in general strong enough to dominate the languages of all immigrants who came later. In the United States, for example, the offspring of foreign parents have generally lost command of their parents' original tongue; in many cases they do not understand it at all.

There are a few exceptions to these generalizations. In the Province of Quebec, French has maintained itself as a remnant of early colonial enterprise and migration. Similarly, French, English, or Dutch is spoken on various West Indian Islands and in the Guianas, while groups of Germans in Brazil and Chile and Ital-

ians in Argentina have kept the use of their mother tongue; in the latter case, Italian has, to some extent, influenced Argentine Spanish sufficiently to make it a mixture of the two languages. These are, however, minor exceptions to the overwhelming linguistic uniformity on the two American continents.

The present Anglo-Latin linguistic divide shows every evidence of maturity. Efforts have failed to make Puerto Rico, as an American colony, bilingual through the use of English in the schools, although English is widely understood.

EUROPE

Except for Germany and Austria, and the miniature states, no two countries in Europe have the same language structure. In some instances, a language group extends beyond the political boundary line, but in such cases the country into which it penetrates has more than one official language or the penetration is of only minor significance.

The European Language Pattern

Figure 49, which shows ethnographic divisions, can also be used as a language map. In a greatly simplified pattern, the three main language groups—Germanic, Romanic, and Slavic—are indicated. Individual languages are listed in the caption. Because language is very important as ethnographic indicator, this map also indicates the general ethnographic picture. Within the main groups, the languages are often so similar that written or sometimes even spoken words of one language can be understood by persons having other mother tongues within the same group. The pattern is fairly simple: Germanic languages in the northwestern and central parts of Europe; Romanic languages in the west, southwest, and south-central sections; and Slavic languages in the east.

The only complication is that the Rumanian language of the Latin stock (a remnant of the Roman Empire) and Hungarian (which was brought in from the East) separate a north Slavic wing, which reaches to the Oder River and to Bohemia, from a southern wing, which reaches to the coast of the Adriatic. The language of the Magyars is related to that of Finland and Estonia, both brought by Asiatic invaders in historic times. Gaelic, a




FIGURE 50.

Celtic tongue, is still spoken in parts of Wales, western Scotland, Ireland, and western Brittany; it has been pushed westward by the Germanic and Latin group. The map shows the existence of other, smaller linguistic areas, such as the Greek, the Albanian, the Basque which is located *à cheval* of the Pyrenees, the Lapps, and the Baltic group combining Lithuanian and Latvian. A special case, too small to be shown, is Malta where the influence of the Phoenician dialect still exists.

Development and Importance of Language

The languages of Europe generally developed from local dialects through a historical process. At the same time dialects other than the official tongue continue to be spoken. For instance, the Dutch language, including Flemish, developed from the low German dialects of northern Germany, whereas the present German language came from the so-called high German. This difference did much to make the Netherlands a separate ethnographic and cultural unit, with its own literature and culture. In contrast with this development, the German Swiss did not raise their dialects into a language but continued to use the official German in schools and writing, making them culturally a part of the German cultural sphere; but here also efforts are made to give preference to the dialects.

The importance attached to language differences among neighboring peoples in order to foster a separate cultural unit is shown in Ireland and in Finland. In Ireland the ancient Gaelic, which seemed on the way out, has been sponsored recently by the government to replace or rank next to English; efforts in this direction, however, have been only partly successful. In Finland, Finnish survived the long period of Russian and Swedish rule; today, with the establishment of a national political state, the government is making every effort to restrict the use of Swedish, although still an officially recognized language of the country, and make Finnish the language of most of the population.

Linguistic Complexity

Switzerland and Belgium are examples of European linguistic complexity. In both these countries two or more unrelated languages are used. Switzerland has four official languages, Ger-

man, French, Italian, and Rhaeto-Roman, recently made official, chiefly as a political gesture. All four have equal official rights; all four are used in parliament. Italian is spoken only south of the Alpine crest in the province of Tessin, and Rhaeto-Roman is confined to some of the eastern Alpine valleys. The language




FIGURE 51.

boundary between French and German crosses the north slope of the Alps, the Swiss plateau, and the Jura. This boundary marks the division between the Alamanni who wandered into Switzerland during the great migrations and have since kept their German cultural contacts, and those who were Latinized. Very few changes have occurred along this language boundary line since its establishment. Where it runs through the city of Fribourg, it separates a German-speaking lower town from a French-speaking upper town. Because Switzerland is a mature state, linguistic complexity does not weaken the national unity even though it does cause some inconvenience.

In Belgium the situation is somewhat different; here the language boundary separates the Germanic Flemish from the Latinized Walloons. For a time this language complex endangered the unity of the state, because the Walloons looked toward France and the Flemish toward the Netherlands. In the earlier years of the state's independence the French influence predominated and the Flemish had a political struggle to gain recognition and equality, even though they were numerically stronger. Within recent years the two groups have achieved essential equality, and with time the bitter feelings they have had toward each other may soften.

AFRICA

The various colonies of Africa have a veneer of bilingualism, using to some extent the language of the governing countries. This does not affect the bulk of the native peoples, however, who continue to speak their own various languages.

In South Africa there is a mixture of Boers, who speak Afrikaans, which is related to Dutch, and of British, who speak English. Except in Natal, where the English element prevails, the population is a mixture of the two ethnic groups, with a Boer majority. Both languages, Afrikaans and English, are recognized by the state, and all state officials are required to speak both. The English find it rather difficult to accept this situation. After winning the Boer War they expected an all-English colony, and instead found themselves in the minority. But circumstances have forced them to cooperate, and out of this cooperation will come the real South Africans, who will speak neither Afrikaans nor British alone, but will use both languages with equal facility.

ASIA

No attempt has been made to show the language pattern of Asia because of its great complexity. For example, in India and Pakistan alone there are 222 different languages, not to mention the numerous dialects. The new Indian State, in facing the problem of language diversity, has had to rely on English, the only language understood by educated people throughout India. At present Hindustani is sponsored as the national state language.

In Indonesia, where a similar linguistic confusion exists, Malay is recognized as the *lingua-franca*, that is, a common or commercial tongue used among peoples of different speech. In the Philippines, where 64 native languages and dialects are spoken, Tagalog is now the official national language although English and even Spanish are used a great deal. An interesting situation exists in China. Chinese of various parts of the country can understand each other when they write, but not when they speak. The reason is that the written language uses symbols for each word, entirely independent from the spoken tongue. The case of the Arab world has already been discussed.

NATIONAL MINORITIES AND LANGUAGE

In Chapter 17, reference was made to national and antinational minorities. The same differentiation may be used in a discussion of language. National minorities, although loyal to the state, nevertheless claim the right to protect and maintain their respective languages. As a matter of fact, language differentiation is often their only ethnographic attribute. In general, the nations have not understood such claims, but within recent years there has been a trend toward viewing them more liberally. Perhaps the fear that such minority groups, if deprived of their language rights, might become antinational has been a prime mover in the increasingly broad attitude. Rhaeto-Roman, as has been mentioned, has been recognized as an official Swiss language, and the efforts of the Gaelic of Scotland, the Welsh of Wales, and the Bretons of France to preserve their respective Celtic languages have recently been given more consideration than in the past.

When the senior author was a boy, he lived in the northern part of the Netherlands where the use of Frisian, an old Nordic language, was limited to a small area and seemed doomed to disappear. Now it is flourishing and is recognized by the government through professorships in universities and use in grammar schools.

An interesting linguistic problem is offered by the German-speaking people of Alsace and Lorraine. When a child there first goes to school he speaks a German dialect, the language of the home. In school, for the first three years of his training, he is

taught entirely in French, which for him at that time is a foreign language. During the rest of his schooling French is the language of instruction, but German is added to the curriculum. The idea is to make the child bilingual. To some this appears to be an attack on freedom of language and many people in the region protest the system, claiming the right to an education in German. However, there is some reason for the scheme since Alsace and Lorraine are only small portions of a large country. Because they are densely populated, whereas France in normal times suffers from a population deficit, it is assumed that the young people of these two provinces will go to other parts of France to work. Obviously they must speak French fluently if they are to succeed. If French were taught in the schools as a foreign language, they would not acquire a thorough speaking knowledge of it and would in consequence be handicapped.

Some opponents of the system argue that a child trained in two languages is unable to express himself well in either. However, one gets the impression, while traveling in Alsace-Lorraine, that the results are rather satisfactory but that if the plan is continued French will eventually dominate. Difficulties inherent in the present period of transition occur when parents who speak only German have the unpleasant task of listening to their children speak French. In the next generation the situation will be different, of course, for both parents and children will be products of the same educational system.

ANTINATIONAL MINORITIES AND LANGUAGES

The attitude of most states toward the language claims of their antinational minorities is generally uncooperative. A state that sponsors or tolerates the claims of an antinational minority in respect to language helps to keep alive the sense of minority differences. This weakens the national structure, and is especially dangerous when the antinational minority is active and awaits the proper moment to join a related group across the border.

In many instances, nations in their earlier stage of development have made efforts to forbid the use of foreign languages, especially in cases of antinational minorities. For example, Rumania and Poland, which signed pledges to safeguard the cultural rights of

their minorities after World War I, frequently broke them. Another typical case is that of the South Tyrol where 300,000 former Austrians were left on the Italian side of the Alps. Names of towns were changed. Italian had to be spoken in churches and schools, and even names on tombstones were changed. However, all these efforts did not change the character of the population, which continued to favor its own German language. Since World War II, Italy has promised cultural autonomy to the German-speaking people of the South Tyrol.

Too much leniency towards antinational minorities in the matter of language differences does not solve the problem either. Czechoslovakia between the two world wars was jealous in protecting minority rights, and the German character of her three million Sudeten Germans was carefully protected. This attitude, however, did not make them more friendly toward the national government; the results before and following the Munich Conference in September, 1938, are well known. This was probably one of the reasons why such drastic steps were taken after World War II to repatriate all nonnationals, even though it meant misery to millions. Experience shows that only very powerful states can permit themselves the privilege of having antinational minorities without running into grave danger.

LANGUAGES AND NATIONAL SENTIMENT

Usually, a definite relationship exists between language and national sentiment, but there are exceptions. Despite a common language, the population of Alsace and Lorraine remained decidedly pro-French and anti-German when under the rule of the latter country from 1870 to 1918. The Germans in Danish Schleswig speak Danish in their homes. The Memellanders, for the most part, used Lithuanian in their homes, but that did not affect their general German orientation. The Masurians spoke a language related to Polish, but in the Allenstein plebiscite of 1920 voted almost solidly in favor of remaining in Germany. Similarly, the people of Hultschinland, a part of prewar Germany, preferred after World War I to remain in Germany although they spoke a Czech-Moravian dialect, which was the basis for their being included in Czechoslovakia. During their sojourn in the

Czechoslovakian Republic they always voted with the antinational Sudeten German party.

The general problem of language complexity and its attending difficulties may seem rather foolish to the average American who has seen European immigrants willing, almost eager, to give up their mother tongues for English. Nevertheless, in Europe and in other parts of the world, language represents a right of the ethnographic group as dear to its members as property, home, and family. The minority member is willing to fight for this right and, if necessary, to suffer for it, but not to give it up. Only by realizing this situation can we understand how and why the languages of a people have survived for years under foreign rule.

A WORLD LANGUAGE

Language difficulties have been overcome to some extent by the use of interpreters. In some international meetings, notably those of the United Nations, speeches are translated as they are being delivered, so that a listener can hear, through earphones, a speech in one language while it is being given in another. For example, while the Russian delegate is speaking in his own tongue the speech is usually broadcast in English, Spanish, French, and Chinese and can be heard in any of these languages by those attending the meeting. But such devices, good as they are, do not solve the problem of communication between people who do not understand one another's language.

It is understandable that in this confusion of world languages the demand arises that a universal tongue be provided, either by the acceptance of an existing one, such as English, or by the creation of one, such as Esperanto, which for a time gained adherents. It should be kept in mind, however, that no group of people would be willing to give up its language in favor of a universal one. Language is part of a people's culture, an expression of its characteristics and traditions. In truth, it would be a great loss to civilization if those various ways of expressing cultural elements were lost to mankind. A solution would be to have one world language that is commonly understood, in addition to the mother tongue, and to have this second language taught in schools all over the world.

The authors favor the universal use of English, not because Americans speak it, but because it is already in common use throughout the world, and it is not very difficult grammatically. English is spoken in the United States, and is spoken or understood by intellectuals in all parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Moreover, it is now taught in most of the countries of western Europe and in many others. However, to make English a world language would be a slow process, especially since some countries, for example, Russia and India, are still trying to establish one official language from the many spoken within their boundaries.

It is to be hoped that eventually the time will come when the peoples of the world can understand each other easily. When that time does come, a great step will have been taken toward a better world.

Religion

IT SEEMS ALMOST A PARADOX THAT religion, a force which should elevate mankind to a higher cultural and social plane, has been often regarded as the direct or indirect cause of more wars throughout history than any other single factor, save the lack of food. Moreover, religious wars have had a tendency to be more bitterly fought and more cruelly waged, because they kindle human passions to a high fervor. All religions, with the exception of Buddhism in its original form, have in them the elements of intolerance which set man against man and group against group.

In our present-day world, however, religion has generally ceased to be a direct factor in the interrelation of states. Where it arises, as in the relations between Israel and the Arab world or between India and Pakistan, it no longer is a case of one religion against another but of the clash between groups of different social and cultural backgrounds.

Nevertheless, religion is a factor of political-geographical importance, chiefly for two reasons: first, religious intolerance as well as religious complexity must be taken into account in evaluating the strength of nations; second, the churches have become strongholds against the spread of communism insofar as it means interference with religion or the sponsoring of antireligious propaganda.

The division of the world on a religious basis has been pretty well stabilized for some time. The great religious drives, such as once carried the crescent from Arabia throughout what is now the Moslem world, and the great Christian fervor, which resulted in the Crusades and so markedly influenced the colonial policy of

Spain, are things of the past. Missionaries still carry on their work of religious propaganda among the so-called pagans and in non-Christian areas, but aside from a certain degree of recent success in the Far East and India they have made only insignificant changes in the world's religious pattern.

As far as the territorial distribution of religion is concerned the world seems to have reached maturity, and there is no evidence of the possibility of a major shift save for the gradual elimination of the "pagan" faith. Religious boundaries generally do not coincide with political boundaries, and cases are rare in which people of different religions are separated by a political boundary.

Religious wars, as such, seem to be out-of-date. The two World Wars found Catholics fighting Catholics, Protestants fighting Protestants, and Moslems fighting Moslems with no distinct religious alignment. Today, only the Mohammedan world represents a potential element of conflict, in that a new religious leader might successfully carry out a program based upon the slogan, "The Mohammedan world for the Mohammedans." The Mahdi of the Sudan, in threatening British supremacy in Africa at the end of the nineteenth century, showed that such a possibility existed.

The creation of a Mohammedan block of states at times seems possible, as indicated by the Arab League, but the different political aspirations of the individual states generally has proved stronger than their common religious affiliations. Even the danger of a Mohammedan Holy War seems rather remote. Germany tried to foster this idea during World War I as a weapon against Great Britain, but the Arabs remained on the side of Britain and helped to defeat Turkey, and efforts to proclaim a Holy War against Israel and against the British were not successful.

DISTRIBUTION OF WORLD RELIGIONS

Figure 52 shows the distribution of the four great religions—Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism—in a general, much simplified way. It does not show the distribution of minorities, such as the many Mohammedans in China and India, nor the many Christians in various parts of central Africa. It depicts the Russians as Christians, in spite of the Soviet antireligious attitude.




FIGURE 52.

The fifth great religion, that of the Jewish faith, is not indicated on the map because Israel is too small to be shown on a map of this scale, and except for the still relatively small number in Israel (less than one and one-half million), the Jews are scattered all over the world.

The map, however, pictures clearly the general religious pattern: Christianity in Europe, the Americas, South Africa, Australia, and the Philippines; the Mohammedan core extending from the Atlantic coast of northwest Africa into central Asia and equatorward into Indonesia and the east coast of Africa; Hinduism in India; and Buddhism in eastern and southeastern Asia. The size of the areal distribution does not indicate the numerical distribution. Roughly speaking, there are about 620 million Christians, 316 million Mohammedans, 700 million Buddhists (including Confucianists, Taoists, and Shintoists), and 275 million Hindus.

Even these figures do not tell the entire story. Subdivisions appear within the main religious divisions. For example, the Roman Catholics, the Protestants, and the Orthodox, are all part of the Christian faith; the Sunnite-Shiite schism split the Islam world; and the many forms of Buddhism subdivide religious sects in eastern Asia. Some of these subdivisions are highly centralized, such as the Roman Catholics under the Pope and the Mohammedans under the Caliphs during the Middle Ages. Others are broken up into many smaller groups, as is the case among the Protestants with their innumerable divisions. In recent years efforts have been made to bring about cooperation among religious groups and their leaders; such greater mutual understanding is tantamount to political friendship, but progress is slow.

Distribution of Religions in Europe and the Near East

Figure 53 gives a more detailed picture of distribution of religions in one part of the world—Europe and the Near East. Complexity prevails in this area, and the map indicates only the dominant types of religion, without attempting to show areas of transition. Even with this omission there are difficulties, because information about conditions beyond the Iron Curtain is meager. For instance, what people live in the parts of former Finland, Poland, and Germany now occupied by the U.S.S.R. and to what religions do these people belong? Can the U.S.S.R. still be shown




FIGURE 53.

on the map as adhering to the Orthodox faith, or has antireligious propaganda been strong enough to change the situation? The authors have decided to continue to show the U.S.S.R. as Orthodox, because it is not known what inroads atheism has made. Man is essentially religious and other efforts to abolish religion have in the long run failed.

* As the map indicates, northwestern Europe including the greater part of Germany with the exception of some western and southern areas, is predominantly Protestant. Protestant islands are found in Switzerland, in Hungary, and in Romania (the Szeklers). Along the Oder River the religious border now coincides with the political boundary because east of the river the Catholic Poles have replaced the Protestant Germans. The distribution of Catholics is also an example of religious and political correlation, in that the new eastern boundary of Poland coincides with the line between Catholics and Orthodox. The Catholic salient in Romania reflects the period of Hungarian rule over Transylvania. Mohammedans in Europe are limited to a few sections in the Balkans, especially the zone running from Albania into Bosnia and the Turkish bridgehead across the Bosphorus. In the eastern part of the map it is interesting to note the large extension of the Islam in the U.S.S.R. (a factor given careful consideration by the Kremlin in its antireligious policy), the Christian Armenians in Russian Trans-Caucasia, the Buddhist Kalmyks south of the Volga, the Jews in Israel, and the Christian majority in the Lebanon.

RELIGIOUS STRUCTURE WITHIN NATIONS

It is now necessary to look more closely at the individual countries. In general, if there is no conflict between church and state, uniformity of religion within a state will lead to political strength, whereas complexity may cause political weakness through friction between religious groups. Despite this situation, efforts made by nations to strengthen themselves by expelling religious minority groups often have resulted in grave cultural losses. This is what happened when Spain expelled her Mohammedans and Jews at the end of the fifteenth century and when France expelled the Huguenots in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In both

cases citizens of high ability who were great assets to the countries in which they settled were forced to migrate.

States with Religious Uniformity

Many nations approach the ideal of religious uniformity. These include France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Austria, and the Latin American countries, which are Catholic; and Estonia, Latvia, and the Scandinavian countries, which are Protestant. Except for the rivalry between the Sunnites and the Shiites and the existence of small religious tribes, there also is uniformity of religion in the countries of the Arab world. In India the remaining Mohammedans are now a small minority. In the Far East, Buddhism prevails in various forms that, for the sake of simplicity, may be considered to include the Confucianism and Taoism of China. Only China, in this area, has a strong Mohammedan minority, about ten per cent of the total religious affiliations. Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa, are dominantly Protestant.

Countries without Religious Uniformity

United States and Canada. North America is rightly regarded as an example of religious tolerance, although discrimination at times is seen, and religious differences sometimes enter the political field. In both Canada and the United States Protestantism in its various forms is the dominant religion, but the Roman Catholic Church is the strongest single church unit. In Canada, which is 40 per cent Catholic, French-speaking Quebec is the Catholic stronghold but Catholicism is also strong in the Acadian Provinces. In the United States, Roman Catholicism prevails in the industrial northeastern and north-central states, as well as in Louisiana, New Mexico, Arizona, and California. There are about five million Jews in the United States, of whom approximately 2,200,000 live in metropolitan New York. The United States total is only slightly less than one-half of the world Jewish population.

Europe. Some of the religious complexity of Europe vanished after World War II. Shifts of population and the almost total eclipse of the Germans in eastern Europe resulted in many changes in the religious pattern, and the disappearance of many former

religious islands. Poland, for example, is now essentially Catholic, whereas before the war it had many religious minorities—Protestant, Orthodox, and Jewish. Czechoslovakia, according to a 1947 estimate, has relatively few Protestants, Orthodox Catholics, and Jews left. In Hungary, the Roman Catholics have a two-thirds majority with a strong Protestant minority. Rumania still has a primarily Catholic-Protestant zone in Transylvania but is otherwise Orthodox. Religious differences in Yugoslavia between the Roman Catholic Croats and Slovenes and the Orthodox Serbs contributed to the difficulties between the ethnographic groups. Many people of Bosnia are of the Mohammedan faith. In Switzerland the distribution of Protestants and Catholics chiefly follows provincial (Cantonal) lines, independent of language differences. One Canton (Appenzell) is divided into two parts, Protestant and Catholic. Both in number of people and in number of Cantons the Protestants prevail, the Catholics forming a large (40 percent) minority. No new figures are available for Germany and the many immigrants from the east may have caused some distributional changes; however, the general picture is still the same as that indicated in Figure 53.

In the Netherlands, Catholics prevail in the south and are scattered through the rest of the area; they form almost 40 per cent of the population. In both Britain and Scotland Protestantism prevails, with a fairly small Roman Catholic minority. According to the *Statesman's Yearbook* (1950) only 6.5 per cent of the marriages in England and Wales and 12.6 in Scotland were celebrated in the Catholic Church. In Northern Ireland Protestants have a two-thirds majority; this is one of the factors that intensifies the cleavage with the Irish Republic.

The rest of the world. The Middle East, despite the prominence of Islam, has many small religious groups which at times have been exposed to terrible suppression. Probably the most tragic case was that of the Christian Armenians within the Turkish state in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The reasons for persecution were not entirely religious, but religion certainly entered into the picture. As a result there are practically no Armenians left in Turkish Armenia, and the bulk of them now live in the Armenian Republic of the U.S.S.R.

Religious conditions in Syria and Lebanon are very complex.

In Lebanon Christian Maronites have a slight majority over the Moslems, but in Syria there are all kinds of Christian groups, remnants of ancient times, such as the Nestorian Assyrians. Interesting also is the case of the Druses, a militant Mohammedan sect which at times terrorizes the area around the mountains of the Jebel Druz in Syria, its homeland and retreat.

The clash between the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine is based only to a small extent on religious differences; it is mainly a struggle between modern civilization as brought in by the Jews and the ancient culture of the Arab peasants and nomads. The position of the Christian Holy Cities of Jerusalem and Bethlehem at the junction of the two opposing groups makes the situation more complicated. International control of these cities is opposed by both Jews and Arabs despite a decision to that effect by the United Nations in 1949.

The most serious recent religious clash occurred in India and resulted in the creation of Moslem Pakistan and Hindu India in 1947. Diverse cultures, as related to religion, were among the factors that caused countless deaths and untold misery for those who left their homes to adjust themselves to new conditions. In the Far East religion rarely enters into political conflict. One exception is found in the Philippines, where the Mohammedan Moros of Mindanao for a long time have been opposed to the rule of the Christian majority.

CHURCH AND STATE

Organized religion results in a religious structure called the church. The influence of the church is not always confined to matters of religion, but often extends into the affairs of the state. On some occasions the nation influences the affairs of the church.

The relation between church and state is most clearly shown in countries with official state religions. The close correlation between the Church of England and the British government is a good example; here the King (or Queen) is at the same time supreme governor of the Church of England. The Scandinavian countries have national churches, and until recently, Swedish dissenters had certain civil restrictions placed upon them. Co-operation between the church and the state in Roman Catholic

countries is not entirely a home affair for it involves the Vatican, a foreign element, which speaks for the church. For instance, church control in education and church holdings of landed properties, which often are not taxed, have led to conflict and in certain instances to a separation between church and state. This happened in France in 1905, and in Brazil in 1946. In 1917, the Mexican government expropriated church property by law, expelled foreign priests, and reduced the priesthood. Passive and active resistance of the population has since resulted in a more liberal interpretation of the rules.

Religious minorities often form political parties in order to obtain what they regard to be their religious and educational rights. In the German Empire, Chancellor Bismarck clashed with the Catholic Zentrum Party to his sorrow. In the Netherlands, the Catholic Party is the strongest party, with constant control of one-third of the seats in parliament. This Catholic Party has often combined with the Calvinist Party to form a government willing to safeguard the religious character of education by financing denominational schools.

Freedom of worship, as a general rule, is accepted in all countries. The exceptions are Catholic Spain and Argentina, where the word "tolerance" does not seem to be part of the vocabulary. In a dictator-controlled country, the state either wants the church to be very cooperative or tries to control it entirely. If either action is not sufficient for the aims of the dictator, the church has to be abolished and replaced by a state religion, or religion has to be dropped entirely.

In Hitler's Germany, the state interfered with the church in every possible way and unofficially sponsored the revival of an ancient Nordic religion, a "true" German one. In prewar Japan the development of the Shinto culture raised the Emperor and the country above all other interests. In Soviet Russia the national church was abolished in 1918, following the Revolution. Private worship has been permitted, especially since 1936, although at times it has been under attack; the state has also encouraged anti-religious propaganda.

In recent years, some of the Russian satellites behind the Iron Curtain, namely, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, which were formerly Catholic, have begun to break away from the

church to free themselves from the influence of the Vatican on their church systems. This trend was accompanied and popularized by indictments against the clergy for antinational acts, leading to persecutions, long prison sentences, and executions. An open conflict between Rome and these states, backed by Soviet Russia, resulted. It is a conflict not only between church and state, but also between believers and those who want to destroy religion. In Yugoslavia, too, the communist government has its problems with the Catholic clergy. In the Arab nations, the Koran is still the base for government and takes over the field covered by civil laws in non-Mohammedan countries.

CONCLUSION

Religion is undoubtedly an element that must be considered in a political-geographical study, for it enters into the evaluation of the strength and weakness of nations. Mature countries favor and practice religious tolerance, whereas young nations, especially if the religious structure is complex, find it difficult to be tolerant, for religious differences may lead to internal strife. Adolescent states in all their dynamic energy use religion as a means of furthering national unity and aggression by imposing various controls upon the religious structure, or they make an effort to destroy it.

The problems of church versus state and state versus church have been present throughout all history without full or even partial satisfactory solutions. There is no reason to believe that they will fail to influence events in the future.

Boundaries from the Ethnographic Point of View

BOUNDARIES ARE DRAWN OVER THE physical landscape and at the same time separate people. The physical aspect of boundaries has been discussed in Part II; this chapter considers them from the human point of view.

The idea of a boundary or a frontier goes far back in history and has existed since man became sedentary and formed political units. Often a no man's land was created as a protective frontier zone, or man-made barriers were set up to control entrances to countries. Most famous of the latter was the Great Wall of China, which today has entirely lost its former protective value of separating the sedentary Chinese from the marauding nomadic Mongols. In Roman times, boundary walls were used frequently; for example, Trajan's Wall, which extended from the Transylvanian Alps to the Black Sea, and the Picten Wall in northern England, marking the northern limit of the Roman Empire.

Walls reappeared in modern warfare, but they were within a country not at its boundary. Examples of this type of wall are the Maginot Line in France and the German West Wall, neither of which proved to be great assets because modern wars are fought not only on the ground but also in the air. Generally speaking, boundaries are not visible in the landscape, except for some posts indicating points along the line and for the customs buildings on the crossing of a line of transportation.

ETHNOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES

The best boundary from the human point of view is one which accurately separates two ethnographic groups that have grown into two distinct national units. Unfortunately, few boundaries are in such complete harmony with the ethnographic structure.

The complex ethnographic structure of most areas and the fact that many other problems must be given consideration when boundaries are being drawn account for the rarity of real ethnographic boundaries. One must realize, also, that boundaries are lines of agreement between two countries, often drawn at a time when the stronger can force its will upon the weaker. True ethnographic boundaries are of five different types, or rather exist under five different sets of conditions.

Such a boundary is possible when two ethnographic groups join along a line which is used as boundary. The interwar boundaries between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were good examples of this type; it was possible to draw satisfactory ethnographic boundary lines between these groups.

A somewhat similar situation arises where a physical barrier, having the character of a no man's land, separates ethnographic groups. One might expect this type to occur rather frequently, but it is surprising how often peoples cross physical boundaries instead of using them as boundary zones. In the Alps, for instance, French- and German-speaking people can be found occasionally in valleys on the Italian side of the mountain barrier. The classical case is that of the Austrians who live south of the Brenner Pass in what is called the Southern Tyrol, now part of Italy. Germans lived on both sides of the Bohemian mountain rim before those on the inner side were expelled after World War II. Even the Pyrenees do not completely separate ethnic groups since the Basques are located on both sides and the Catalan group on the Mediterranean side extends into French Roussillon. Likewise, the high Himalayas did not prevent the Mongolian tribesmen from descending the southern slopes into India. However, when mountains are used as boundaries they generally separate groups of people and may be considered ethnographic.

Sometimes an originally non-ethnographic boundary has existed

for such a long time that the people on both sides have formed different ethnographic groups from what was once a unified people. The boundary between the Netherlands and Germany is a good example of this type for it was originally without any ethnographic foundation. Through the centuries of its existence the cultural developments on either side progressed along different lines until today this boundary is almost ideal from the human point of view in that it separates two groups of different cultures.

Boundary lines also coincide with the ethnographic conditions in cases where the line was there first and the people came in on each side later. These conditions are found, for instance, in North America where the Canada-United States boundary west of the Great Lakes is older than the occupancy of the land by white settlers. However, the differences between the groups on either side were originally small, for the people came from the same stock, speak the same language, and enjoy the same geographical environment.

Boundaries become ethnographic if the people are moved to fit them. This often was done in Europe after World War II when boundaries were drawn first, and the people moved so that the boundary became ethnographic. The new boundaries of Poland and Czechoslovakia are of this type. They solve the problem of minorities, but cause great hardship. This point is discussed later in the present chapter.

NONETHNOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES

Most boundaries, however, are nonethnographic. As indicated above, the two chief reasons are ethnic complexity and the use of other boundary criteria, such as military or economic.

Ethnographic complexity is a handicap in making ethnic boundaries. In the first place the absence of sharp divisions or limits of different groups makes it almost impossible to draw a line that is in harmony with the ethnic structure. Second, many ethnic enclaves are too small to be taken into consideration.

Contact lines between ethnographic groups, which might be used as political boundaries, can exist only if no movement of population is taking place or has taken place recently. In such cases, the ethnographic structure is stable and mature, as in Europe

along the line of contact between the Germanic (Flemish-German) and the Latin (French-Italian) groups, but the contact line is rarely used as a political boundary.

A good example of such a contact line of long duration is found in Switzerland where the line crosses the city of Fribourg on the Saane River, southwest of Berne. The lower part of the city, located in the valley, has a Germanic population—German names are common, beer and sausage are popular; the population of the upper town on the plateau speaks French, drinks wine instead of beer, and prefers *croûte au fromage* to sausage.

Generally, however, an infiltration has taken place on either side of a contact line and this makes the drawing of an ethnographic boundary very difficult. This problem came to the fore, especially after World War I, when Wilson favored the doctrine of self-determination; plebiscites were used as a device for determining the desires of the people on which to base the location of boundaries.

Plebiscites

The idea of plebiscites goes back to the French Revolution when the French revolutionary government was not willing to include new areas in the French state without the expressed desire of the majority of the population. The plebiscite was used fairly frequently thereafter, especially at the end of World War I when a definite attempt was made to give Europe an ethnographical political map. It should be noted that this attempt was very successful. The political map as it existed between the two wars was the nearest approach to an ethnographic map Europe had ever known. It ranks high as a model despite some mistakes and some deviations for nonethnographic reasons.

Altogether, six plebiscites took place under the auspices of the League of Nations in the interwar period: Schleswig, 1920; Allenstein-Marienwerder, 1920; Klagenfurt, 1920; Upper Silesia, 1921; Sopron, 1921; and the Saar plebiscite in 1935. Another plebiscite was taken in 1920 in Eupen-Malmédy, which was given to Belgium in spite of its essentially German population. This plebiscite, however, cannot be considered a real test of popular sentiment because of the way it was administered. Each of these six plebiscites was carefully prepared and carried out quite honestly

under existing conditions; in none of them, however, were both parties satisfied with the result. The reasons are discussed in full in Sarah Wambaugh's standard work on this subject;¹ some of the difficulties and dissatisfactions are touched upon here.




FIGURE 54.

Besides the actual handling of the voting and the protection against too much pressure by either of the two countries concerned, there were two kinds of difficulties, namely, who was to be allowed to vote, and how the results were to be used in drawing the boundary line.

The first problem arose because many of the natives had left the region, while many new residents had come in but were not regarded as natives. In the case of Schleswig, voters were divided into four categories: (1) resident natives; (2) nonresident na-

¹ *Plebiscites Since the World War* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1933).

tives; (3) nonnative residents domiciled prior to January 1, 1900; and (4) nonnatives who had been residents before 1900 but had later been expelled. To avoid the necessity of extending the vote over large political units the plebiscite area was, in some instances, such as Schleswig and Klagensfurt, divided into zones. After the vote had been taken in the most critical zone, the outcome could be used as a basis for deciding whether it was necessary to extend the vote to other zones.

The second difficulty was how to interpret the vote. Should the area or zone be considered as a unit and go to the state for which the highest number of votes had been cast, or should the distribution of the vote be taken into consideration and the new boundary line drawn accordingly? In the plebiscites of Allenstein and the Saar the majority was so overwhelmingly in favor of remaining with Germany that this problem did not arise. In the other plebiscites the method followed varied according to conditions. In the case of Klagensfurt, the economic unity of the plebiscite area was considered important enough to give the whole area to Austria which had obtained the majority of the votes. In the three other cases—Schleswig, Upper Silesia, and Sopron—the new boundary was adjusted to the distribution of the votes, the line following the results of the vote as closely as possible. For Schleswig and Sopron that method proved rather successful, although some people, of course, according to their political beliefs, were left on the “wrong” side of the line. In Upper Silesia the solution was most difficult and was obtained only after many plans had been made and rejected. The reason for the difficulty is shown in Figure 55.

The industrial district in Upper Silesia constituted a German enclave surrounded by a chiefly Polish rural population. Two alternatives were available: (1) to sacrifice the rural Polish population by connecting the German enclave with Germany, or (2) to sacrifice the German enclave by placing the boundary along the contact lines between the German and Polish majorities. The compromise solution, as the problem was finally decided, divided the economically valuable enclave into two parts: the larger part was given to Poland and the smaller was connected with Germany. This solution proved to be a “Solomon’s judgment” which satisfied neither state.




FIGURE 55.

In South America a plebiscite was attempted between Chile and Peru with regard to the Tacna-Arica area (1925-1926). The attempt failed because the parties concerned could not agree about the terms. The two countries later (1929) came to an agreement whereby Tacna went to Peru and Arica to Chile.

The Russians also have applied the idea of plebiscites or elections in order to show that the sentiment of the people was favorable to any conquest made. Results always favor Russia with

percentages ranging in the nineties; in Lithuania, for instance, the vote taken in 1940 was 99.19 per cent. The following quotation suggests how this came about: "It was an unfortunate slip by which a London newspaper published the official results from a Russian news agency twenty-four hours before the polls were closed."² No further comment seems necessary.

Shifts of Population

A totally different procedure was followed during and after World War II. New boundaries were drawn with little regard for ethnographic structure and the native population was forced to move out, either in part or in most cases entirely. This procedure was used in ancient times when the Assyrians and later the Carthaginians were almost completely eliminated by their conquerors. Whereas the cases of the Germans in Europe is most spectacular, the same technique has also been used in Asia. Here the Turks in 1923 expelled the Greek inhabitants of Asia Minor despite the fact that they had their roots there since the time of the ancient Greek civilization. The flight of Arabs from Israel and the exodus of Hindus from Pakistan are even more recent examples. It is needless to speak of how much misery is involved in such shifts of population and how long it will take before all the displaced persons are settled elsewhere.

Change in areal distribution of the Germans. At present there are about 10,000,000 displaced Germans within the borders of what is left of Germany. Not only does this mean overcrowding in an already impoverished land, but the areas from which they came are now populated by other people who moved in when the Germans left. This changed the ethnographic pattern; moreover, boundary lines now stand out as separating ethnographic groups without zones of transition or minority groups. The operation has been a very severe one, but the hope can be expressed that the ethnographical homogeneity will ultimately be advantageous.

Three phases can be distinguished in this process. First came the recall of the Germans living in Russian-controlled territory, according to a German-Russian agreement made in the fall of

² Bernard Newman, *New Europe* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1943), p. 204.

1939. To those who returned should be added those who came from the South Tyrol where a vote was taken on whether the German-speaking people wanted to move out or stay and become Italianized. Second, the returned Germans and many others settled in conquered territory, either expelling those who lived there or using them as forced labor. People were settled in western Poland, parts of Bohemia-Moravia, and also Alsace-Lorraine in this way. Third, came the great exodus of the Germans when the Russian armies advanced, ending in the complete elimination of all German occupancy east of the Elbe River as well as in Silesia, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, and Yugoslavia; the newcomers in Alsace-Lorraine were also forced to leave.

THE DURATION OF BOUNDARIES

In studying boundaries, it is possible to distinguish between stable and unstable ones by the criteria of how long they have existed and whether the nations involved are satisfied. Boundaries in the Americas have remained remarkably stable. Such changes as have been made were discussed previously in Chapter 2; very few of them are open to dispute. Even in Africa changes have been few. Though shifts of political control such as the elimination of German and Italian colonies have occurred, they have not resulted in boundary changes.

The picture is very different in Europe and in parts of Asia. In these areas the World Wars have caused old boundaries to be modified and new ones to be established. In Europe the two defeats of Germany, the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Empires, and the recent westward advances of Russia after initial retreat following World War I have resulted in profound changes. Only in western Europe are many of the old boundaries still in existence. In Asia, the defeat of Japan, the decline of Chinese influence in the interior, and the separation between India and Pakistan have made necessary the creation of new political boundaries. Whether all the present boundaries in Europe and Asia will become stable or whether further changes will occur, only time will tell.

CONCLUSION

The survey of boundaries from the point of view of the ethnographic structure of population presents a rather complex picture. In a well-organized world it should be possible to draw boundaries acceptable to the people involved. This however, can be done only in a world at peace.

The border between the United States and Canada reflects the friendly relations between these two nations, and the Mexican-United States boundary, once it was agreed upon, has remained well established. In Europe such mature and mutually friendly nations as Norway and Sweden have no frontier disputes. These conditions give some hope for the future, and indicate that mutual cooperation and respect between neighboring countries can make possible a situation that is stable and worthwhile for all concerned. It is perhaps in moments of great distress, such as the present, that the need for stability is obvious.

Population

BEFORE WORLD WAR II THE SO-called dynamic countries—Germany, Italy, and Japan—defended their desire for expansion by the claim that they needed more land because of population pressure. Often the areas they coveted were already densely populated, but such slogans as “Volk ohne Raum”, a people without living space, nevertheless made an impression and marshalled public opinion in support of expansion. Thus it is pertinent to raise the question, is there in reality such a thing as overpopulation?

DENSITY OF POPULATION

There is a close relation between large areas of high population density and political power. Although other factors, such as resources and standards of living, enter into the evaluation of power, numbers of people count heavily in our modern world. For example, China, which only fifty years ago was so weak that other nations interfered with her sovereignty with impunity, has become a powerful military nation whose inexhaustible supply of manpower is a major asset. Similarly, India, until recently a British colony, is now one of the great nations of the world, with roughly one-sixth of the world's total population.

Figure 56 depicts four main areas of population concentration. Two of them are in Asia: India, and the China-Korea-Japan unit; one is in Europe: a zone stretching from the Atlantic into Russia. Roughly speaking, each of the first three areas has about 500 million people, and taken together have almost three-fourths of the total population of the world. The fourth area is in the eastern




FIGURE 56.

part of the United States. It has a smaller number of people than the other areas, but greater economic and financial power. Outside the four major concentrations are local areas of high density, such as Java, Egypt, and certain spots on the east coast of South America; these, however, play a relatively minor role.

The concentration of population in the four main areas is in part the result of physical conditions, such as relief and climate, as well as of various other factors. Two of the areas are primarily agrarian in their economy. The fertile plains of China and India, with their monsoonal climates that guarantee a long summer growing season, have for many centuries been cores of dense population. Since the population saturation point has been reached under prevailing methods of production, both areas have known frequent times of distress when floods, drought, or wars interfered with normal production, and millions died because of lack of food. The other two areas became densely populated in comparatively recent times. Western Europe owes its high density to the industrial revolution. The population, which until that time had been adjusted to the food supply, increased tremendously, and part of the needed food had to be imported from other sections of the world. A more recent occurrence is the industrial development, with its attendant growth in population, in eastern United States. Here other sections of the nation, notably the Middle West, have served as a granary, and provided the food requisite for the dense population.

In the European and United States areas, population saturation, though not yet reached to the same extent as in the Orient, is a potential threat. In Europe, the destruction caused by wars and the loss of markets led to a population surplus in many countries during the first half of the present century. This situation put a great burden on the existing economy. The North American area, the smallest from the point of view of number of people, is the only one in which thus far industrial development has in general kept pace with population. This development has only infrequently been halted or threatened by business recessions.

In this connection it should be mentioned that in Japan, one part of the Far Eastern core, industrial factors have also been responsible for the high density of population; as in Europe, there is in Japan a declining market, and food has to be imported.

Outside of the areas of dense population noted above, the world is sparsely populated, with exception of the few special sections already mentioned. Some noteworthy industrial centers in the U.S.S.R. have recently been developed. Physical factors, chiefly climate, are responsible to a large degree for the fact that most of the world is still inhabited by very few people. However, the application of modern science to offset unfavorable conditions, together with population pressure in the relatively few areas that are densely populated, will eventually increase population in those portions of the world that are now sparsely settled. The search for arable land is now in process.

WHAT IS OVERPOPULATION?

Density of population, however, is not an adequate yardstick for determining whether or not an area is overpopulated. For instance, the density of Iceland is quite low (four persons per square mile), yet its inhabitants often are forced to migrate because the island is really populated to capacity since most of the land is unproductive. By using arable land instead of all land in computing density, we obtain the figure of 1,300 persons per arable square mile. Even this calculation does not explain the entire story because it ignores the sheep pastures and coastal waters rich in fish—the two chief resources of Iceland.

Great Britain, for example, has a high density per square mile (560) and, of course, a much higher density per square mile of the arable land. Food production is insufficient for even half the food consumption. Nevertheless, under the conditions of a large world market that existed before the World Wars, England was not overpopulated. She sold her manufactured products and her coal, financed economic developments in all parts of the world, and had enough income to buy all the food she needed. After World War II, however, a declining demand for British products coupled with the high costs of reconstruction resulted in Great Britain having too many people. This situation necessitates either increased production or a lowering of the standard of living, unless it is remedied by emigration.

Java, core of the young Indonesian Republic, may be cited as a third case. The population is 1,000 per square mile and about

1,500 per square mile of arable land. The senior author once calculated how many people could live in Java without the area reaching saturation, on the basis of soils and their average production, and arrived at the figure of about 50,000,000. Of course, the standard of living is much lower in Java than in either Iceland or Great Britain, but life in the tropics is simpler than in the temperate and subarctic zones. The figure of 50,000,000 now has been reached and the new Republic faces the problem of industrialization or emigration to the neighboring islands. Only in one or both of these ways can it avoid the tragic results of overpopulation.

The United States is not yet confronted with the problem of overpopulation. With its two and one-half acres of arable land per person and its huge industrial development, it is a land of plenty with the highest standard of living in the world. Depressions, with attendant unemployment, are the result of the risks of such a system. Compared with other nations, even those of Europe, the United States is underdeveloped, but an economic change which would use the arable land more intensively and also plow marginal areas might result in a lowering of living standards.

These examples suffice to indicate that the problem of population pressure varies greatly according to conditions, and that the idea of overpopulation is always a relative one which reflects, and is reflected in, economic and social conditions.

POPULATION GROWTH

The last century and a half has seen an astonishing growth in world population. The two chief factors responsible for this growth are: (1) advances in medical care which have resulted in more infants and children surviving the critical early years and more persons reaching maturity and old age, and (2) great economic possibilities stemming from better methods of production in both agriculture and manufacturing. Europe, for instance, increased its population from 175 million in 1800 to the present number of about 500 million. England and Wales increased their population sevenfold between 1801 and 1921, Java, tenfold in 150 years; and as an extreme case, the 5,800 French immigrants who




FIGURE 57.

reached Quebec before 1680 are the forefathers of the four million French Canadians of today—a 600-fold increase in 250 years.

The trend of population increase has not yet reached many of the more primitive countries where the death rate is still 50 as compared with 10 per 1,000 for some of the most progressive nations, and where economic and social conditions have changed little since ancient times. Expectation of life at birth is now 67 years in the Netherlands in contrast to only 26 years in India; figures in parts of the Near East are probably even lower. What will happen if modern scientific advances with their inevitable results reach those areas?

Figure 57 shows the increase of population in a general way by using the difference between birth rates and death rates for the various countries which publish these vital statistics. The data are for 1950 except in the case of a few countries for which 1950 data are not available and older statistics had to be used. Although most of the warring nations had a remarkable increase in births immediately after World War II, the situation in 1950 may be regarded generally as back to normal.

The map brings out some interesting points despite the fact that it is not based entirely on recent information. Low annual increase, below ten per 1,000 inhabitants, prevails in large parts of Europe, in India, and probably also in sections of the Near East. In Asia very high birth rates still give a surplus, in spite of the high death rates. Economic factors enter into the picture for Germany, Austria, Hungary, and especially Rumania where the lowest increase is found.

Annual increases of between 10 and 20 per 1,000 inhabitants are probably most typical and are found all over the world. Various types of increase exist, such as the combination of a fairly high birth rate with a low death rate, as in the United States and Canada; and of a high birth rate but a somewhat higher death rate, as in Argentina. The latter type is found in parts of southern and eastern Europe; the Netherlands, Norway, and Iceland are of the North American type.

In general, the category of high increase shows very high birth rates which result in an increase of above 20 per 1,000 inhabitants, in spite of fairly high death rates. Santo Domingo even stands above 30. Some of these figures, however, are open to the sus-

picion of inaccuracy because life expectancy is not high and possibly the number of deaths is incorrectly recorded. In Java, where the senior author lived in the 1920's, the reported number of deaths always exceeded the number of births, and yet the population increased rapidly. The reason for the discrepancy was that death figures were well known because of elaborate death ceremonies, whereas births often remained unrecorded.

In more advanced countries the number of births will probably decline and the death rate will not drop much more; hence the increase will be quite small. For instance, in France before World War II the number of births and the number of deaths balanced each other. In the more primitive countries, however, the decline in the death rate will probably be much faster than the decline in the birth rate, and accordingly for a period of time a heavy increase in population may be expected.

Population Structure

Another population factor which should be taken into consideration is the structure of the population according to sex. In the nineteenth century the population pyramid had displayed very regular shape because each age group showed a decrease if compared with the one below while the number of males about equalled the number of females with the usual contrast of more males in infancy and more females in later years. The present pyramid has a different shape because of the drop in the birth rate and the increase in the number of older people.

From the political-geographical point of view, another factor affects the situation in some countries, that is, the losses sustained in the two World Wars. This is very well illustrated by an age census taken in the British occupied zone in Western Germany after World War II (Figure 58). The shape of the pyramid was somewhat influenced by the birth rate in the prewar years, which reflected depression and prosperity periods, and to some extent government propaganda for large families. The striking point about the pyramid, however, is the dominance of females over males as a result of war losses. At present there are almost twice as many women of marriageable age (between 20 and 30) as men. This situation will affect future birth rates and also give rise to other unfortunate conditions in a society with too few men—what

may be called the battle of the sexes. Similar conditions prevail in the U.S.S.R. but no statistics are available to show the population structure there.

**POPULATION PYRAMID
BRITISH ZONE OF GERMANY
1948**




FIGURE 58.

PROBLEM OF OVERPOPULATION

Overpopulation under existing conditions, either temporary or seemingly permanent, remains one of the chief problems in the world. Some of the reasons are increase of population beyond the possibilities of employment, decline of industrial development resulting from loss of markets with consequent unemployment, and a sudden increase of population owing to population movements. In Europe, for instance, the agrarian East has long been overpopulated, and this situation is one of the causes of poverty and of the

desire to migrate. Italy has a permanent unemployment problem because of overpopulation. Germany, with only two-thirds of her pre-World War I territory and with a large increase of population resulting from the forced migration of the Germans who formerly lived in other parts of Europe, is crowded beyond the hope of an immediate solution. This is especially the case in Western Germany where a constant flow of immigrants from eastern Germany has added to the already overcrowded conditions. The Netherlands, with the loss of her colonial empire, faces the problem of too many people and not enough land, and sees her standard of living declining, and her young men migrating. Conditions are still worse in Asia. Instances of overcrowding in parts of India and China have long been known. Japan with her high rate of population increase also faces difficulties if she is not able to recover some of her former markets for her industrial products.

Population pressure, where it exists, causes tension and unstable conditions and may lead to international complications. It is one of the greatest challenges of our modern world, for overpopulation and low standards of living are fertile ground for communism.

Potential World Population

Estimates of potential world population have been made, taking into account the possibility of making large areas that are now almost uninhabited productive through modern methods of hygiene and cultivation. The present world population is about two and one quarter billion. The German political geographer, Richard Hennig, made the following estimate of the potential world population: Africa, 2,320 million (now 197 million); Asia, 1,700 million (now 1,300 million); Europe, 600 million (now 540 million); North America, 1,100 million (now 213 million); Oceania, 400 million (now 12 million); and South America, 2,000 million (now 107 million).¹ Hennig's figures, totalling about 8 billion, are indeed astonishing, especially if it is remembered that he and some others regarded them as low and expected that the actual figures would be higher.

The late English geographer, C. B. Fawcett, after a careful study, came to similar conclusions. According to his estimate, the world could support six and one-half billion people if the standard

¹ *Geopolitik* (Leipzig and Berlin: Teubner, 1931).

of living in France were taken as a basis, and even ten billion on the basis of conditions in India. He summarizes his conclusions as follows:

It is clear from the estimates here given that the world, as a whole, is capable of supporting a population much more numerous than that which it carries today. The immediate problems of overpopulation are limited to some comparatively small areas; and the present-day pressure of population is not against the limited resources of the earth but against the various barriers, natural and artificial, which hinder access to these resources. With our present powers of production the world may well be able to support three times its present population in reasonable comfort. But at the rates of increase of 1900-1910 that number would be reached in about a century from now. And the fact that the size and natural resources of the earth are fixed and limited insures that its human population cannot increase indefinitely.²

Territorial Expansion

It has already been noted that territorial expansion rarely solves the problem of population pressure. Even colonies have not proved to be a remedy. At the time of World War I there were comparatively few Germans in the German colonies (24,000); likewise the Italian colonies did not help to solve Italy's population problems. Even Japan profited little, in relieving population pressure, from the conquest of Korea, Manchuria, and Formosa; the number of Japanese in those areas was only about one million, the equivalent of one year's increase in the population of the homeland.

Migration

Migration from densely populated countries to less densely populated ones is a direct method of reducing population pressure. The white population of the Americas, Australia, and Africa represents migration from overcrowded European countries. One might imagine that this migration was a great help in relieving pressure in the home countries, but such was not the case.

Robert R. Kuczynski estimates the net overseas migration of Europeans since 1492 to be about 45 million, of which 24 million

² "The Numbers and Distribution of Mankind," *The Scientific Monthly*, LXIV (May 1947), 389-395.

went to what is now the United States, 15 million to other American countries, and 6 million to other continents. These figures, which seem very small, represent net migration. The actual movement of people was much greater, but many persons returned to Europe. It is estimated that of the 55 million persons who came to the Americas between 1820 and 1938, only 35 million remained for the rest of their lives. The population of Europe increased from 120 to 175 million during the eighteenth century, and it has increased to 500 million since the beginning of the nineteenth century. In view of these facts, it is evident that the net emigration of 45 million persons during a 446-year period was relatively insignificant and failed to serve as a check to the increasing population in Europe. Ireland is the only exception to this general statement.³

Moreover, European countries were robbed of the pick of their youth, for whose rearing and education they had paid, without reaping the benefits. Thus many European countries did not look with favor upon the migration of their young people, and the "dynamic" countries stopped it in an effort to preserve their manpower.

In general, the European countries gained little or nothing from migration in relieving their population pressure, and lost much culturally. An exception to this statement is that in southern Europe often only the men emigrated; they either returned to their homes within a few years, or, if they did not do so, they sent a part of their earnings back to their families at home. Thus a part of the loss that their migration had imposed upon their countries was repaid.

Not only did most of the countries of Europe try to prevent the migration of their young people, but the countries to which these people wished to go also objected. They did not want more people than could easily be absorbed without lowering the wage level and the standard of living.

In the United States another cause for restricting immigration was the change in the character of migration, in the last decade of the nineteenth century, from northern European stocks to southern European, and a desire to limit the influx of immigrants from the latter stocks. Similarly, Australia has been anxious to avoid too great an influx of non-British elements; at times even the British

³ *Population Movements* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 22.

have not been welcomed because the strong labor elements fear that a high wage scale could not be maintained in the face of an increasing labor supply. In some Latin American countries efforts have been made to encourage European immigration but without marked success. The Germans who migrated to South America have not been completely assimilated into the general national blends.

The migration of Negroes to the Americas was entirely different from European migration. This was a forced, not a free movement of peoples, and those who were taken from Africa were not the selected youth but rather those who were caught by the slave traders. The number of Negroes brought to the Americas has been estimated at 15 million. The 40 million Negroes in the Americas today are the descendants of these forced migrants with some admixture of blood.

CONCLUSION

In world politics, overpopulation and underpopulation often have been used to defend the right of some nations to expand and of others to open or close their boundaries to immigrants. This chapter points out that the situation is not so simple and that the two words, overpopulation and underpopulation, can only be used in a very relative way. World population is increasing at present and there is no reason to believe that the trend will stop in the near future. It is obvious that, because of areal and economic limitations, population expansion will have to stop at some time. That moment, however, is much farther off than most people thought at the time Malthus made his famous prophecy. Nevertheless, we must take great care of our resources and plan for the expansion of population. Here is another reason why peace and international cooperation are necessary for survival.

Government

A WELL-KNOWN TEXTBOOK ON GOVERNMENT¹ recognizes two major categories under the heading of "constitutional bases" namely, oligarchy and democracy. The first category is subdivided into monarchy, dictatorship, theocracy, and plural headship; the second, into limited monarchy and republic. Under "economic bases" of government are placed the capitalistic and socialistic forms, and under "communal bases" are national, multinational, and world governments. Unitary, imperial, and federal governments are considered under "sovereignty structure."

In a book on political geography it is not possible to discuss these categories in detail, except for the inferences that may be drawn from them concerning the strength or weakness of a nation and its relation to other nations.

THE OLIGARCHIC MONARCHY

The hereditary monarch as sole ruler is a disappearing type. In all probability he never was really absolute, because even the strongest princes had to take into consideration groups or classes within the state. Gradually, those groups forced the monarch to accept certain limitations to his power. In modern times, these limitations have been in the form of a constitution that has put an end to the oligarchy.

In its purest form, the oligarchic monarchy can still be found in the Arab world, where tribal chiefs, through military power, have

¹ R. M. MacIver, *The Web of Government* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949).

control over territories that, because gradually boundaries had to be drawn, became recognized states. The royal house could be overthrown by another tribal chief, again by the use of military power, and often within the royal family the struggle for succession led to murder as well as to local revolts.

An example of oligarchic monarchy was the Saudi Arabia of King Ibn Saud. Ibn Saud, whose father was sultan of Nejd (central Arabia), had lived as an exile in Kuwait during the period when a local rival with Turkish help ruled over Nejd. In 1905, he conquered his former territory by military force and became its recognized ruler. After the first world war the traditional feud between Nejd and Hejaz (the territory along the Red Sea coast with the holy cities of Mecca and Medina) ended with the complete defeat of the ruler of Hejaz (King Husain). In 1932, Ibn Saud, consolidating his gains proclaimed himself King of Saudi Arabia and became its absolute ruler. The development of the oil fields along the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf made him one of the richest men in the world and greatly increased his influence.

Although he had to allocate power to others and even had a cabinet, these positions were generally kept within the family, and Ibn Saud retained complete control. As a ruler he showed remarkable wisdom and restraint. When his feud with Yemen led to the defeat of that nation, he did not press his advantage but arranged for a friendship pact between the two countries. Even his relations with the Hashemite family, the descendants of King Husain, now ruling over Jordania and Iraq, improved. As a member of the Arab League his attitude in the Palestine conflict, although anti-Jewish, was less bellicose than that of other members of the League. At the same time, the oil money that poured into his treasury was used in a way beneficial to the future of his country. The conduct of the affairs of state rested on the shoulders of one man whose word was law and whose sentiments affected the whole Middle East. It seems almost anachronistic, but to the Arab, brought up on tribal tradition, it still seems natural.

Absolute monarchies were once customary and not, as now, exceptional. Historians do not always agree whether they were good or bad for their respective countries or for the world. Undoubtedly the quality of the monarchy varied with the incumbent ruler because the law of primogeniture prevented the selection of

the fittest. Many wars may have been the personal wars of kings, but it would be difficult to defend a statement that democratic countries had fewer wars. Each monarch and each case will have to be judged on its own merits. Such cases as those of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Kuwait are interesting not only as remnants of the past but also as they affect international policy in the Middle East. Relations with those monarchs have to be handled most carefully because in the struggle between the communist and the democratic worlds their attitude is of vital importance.

DICTATORSHIP

A dictator differs from an oligarchic king because in his case the succession is not stabilized.² Often a dictator introduces that hereditary succession and automatically becomes an absolute monarch. There are, however, other much more important differences. Dictators generally have a definite program or mission that they feel compelled to accomplish. Such programs can be concerned with the internal affairs of the state and also with its relations to other nations. Moreover, dictators generally come into their position by power, political as well as military, and in many cases, they represent a minority. This means they have the dual task of trying to become or remain popular with the masses and, at the same time, of preventing the opposition from overthrowing the dictatorship. This makes them intolerant to other ideas and hostile to any strong organization within the state, such as an army or a church not under their control. Except when established by foreign pressure, as was the case in the new communist states in eastern Europe, dictatorships are the response to distress, be it political, economic, or military, or combinations of all three. Accordingly, there are many types of dictatorship ranging from benevolent to despotic. Democracy needs to rest on a certain degree of maturity. If such is absent the transition to a dictatorship is almost unavoidable. There is the Latin American type where democratic governments alternate with dictatorships, but where there is always the hope that eventually those republics

² For readers interested in a more detailed treatment of dictatorship the authors recommend the chapter, "The Ways of Dictatorship," in MacIver's *The Web of Government*.

will find their way to more stable and permanent democratic government. Similar conditions existed in the new countries which arose in Europe after the Balkan wars and the first world war. In most of them, democracy temporarily failed and dictators took over, but there was hope for the future.

Even such dictatorial countries as fascist Italy and Franco's Spain are never to be regarded as permanent features but as steps toward something else. Italy under fascism still had a king; Franco stated that he was the leader of a transitional period which might end in the return of the royal house. Few people realize that Portugal has a dictatorship type of government because the dictator has stayed very much in the background and the regime has few of the dictatorial characteristics.

On the opposite side there was Nazi Germany, one of the worst types of dictatorship the world had ever known—the extreme police state with its Elite Guard, its storm troopers, and its Gestapo. Here the law and individual rights were completely disregarded; protests were punished by imprisonment in concentration camps, places of inferno-like horror.

Most of these features have been taken over by communist Russia, and it is not necessary to dwell on them, since almost every day there are new examples of the lack of freedom in that country. But there is still the communist creed, which has found adherents in different parts of the world. MacIver describes it in the following words:

There was the doctrine of the socialist or communist economy, demanding the collectivization of all productive wealth, the abolition of capitalism, and the establishment of the formula: from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs. There was the doctrine of equality, denying advantage or privilege to any class, race-group, or interest. There was the doctrine of internationalism, opposing the dominance and the exclusiveness of the nationalist state. There was the doctrine of democracy, making all authority the expression of the people's will. And there was the doctrine of the "withering state," attacking the whole system of power politics and envisaging a future in which the role of the state as power would disappear and the classless society would function in liberty. To these doctrines was attached an elaborate "dialectic" of the inevitable historical processes through which the transformation must take place.³

³ MacIver, *The Web of Government*, p. 257.

This story, in fact all the so-called benefits of communist rule, in contrast to the conditions in noncommunist countries is broadcast daily in different forms all over the world—a terrible weapon influencing those who have no idea what life in the communist state is really like.

It is very important to consider just what dictatorship means in the evaluation of nations and the relations between them. The dictator or the group that dictates with him is a much greater danger than the absolute monarch, because dictatorship is based on propaganda and on the results obtained by it. Dictatorships, such as Germany and Russia, are geared for expansion, through war, if necessary, because they realize that in a peaceful world they would eventually be doomed to disappear. Opposition has to be eliminated within, and eventually without, the state. Only a complete communist world can safeguard Russia's present type of government. All their actions have that final goal. For the political geographer a good knowledge of such countries is essential not only from the point of view of democratic self-protection but also because they represent the major obstacle to a better type of world in which the freedom of the individual is protected. The Iron Curtain in its full extension is a battle front, sometimes cold but often warm with the future of the world at stake. This may sound quite dramatic but it is the unfortunate truth. Only a total change in the attitude of the ruling group in Moscow can give us hope of a compromise, of a chance to live side by side in peace.

THEOCRACY AND PLURAL HEADSHIP

The third division under oligarchy, theocracy, is not important any more. The last theocratic leader was the Dalai Lama of Tibet, who governed the state as the leader of the priestly class. In 1951, however, communist China took control, and the Dalai Lama, although he was permitted to stay, lost his temporal power. Of course there is Vatican City where the Pope rules over approximately 100 acres, but his power outside is of a different type and has been treated in the chapter on religion. Plural headship, either in the form of a joint jurisdiction by king and priest or as a two-consul system, was once rather popular but has now ceased to exist.

DEMOCRACY

The difference between a limited monarchy and a republic is only minor and the two can be discussed together. The main difference lies in the fact that in a true democratic type of monarchy, the monarch, as first servant of the state, is permanent and is often a stable factor, although his direct influence is often much smaller than that of a president of a republic. Democracy means rule by the people. There are many ways to interpret that rule. In fact there are as many types of democracy as there are democratic nations. Also, many so-called democracies have very little democracy because a relatively small group, either under a king or a president, controls the elections. The people in these countries have not become conscious of the fact that they are part of a democracy and either do not vote or else they follow the instructions of the ruling class. A good example of that is found in the Middle East. In Iraq, the government is run by a small group composed to a large extent of landowners who still control the vote in their districts. A middle group of intellectuals, businessmen and workers have grown up in the larger cities but are not powerful enough to overthrow the ruling class because the rural vote is still government controlled. Still, on paper it is a democracy, a constitutional kingdom.

There remains little of the original type of democracy, such as existed in ancient Athens and in which any citizen could be called by lot to a government position. The Swiss approach is probably best because in certain communities votes are still taken by a show of hands in public outdoor meetings, and all important decisions accepted by the Swiss parliament are referred back to public vote; in fact the Swiss vote so often that democracy sometimes becomes a burden. However, we are not concerned here with the system used but the influence it has on the conduct of state affairs. Three points are especially pertinent: the function of the actual head of government (not counting the constitutional monarch), the party system, and centralized government as opposed to federation.

The election of an American president attracts world-wide attention because of the power given to him by the Constitution, and of course the fact that the United States is the leading great power.

The election of President Eisenhower in 1952, for instance, was received in other countries with mixed feelings because of the uncertainty what the election would mean to the foreign policy of this country. Many other presidents, even of important countries, come and go almost unnoticed. Very few know the name of the president of the French Republic who is mentioned by the foreign press only if he has trouble finding a new prime minister after the too frequent falls of the cabinet. Perhaps the least known president even within his own country is the Swiss president who is only the chairman of the Bundesrat (the Swiss cabinet) who changes every year in a regular rotation.

In many countries the prime minister is the real power. In Britain he represents the power given in the United States to the president with this difference: he is the leader of the majority in Parliament or of a parliamentary coalition while in the United States the majority in Congress and the president do not always belong to the same party. It is understandable that such a discord influences the firmness of the policy of government and may lead to situations which are for non-Americans difficult to understand. When President Wilson sponsored the League of Nations it came as a great shock that his own government was not willing to support him and refused his request that the United States become a member of that league.

Party systems also vary a great deal. The two-party system is, for instance, typical of the United States and also of Britain, although for a time three British parties existed of which one, the Liberal Party, gradually faded out of the political picture. A change in government in Britain, has, of course, its influence in the general policy of that nation, but means little to the overall government system, which is nonpolitical to a large extent. In the United States a change in the administration involves not only the elected officials but many minor governmental posts as well. The many changes in the French government are partly offset, in their influence, by the nonpolitical government core. Even at times when a head of state is absent due to party politics, the state itself, except when a major decision is required, functions as if nothing had happened.

The example of France brings up the plural party type of government where cabinets are based on coalitions between parties

because no party has a majority. This is the case in most countries that do not have a traditional two-party system that is strong enough to withstand efforts of new parties to become important. Coalitions generally mean that no great changes have taken place; it is mainly a slight shift in the emphasis in certain phases of national policy.

The difference between a unitary type of government and a federal one depends on the amount of autonomy given to the members of the union. The federal type introduces a dual citizenship which means, in the United States, citizenship in both the state and the federation. A centralized government encourages global national thinking while in a federation each state may have its own approach to problems which occur. Generally, there is a tendency in a federation to strengthen the federal government at the cost of the individual units; this has been noticeable in the history of American government and in other federations such as Canada, Australia, Switzerland, and Germany.

A democracy has within itself both strength and weakness. Strength prevails in mature countries where the people's verdicts are generally accepted even by the losing party or parties and the national sentiment prevails over party differences. The fight during an election may be a bitter one, but the ranks are closed once the verdict is given. In countries that lack maturity the democratic way of government may lead to weakness because the parties continue to fight each other and hamper the conduct of a smooth government. For the political geographer each country demands careful evaluation as far as type of government is concerned. On the strength of such studies he can come to certain conclusions about strengths and weaknesses. Recently the senior author spent several months in the Middle East. He went there mainly concerned with economic progress and with certain territorial problems in mind. He discovered, however, that national politics played such a part in the economy of the countries and their relations with each other that he was forced to study the politics most carefully and use them as a major factor in his evaluation. Such problems, for instance, as the relation of Iraq and the United States and Great Britain on the question whether the oil wells should be nationalized, all depended on the structure of government and possible changes that might occur.

WORLD GOVERNMENT

The idea of a world government goes back as early as 300 B.C. when the Stoics formulated the concept of a world society in which all races and nations would be merged in a common brotherhood. Among the later advocates were such men as Hugo Grotius, the famous Dutch lawyer in the first part of the seventeenth century, who in his book *De Jure Belli et Pacis* approached the problem from the point of view of international law and Immanuel Kant,¹ who in his essay "Zum ewigen Frieden" advocated that permanent peace can be achieved only through a union of free states, each organized as a democracy under representative government.

The first practical step was taken at the Peace Conference at Versailles in 1919 when the League of Nations was created.

For the first time in history, a permanent, continuous world organization appeared dedicated to the maintenance of world peace and security. Secret diplomacy was to be abolished by the requirement that all treaties be made public and registered with the League. Armaments were to be limited through collective agreements. Most important of all, war as an "instrument of national policy" was to be curbed by economic and military sanctions, to be applied by the members of the League against an aggressive nation. Unity of power was now to succeed the balance of power that had failed so signally in preserving the peace of the world. Hope ran high, and many came to believe that, in time, the League would become a "parliament of man" that would solve the age-old problem of war.⁴

The senior author would like to second that statement about hope. He will never forget the European sentiment when President Wilson landed in France after the first world war. It was almost like the coming of the Messiah. Even in his failure, especially when he failed to get the cooperation of his own nation, Wilson remained a great man, and many Europeans still regard him as America's greatest president.

It is not the place here to enumerate the reasons why the League was not successful. It is sufficient to say that it lacked power, that its members were unwilling to take action when it had to be taken and that it finally died of its own inertia.

⁴ By permission from *The World in Crisis*, by J. S. Schapiro. Copyright, 1950. McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., p. 293.

The United Nations

The second step was taken in June, 1945, when the charter establishing the United Nations was signed by the representatives of 50 countries. Again it seems worthwhile to quote Schapiro, who describes the functions of the United Nations rather precisely.

How was the Charter of the United Nations an improvement on the Covenant of the League of Nations that had failed so tragically in the hour of need? Would the nations be willing to surrender their sovereignty and form a world government having supreme power over them? Clearly, not. Would they be willing to surrender their sovereignty in the right to make war? Probably. A world organization would have no reason for existence unless it could prevent war. The United Nations, like the League of Nations, was an association of nations each of which retained its sovereignty, but in several respects it appeared to be far stronger than the League. In the first place, nearly all the nations of the world were members, including the United States. And the adherence of the greatest power in the world gave immense prestige to the newly born world order. The chief organs, the Assembly and the Security Council, were—or appeared to be—stronger than those of the League. Like the Assembly of the League, the Assembly of the United Nations, representing all its member-nations, each having one vote, was mainly a world forum, with the right to discuss and to make recommendations. But real power to act lay with the Security Council, consisting of eleven members: five permanent ones, the Big Five, namely, America, Britain, Soviet Russia, France, and China; and six, representing the other members of the United Nations, elected for a term of two years by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly. But there was an important difference between the Council of the League and the Security Council of the United Nations. Action by the former in important matters required the unanimous consent of its fifteen members; but similar action by the Security Council required only an affirmative vote of seven of its eleven members. There was, however, a fly in the ointment. This was the famous veto, according to which any one of the Big Five could block action by the Security Council on any matter that it considered important, by interposing a “veto.”

Unlike the Covenant, the Charter provided for “teeth.” An international general staff was to be organized by the Big Five, with power to make available armed forces, to be supplied by the members of the United Nations. In case of a breach of the peace, the general staff, acting on a decision of the Security Council, would take prompt

action against an aggressor. Military power, ready for action, was to be placed behind the new world organization.⁵

It is still too early to give a definite opinion about the practical value of the United Nations. Most of what it did is well known. It had its moments of failure, chiefly because of the veto of the Soviet Union but it also had its moments of glory, especially when the Council voted a resolution condemning the government of North Korea for its refusal to obey the order to withdraw its armed forces and recommended to the members that they furnish such assistance as might be necessary to repel the armed attack.

It is unavoidable that the United Nations is in an impasse in a world dominated by two conflicting powers, both members of the United Nations. It is also understandable that with war a constant possibility, many people want to go farther and are in favor of a federal world government if possible with, or if necessary, without the communist bloc. Various plans have been presented. They all have in common the premise that the nations should be willing to accept, in certain instances, world sovereignty, which would mean some loss of sovereignty at home. Regional agreements, if they work out well, can be regarded as steps toward such a world federation of nations. The recent efforts to construct a western European federation, which will go much farther than a system of cooperative defense such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, show that the time may be ripe for such regional pacts.

In 1952, a most encouraging event took place in the Netherlands. Two towns, selected as being representative of public opinion, voted (unofficially) whether or not they would agree to give part of the nation's sovereignty to a European federation. The result was quite remarkable. In Delft, an industrial city, 75 per cent of the eligible voters went to the polls; in Bolsward, a rural market town, 88 per cent; the majority in favor of federation in the first city was 93 per cent and in the second, 97 per cent.

For a political geographer it is rather inviting to construct regional divisions, stepping stones to a world federation. Using some existing units such as the British Commonwealth of Nations, the

⁵ Schapiro, *The World in Crisis*, pp. 396-397.

United States, and the U.S.S.R., the following divisions are suggested: United States, Latin America, Western and Southern Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, the Far East and the U.S.S.R. Under present conditions the U.S.S.R.-China bloc will not be willing to cooperate; this leaves the Philippines, Formosa, South Korea, and Japan to represent the Far East. Southeast Asia would include Indochina, Siam, Burma and Indonesia. The Middle East as a unit has already been discussed in this book. Latin America, perhaps, should be divided into two parts, the Caribbean realm, closely bound to the United States, and central and southern South America which has more divided interests. All this, however, is merely theoretical because the world is not yet ready to take the steps toward federation. But intelligent people all over the world have that goal in mind.

Freedom of Information

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IS ONE OF the basic principles of a free world, and access to such information is essential to everyone who wants to know what is happening in his own country and in the world outside. This is especially essential in the field of political geography which is concerned with nations and the relations between them. The principles may sound quite simple and self-evident to an American, but in reality, they are not so simple.

The Special Committee of the Assembly of the United Nations on the Draft Convention on Freedom of Information needed 27 meetings until the Draft was completed in 1952. The following is a quotation from that Draft, including the preamble and the first two articles:

PREAMBLE

The States Parties to this Convention,
Bearing in mind the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

Considering that freedom of expression and the free interchange of information and opinions, both in the national and in the international spheres, are fundamental human rights and essential in the cause of democracy and peace and for the achievement of political, social, cultural and economic progress;

Desiring to co-operate fully with one another to guarantee these freedoms and thereby to promote democratic institutions, friendly relations between states and peoples and the peace and welfare of mankind; and

Recognizing that in order to achieve these aims the media of information should be free from pressure or dictation, and that these media by virtue of their power for influencing public opinion bear a great responsibility to the peoples of the world;

Have accepted the following provisions:

Article 1. Subject to the provisions of this Convention:

(a) Each Contracting State shall secure to its own nationals, and to such of the nationals of every other Contracting State as are lawfully within its territory, freedom to seek, receive and impart without governmental interference and regardless of frontiers information and opinions orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art or by duly licensed visual or auditory devices;

(b) No Contracting State shall regulate or control the use or availability of any of the means of communication discriminating against any of its own nationals or of the nationals of any other Contracting State as are lawfully within its territory on political grounds or on the basis of their race, sex, language or religion.

Article 2. The exercise of the freedoms referred to in Article 1 carries with it duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to limitations, but only to such as are clearly defined by law, applied in accordance with the law and necessary with regard to:

- (a) The protection of national security;
- (b) Expressions which incite persons to alter by violence the system of government or which promote disorder;
- (c) Expressions which incite persons to commit criminal acts;
- (d) Expressions which are obscene or which are dangerous for youth and intended for them;
- (e) Expressions which are injurious to the fair conduct of legal proceedings;
- (f) Expressions which infringe literary or artistic rights;
- (g) Expressions about other persons, natural or legal, which defame their reputations;
- (h) Legal obligations resulting from professional, contractual or other legal relationships including disclosure of information received in confidence in a professional or official capacity; or
- (i) The prevention of fraud.

However, in the fall of 1952, the so-called Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) of the United Nations decided to postpone action, due to difference of opinion and asked the Council for its view regarding future work on freedom of information. The debate before the committee had been heated, and the votes on the different articles had been very close. Five nations even voted against a resolution thanking the Committee for its work. All this shows that the idea of freedom of information is a very complex one, and that it is difficult to agree on the same standards in different parts of the world.

In the United States, freedom of speech and of the press is guar-

anted by the Constitution. There are, however, some limitations. For instance, every nation has the right to maintain its own protection. In other words, efforts, written or spoken, to overthrow the government of the United States by violent means is punishable by law (McCarran Act, 1949). Also, freedom does not mean that statements are allowed which involve tangible harm to others, and there are laws defining and punishing libel, slander, and sedition. Moreover, states can ban publications if they are considered harmful to the morality of its citizens.

These limitations are understandable, and under the protection of the freedom of speech, the people of the United States rightly claim to be among the best informed people on earth. The foreign policy is constantly scrutinized by Congress, by newspaper and radio commentators, and by other persons and agencies. Major actions in the field of international relations, such as the Marshall Plan, are fully debated in Congress. The change in policy from isolationism to an attitude of world responsibility was supported by public opinion; without that support the change would not have been possible.

However, is the American public actually well informed, and are the conclusions reached always correct? How many Americans read newspapers and periodicals that fully cover world affairs? How many limit their reading to one paper, which cannot bring them all the news and, moreover, often presents a point of view highly colored by politics? Of course, all of us can listen to the radio, but even the best commentator has a personal approach, and no one can listen to all of them and form his own opinion out of the mass of information and comment presented to him. Moreover, it is debatable whether our press, radio, and movies are really free. Newspapers must sell their product because they are, after all, business enterprises. Radio commentators must be careful not to displease their sponsors. The movies, when they enter the field of world politics, try to express whatever shade of public opinion is prevalent and most popular. Nevertheless, Americans have reason to be proud of their achievements in the realm of freedom of expression in comparison with the situation in some other countries.

H. V. Kaltenborn summed up the situation at a symposium on freedom of the press as follows:

Newspapers must make a profit or go out of business. They should not be asked to do the impossible. Newspaper ethics have a definite relation to the general standard of business ethics. Both advance or regress together. Fortunately, for the average newspaper reader, the American press has made steady progress in the direction of higher standards.

The authors, on the basis of their teaching experience at the university level, can certify that discussions on international problems in college classes and seminars are certainly not one-sided, and at times reach a high level of criticism. However, statements sometimes do appear in the press, in books, and in broadcasts or television that are greatly resented by foreign countries, and by being quoted do direct harm especially in those countries where the people do not realize that such statements are only one man's opinion and do not reflect the general opinion. Retired statesmen and military leaders who express themselves in no uncertain terms about decisions taken while they were not permitted to speak, often cause much controversy, and one sometimes wonders whether the desire for self-justification or even vengeance is not the main reason for such statements.

American opinion also covers most of the world except when blocked by censorship or radio interference. For example, the overseas edition of *The New York Times*, which contains all the leading articles, is printed in Amsterdam from plates flown from New York, and from Amsterdam it is flown in all directions. It is possible to read the paper, for instance, in the Middle East three days after it has reached its readers in New York, and the costs are low enough to permit a wide circulation. In Baghdad—to take a faraway city—the bookstores sell *Time*, *Newsweek*, *The Saturday Evening Post*, *Colliers*, and *Fortune*, and copies, necessarily expensive, are passed from hand to hand. Information offices sponsored by the government are well stocked with magazines, books, records, and films. The effectiveness of the Voice of America radio broadcasts has been much debated. In contrast to other broadcasts, such as those from Moscow and London, they have been difficult to receive, even when transmitted through relay stations. The senior author was in Baghdad at the time of the riots in November, 1952, and blockaded in his hotel, he had to listen to

a broadcast from Melbourne, Australia, in order to find out what was happening in the streets of Baghdad.

In western Europe, conditions are quite similar to those in the United States. Western Europeans also congratulate themselves on being well informed. But the selection of newspapers depends more often than in the United States on what party a person belongs to; and in each case the interpretation of the news is highly colored by the political approach. The Marshall Plan was considered by some to be one of the greatest gifts Europe ever received, but by others as another example of American imperialism. Nevertheless, the average western European has access to all types of communication media and can, if he wants to, form his own opinion.

With but few exceptions, the farther east a country is from western Europe, the greater are the restrictions placed on freedom of information. Foreign papers and magazines are often blocked or greatly delayed by censorship, and even outgoing mail is interfered with. The local press, to the contrary, is often allowed to be violent in its expression of dislike for foreign countries and foreign statesmen. In 1952, Trygve Lie, for instance, was described in a Jordania newspaper as the prince of all gangsters and it was not always pleasant for the American group of experts trying to be of service to read the so-called public opinion about them and their work. It certainly did not help to establish more friendly relations.

But what about those living in dictator states? Here the government is not responsive to public opinion nor dependent on it. The government is permanent; it is not responsible to the people for its actions and cannot be overthrown except by force. It strangles any opposition, generally through death, imprisonment, or forced labor; it reigns supreme without visible opposition. All the power is in the hands of a few men who cannot be criticized. Newspapers reflect the government point of view only; the radio is government controlled. Education has as its main purpose indoctrination in party ideology and discipline. People are instructed not to think but to accept what the state thinks for them.

The Russian point of view on censorship of information to foreign nations was expressed by Andrei A. Gromyko during the Assembly meeting of the United Nations in 1949. He said that


the objective of the sponsors of the Convention on Freedom of Information was far removed from the fight for true freedom of information. He asserted that the sponsors were afraid of free and objective information and that for the task of striving for such information, they substituted a collection of rules and advice that enhanced the role played by the American newspaper trusts in the dissemination of war propaganda. He said further that the Soviet Union had to resort to censorship for the very purpose of combating the slander that foreign correspondents stationed in the U.S.S.R. endeavored to supply by order of their employers. It is hardly necessary to point out here about the flaming statements appearing in the Russian press whenever the signal is given and the constant reference to the capitalistic warmongering nations. Do they feel that a lie if repeated constantly will finally be accepted as a fact by the peoples they want to dominate?

One wonders whether modern men can accept this kind of lie indefinitely; whether they actually believe what the state forces upon them. For example, do they actually believe that people, once prominent and now brought before a court and severely punished after a spectacular acknowledgment of guilt, are real traitors to their country, or that countries they had learned to like are now guilty of warmongering and deceit?

Let us take a specific case. The senior author in the spring of 1939 was in Bulgaria attending the 50-year celebration of the founding of the University of Sofia. After the celebration he was in one of the groups of foreign scientists who travelled through Bulgaria under the auspices of the university. In every city or town we were met by the authorities; it was a national holiday and everywhere the people lined the sidewalks and threw roses in our path. Speeches were made stressing international friendship—speeches which were not merely a sequence of words but which interpreted the real feelings of the people. Bulgaria had been through three wars since 1912 and the people were sick of fighting and wanted peace and mutual understanding.


These same people are now living behind the Iron Curtain under a dictatorial type of government run by a small group which receives its orders from Moscow. Those who opposed this state of affairs have been silenced, and the situation seems hopeless. The Bulgarians are still the same people as they were in 1939; they still

believe in peace. It seems illogical to think that they now accept the official verdict that all those whom they once liked are war-mongers and fascists. The belief that mankind is essentially sound and will eventually come to sound conclusions, uninfluenced by even the most ferocious propaganda, is a very encouraging one, and one in which the authors firmly believe.



Part Five

COLONIES



Colonies

IN THE SECOND CHAPTER OF THIS book, "The Political Pattern of the World," most colonies have been mentioned and there is no reason to enumerate them again. The question arises immediately—what is a colony?—and the answer is not an easy one. As one writer put it: "A colony is an outlying possession of a national state, the administration of which is carried on under a system distinct from, but subordinate to the government of the national territory."¹ At first glance this definition seems to be a good one, but what about the many protectorates that, except for minor limitations, are virtually independent? Another point is that many former colonies have received various forms of self-government and one can ask when does a colony cease to be a colony? Again, this question is difficult to answer because generally the transition from colonial status to self-government is a gradual one. Also, the mandates, which were created after the first World War and were changed into trusteeships after the second World War, complicated the situation. The areas involved belonged to an international organization, first the League of Nations and then the United Nations, but the administration was given to a country.

Another question that has to be answered in any treatment of colonies is "What were the reasons for their existence?" Many reasons can be brought forward as to why a nation decided to start a colony. The decision was always the result of a conquest, but the reasons for the conquest differ a great deal; generally, there were several different reasons. A colony may have been planned for a

¹ V. Shiva Ram, *Comparative Colonial Policy* (Calcutta: Longmans, Green and Company, Ltd., 1926), p. 1.

specific purpose, or it may have been acquired by the colonizing power more or less by accident. Generally, the actual birth of a colony followed something which happened before, such as the commercial activities of trading companies, missionary activities, attempts to find outlets for surplus population, or the acquisition of land for strategic purposes. Even exploration and adventure without ulterior motives have been factors in colonization. These are fascinating problems, but they cannot be treated in their entirety in a general book on political geography.

The era of modern colonization—using the name ancient for the colonial exploits of the Greeks, Phoenicians and Arabs—started toward the end of the fifteenth century when the Portuguese ventured along the west coast of Africa, finally rounded the Cape of Good Hope, and found their way to India and the Malay Islands, and Columbus led the Spaniards to the New World. About a hundred years later other nations followed, notably the British, the Dutch, and the French. However, even in 1800 the territory actively occupied as colonies was rather small and was limited to coastal or near coastal strips or to the control of certain points. Also, few people settled permanently or even semipermanently; the time of the migration of surplus populations had not yet arrived. Only in the Americas did the colonizers go further inland, following the rivers, and in South America, occupying tropical and subtropical uplands which had already been cores of occupancy in precolonial times. Also, along the east coast of North America there was evidence of permanent settlement under climatic conditions that resembled those of the European homeland.

The real colonial development, which was responsible for the world map at the beginning of this century, did not start before 1800, and it was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that Africa, large parts of Asia, and the Pacific islands were divided among the colonizing powers. However, at the time when the peak of colonial activity was being reached in Africa and Asia, the colonial period in the Americas had already ended. The United States had gained its independence, the South American republics were gaining theirs, and Canada was obtaining dominion status. This left only the Caribbean as a field for colonial endeavors. Figure 59, showing colonial territories in 1826, indicates the relatively small areas even at that time under colonial control.




FIGURE 59.

in contrast to Figure 60, which represents the colonial period in all its glory.

A new period of colonial collapse came at the end of the second World War when the large colonial possessions in Asia received their independence (India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines), and the mandates of the Middle East gradually had been replaced by independent states. In Africa, the defeat of Italy resulted in a reborn Ethiopia and a free Libya. But not all colonies have vanished, and it is necessary to discuss them briefly before answering the question of their future.

COLONIAL POSSESSIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

The colonial aspirations of the United States are of comparatively recent date. The purchase of Alaska in 1867 cannot be regarded as a move toward colonial expansion. It was in line with a policy of keeping foreign powers out of the North American continent insofar as possible, and little thought was given to settlement and development of the territory until many years after its purchase. It was not until 1912 that Alaska became a territory, and its admission into the Union as a state was still undecided in 1953.

A rather sudden change in our colonial attitude took place in 1899 as a result of the Spanish-American War. The United States obtained Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippine Islands; Hawaii was annexed at its own request; and trade interests in Samoa led to an agreement with Great Britain and Germany through which a portion of the islands east of 171° W. became American possessions. The construction of the Panama Canal resulted in the permanent lease of the Panama Canal Zone from the Republic of Panama. In addition, because of the possibility of constructing a Nicaraguan canal, the United States leased the Corn Islands from Nicaragua in 1914 and obtained an option on a base in Fonseca Bay. In 1917 the Virgin Islands were purchased from Denmark.

In the Philippines and in Puerto Rico, Americans found a well-established Spanish cultural pattern and a desire for future independence based on the cultural and social maturity of a portion of the population. Ultimate independence was promised to the Philippines at the time of acquisition, and in 1934 the date for




FIGURE 60.




FIGURE 61.

independence was set for 1944, providing for a ten-year period of transition. World War II caused a delay, but in 1946 the Republic of the Philippines came into existence. Special privileges for exports to the United States, special rights of Americans in the Philippines, as well as the use of some strategic bases by American forces, still closely connect the Philippines with the United States. From 1947 to 1952 Puerto Rico elected its own governor and had its own legislature, although all legislation had to be submitted for ratification to the Congress of the United States. In July 1952 Puerto Rico became a "Free Commonwealth" with its internal affairs completely in the hands of its elected law-makers. Hawaii, like Alaska, has applied for admission to the Union as a state, but action on the application has been slow.

After World War II, the United States received in so-called strategic trusteeship from the United Nations the former Japanese mandates, the Carolines, Marianas, and Marshalls. These islands, together with Samoa, the Pacific islands already in American possession—Guam (1898), Baker, Howland and Jarvis (1936), Midway (1867), and Canton and Enderbury (jointly controlled with Great Britain under the agreement of 1939)—give the United States control over a great part of the Pacific, especially north of the Equator. The fate of the Ryu Kyu Islands, occupied by American forces during the war, has not yet been decided (1953).

From a strategic point of view, United States possessions can be considered as an inner and an outer line of defense and also of attack, if necessary. The inner line is the old triangle—the Panama Canal, Hawaii, and Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands—which functioned well in the last war. The outer line starts near New Guinea, stretches northward and includes the Philippines, the Ryu Kyu Islands, Japan (at least temporarily), runs between the Aleutian and Russian Islands off Kamchatka, and through the Bering Strait into the Arctic Ocean. About half way along that outer line, separating the Philippines from Okinawa in the Ryu Kyu Island lies Formosa, the last stronghold of the Chinese national government. Although its nearness to the coast of the Chinese mainland with its communist government makes the defense of Formosa rather difficult, the close ties between the United States and Formosa makes it the keystone in the strategic outer line.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

British colonial efforts go back to the beginning of the seventeenth century when settlements were made on the east coast of North America in Virginia, New England, and Newfoundland. Contacts were made with India, the West Indies, and the African Guinea coast. Successful wars with the Dutch Republic and France greatly increased the colonial interests of Britain. Thus, the British Colonial Empire gradually came into existence. For centuries it was supreme in the world. Originally undertaken as a series of commercial enterprises interested only in the control of coastal settlements, it gradually extended its political control inland, first in North America, and later in India and in Africa. The revolt and subsequent independence of the North American colonies (except for Canada) brought home the fact that as soon as white settlers under advantageous conditions of climate had solved the problem of conquest of the aborigines and had increased in number, the idea of a colony—that is, a dependency of the homeland—had to be changed radically. Colonial status as such ceased to exist. This experience led to the creation of areas with so-called Dominion status, among these being Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa. Great Britain showed her wisdom in gradually transforming the British Empire into the British Commonwealth of Nations in which all the dominions are members with equal status.

Meanwhile, the British Colonial Empire grew in size and reached its peak after World War I when it received the large share of former German territories as mandates. Dark clouds, however, began to rise over the colonial horizon. In Asia the mandates obtained from Turkish territory plainly won their independence—Iraq, Transjordan, and later Palestine. In India the voice of freedom became stronger and stronger.

The Present Situation

The British Commonwealth of Nations consists of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, the colonies and protectorates, and the territories under trusteeship. It has been, in recent years, the policy of the British government to give independence to former colonies




FIGURE 62.

showing evidence of being able to look after themselves and to leave to them the decision to join the Commonwealth or to break all their ties. India, Pakistan, and Ceylon selected the first, Burma the second. Some others may reach that point in the near future, such as the Malayan Federation and the British Caribbean possessions. Except for the Pacific islands, the colonial empire will then be concentrated on central Africa. But there also, changes are taking place that will be discussed in the next chapter. Besides these colonial possessions, Britain still has a number of strategic islands and bases, which have coaling stations, dry docks, and airfields. Foremost of these are Singapore, a base reconstructed after the Japanese conquest in 1942; Malta, which withstood all attacks in the second World War; Gibraltar with its famous rock honeycombed with fortifications; Cyprus, now the keystone of British power in the eastern Mediterranean and the Falkland Islands in front of the eastern outlet of the Strait of Magellan.

From an economic point of view some of the British colonies are valuable to the homeland not only because of certain products needed for British consumption or use, such as cotton, tea, sugar, and petroleum, but also because sales to other nations, especially to the United States provide Britain with dollar credits which are badly needed. The outstanding example is the rubber of Malaya, but the palm oil and cacao of tropical Africa and the copper of Northern Rhodesia serve the same purpose. Interesting, too, was the project of making Tanganyika a major peanut producer. A target was set for the cultivation of three million acres in peanuts, but in 1950 the whole prospect virtually was dropped as untenable—a case of insufficient knowledge of the local conditions.

FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE

France, having lost its original colonial empire to Britain and the Netherlands except for a few remnants, again started to build a colonial empire in the nineteenth century, especially in the second half. At that time, France had St. Pierre and Miquelon off the coast of Newfoundland, the West Indian islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe, French Guiana, some settlements on the West African coast, Réunion in the Indian Ocean, and a few stations in India.

After World War I, the French colonial empire reached its peak. Concentrated chiefly in Africa, it included with a few exceptions all the territory between the Guinea Coast and the Mediterranean, with an offshoot from Lake Chad down to the Congo. French Somaliland became for France a strategic point on the outlet of the Red Sea, and also the gateway to Ethiopia. Madagascar was added. Various scattered islands in the Pacific were consolidated into two groups, New Caledonia and the French settlements in Oceania. In the Far East Indochina was gradually organized into a French colony. Former German Togo and Cameroon were partly mandated to France, and through the Syrian mandate (formerly Turkish and, after World War I, French under the League of Nations) France had a great deal of influence in the Near East or what the French call the Levant. In the 1920's, the French colonial empire had a territory of almost 4,500,000 square miles and a population of 65,000,000, ranking second to Great Britain as a colonial power.

But like Britain, France faced colonial difficulties, despite her reputation for being able to work with the native populations and for displaying a comparative lack of racial discrimination. Syria and Lebanon, after a long struggle, finally received their independence in 1944. In Indochina France has had political difficulties very similar to those of the Dutch in Java; although Laos and Cambodia remained loyal, the Vietnam state revolted against French control and was only partly pacified after a bloody conflict. In 1952 Vietnam won autonomy under Emperor Bao Dai, as part of the French Union. With the help of French troops Vietnam has opposed the Communist government under Ho Chi Minh, but in 1953 fighting was still going on, with the possibility that, as in Korea, Chinese "volunteers" might join in the struggle. Vietnam is now part of the Indochinese Federation which also includes Cambodia and Laos.

Even in French North Africa, which consists of Algeria, the protectorates of Morocco, and Tunisia, the Arab-Berber native stock clamor for more self-government and even for independence. Although France has made many concessions, and Algiers can almost be regarded as part of the French homeland, these clamors will continue. Martinique, Guadeloupe, Réunion, and French Guiana are also regarded as overseas departments; they are repre-

sented in the French Parliament and their natives have the status of French citizens. The French settlements in India will have to decide whether to join India or stay with France. One of them, Chandernagor, voted to join India; the others had (as of 1953) not yet made a decision.

Economic and Military Value

Economically, some of the French colonies have appreciable value. North Africa has its phosphates and iron ore, its surplus wheat, and its wine which is used to blend with those of the homeland; also fruits, vegetables, and fats for the homeland market. French West Africa exports bananas, cacao, groundnuts, and palm oil. Madagascar is renowned for its graphite and mica. Nickel and chromite form leading exports from New Caledonia. Rice and rubber come from Indochina, copra from the Pacific Islands; Martinique and Guadeloupe produce sugar and bananas.

Of even greater value to France than the products of its colonies is the large colonial population which can be utilized for military service and for war labor to offset the shortage of manpower in France itself. North African "Spahees" and Senegalese Negroes are now well-known in Europe as part of the French army.

THE DUTCH COLONIES

The formation of the Indonesian Federation, now the Republic of Indonesia, in December, 1950, marked the end of the Dutch colonial empire. Launched in the beginning of the seventeenth century, the empire after considerable struggle reached its climax in the Dutch East Indies, regarded for a long time as the most valuable of all colonial possessions and as a model of colonial government. At the height of their productive activity, the Indonesian islands exported a surprising number of products and in many of them ranked high among the world leaders. The most important were oil, rubber, sugar, tea, coffee, sisal, palm oil, tobacco, copra, quinine, pepper, and other spices. Here was a tragic example of how even the most efficient type of colonial government cannot offset the desire for independence. Hastened by Japanese occupation and after bitter struggle, the goal of freedom was finally reached. The Republic of Indonesia has complete inde-

pendence, and plans to continue close cooperation between herself and her former colonial homeland have gradually been dropped. At present, it is too early to judge the wisdom of that break. One may only wish for the sake of the Indonesians that the outcome may prove to be successful both economically and politically.

Still belonging to the Kingdom of the Netherlands are a few possessions in the Americas as well as the western half of New Guinea. New Guinea is economically still largely virgin territory. The Dutch Antilles contain the oil-refining centers of Curacao and Aruba, as well as Dutch Guiana (Surinam), which in spite of its wealth of bauxite has not been self-supporting. The Netherlands, once one of the great world colonizers, has lost the empire that meant so much to its economy and where its young men could go and prosper—indeed a tragic fate for the nation but unavoidable in a world which is opposed to colonial control.

PORTUGUESE COLONIES

After the Dutch and English had replaced the Portuguese in most of their former Asiatic possessions in the seventeenth century, the main concentration of Portuguese colonial efforts was in Brazil. When that country declared its independence in the beginning of the nineteenth century, there were left only remnants of former glory. In Asia, Portugal has only three small coastal areas, in India, half of Timor, and Macao at the mouth of the Pearl River in South China, which is overshadowed by Hong Kong. In Africa, however, there is still a great deal of Portuguese territory. Other nations have tried to take over this territory, but it still remains under the control of Portugal even though its economic significance is minor.

Absence of racial discrimination has given these areas an atmosphere of tranquility, but they have been only slightly developed because capital and enterprise were lacking. The Cape Verde Islands suffer under dry climatic conditions. Portuguese Guinea with the Bisagor Islands off the coast is the least important of the Guinea colonies. São Thomé and Príncipe in the Guinea Bight, once very important economically with their products such as cacao and coffee, now are only minor factors in the world market. Angola, including Cabinda across the Congo outlet, and Mozam-

bique are the only two large areas left. In both, economic resources have been scarcely touched, and the colonial government, or rather the lack of colonial government, has been a hampering factor.

The Portuguese look back on a great colonial era, and perhaps better conditions in the homeland will be reflected in renewed colonial activity. Whether an era of liberation for the natives also will begin here remains to be seen. The Azores and Madeiras, both very productive, are not regarded as colonies but as part of the mainland; in both cases the population is white.

BELGIAN COLONIES

Belgium entered the field of colonizing rather late; it was only in 1908 that King Leopold transferred his sovereignty over the so-called Congo Free State to his country, as the Belgian Congo. The Congo territory had been established by the Berlin Conference in 1884 and given to Leopold in order to avoid international complications through competition between other claiming nations. Until 1908 its value was small and except for the copper of the Katanga district little was exported. Since then, the Belgian Congo has become a most valuable possession. Together with Ruanda-Urundi, formerly German and now a Belgian trusteeship under the United Nations, the colony has an area of more than 900,000 square miles and a population of about 14,000,000. Strategically located in the center of Africa, the main value of the colony is economic. Its production of minerals is astonishing; in uranium and radium it holds one of the top positions in the world. Other minerals produced are copper, tin, zinc, cadmium, and wolframite. Belgium has become colony-conscious, and rapid improvements are being made in the Congo in the field of hygiene and education.

SPANISH COLONIES

The colonial story of Spain is one of ancient glory, and of almost complete decline. Gone since the first part of the nineteenth century is the great Latin American empire which extended from California to the Strait of Magellan. Very little is left. Spanish Morocco, the African bridgehead across the Strait of Gibraltar was

pacified only in the 1920's after bloody campaigns. In Franco's time the conquest paid dividends to the dictator because his Arab troops were the core of the army with which he defeated the Republic, and these troops still form his elite corps. In addition, Spain now has the Spanish Sahara, of very little value; the small Ifni territory where the main activity is coastal fishing; Spanish Guinea, consisting of two islands in the Bight of Guinea, of which Fernando Po is the most important; and Rio Muni on the mainland. The Canary Islands are part of Spain proper.




FIGURE 63.

JAPAN AND GERMANY

Missing from the list of colonial powers are Germany and Japan. Germany entered the field of colonial enterprise rather late and had little to choose from. Its main colonies were in Africa includ-

ing Togo, Cameroon, South West Africa, and East Africa. In the Pacific, Germany bought the Marianas, the Carolines, and the Marshall Islands from Spain at the end of the Spanish-American War and at the same time obtained Western Samoa as a tripartite agreement between herself, the United States and Great Britain. All these colonies were taken away from her at the end of the first World War and put as mandates under the League of Nations. Claims that Germany had lost all rights on colonies because of her treatment of the local population were somewhat exaggerated. No colonial power has had a pure white record in that respect.

The Japanese Empire (Figure 63) started its phenomenal colonial growth at the time of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and attained its peak in 1942. At that time Japan controlled almost all the Far East south of the U.S.S.R. Then came the downfall. Three years later, after her defeat in World War II, Japan was again limited to her island homeland. The rise and fall of Japan's colonial empire took place in a short space of fifty years. Indeed, "How are the mighty fallen."

Colonial Problems

COLONIES ORIGINALLY WERE THE RESULT of conquest and they were ruled for the benefit of the colonizing power without much regard for the native population, which in some cases—for instance that of the Caribbean Indian—was annihilated in that process of exploitation. By conquest the Spanish brought the gold and silver of the Americas back to Spain as their spoils of victory, and made Spain the wealthiest country on earth for a time. Likewise, the Dutch bought the coveted spices of the Moluccas at low cost, controlled their production, and sold them at a great profit to the shareholders of the Dutch East India Company. A few of the colonists became rich but many perished in this venture. The risks were heavy. While this system of exploitation was in many ways a cruel one and the pages of colonial history are certainly not to the credit of the colonizers or traders, one has to take into consideration that at that time nothing else was expected and that history up till then had seen few examples of noble endeavor. Even the spread of Christianity, which was so successful in the Americas, was often accompanied by slavery and oppression. It was not until the nineteenth century that a gradual change in attitude occurred and that colonizing nations became conscious of their obligations to the native population they controlled. This change in attitude culminated in the statement made in the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations was written with regard to the mandated territory established from areas belonging to Germany and Turkey before their defeat in World War I. Even then it took some time until the article, which describes three classes of mandates—A, B, and C—was accepted as a guide

for colonial government. It is worthwhile to quote Article 22 in its entirety.

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them, and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization, and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations which, by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and which are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances.

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory. (A mandates)

Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience or religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses, such as the slave trade, the arms traffic, and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defense of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League. (B mandates)

There are territories, such as Southwest Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population. (C mandates)

In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Coun-

cil an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.¹

The A mandates, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordania, have since been replaced by independent states according to the plan outlined in the Covenant. The last A mandate to go was Palestine where, in 1948, Britain, unable to cope further with the Jewish-Arab controversy, gave up its mandate. As a result, Israel was created as an independent state and part of the territory was added to the Kingdom of Jordania.

The C mandates, which, according to the Covenant, were doomed to eternal colonial status comprised chiefly the former German Pacific islands. Of these North East New Guinea and the adjacent islands were mandated to Australia, western Samoa to New Zealand, Nauru came under the joint mandated control of Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand, and the islands north of the Equator were mandated to Japan.

The real problem arose in the case of the B mandates, a problem that also included other colonies which were not mandates. Moreover, the principles expressed in Article 22 of the Covenant could and have been applied to other colonies not under mandate. The article has served as a kind of yardstick, although some items, such as demilitarization and free trade often were not introduced. Many colonial powers still wanted control of the trade of their possessions and some also wanted to use their location for military purposes and employ the inhabitants for military service.

Generally the mandate system worked out rather well and caused an improvement in administration. Only in one case, the Japanese control on the mandated Pacific islands (Carolines, Marshalls, and Marianas), were the principles outlined in the Covenant completely disregarded. Japan made those islands military strongholds, bulwarks of defense as well as points from which attack

¹ Covenant of the League of Nations (Geneva: The League, 1935), pp. 13-14.

could be launched. The League, from which Japan later resigned, was too weak to do anything about it. After the second World War the mandate system was replaced by one of international trusteeship under the United Nations. The wordings in the Charter are a little different from Article 22 of the Covenant, but the underlying principle is the same. Article 73 of the Charter reads as follows:

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and to this end:

(a) To insure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;

(b) To develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;

(c) To further international peace and security;

(d) To promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to co-operate with one another and with appropriate international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this paragraph; and

(e) To transmit regularly to the secretary general for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions in the territories of which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.²

The Trusteeship Council consists of administering authorities (Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, and the United States), China and the U.S.S.R., neither of whom are in trusteeship administration, and as many other members elected by the General Assembly for a three-year period as are

² *Charter of the United Nations* (New York: United Nations, 1950), pp. 37-39.

necessary to insure that the total membership is equally divided between those members who administer trust territories and those who do not.

The only formerly mandated territory that is not included in the trusteeship system is South West Africa. In this case the government of the Union of South Africa, the former mandated power, has refused to recognize the right of the United Nations to hold trusteeships and feels she is the rightful successor to the title held by the defunct League of Nations. Even a limited degree of international supervision as proposed by the United Nations was refused, and South-West Africa "de facto" is now a part of the Union.

THE MYTH OF EXPLOITATION

It is necessary to point out here that many colonies were already well governed, and were considered so by the native population, before the mandate system came into existence, and that the colonial system, as it existed, could not be called one of exploitation even if the commercial interests of the homeland still were involved. The collapse of the colonial system after the last World War was not due to bad administration. In fact, governmental systems in most of the new countries were far less efficient than the former colonial ones, but the desire for liberty dominated all other considerations. The following discussion of the case of Indonesia as a colony of the Netherlands is not meant as an apology or defense but merely as rectification of the often expressed feeling that colonies meant imperialism and conditions close to slavery. Indonesia is selected as a test case for six reasons: (1) its large population—in 1940 about 70 million; (2) its important trade—in 1939, exports had a value of 431 million dollars, and imports a value of 219 million; (3) the large amounts of foreign capital invested in the country—a total sum of almost two billion dollars; (4) the important American share in its trade—13.6 per cent of the imports and 19.7 per cent of the exports; (5) American capital invested in the country—219 million dollars; (6) the senior author's experience, based on five years there in the service of the colonial government.

The Case of Indonesia

In the nineteenth century, after a long period of colonial exploitation under the Dutch East India Company, a gradual shift to a more humane treatment took place. The beginning of the present century saw that shift continued with the emphasis on increasing the share of the Indonesian in government. A People's Council, constituted after the first World War as an advisory body without power and with the majority of the seats occupied by the Dutch, gradually changed into a native parliament, although on paper its advisory function was retained. More and more, Indonesian officials took over from the Dutch, and before the last war, Indonesia was well under way to the dominion status that the Dutch had contemplated. The major problem was one of speed; the Dutch favored a slow change, the Indonesians a rapid one.

Before World War II, the desire to "get rid of" the Dutch, as expressed by small left-wing groups, was not wide-spread, and the governmental system was regarded by the outside world as a model of efficiency. The Dutch, moreover, without actually planning to do so had given to the Indonesian world peace (in contrast to the internal strife of former times) and unity; for the first time the feeling of unity between Java and the other islands came to the foreground in spite of ethnic difference between them. However, the importance of Indonesia lay in the field of economic production for the world market.

Capitalism in the form of investments had been largely responsible for the importance of the Malayan islands on the world market. Practically all the mineral exports and 63 per cent of the agricultural exports were derived from foreign concessions. This is understandable because mining as well as the estate or plantation type of commercial agriculture needs large amounts of capital. Few of the agricultural exports were indigenous to the island. Foreigners introduced them, tried them out, learning often through bitter experience, and through modern laboratories and experimental stations increased the yields. For example, Indonesian sugar cane had the largest sugar yield per acre in the world with the exception of Hawaii; Java had virtually a monopoly on quinine; and the island's production of palm oil, introduced in the

beginning of this century, surpassed its African competitors both in quality and in yield.

The investments opened new land. Except for sugar and tobacco for which land was leased from the natives for one-crop periods under strict government regulations, estates were permitted on a long lease on land not yet in production, in order not to interfere with the food production. These estates brought life to the former dense tropical jungle. A new estate meant not only a good road, a modern plant, and housing facilities, but generally also the founding of a new native village with rice fields and fruit gardens, with shops, a school, and a movie. It also increased, in many instances, the interest of the neighboring population in the new crop. Often natives followed suit, selling their product to the estate or competing with it. Estates meant wages for thousands, an economic outlet for the crowded population.³ It meant that the taxes paid by the estate became a major source of income for the government.

In spite of this rapid development of estate agriculture, the area actually involved was small in comparison to the native holdings. In Java, for instance, only seven per cent of the cultivated area was under estate control. This arrangement was necessary in order that the food supply should not be diminished, and even Java, with its high density of population, was practically self-supporting in spite of agricultural exports.

These were the assets, but what were the liabilities? The major complaint was that a relatively high share of the wages were paid to white men, generally in leading positions, and that part of the income was spent outside Indonesia, especially in the form of pensions after retirement. It was rather unfortunate that estate managements generally had not developed a program to prepare Indonesians for high, responsible positions in contrast to the government policy in civil service. Finally, the profits paid to the foreign shareholders left the country and were so lost to the home economy. However, the time of high profits had gone. The

³ Contract labor, used frequently in the beginning, was gradually eliminated, the last remnants existing in the tobacco estates of northeast Sumatra where Javanese labor was working under contract. It was dropped in the thirties (see the Blain amendment of the United States Tariff Law of 1930 and its application to Sumatra tobacco).

average dividends were scarcely more than the interests on government loans, and a large part of the profits were used for new enterprises and stayed within the country.

The contribution of trade and investment to the budget in the form of taxes was outstanding. Of a total government income of 165 million dollars in 1940, 40 per cent was derived from company taxes and export duties, whereas a large share of the other taxes (income, property, and excise) came from the same source. Prosperous estates meant more schools, more hospitals, and a higher standard of living. However, any step forward could only be obtained through unbelievable patience and clever propaganda. The Indonesian then, and probably still, does not think in terms of money. That is not his primary interest, and more income often means the chance to work less. Higher wages do not increase production until he has become conscious of the advantages of better living conditions. That change in attitude was coming slowly helped by the introduction of small scale home industries which brought cash money into the households. However, the introduction of better methods of production of local crops, which would result in higher yields, the emphasis on hygiene and even on education, the inducing of the Javanese to migrate from that crowded island to carefully prepared areas on other islands, all that required the efforts of a lifetime.

The following table covers the period from 1928, the end of prosperity, through the economic depression of the thirties which hit the Indonesian economy hard, up to the time of gradual recovery and the war. The interesting fact is that in spite of the depression the trend was upwards. This progress could not have been made without the benefits of the foreign trade and investments that provided the government with the tools with which to work.

The Japanese conquest sadly interrupted this process of improvement and progress toward self-government. When the Japanese left, political leaders proclaimed the Indonesian Republic, and the Dutch were gradually convinced that they were not welcome; certainly not in their former function of colonial rulers, but not even in terms of equality and mutual cooperation. As has been said before, the desire for independence outranks all other considerations. The colonial period is over as far as Indonesia is concerned. But it is wrong to condemn the past entirely, and

TABLE X

TREND OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES, 1928-1940 *

| | 1928 | 1932 | 1935 | 1939 | 1940 |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|
| 1. Population increase | 100 | 108 | 110 | 118 | 119 |
| 2. Cost of living | 100 | 65 | 56 | 57 | 60 |
| 3. Price level of food | 100 | 51 | 43 | 44 | 46 |
| 4. Income from native agricultural ex- ports | 100 | 52 | 64 | 88 | 118 |
| 5. Income from industry | 100 | 165 | 210 | 235 | 270 |
| 6. Consumption of primary foodstuffs per person | 100 | 102 | 105 | 112 | 115 |
| 7. Calorie value of this food | | | 100 | 110 | 112 |
| 8. Consumption of textiles per person | 100 | | 92 | 136 | |
| 9. Number of mechanically operated factories | 100 | 132 | 134 | 162 | 194 |
| 10. Area technically irrigated | 100 | 125 | 139 | 164 | |
| 11. School attendance (first grade na- tional school) | 100 | 127 | 164 | 202 | |

many Indonesians, in a less emotional moment, will think back with some nostalgia to the time of the Dutch administration.

PRESENT COLONIAL PROBLEMS

The Case of Africa

Africa is the last stronghold of western colonization, and here it is possible to study the methods used by the colonizing powers to postpone the day of liberation, or if possible, to find a way that would entirely avoid it.

The French are using the system of assimilation. They try to integrate the colonies with the homeland into a kind of Greater France, in which the natives are regarded as French citizens, and incidentally, are also called upon to serve in the French army. It is too early to judge the results, but one gets the impression that it has been fairly successful with the Negroes (French West and French Equatorial Africa) but has failed in Northwest Africa (the

* Peter H. W. Sitsen, *Industrial Development of the Netherlands*, Bulletin 2 of the Netherlands and Netherlands Indies Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944), p. 2.

Government General of Algeria and the protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia) where, as we have already mentioned in a former chapter, the desire of the Mohammedan Arabs and to a minor degree of the other Arabs, is for self-government and even complete independence. This has led at times to bloody riots and has made the position of the United States, with its friendship for France and its sympathy with the desire for freedom, a very difficult one. Moreover, the use of African air bases and the presence of American soldiers has added to the seriousness of the problem.

The bulk of Africa is under British control, and here there are great differences in colonial policy. In the Rhodesias, the tendency has been toward accepting the two units as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. In fact, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia already attends the council meetings of the Commonwealth. However, in both Rhodesias, the whites, who form only a small minority, rule over a much larger number of natives, who are used as labor or concentrated in large reservations. The situation resembles that of South Africa, and the Rhodesias probably would have joined the Union but for the fact that the present government is anti-British and may eventually drop all ties with Britain. In 1953, efforts were well underway to combine the Rhodesias with adjacent Nyasaland, in spite of strong objections from the native population. Also, in Kenya, a relatively small group of white planters rule over a large number of natives whereas the coastal Arabs (the coast was once an Arabian colony) and the population of more recent Indian origin make the picture even more complex. The Legislative Council of Kenya has a solid British majority but includes also Arab and Indian members and four unofficial members representing the interests of the African community. The rioting of the Mau-Mau, a Negro organization, showed by its bloody impact on African life that the situation is not well in hand.

In cases where no British settlers were involved the British colonial attitude has been quite different. Britain introduced a system providing for an increased degree of native self-government, first by a policy of indirect rule through the continuation of British advice and supervision, and later by direct native rule. Such is the case in the Uganda and in Nigeria, but the outstanding example is the Gold Coast, where the Legislative Council founded

under the Constitution of 1951, consists of 84 members, the majority of whom are elected either directly, or by local councils and the Electoral College of the Northern Territories. The Executive Council also has a Negro majority and operates under the governor who serves as president. The sentiments of the leading political party have been rather anti-British and one wonders whether Britain again, as in India, will be willing to accept secession if that is desired by the population.

The Belgians in the Congo have a quite efficient, but rather authoritative type of administration, which may be necessary because of the low stage of development of the native population. It seems that here the hour of critical decision has not yet struck. Much less efficient are the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, but their rather happy-go-lucky lack of interference has also prevented the outbreak of political unrest. The Italians, who had a rather poor record in Libya and Ethiopia, as far as their relations with the native population were concerned, have a chance in Somalia which they hold in trusteeship, to show what they can do.

The Caribbean

Another colonial region is found in the islands of the Caribbean where, with the exception of Cuba and Hispaniola, all the islands are under foreign control. The nations involved are the United States, Britain, France, and the Netherlands. Adjacent are the mainland colonies of British Guiana, Surinam, French Guiana, and British Honduras. Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands are under United States control. Puerto Rico, after a long struggle, received in 1947 a status that gave it autonomy under a senate and a house of representatives, and a governor elected directly by the people; in 1952, she obtained Commonwealth status. In the Virgin Islands, the executive power is in the hands of the governor, who in 1950 was a Virgin Islander. The French colonies, in line with the general French policy noted above, are regarded as overseas departments of France and elect representatives to the French National Assembly. The Netherlands islands have self-government in internal affairs under a governor appointed by the Netherlands government. The same is true for Surinam. The British islands, falling into six groups (see Chapter 2) also have various forms of self-government under a single governor and are tied to-

gether by various Caribbean committees. Moreover, all the colonial islands cooperate in a so-called West Indian Conference which has advisory power and discusses problems of common interest, especially those having social and economic significance.

CONCLUSION


Colonies are passing out of existence rapidly except in a few cases where the areas are too small to stand alone or where the cultural level is still so low that no greater political freedom is possible. We have seen that in almost all cases steps have been taken to give the natives a greater share in the conduct of their own affairs. Such steps eventually will lead to complete autonomy or, if so desired, complete independence. Often ties with the motherland will continue to be strong. For instance, it is interesting to observe that of the four British colonies that received independence after World War II—India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Burma—only Burma decided to sever all ties with the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Amazing progress has been made in the direction of recognizing the rights of the natives to take part in their own government. For the security of the world, it is hoped that steps in this direction will not be taken so hastily that political and economic stability will be destroyed. The growing pains in many of the new nations, once colonies, should be a warning that a sudden break is not profitable for any of the people concerned. All the powers that formerly had, or still have, colonies recognize the fact that the colonial era is over, and that the present problem is how to make the change to the new era as smoothly as possible.

Despite some abuse and exploitation, colonies served a purpose and had a place in the history of world progress. The colonizing powers can look back with a certain amount of pride on their efforts to make productive those parts of the world in which they held colonies.

Part Six

CONCLUSIONS



At the Mid-century Crossroads

SOME OF THE WORLD'S POSTWAR problems have been solved, at least temporarily, despite the fact that the interrelation of the major political powers, with their various and often diverse aspirations, constantly engenders friction. However, the all-important immediate problem is the relation between the communist and noncommunist parts of the world, with the possibility of open conflict between these two major elements. The all-important long range problem, which must be solved if western civilization as we know it is to survive, is how to remove the underlying causes of that conflict.

This chapter realistically sketches the predicament in which we find ourselves today and its possible outcome, which would be disastrous for victor and vanquished alike. It also outlines a constructive program that, in the opinion of the authors, holds promise of avoiding that outcome and of ushering in a better tomorrow.

THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM

As we look at the world today, it seems at times that the line of contact between communist and noncommunist areas, which runs all the way from the Arctic to the Pacific (Figure 64), is like a battlefield during a lull in the fighting—ready to explode at any moment. The issue of communism versus noncommunism overshadows all others.

The evaluation of the happenings in Israel, India, Pakistan, Burma, Indochina, Indonesia, Formosa, and Korea is made with this major problem in mind. It appears at times that the noncommunist countries are clearing their decks for action, and that some

nations are willing to be remarkably lenient in their opinions and actions in order to avoid unnecessary complications. That attempt to compromise failed in China, which is now on the other side of the Red line.




FIGURE 64.

The Communist Heartland

Communist control of the Heartland, the solid mass of Eurasia, leaves only the western and southern countries outside its sphere of direct control. Except for Finland, Yugoslavia, and to a certain extent China, the control of Moscow is complete. Finland is allowed an astonishing amount of freedom as long as it pleases Russia; Yugoslavia, although communist, can no longer be regarded as a part of the Russian bloc; and in China it is still too

early to evaluate Russian influence. Behind the Iron Curtain the satellites are geared to the same economy, the same propaganda, the same military system. The Heartland is like a world island isolated from foreign influences, and run by a few men who at times have expressed the thought that communists and noncommunists can not live in the same world and that one of the two has to disappear. Moreover, in many countries outside the Iron Curtain there are strong political parties or groups willing to accept orders from Moscow, when the time comes.

The Noncommunist World

The noncommunist world is an array of nations of different political systems, indeed not all of them can be called democratic, which have in common a desire to oppose Russia and Russian communism. Many of these nations are weak and have their troubles at home; some of them are so near the danger zone that they are almost afraid to act, or else they still hope that they can remain aloof from the world conflict. The heart and soul of this opposition against the communist world is the United States, which rightly calls itself the "bulwark of democracy." Working in international affairs in close cooperation with the British Commonwealth of Nations and helping most of the noncommunist European nations to recover from the effects of World War II economically and militarily, the United States carries the full burden of world responsibility. In so doing, she seeks not only to benefit the other nations of the free world but also to safeguard its integrity.

Many questions undoubtedly arise daily in the minds of American political leaders. Will Indochina with its newly established Vietnam government under Bao Dai be able to stop communist infiltration? What will happen in Indonesia where some of the leaders have strong "left" feelings? What will happen in Siam and Burma? Will Nehru be able to consolidate India as a democratic state? How will Japan fare when the United States armies are finally withdrawn? Will Korea become communist if United Nations support ceases? What about Persia, weakened and broken by political strife, and how will Afghanistan stand as the keystone of Asia? Will the Arab world be able to cooperate, or will it break into opposing factions and be weakened accordingly? Will

Israel cooperate with the United States? Can Turkey withstand the constant Russian pressure? Which is Tito's stronger motivation—communism or the dislike of Moscovian control? Will the separation between Russian and Allied zones in Austria and Germany continue, and will there be two German states? Can Sweden be persuaded to be more cooperative with the West and less afraid of Russia? Why doesn't Switzerland understand that the concept of neutrality no longer exists? Is the Arctic, the immediate contact between the U.S.S.R. and the Americas, well defended or is it the soft belly of the democratic world's defense structure? These and many other similar questions confront American diplomats and military leaders—questions without immediate answers.

The Immediate Defense

The reasons for the superiority of democracy, as it is practiced in the United States, over communistic totalitarianism have been stated in Chapter 22. There are, however, great differences among the individual countries on the democratic side, and it sometimes is very difficult for Americans to understand that there are different approaches and that state socialism is not the same as communism. Moreover, although the tendency of some nations in the direction of dictatorial power is certainly to be deplored, to put it concisely, "united we stand, divided we fall."

An all-out war in the near future can be avoided, but to achieve this end the democracies of the world must be strong because strength and strength alone seems to be understood by the Russian mind. After a short period of disarmament following World War II, the idea of military strength has been accepted here and abroad. Weapons are being improved; Europe is being rearmed and put in a position to defend itself. Of course, behind the Iron Curtain similar efforts are being made, with the use of atomic power as the open question, but the democracies have the advantages of much greater resources, and a higher technical level of production. The potential battle front is very weak in spots, but in the long run victory will be on the side of the right. As the Germans learned, if the world is challenged it will meet that challenge successfully. In such a conflict, however, the victors as well as the vanquished will suffer greatly. Can another world war be avoided?

LONG RANGE PROGRAM

Most of the people of the world have an insufficient or faulty diet, as was brought out in Chapter 12. Chronic undernourishment is the primary reason why they are an easy prey to disease; in fact many are never physically well, and this limits their working energy. Not only in respect to food, but in housing, education, recreation, and other elements that more favored people have come to take for granted are the majority deficient. The common people in the tropics and subtropics of the Americas, of Africa, and of Asia live under conditions that make life scarcely worthwhile. No improvement in the situation is in sight. As long as these people did not realize their plight, they accepted their meager mode of life as inevitable, and even in their first contacts with men of higher living standards they were filled with awe rather than with envy.

The situation is different today. Even in the remotest jungle, the knowledge has spread that there is no inexorable rule that people must live in perpetual misery and want. The lowliest are awakening and want a place in the sun and a share of the good things in life. If the democratic nations want civilization to continue, they must show these millions that the philosophy of freedom, which includes freedom from want, is also meant for them; that it is not applicable to the favored nations only, but to all.

If this cannot be done, and protestations somehow translated into action, civilization is doomed, even in the relatively near future. This is so because communism feeds on human misery. If that misery is not alleviated, communism will grow, spreading not only its ideology but also its promises for a better life. The spread of communism throughout China should be a warning that there is little time to prevent it from spreading over the rest of Asia, over Africa and Latin America, and finally over Europe and North America, challenging or eliminating Western civilization.

What must be done is not to give temporary aid to those underdeveloped masses, but to make permanent plans for a more productive world. We certainly have not used our planet to its greatest advantage. We are not yet too crowded—experts tell us that many more could be nourished (see Chapter 20), but we must find a way to increase productivity. We must develop a

long range program which will be our invincible defense in the future.

Such a program will necessarily bring together well-trained men in many fields. We will have to know more about climate, especially of local conditions; learn about the soils; take into consideration relief, especially slope and drainage. We will have to find which crops can be grown under existing conditions and, if conditions are bad, what can be done to improve them through fertilizers or through irrigation. Such programs will require chemists, agronomists, engineers, and many others; it will also need geographers who can be the uniting link between these fields and can map the results obtained.

A plan already has been drafted for geographers to make an inventory survey to show what we actually have done with our earth's surface; the results are to be used as a base for further planning. That the plan is practical is evidenced by the work done already in various parts of the globe. It is clear that all these studies cannot be completed overnight, but the job must be tackled before it is too late. Only by knowing the present situation can we work for the future. We *must* work for the future, because our way of life and our civilization is at stake.

THE UNITED NATIONS

Of course, in talking about world cooperation and plans for the future, our thoughts turn to the United Nations with the hope that this organization can become the keystone of world progress. In the structure of the United Nations there already are specialized agencies which can carry on the work envisaged above. For example, there is the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), with headquarters in Paris. Its purpose is to promote collaboration among nations through education, science, and culture in order to further justice, rule of law, human rights, and freedom without distinction of race, sex, language, or religion. There is the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) which has as its purpose the raising of nutrition levels and living standards, to achievement of improvements in the production and distribution of food and in agricultural products, the betterment of conditions of rural dwellers, and by these

means to contribute to an expanding world economy. The framework is there and much has already been done; the weakness lies not in the agencies and commissions, but in the very foundation, the Security Council and the General Assembly on which the total structure must rest.

The United Nations, born in 1945 in San Francisco when the War was almost won and the time was ripe to replace the defunct League of Nations by a new international body, profited by the experiences of the League. It has in its charter a preamble which should be read more often by its members than appears to be the case. This preamble says:

WE THE PEOPLES
OF THE UNITED NATIONS
DETERMINED

to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and

to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and

to promote social progress and better standards of life in large freedom,

AND FOR THESE ENDS

to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and

to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and

to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and

to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

HAVE RESOLVED TO
COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO
ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS.

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their

full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.¹

The meetings of the United Nations have been the scenes of many clashes between communist and noncommunist nations. The veto frequently has been used by the communist members of the Council, and many of the decisions of the Assembly have been made over a minority of communist votes. However, there has been no official break and the Russian bloc has shown no inclination to leave the United Nations permanently. That is a very hopeful sign because if this did happen the hope for "one world" would be gone. In international affairs the United Nations has been rather successful, especially in its function of bringing opposing nations or groups of nations together. Such action was taken in the case of Palestine and of Indonesia; in both instances the United Nations, through its services, prevented a major clash and eventually succeeded in obtaining a peaceful solution. The question of what to do with the Italian colonies was also answered to a large extent.

Still the main issue is the cold war between the western powers and Russia. Only if that problem can be solved will the United Nations be able to work productively without fear of a split. However, as long as the nations are willing to sit together at the same table and discuss the problems of the world, there is hope for the future.

INTO THE FUTURE

It is sometimes provocative to dream a bit and look into the future, although it is generally not done in books of this type. What kind of a world do we want? For what are we striving even if it is for the far distant future?

We naturally want a world at peace, a world based on the preamble of the Charter of the United Nations. We want a world in which only the central authority has the right to use arms, a world without armies except for a central police force.

We want a world in which the various states, while keeping

¹ *The Charter of the United Nations* (New York: the United Nations, 1945).

their cultural and social autonomy, will be members of a close world federation; a world in which boundaries have lost their military and economic significance.


We want a world where production is based on such geographic factors as climate, soil, population structure, transportation, and distance from markets, without the need for government interference or protection.

We want a world in which people can meet one another freely, and where the nations compete only in the fields of social and cultural progress.

Looking at this list it is suddenly evident that the United States comes close to the ideal, except for the fact that in a federated world the various units will differ much more than do the states in the Union. In that world, as in the United States, there will be differences, because certain areas will have a more advantageous environment than others, but those differences will be the result of physical conditions and not of slavery, or oppression.

Such a world seems very far off and we can hardly help being under the impression that we are at present going in the wrong direction. Tariffs, government interference, or complete government control are certainly not indications that we are approaching the goal of the world we have contemplated. But there are also steps forward: inter-American cooperation, and efforts to bring the countries of western Europe closer together are only two of the many examples.

In the process of making a better world, the United States will play a major role. All kinds of factors have given her an outstanding position. Only by understanding the world can she play that role well. She has the sentiment and the energy, but still lacks experience in world affairs. It is the hope of the authors that this book has brought to the attention of all Americans a few of the facts they will have to know, in order that their country may use her leadership for the greatest benefit of all mankind.



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
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